BAtKANIZED 
EUB.OPE 


PAUL  SCOTT  MOVRER 


UBP4PY     \ 


EUR  OPE 

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..    Boundaries  as  they  existed  before  f/ie  H^r. 

m  ■>    I/iternationoi  Territory  and  Territories 

subject  to  Plebiscite. 
...•    Zone  of  the  Straits. 
m.^    Zone  of  Aiiied  Occupation. 


B    [As    S  /  A 


SKief 


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in  2007  with  funding  from 

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http://www.archive.org/details/balkanizedeuropeOOmowriala 


BALKANIZED   EUROPE        , 


BALKANIZED   EUROPE 

A  STUDY  IN 
POLITICAL    ANALYSIS    AND    RECONSTRUCTION 


BY 

PAUL  SCOTT   MOWRER 


NEW  YORK 

E.  P.  DUTTON  ^  COMPANY 

681  FIFTH  AVENUE 


Copyright,  1921, 
BY  E.  P.  BUTTON    &   COMPANY 


All  Rights  Reserved 


VHntAd  in  til*  triilt«a  states  of  AmMdOA 


TO  MY  WIFE 

MY   COMPANION    AND    COLLABORATOR 
IN    ALL    THINGS 

THESE  PAGES  ARE  DEDICATED 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  the  result  of  eleven  consecutive  years  of 
experience  as  a  special  European  correspondent  for  The 
Chicago  Daily  News.  It  probably  contains  errors  both 
of  observation  and  of  opinion:  for  to  see  truly  into  a 
complex  web  of  motives  and  movements  is  a  task,  whose 
difficulty  can  be  suspected  only  by  those  who  have 
seriously  attempted  it;  and  to  endeavor  to  read  a  few 
lines  of  the  future  out  of  the  evanescent  hieroglyphics 
of  the  present  is  perhaps  even  more  temerous.  Time 
alone  can  reveal  to  what  extent  I  have  been  right,  and 
in  what  respects  I  have  been  wrong.  Meanwhile,  if 
the  book,  in  presenting  certain  problems,  and  raising 
certain  questions,  does  thereby  stimulate  broader  think- 
ing with  regard  to  international  affairs,  it  will  have 
served  its  purpose. 

The  specialist  no  doubt  has  his  mind  made  up  re- 
garding the  war,  the  peace  conference,  and  all  their 
multiple  consequences.  It  is  rather  to  the  general 
reader  that  I  would  address  myself;  and  although  I 
have  read  much,  and  absorbed  from  many  sources,  I 
have  therefore  preferred  not  to  encumber  the  text  with 
footnotes  and  bibliographical  references. 

The  book  is  frankly  "journalistic."  In  order  that 
whatever  of  value  it  contains  might  be  placed  at  the 
disposition  of  the  public  without  more  delay,  I  have 
had  to  sacrifice  the  satisfactions  of  slow  composition 
and  of  conscientious  revision,  and  write  over-hastily  in 


viii  PREFACE 

the  leisure  moments  in  busy  days.  Meanwhile,  situa- 
tions are  developing  rapidly,  and  although  I  have 
sought  in  the  main  to  keep  to  essentials,  and  to  the  more 
enduring  aspects,  there  are  almost  certain  to  have 
been  a  number  of  changes  or  evolutions  even  before 
these  lines  are  printed.  For  all  of  this,  I  ask  the 
reader's  indulgence. 

A  considerable  amount  of  my  material  has  already 
appeared  in  the  form  of  articles  in  The  Chicago  Daily 
News  and  other  affiliated  newspapers.  For  permission 
to  use  it  again  here,  I  have  to  thank  the  kindness  of 
that  far-sighted  and  perspicacious  pubHsher  and  editor, 
Mr.  Victor  F.  Lawson,  who  was  one  of  the  first  news- 
paper proprietors  to  foresee  the  importance  which  "for- 
eign news"  was  destined  to  attain  in  the  eyes  of  the 
American  public. 

Paul  Scott  Mowrer. 

Paris,  Nov.  25,  1920. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I.     BALKANIZED   EUROPE 

PACK 

1.  Introductory    3 

2.  The  New  Geography 8 

3.  The  Crossways  of  the  Races 15 

4.  The  Meaning  of  "Balkanization" 23 

5.  The  Disintegration  of  Austria-Hungary 26 

6.  Some  Racial  Distinctions 34 

7.  Hegemony  or  Federation  ? 42 

PART  11.  PROBLEMS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION 

1.  Economics  and  Politics 47 

2.  Morbid  Psychology 53 

3.  Propaganda 60 

4.  The  New  Militarism 69 

5.  Economic   Self-Suffictency 76 

6.  Government  Control 82 

7.  Frontiers 91 

8.  The  Restoration  of  Confidence        98 

PART  III.    PHYSICAL  AND  SOCIAL  HEALTH 

1.  Epidemics 105 

2.  Famine 115 

3.  The  American  Error 122 

4.  Bolshevism 129 

5.  The  Nightmare ,.  137 

6.  The  New  Formula 153 

ix 


X  CONTENTS 

PART  IV.    NATIONAL  PROBLEMS 

FAGS 

1.  Austria  ^     ....     * 171 

2.  Hungary r    i     <     <     .  179 

3.  BULGARU ...«.#..  188 

4.  Czecho-Slovakia 197 

5.  Poland 207 

6.  RouMANiA 217 

7.  Jugo-Slavia 228 

8.  Greecr .  240 

PART  V.    FORCES  OF  COHESION 

1.  The  Nationalism  of  the  Masses 253 

2.  The  Genesis  of  Foreign  Policy 259 

3.  The  League  of  Nations 265 

4.  The  Economic  Solidarity  of  the  World     ......  269 

5.  Political  Realities 274 

6.  The  Restoration  of  Equilibrium 279 

PART  VI.    PRESENT  POLITICAL  TENDENCIES 

1.  The  Recovery  of  Russia 287 

2.  Pan-Slavism 297 

3.  The  Future  of  Germany 302 

4.  Aspects  of  French  Foreign  Policy    .     .     .   ' 310 

5.  Aspects  of  British  Foreign  Policy 317 

6.  Aspects  of  Italian  Foreign  Policy 324 

7.  The  Dissolution  of  the  Entente     ....,,,.  330 

8.  The  New  Balance  of  Power •     •     •  334 

9.  The  Role  of  the  United  States 341 


PART  I 

BALKANIZED   EUROPE 


BALKANIZED  EUROPE 


INTRODUCTORY 

The  thesis  which  I  shall  elaborate  in  the  following 
pages  had  best  be  set  forth  briefly  at  the  outset: 

As  a  result  of  centuries  of  invasions,  conquests,  mi- 
grations, marchings  and  counter-marchings  in  which 
whole  peoples  often  took  part,  eastern  and  southeast- 
ern Europe,  including  all  of  what  used  to  be  Austria- 
Hungary  and  a  fringe  of  what  used  to  be  Russia,  is  an 
inextricable  medley  of  disparate  races  whose  identity 
has  been  fully  preserved  down  through  the  centuries. 
This  entire  region  has  now  been  "Balkanized,"  that  is, 
broken  up  into  a  number  of  nominally  "national" 
states,  which  are  small,  weak,  jealous,  afraid,  eco- 
nomically dependent,  a  prey  to  intrigue,  and  pregnant 
with  trouble  of  many  descriptions,  not  to  say  wars. 
Under  these  circumstances,  which  must  be  accepted  as 
they  are,  only  two  solutions  present  themselves :  hegem- 
ony or  federation.  Three  energetic  states,  Turkey, 
Austria  and  Hungary,  have  tried  hegemony,  and  have 
failed;  for  they  could  neither  gain  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  nor  assimilate  the  various  subject  races  by 
force.  There  remains  to  be  tried  a  series  of  feder- 
ations of  free  nations,  on  an  economic  or  political 
basis,  or  on  both. 

3 


4  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

Meanwhile,  it  is  necessary  to  look  more  carefully 
into  the  nature  of  the  malady  which  is  afflicting 
"Balkanized  Europe."  Diagnosis  must  precede  pre- 
scription. 

This  malady  is  in  part  material — the  result  of  the 
destruction  and  disorganization  of  war — but  it  is,  to 
a  far  greater  extent,  mental.  Each  of  these  small 
states  is  morbidly  self-important,  disillusioned  with  re- 
gard to  the  great  powers,  afraid  of  its  neighbors,  pre- 
occupied with  propaganda  and  the  raising  of  armies, 
shaken  by  social  disturbances.  Each  is  attempting  the 
impossible  task  of  achieving  economic  self-sufficiency, 
by  exercising  stringent  government  control  over  com- 
merce, finance,  transport,  and  even  industrial  and  agri- 
cultural production.  The  result  is  interrupted  com- 
munications, hermetically  sealed  frontiers  and  almost 
complete  isolation.  Private  initiative  is  effectively 
blocked  and  business  of  every  description  languishes, 
or  flows  into  the  unhealthy  channels  of  speculation  and 
corruption.  The  only  cure  for  these  ills  is  to  remove 
the  causes  of  international  fear  and  distrust  by  a  system 
of  alliances,  which,  bringing  about  a  restoration  of  con- 
fidence, will  permit  the  reopening  of  frontiers  and  the 
relaxation  of  control.  Political  solutions  must  precede 
economic  solutions. 

The  peoples  in  question  will  neither  starve  from  lack 
of  food,  nor  perish  by  pestilence.  Moreover,  despite 
the  incessant  alarmist  reports  of  the  last  two  years, 
bolshevism  is  not  going  to  overrun  Europe,  for  it  is  a 
form  of  government  violently  inacceptable  to  most 
European  peoples.  There  is,  however,  a  wave  of  social 
evolution  surging  across  the  continent  which  bids  fair 
to  bring  about  many  Important  changes — constitutional 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

reforms,  land  reform,  industrial  reform.  The  new 
social  formula  for  which  all  earnest  statesmen  are 
seeking  Is  far  more  likely  to  come  out  of  Western 
Europe  than  out  of  the  backward  cultures  of  the  East. 

In  working  to  replace  the  existing  international 
anarchy  by  a  new  political  combination,  not  only  con- 
siderations of  general  politics  and  economics,  but  cer- 
tain specific  considerations,  must  be  borne  in  mind. 
Each  of  the  states  in  question — Hungary,  Austria,  Bul- 
garia, Czecho-Slovakia,  Poland,  Roumania,  Jugo- 
slavia, Greece — has  Its  own  individual  problems  with 
which  it  Is  preeminently  engrossed.  Proposals  of 
understanding  must  harmonize,  so  far  as  may  be  pos- 
sible, with  these  Individual,  as  well  as  with  more  gen- 
eral needs. 

The  worst  enemy  of  success  in  political  undertakings 
is  that  kind  of  idealism  which  refuses  to  study  and 
accept  the  facts  of  the  case,  however  distressing  or  dis- 
concerting they  may  be.  The  foreign  policy  of  any 
given  nation  Is  not  so  much  the  result  of  the  machina- 
tions of  Its  diplomats  and  statesmen  as  of  a  kind  of 
national  necessity  and  popular  instinct,  of  which  the 
statesman  is  merely  the  Interpreter  and  executive. 
Therefore,  though  governments  may  come  and  go,  and 
the  movement  of  foreign  policy  may  be  retarded  or 
accelerated,  the  main  direction  remains  the  same.  The 
recognition  of  this  principle  would  do  much  to  facili- 
tate the  formation  of  sound  political  opinion  in  foreign 
affairs. 

The  League  of  Nations,  though  it  does  Indeed  pro- 
vide the  machinery  for  a  better  understanding,  cannot 
be  expected  to  eradicate  at  one  blow  the  age-long  ills 
from  which  men  suffer;  neither  will  the  increasing  eco- 


6  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

nomic  solidarity  of  the  world  of  itself  lead  inevitably  to 
political  solidarity.  As  the  scientist  has  learned  the 
necessity  of  obeying  nature  in  order  to  conquer  nature, 
so  the  statesman  must  seek  to  found  his  combinations 
not  on  mere  theories,  but  on  the  realities  of  inter- 
national relations — economic  interest,  the  sentiments  of 
nationality  and  race,  the  instincts  of  self-preservation 
and  expansion.  The  principle  of  equilibrium,  which 
indeed  may  be  said  to  underlie  the  whole  created  uni- 
verse, is  already  acting  potently  upon  the  nations  in 
the  sense  of  a  new  balance  of  power,  either  within  or 
without  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  restoration  of  equilibrium — that  Is  to  say,  of 
political  health — in  Europe  is,  however,  being  indefi- 
nitely retarded  by  uncertainty  as  to  the  future  of  Rus- 
sia, and  to  a  less  extent,  as  to  the  future  of  Germany. 
So  long  as  the  definite  political  orientation  of  these 
great  countries  remains  unknown,  whatever  combina- 
tions may  now  be  elaborated  must  remain  undecided 
and  incomplete.  Moreover,  given  the  absolute  di- 
vergence of  interest  expressed  in  the  present  foreign 
policies  of  France,  Britain  and  Italy,  the  dissolution  of 
the  entente,  lately  begun,  is  seen  to  be  inevitable,  thus 
further  increasing  the  general  anarchy.  To  foresee  the 
new  alignment  of  nations  which  will  gradually  grow  out 
of  this  anarchy  Is  exceedingly  difficult.  The  possibili- 
ties are  many,  the  certainties  very  few.  However,  the 
broad  political  tendencies  which  have  already  begun  to 
manifest  themselves — Pan-Slavism,  the  revival  of  Pan- 
Germanism,  the  Danube  Confederation  movement  and 
the  "Petite  Entente" — are  worthy  of  the  closest  ob- 
servation. 

The  United  States,  morally,  politically,  financially 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

and  commercially,  is  already  inextricably  involved  in 
world  affairs.  Our  best  course,  both  from  the  stand- 
point of  practical  expediency,  and  from  that  of  strict 
national  interest,  will  be  to  join  the  League  of  Nations 
with  appropriate  reservations,  and  to  ratify  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles,  thereafter  applying  ourselves  resolutely 
to  the  study  of  international  politics,  in  knowledge  of 
which  we  have  hitherto  been  somewhat  deficient.  The 
peace  of  the  world  in  the  immediate  future  may  be  said 
to  depend  to  a  great  extent  on  Anglo-American  rela- 
tions. The  conception  of  a  definite  policy  with  regard 
to  Britain  is  an  urgent  necessity  for  the  American 
people. 


THE  NEW  GEOGRAPHY 

A  COMPATRIOT  of  mine,  Raymond  Duncan  by  name, 
is  intent  upon  restoring,  in  our  modern  world,  what 
he  imagines  to  have  been  the  beautiful  simplicity  of 
ancient  Greek  life.  He  goes  about  Paris  bare-legged 
and  bare-headed,  in  a  toga  and  sandals,  with  a  fillet 
around  his  long  dark  hair.  The  other  day,  in  the  act 
of  paying  a  cabman,  a  stranger,  seeing  Mr.  Duncan 
striding  across  the  Place  de  I'Opera  in  this  garb,  was 
overcome  by  surprise,  and  from  his  astonished  lips  fell 
the  question: 

"What  on  earth  is  that?" 

"Oh,  that!"  said  the  cabman,  in  a  tone  of  easy 
contempt,  "that's  one  of  those  Cze-cho-Slo-vaks!" 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  in  Western  Europe  and 
America,  ideas  popularly  prevail,  of  the  peoples  of 
Central  and  Southern  Europe,  which  are  scarcely  more 
accurate  than  those  of  the  Paris  cabman.  To  the 
schoolboy,  certainly,  the  collapse  of  Turkey  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary is  a  severe  blow;  instead  of  learning  two 
countries,  he  must  now  learn  ten;  and  no  wonder  that 
elderly  persons,  brought  up  in  the  simplicity  of  the 
older  geography,  should  feel  rather  impatient  at  the 
complexity  of  the  new.  I  am  reminded  of  the  vener- 
able French  astronomer  who,  when  it  was  first  pro- 
posed to  set  forward  the  clock  one  hour  for  the  pur- 
pose of  "saving  daylight,"  protested  that  such  a  deed 

8 


N 


THE  NEW  GEOGRAPHY  9 


would  be  nothing  less  than  "an  insult  to  the  stars." 
But  what  is,  is,  and  what  is  done,  is  done;  both  stars 
and  men,  however  indignant  they  may  be,  can  only 
make  the  best  of  it.  The  useful  student  of  politics 
is  he  who  will  cease  henceforth  to  be  disturbed  by  mere 
railings  about  the  state  of  the  world,  and  will  de- 
vote his  energies  to  the  search  for  policies  of  recon- 
struction. 

I  wish  that  to  those  to  whom  the  opportunities  of 
travel  have  been  denied  I  could  communicate  a  sense 
of  the  vital  reality  of  all  these  teeming  populations, 
their  hates,  their  fears,  their  human  weaknesses,  their 
human  dignity.  There  are  millions  and  millions  and 
millions  of  them,  eating  and  drinking,  buying  and  sell- 
ing, mining,  milling,  turning  the  soil,  cherishing  their 
children,  loving,  aspiring,  making  mistakes.  They 
cannot  be  ignored.  If  one  will  but  take  the  trouble 
to  try  to  comprehend  them,  they  are  all,  somehow,  and 
each  in  a  different  way,  essentially  likeable.  It  is  not 
their  fault  that,  instead  of  being  born  in  America  or 
Japan,  they  have  grown  up  crowded  in  an  inextricable 
tangle  in  the  center  of  the  continent  of  Europe.  They 
have  to  take  their  problems  as  they  find  them,  and 
seek  what  solutions  the  wisdom  they  chance  to  have 
gathered  may  suggest.  We  may  smile  at  their  vanity, 
scold  at  their  politics,  look  askance  at  their  armies,  but 
we  cannot  mistake  their  deep  sincerity  of  purpose.  As 
for  helping  them,  who  would  help  must  first  under- 
stand. 

Perhaps  the  hardest  thing  for  an  American  to  grasp 
is  the  shortness  of  the  distances  between  country  and 
country.  You  leave  Paris  one  night,  to  awaken  next 
morning  in  Switzerland;  and  from  the  Swiss  frontier 


10  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

to  the  beautiful,  unhappy  city  of  Vienna,  though  the 
trains  are  slow,  is  only  another  night's  ride.  A  hun- 
dred and  seventy-five  miles  northeast  of  Vienna  is 
Prague,  the  town  of  medieval  towers,  the  capital  of 
Czecho-Slovakia.  Everything  changes.  The  soft 
South-German  tongue  is  replaced  by  a  sibillant  Slav 
language.  To  hear  a  Bohemian  saying  that  "thirty- 
three  silver  cuckoos  flew  over  thirty-three  silver  roofs" 
is  like  listening  to  a  'leak  in  an  air-brake;  and  a 
Prague  waiter,  adding  up  a  bill,  sounds  like  a  child 
playing  "choo-choo." 

Czecho-Slovakia  is  a  country  of  red-tile  roofs  and 
baroque  church  steeples.  Flotillas  of  fat,  snowy 
geese  go  rocking  over  the  meadows;  a  shepherd  boy, 
bare  to  the  waist,  and  brown  as  a  fawn,  walks  on  his 
hands  among  the  browsing  goats.  The  fields  are  full 
of  stocky,  short-skirted  peasant  women,  bending 
barefoot  over  the  furrows.  A  night's  ride  eastward, 
and  you  come  to  the  contested  district  of  Teschen. 
It  Is  like  an  Industrial  suburb  of  Chicago — grirny, 
dusty,  laborious,  factory  alternating  with  farm  or 
garden,  while  crowded  yellow  street  cars  rattle  over 
the  prairies,  joining  innumerable  scattered  settlements. 
Just  beyond.  Is  the  Polish  frontier,  and  once  more 
everything  changes. 

Poland  Is  one  vast  muddy  plain.  The  fields  are 
lean,  the  towns  are  few,  the  miserable  villages  of 
thatched  huts  straggle  out  along  unkempt  roads.  A 
slender,  melancholy-looking  woman,  barefoot,  wrapped 
full  length  In  a  striped  shawl,  stands  guard  over  a  few 
cattle.  In  a  grove  of  pines,  a  few  old  women  and 
children  are  picking  up  sticks.  In  the  streets  of  War- 
saw a  religious  procession  goes  by,  carrying  colored 


THE  NEW  GEOGRAPHY  11 

banners.  Three  Jews,  with  ruddy  beards,  in  black 
skull-cap  and  long,  black  gaberdine,  stand  at  a  comer, 
gravely  shaking  their  heads  together,  bargaining  over 
a  rabbit  skin.  Dignified  officers  go  and  come,  with 
clinking  swords.  Outside  a  church,  a  poor  woman 
crawls  on  her  face  in  the  gutter,  rapt  In  reli^ous 
ecstasy. 

Or  take  the  train  eastward  from  Vienna.  Thirty 
miles,  and  you  are  in  Hungary.  The  cowboys  drive 
their  herds  of  wild  horses  down  to  the  Danube  to 
drink.  The  language  Is  half  Asiatic.  A  hundred  miles 
— beautiful  Budapest  I  Under  the  locust  trees,  over- 
looking the  Danube,  tall  officers.  In  bright-braided  uni- 
forms, walk  to  and  fro  in  the  Corso,  with  handsome, 
clear-skinned  women.  Across  the  river,  on  the  hill, 
they  are  changing  the  castle  guard.  The  feet  tread 
firmly  in  unison,  the  word  of  command  rings  clear,  the 
flag  flies,  the  band  breaks  forth  in  the  national  hymn. 
Now,  over  the  mingled  spires  and  hill-tops,  the  sun 
is  setting  in  crimson  glory;  the  river,  under  the  stately 
bridges,  reflects  the  glow;  the  sound  of  music  drifts 
across  the  water. 

A  night's  ride  down  the  Danube,  on  the  side-wheel 
steamer,  is  the  Jugo-Slav  frontier.  A  shepherd  sits  by 
the  willows  on  the  low  bank,  playing  his  reedy  pipe. 
Another  night,  and  you  are  in  Belgrade,  a  crowded, 
poorly  tended  village,  overgrown  into  a  national  capi- 
tal. Tall  peasants,  in  brown  homespun,  drive  their 
pigs  down  the  long  main  street,  past  the  modest  yellow 
palace  of  the  king.  A  company  of  ragged  but  superbly 
marching  soldiers  passes  by.  Th6  people  sit  at  the 
cafes,  on  the  shady  side  of  the  street,  drinking  Turkish 
coffee,   and  conversing  Interminably.     Down  by  the 


18  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

railway  station,  in  the  moonlight,  an  orchestra  of  man- 
dolins is  thrumming  monotonous  airs.  A  man,  from 
the  table  where  he  has  been  quietly  sitting,  breaks  sud- 
denly into  a  wild  loud  song,  quavering,  strange,  almost 
sad. 

"On  the  road  from  Nisch  to  Vranja,  how  the  girls 
all  love  me  I  On  the  road  from  Nisch  to  Vranja,  on 
the  road  from  Nisch  to  Vranja  .  .  ." 

Beyond  Serbia  lies  Bulgaria,  a  hundred  and  seventy 
miles  over  the  mountain  passes,  and  through  the  bibli- 
cal valleys.  The  mother,  in  bright-colored  homespun, 
swings  her  baby  in  a  hammock,  under  a  tree,  and  goes 
with  the  other  women  to  reap  in  the  fields.  The  peas- 
ants drive  their  teams  of  black  water-buffaloes  in  to 
market.  Sofia,  under  its  mountain,  is  a  modern,  pleas- 
ant little  town,  with  clean  streets,  and  neat  and  sober 
people.  The  domes  of  the  great  new  Alexander 
Nevsky  church  bulge  against  the  sky.  The  young  Czar 
dashes  past,  driving  his  own  motor  car,  going  for  his 
evening  spin  in  the  country. 

Eastward,  a  hundred  and  seventy  miles  through  the 
northern  foothills  of  the  Balkan  range.  Is  Rouschouk. 
A  steamer  ferries  you  over  the  Danube.  You  are  In 
Roumanla. 

The  peasants,  in  tight,  white-linen  trousers,  and  tall, 
black,  sheepskin  hats,  loll  in  the  railway  station,  or 
walk  with  baskets  of  ripe  fruit  hung  from  their  should- 
ers, on  the  ends  of  a  stick,  like  a  yoke.  The  capital, 
Bucharest,  Is  a  wealthy  city  of  rich  stone  dwellings, 
gilded  palaces,  banks,  hotels,  and  shops  of  personal 
adornment.  A  gypsy  boy  offers  you  fresh-shelled  wal- 
nuts from  a  glass  jar.  Two  young  officers,  with 
powdered  cheeks  and  a  suspicion  of  rouge  on  their  lips, 


THE  NEW  GEOGRAPHY  18 

stroll  arm  in  arm.  It  is  five  o'clock.  The  cafes  are 
crowded.  All  Bucharest  is  in  the  Galea  Victorei,  walk- 
ing, talking,  sipping  ices,  watching  the  fops  and  painted 
beauties  riding  endlessly  up  and  down  in  two-horse, 
open  carriages,  driven  by  stately  cabmen  wearing  their 
traditional  long  gowns  of  blue  or  green  velvet. 

Or  go  from  Sofia  southeastward.  Three  hundred 
miles,  and  Europe  ends  in  the  swarming,  squalid  tene- 
ments and  numberless  white  minarets  of  Constanti- 
nople. Opposite  lies  Asia.  To  the  westward,  not  two 
days'  journey  across  the  -^gean,  Greece  rises,  a  jagged 
miracle  of  baking  rock  and  mountainous,  barren  isles. 
The  Piraeus — a  horde  of  skiffs,  a  thicket  of  tall  masts  I 
Athens — clean,  pretty,  modern!  The  cicadas  trill  in 
the  pepper  trees  above  the  hot  white  pavement.  A  big- 
framed  Evzone  passes,  in  red  cap,  tight,  white  trousers, 
and  plaited  kilts.  There  are  black  pompons  on  his 
sandals.  Away  to  the  right  of  the  ancient  Acropolis, 
the  blazing  sun  goes  down.  Good-looking  young 
Athenians,  with  neatly  pressed  trousers,  emerge  into  the 
streets.  The  flags  of  blue  and  white  stir  faintly  in  the 
evening  breeze  .  .  .  Greece  is  the  southernmost  tip  of 
the  Balkan  peninsula. 

These  things  are  all  external,  it  is  true.  But  within 
these  same  brief  distances  the  mental  transformations 
are  no  less  striking  than  the  material.  And  having  lis- 
tened with  equal  sympathy,  I  hope,  and  an  equal  desire 
of  understanding,  to  the  eagerly  proffered  or  reluctantly 
admitted  views  of  many  parties  and  many  peoples  in 
these  old  lands,  I  find  myself  returning  again  and  again 
to  the  words  of  my  Hungarian  friend. 

Seated  in  the  restaurant  of  a  Budapest  hotel,  which, 
only  a  year  ago,  had  been  the  headquarters  of  a  com- 


14  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

munist  revolution,  we  had  been  talking  for  three  hours, 
I  to  open  a  way  into  his  mind,  he  to  expound  to  me  his 
country's  virtues  and  convince  me  of  its  wrongs.  As 
he  warmed  to  his  subject,  his  strong  young  features 
grew  tense,  his  eyes  blazed,  and  then,  at  last,  he  sank 
back  in  his  chair,  he  bowed  his  head,  his  voice  fell. 

"Unhappy  the  man,"  he  said,  "who  is  born  into  the 
midst  of  this  whirlpool  of  conflicting  races.  If  it  isn't 
war,  it  is  revolution.  If  it  isn't  revolution,  it  is  war. 
And  yet,  I  could  never  go  away.  Any  other  life  would 
seem  dull  to  me  now.  And  who  knows?  Perhaps  out 
of  this  very  clash  and  turmoil  of  peoples,  some  of  the 
finest  achievements  of  man  are  destined  to  come — in 
the  future  again,  as  they  have  in  the  past." 


THE  CROSSWAYS  OF  THE  RACES 

The  peace  treaties  have  added  a  new  word  to  the 
vocabulary  of  the  nations.  A  large  part  of  Europe,  we 
apprehend,  has  been  *'Balkanized."  It  may  be  well  to 
inquire  what  this  word  means. 

In  southeastern  Europe,  between  the  Black  Sea  and 
the  Adriatic,  lies  a  mountainous  peninsula  which  has 
perhaps  borne  more  than  its  share  of  the  turmoil,  gran- 
deur and  hardship  of  human  affairs.  It  is,  in  fact,  a 
great  crossway  of  the  movement  of  peoples.  Here, 
separated  by  the  narrow  waters  of  the  Bosphorus  and 
the  Dardanelles,  Asia  meets  Europe,  bare  hilly  shore 
to  hilly  shore,  eternally  opposed.  Here,  too,  lies  the 
first  stopping-place  of  the  great  migrations  which,  mov- 
ing steadily  westward,  century  after  century,  along  the 
northern  coast  of  the  Black  Sea,  now  swung  and  crossed 
the  Danube  to  the  south,  now  pressed  on  through  the 
Transylvanian  valleys  into  the  rich  plains  of  Hungary, 
conquering,  devastating,  settling,  only  to  be  attacked 
and  overcome  in  turn,  a  few  generations  later,  by  some 
new  wave  of  restless  warriors. 

The  streams  of  modern  civilization  have  their  origin 
in  three  deep  springs :  Greece,  Rome,  Byzance.  Two 
of  these,  Greece  and  Byzance,  were  situated  in  this 
same  mountainous  peninsula  of  which  men  now  speak, 
half-contemptuously,  as  "the  Balkans." 

Hither,  by  the  Black  Sea  route,  in  the  early  morning 

15 


16  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

of  recorded  time,  came  the  Hellenic  tribes,  who,  inter- 
mingling with  the  original  inhabitants,  the  Pelasgians, 
probably  Semitic,  developed,  under  the  quickening  in- 
fluences of  their  trade  by  sea,  with  the  older  culture  of 
Egypt  and  Asia  Minor,  that  serene  civilization  which 
we  know  as  Ancient  Greece.  In  vain  the  Persians  drove 
their  crowded  galleys  to  the  conquest  of  Athens.  At 
Marathon  and  Salamis  the  first  truly  European  culture 
was  saved  from  Asiatic  absorption.  Indeed,  it  was 
the  Greeks  themselves,  in  the  armies  of  Alexander,  who 
first  carried  Europe  into  Asia — an  exploit  which  the 
Greeks  of  to-day,  in  the  armies  of  Venizelos,  are  merely 
repeating. 

Greece  succumbed  to  Rome,  and  though  the  victors 
were  soon  after  more  than  half  conquered  by  the  arts 
and  schools  of  the  vanquished,  the  European  center 
of  gravity  shifted  for  a  time  across  the  Adriatic  to  a 
more  westernly  peninsula.  But  for  a  time  only  I  With 
the  decline  of  Rome,  there  arose  the  dazzling  power  of 
Byzance,  half  Greek,  half  Oriental.  Once  more  the 
brightest  spot  in  a  darkening  continent  was  in  the  Bal- 
kans. Trade,  philosophy,  society,  art — all  centered  in 
the  brilliant  Constantinople  of  that  day.  For  half  a 
score  of  centuries,  there  lingered  here  many  of  the 
forms  and  a  little  of  the  spirit  of  the  ancient  European 
world.  The  cunning  diplomats  and  cruel  mercenaries 
of  Byzance  maintained  the  empire  stubbornly  against 
the  ominous  encroachments  of  the  barbarians.  It  was 
the  brothers  Cyril  and  Method,  monks  of  the  Greek 
church,  who  carried  Christianity  and  a  written  language 
to  the  invading  Slavs — an  alphabet,  that  which  we  know 
to-day  as  Cyrillic,  or  Russian;  and  a  creed,  that  of 


THE  CROSSWAYS  OF  THE  RACES  17 

Greek  orthodoxy,  whose  patriarch  still  dwells  in 
Constantinople. 

But  little  by  little  the  darkness  was  falling.  Driven 
on  perhaps  by  dearth  and  famine,  perhaps  by  more 
mysterious  impulses — vague  dreams  of  loot  and  con- 
quest— the  half-wild  peoples  of  the  East  were  moving, 
one  pushing  another.  In  a  century  and  a  half  of  wars, 
Rome  had  overcome  the  Thracians  and  the  Illyrians, 
and  occupied  the  Balkan  peninsula  as  far  as  the  Danube. 
Trajan,  crossing  the  Danube,  had  made  of  Dacia — ^the 
modern  Roumania — a  Roman  province.  Adding  to  the 
already  formidable  confusion  of  races,  a  number  of 
Gauls  had  settled  in  Thrace,  for  it  is  recorded  that  in 
278  A.  D.  they  arose  and  attacked  Constantinople. 
The  first  of  the  invincible  migrations,  however,  was 
that  of  the  Goths,  who  appeared  on  the  Dacian  confines 
in  247.  Less  than  thirty  years  later  the  Romans  re- 
crossed  the  Danube,  abandoning  Dacia  to  the  fierce 
newcomers  who,  already  in  269,  had  daringly  raided 
southward  to  the  very  gates  of  Byzantium.  A  century 
passed.  The  shrill-crying  Huns  appeared,  eating  wild 
grass  and  raw  flesh,  and  ravaging  like  a  fire.  The 
greater  part  of  the  peninsula  fell,  under  these  successive 
onslaughts,  until,  with  the  death  of  Attila,  in  453,  they 
disappeared  from  the  Danube  as  suddenly  as  they  had 
come,  giving  place  to  a  little-known  Gothic  tribe,  the 
Gepidae. 

Csesar,  in  the  first  book  of  his  "Commentaries," 
writes  a  detailed  account  of  one  of  these  strange  racial 
dislocations — an  attempted  migration  which  failed. 
The  Gauls  of  Switzerland,  imagining  that  their  own 
country  had  become  too  small  for  them,  determined  to 


18  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

cross  westward,  through  Burgundian  Gaul,  into  the 
seaside  province  of  Saintonge,  and  possess  it  for  them- 
selves. Their  preparations  lasted  two  years.  They 
sowed  large  crops,  they  gathered  carts,  war-chariots, 
pack-animals.  There  was  violent  intrigue  for  leader- 
ship within  the  tribe,  and  intrigue  as  well  with  neighbor- 
ing tribes — on  the  one  hand,  to  secure  as  many  friendly 
alliances  as  possible,  and  on  the  other,  to  divide  into 
factions,  by  exciting  the  conflicting  ambitions  of  minor 
chieftains,  the  peoples  whose  territories  they  intended 
to  invade.  Finally,  taking  each  three  months'  pro- 
visions, they  burned  their  entire  settlement — ^twelve 
towns  and  four  hundred  villages,  with  all  that  they 
could  not  carry  of  their  goods  and  stores  of  grain,  and 
having  thought  thus  to  increase  their  valor  by  destroy- 
ing all  hope  of  return,  forded  the  Rhone,  men,  women 
and  children,  368,000  primitive  souls,  of  whom  92,000 
bore  arms.  After  several  months  of  ruse  and  ravage, 
advance  and  retreat,  parley  and  battle,  ending  in  de- 
feat and  disaster  at  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  there  re- 
mained less  than  a  third  of  the  original  number.  The 
broken  horde  was  ordered  by  Cassar  to  go  back  into 
Switzerland  and  rebuild  its  dwellings,  lest  the  Germans, 
in  turn  pressing  westward,  should  themselves  cross  the 
Rhine  and  occupy  the  fair  Alpine  valleys. 

Such  tragic  reverses,  which  doubtless  were  no  less 
frequent  on  the  Danube  than  on  the  Rhone  and  the 
Rhine,  may  be  regarded  as  mere  incidents  in  the  in- 
vincible racial  gravitation  toward  the  sunset. 

In  the  Balkans,  another  hundred  years  went  by. 
From  their  northern  home  on  the  Baltic,  the  Lombards 
came  pouring  down,  and  from  Central  Asia,  simultane- 
ously, came  the  Avars.    A  few  score  years  of  war  and 


THE  CROSSWAYS  OF  THE  RACES  19 

devastation,  and  Lombards  and  Avars,  in  turn,  van- 
ished to  the  westward.  As  early  as  the  third  century, 
groups  of  a  remarkable  tribe,  known  as  Slavs,  had  be- 
gun to  settle  south  of  the  Danube,  but  it  was  not  until 
the  sixth  that  this  people  descended  in  numbers  suf- 
ficient to  occupy  nearly  the  entire  southern  and  western 
part  of  the  peninsula,  driving  out  or  assimilating  all 
previous  races.  And  still,  at  majestic  intervals,  the 
waves  of  wild  humanity  surged  on.  In  750  came  the 
Bulgars,  a  narrow-eyed,  high-cheek-boned  Touranian 
tribe.  These  horsemen  conquered  the  foot-fighting 
Slavs,  settled,  and  were  absorbed  by  the  more  vigorous 
culture  of  their  victims.  By  893,  Bulgar  still  in  name, 
but  Slav  in  language,  they  had  founded  an  empire,  and 
were  waging  a  successful  war  with  Byzance.  The  lat- 
ter's  diplomacy  succeeded  in  winning  to  Its  cause  a  new 
Touranian  tribe,  the  Magyars,  who  had  lately  appeared 
about  the  mouth  of  the  Danube.  The  Magyars  In- 
vaded Bulgaria  and  were  defeated;  their  camps  were 
burned,  their  women  slain,  and  retiring  northward,  they 
settled  in  the  plains  of  the  middle  Danube,  whither  they 
were  followed,  In  the  course  of  the  next  century  or 
two,  by  the  kindred  tribes  of  the  Petchenegs  and  the 
Kumanl.  With  the  Tartar  incursion  of  1240,  the  age- 
long cavalcade  out  of  Central  Asia  seems  to  have 
thinned  away.  But  In  Asia-Minor,  a  new  menace  to 
Europe  was  gathering  strength. 

In  1 07 1,  Jerusalem  had  surrendered  to  the  Seljuk 
Turks,  whose  fanatical  sway  had  been  at  once  extended 
to  the  Sea  of  Marmora.  The  Eastern  church  appealed 
for  aid  to  the  Western,  and  the  Balkans  were  the  path- 
way of  a  fresh  Invasion — that  of  the  Crusaders.  Two 
divisions  of  Crusaders,  led  by  Peter  the  Hermit,  per- 


20  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

ished  under  the  sword  on  the  sands  of  Asia  Minor,  but 
the  following  year,  1097,  an  army  of  150,000  Chris- 
tians— Normans  and  Provengals — carried  the  cross  to 
victory.  From  iioo  on,  for  nearly  a  century,  Jeru- 
salem was  in  the  hands  of  the  Franks,  and  for  still 
another  hundred  and  fifty  years  the  bitter  struggle  of 
Moslem  and  Christian  continued.  But  early  in  the 
XIII  Century,  a  second  Turkish  horde,  the  Ottomans, 
driven  from  Central  Asia  by  a  turmoil  of  Mongols, 
poured  down  through  Persia  and  Armenia  into  Asia 
Minor,  where  they  soon  became  a  dreaded  miUtary 
power.  By  1350,  they  had  checked  the  last  crusade; 
by  1365,  they  had  crossed  into  the  Balkans  and  taken 
Adrianople  and  Philippopolis.  The  whole  of  the  penin- 
sula fell  gradually  to  them.  Hungary  itself  was  in 
panic,  until  John  Hunyadi  and  Wladislas  of  Poland, 
combining,  achieved  a  defensive  victory,  and  obtained 
the  truce  of  Szegedin,  in  1444.  But  over  the  Balkans 
the  darkness  had  settled  at  last.  Constantinople  was 
besieged  and  taken  in  1453.  It  was  the  end,  for  the 
time  being,  of  what  Is  probably  the  most  extraordinary 
going  and  coming  of  peoples  in  history. 

With  the  gradual  lifting  of  the  veil,  in  the  latter  half 
of  the  last  century,  after  five  hundred  years  of  Turkish 
rule,  there  was  seen  to  remain,  of  all  this  surging  of 
restless  hordes,  this  marching  and  countermarching  of 
armies,  the  following  dazed,  half-conscious  peoples :  the 
Greeks,  descended  far,  but  speaking  still  the  language 
of  their  fathers;  the  Turks,  soldiers,  overlords,  tillers 
of  the  soil;  the  Bulgars,  humble  peasants;  the  Serbs, 
unmixed  descendants  of  the  Slavs ;  the  Montenegrins,  a 
branch  of  the  Serbs;  the  Albanians,  a  hardy  remnant  of 
the  ancient  lUyrians;  and  the  Roumaniafts,  speaking  a 


THE  CROSSWAYS  OF  THE  RACES  21 

bastard  Latin  mixed  with  Slav,  descendants,  as  they 
proudly  claim,  of  the  Dacians,  and  of  Trajan's  colonist 
legionaries.  Under  the  long  Turkish  regime,  a  part 
of  the  Albanians,  and  a  good  number  of  Bulgarians, 
known  thenceforth  as  Pomaks,  were  converted  to  Islam 
and  partially  assimilated;  the  rest  had  remained  dis- 
tinct, not  only  from  the  Turks,  but  from  one  another. 
The  Turks,  as  the  dominant  people,  were  scattered 
more  or  less  everywhere,  but  they  dwelt,  like  the  various 
Christian  races,  in  their  own  separate  villages,  or  their 
own  quarters  of  the  towns.  The  Christian  races, 
though  homogeneously  massed  at  the  centers  of  their 
respective  countries,  overlapped  bewilderingly  at  the 
peripheries.  Thus  the  trading,  seafaring  Greeks  had 
spread  all  around  the  southern  coast  of  the  peninsula 
and  into  the  towns  and  principal  seaports,  far  up  the 
Adriatic  and  along  the  Black  Sea.  The  Albanians  were 
to  be  found,  not  only  in  Albania,  but  in  southern  Mon- 
tenegro, western  Macedonia,  northern  Greece,  and  even 
in  parts  of  the  Peloponnesus.  The  Bulgars  were  scat- 
tered down  through  Thrace,  and  were  the  principal  in- 
habitants of  Macedonia,  into  which  the  Serbs  had  also 
penetrated  from  the  north,  and  the  Greeks  from  the 
south.  The  Roumanians  were  increasingly  numerous 
in  Transylvania,  Bessarabia  and  Southern  Hungary, 
and  had  thrust  a  wedge  over  the  Danube  into  north- 
eastern Serbia;  moreover,  throughout  the  Balkans,  in 
Greece,  Serbia,  Macedonia,  Bulgaria,  Albania,  was  to 
be  found  a  race  of  wandering  shepherds,  calling  them- 
selves Roumanians,  speaking  the  Roumanian  tongue, 
who  have  emigrated  from  Roumania  proper,  or  who 
may  have  been  the  direct  descendants  of  ancient  Roman 
colonists.     Of  the  Spanish  Jews,  driven  out  of  Spain 


22  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

and  Portugal  in  the  XVI  Century  by  the  Holy  In- 
quisition, who  found  shelter  in  Saloniki,  Constantinople, 
and  to  a  less  extent  in  other  Balkan  cities;  and  of  the 
numerous  bands  of  Balkan  gypsies,  a  mysterious  Asiatic 
people  of  obscure  origin,  I  merely  make  mention,  for 
though  these  are  indeed  distinct  races,  they  have  as  yet 
put  forward  no  claims  to  separate  nationality. 


((t>     .    T    T^    A   -..TT^  «  r»^Trt-KT'» 


THE  MEANING  OF  'BALKANIZATION 

If  I  have  dwelt  at  considerable  length  on  the  causes 
and  the  character  of  the  inextricable  medley  of  races 
which  we  now  properly  think  of  as  the  most  salient 
trait  of  the  Balkan  peninsula,  it  is  because,  when  all  is 
said  and  done,  this  racial  medley  will  be  found  to  be 
at  the  bottom  of  most  of  the  mischief.  But  the  word 
"Balkan"  has  come  also  to  have  certain  secondary  sig- 
nifications which  are  not  without  interest. 

The  Christian  states  of  the  Balkans  were  no  sooner 
liberated  from  the  Turks  than  they  began  fighting 
among  themselves.  Clean-cut  ethnical  and  natural 
boundaries  being  impossible,  each  felt  that  his  neighbor 
was  encroaching.  The  peoples  were  uneducated  and 
primitive,  that  is  to  say,  easily  aroused  and  easily  led. 
They  were  consciously  weak,  that  is  to  say,  jealous, 
covetous,  intriguing,  afraid.  Their  economic  fraility, 
the  ruinous  condition  o-f  their  finances — always  hope- 
lessly in  debt — combined  with  their  feuds  to  make  them 
an  easy  prey  to  the  machinations  of  the  great  powers. 
The  Balkans  became  a  sort  of  chess-board  on  which  the 
diplomats  of  the  Triple  Entente  and  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance maneuvered  for  advantage.  Finding  a  professed 
disposition  on  the  part  of  Western  Europe  to  correct 
political  frontiers  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  na- 
tionality, Bulgars,  Greeks  and  Serbs  soon  turned  mixed 
regions  like  that  of  Macedonia  into  hotbeds  of  guerilla 

33 


24  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

warfare,  tiow  against  the  Turks,  now  against  one  an- 
other, each  party  seeking  the  eviction  or  forcible  con- 
version of  its  rivals.  Priest  and  peasant,  bandit  and 
functionary,  all  joined  in  this  futile  conflict  of  primitive 
cultures.  The  wars  of  blood  were  supplemented  by 
wars  of  propaganda.  One  set  of  doctored  statistics 
was  hurled  furiously  against  another,  and  "atrocity  re- 
port" met  "atrocity  report"  in  horrible  confrontation. 
The  so-called  Balkan  wars  are  a  typical  instance  of 
modern  Balkan  history.  In  19 12,  Turkey  being  at  war 
with  Italy  and  Tripoli,  four  Christian  states,  Bulgaria, 
Serbia,  Montenegro  and  Greece,  secretly  banded  to- 
gether to  oust  the  Turks  from  Macedonia,  Albania  and 
Thrace.  They  were  successful  beyond  their  expecta- 
tions, and  the  Bulgars  would  no  doubt  have  captured 
Constantinople  itself,  had  not  Russia  called  a  halt.  By 
a  preliminary  treaty,  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  had  arranged 
that  the  former  should  have  Macedonia  and  Thrace, 
and  the  latter  Albania,  procuring  thus  an  outlet  on  the 
Adriatic.  But  Austria,  not  wishing  the  Serbs  to  reach 
the  sea,  intervened.  The  Triple  Alliance  insisted  upon 
an  independent  Albania.  Serbia,  by  way  of  compensa- 
tion, demanded  a  part  of  Macedonia,  which  Bulgaria 
was  not  disposed  to  surrender.  Greece,  whose  share  in 
the  spoils  had  not  yet  been  defined,  hastily  negotiated 
a  secret  treaty  with  Serbia  directed  against  Bulgaria. 
The  latter,  foreseeing  the  inevitable,  put  itself  in  the 
wrong  by  suddenly  attacking  the  Greeks  and  Serbs. 
The  war  was  still  in  progress,  and  was  going  badly  for 
Bulgaria,  when  Roumania  mobilized  and  invaded  Bul- 
garia over  the  unprotected  northern  frontier.  Greece 
and  Serbia  divided  Macedonia  between  them.  Rou- 
mania, in  the  name  of  "compensation,"  took  a  piece  of 


THE  MEANING  OF  "BALKANIZATION"      25 

the  Bulgarian  Doubroudja.  The  defeated  Turks  tran- 
quilly reoccupied  Adrianople  and  Eastern  Thrace,  and 
there  was  none  to  say  them  nay.  One  treacherous  in- 
trigue followed  another,  with  always  just  enough  in- 
decisive interference  on  the  part  of  the  powers  to  in- 
crease the  complication.  At  the  present  time,  political 
conditions  have  vastly  changed,  but  not  the  mentality 
of  the  Balkan  peoples. 

And  this,  then,  we  find  to  be  the  meaning  of  the 
word  "Balkanization" :  the  creation,  in  a  region  of 
hopelessly  mixed  races,  of  a  medley  of  small  states  with 
more  or  less  backward  populations,  economically  and 
financially  weak,  covetous,  intriguing,  afraid,  a  con- 
tinual prey  to  the  machinations  of  the  great  powers, 
and  to  the  violent  promptings  of  their  own  passions. 


THE  DISINTEGRATION  OF  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

Of  all  the  countries  which  bore  great  weight  In  the 
ante-bellum  balance  of  power,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy,  it  may  safely  be  said,  was  the  least  well 
known.  To  most  people,  outside  this  conglomerate 
realm,  not  only  its  institutions,  but  its  very  composition, 
were  obscure.  Like  Turkey,  it  was  a  veil ;  and  its  fall- 
ing away,  in  the  Treaties  of  Paris,  has  revealed,  some- 
what to  the  astonishment  even  of  those  who  made  the 
treaties,  that  the  typical  "Balkan"  condition  no  longer 
ends  on  the  banks  of  the  lower  Danube :  It  extends  right 
up  through  the  center  of  Europe.  By  Russia's  collapse. 
It  is  prolonged  through  Poland,  and  in  Lithuania,  Lat- 
via and  Esthonia,  far  up  the  coast  of  the  Baltic. 

The  Central  European  culture,  which  attained  to 
such  notable  heights  in  Vienna  and  Budapest,  appears. 
In  other  parts  of  the  Hapsburg  realm,  to  have  been  an 
exceedingly  thin  veneer,  overlaid  on  people,  still  im- 
mature. Even  in  those  two  capitals,  the  repeated 
shocks  of  defeat  and  misery  have  caused  the  level  of 
culture  temporarily  to  decline.  The  succession  states  of 
Austria-Hungary,  like  the  Balkan  states,  are  small  and 
ill  at  ease,  at  once  covetous  and  fearful,  passionate 
and  intriguing.  Their  political  weakness  excites  the 
diplomatic  initiative,  as  their  economic  and  financial 
weakness  attracts  the  competitive  investments,  of  the 

great  powers.     Already  the  eager  fingers  of  France, 

26 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  27 

Britain  and  Italy  vie  with  the  sly,  shadowy  hands  of 
Germany  and  Russia  in  the  attempt  to  maneuver  the 
pieces  on  this  new  and  fascinating  chessboard.  No 
element  of  the  definition  is  lacking.  Here,  too,  was  a 
crossroads  of  peoples;  in  successive  migrations,  numer- 
ous races  clashed  and  swirled;  here,  too,  strong  off- 
shoots of  these  races  have  existed,  cohesive  and  mu- 
tually unassimilated,  right  through  the  centuries: 
Slovaks  and  Slovenes;  Serbs  and  Croats;  Czechs  and 
Poles;  Ruthenians;  Italians;  Bosnian  Moslems;  Ger- 
mans; Roumanians;  Tyrolese;  Bulgars;  Gypsies  and 
Jews.  Here,  again,  as  in  the  Balkans,  the  racial  groups, 
though  homogeneous  at  the  center,  seem  intermixed 
irrevocably  where  race  meets  race,  and  to  complete 
the  despair  of  the  partisans  of  ethnological  boundaries, 
while  some  peoples,  like  the  Gypsies  and  the  Jews,  are 
scattered  more  or  less  everywhere,  others,  like  the 
Magyars  of  Eastern  Transylvania,  or  the  Bulgars  and 
Germans  of  the  Banat,  live  on  as  isolated  groups, 
though  far  removed  from  the  bulk  of  the  parent  stock. 
Geographically,  as  well  as  politically,  Austria  was 
frankly  a  patchwork.  Even  Hungary,  which,  with 
Croatia  omitted,  was  considered  as  perhaps  the  type  of 
geographical  unity,  had  around  its  Magyar  nucleus  a 
broad  rim  of  other  and  mutually  uncongenial  peoples. 
Count  Paul  Teleki,  the  Hungarian  geographer,  has  re- 
cently published  an  ethnological  map,  in  colors,  of  for- 
mer Hungary.  It  looks  like  a  new-art  sofa-pillow. 
Roughly,  the  center  is  more  or  less  solidly  colored  red, 
to  represent  Magyars;  the  north  is  green,  of  two 
shades,  to  show  Slovaks  and  Ruthenians;  the  eastern- 
most third  is  splotched  with  the  purple  of  the  Rou- 
manians; and  the  narrow  western  border  is  yellow. 


28  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

meant  for  Germans.  But  the  mass  of  red  is  daubed 
with  spots  of  yellow  and  green;  the  green  is  dotted  red, 
and  the  purple  is  also  streaked  and  scrawled  with  red 
and  yellow.  As  for  the  south,  the  rich  black-earth 
plains  of  the  famous  Banat  region,  after  having  been 
depopulated  in  the  Turkish  wars,  it  was  re-settled  not 
only  from  the  nearby  groups  of  Roumanians,  Serbs  and 
Magyars,  but  by  Germans  from  far  to  the  north,  and 
by  bands  of  Bulgars  and  Slovaks.  And  this  part  of 
Count  Teleki's  map  looks  like  a  kaleidoscope.  The 
patient  historian  can  explain  the  presence  of  each  of 
these  bits  of  color;  but  the  task  of  the  boundary  ex- 
pert, charged  with  contriving  amongst  them  a  reason- 
able racial  frontier,  is  of  entirely  different,  not  to  say 
an  impossible,  nature. 

Moreover,  not  all  these  shiftings  of  population  are 
historic.  What  with  human  restlessness  and  human  am- 
bition, changes  were  constantly  taking  place  right  up  to 
the  time  of  the  war.  The  gypsies  were  ceasing  to  wan- 
der, and  were  slowly  being  assimilated.  The  small 
German  immigration,  which  started  into  Hungary  over 
ten  centuries  ago,  was  falling  off.  The  presence  of 
Jews  in  Hungary  is  quite  modern;  they  were  steadily 
trickling  in  from  Galicia.  The  Magyars,  who,  at  the 
end  of  the  Seventeenth  Century,  are  said  to  have 
formed  only  a  fourth  of  a  total  population  of  ten  mil- 
lion, were  making  a  tremendous  effort  at  "Magyariza- 
tion"  and  in  1910  numbered  over  one-half  of  a  popula- 
tion of  more  than  twenty  million.  Attempted  assimila- 
tion of  the  Slovaks  by  the  Magyars  was  just  beginning 
to  give  results.  In  Transylvania,  the  number  of  Rou- 
manians was  growing,  as  was  the  number  of  Magyars 
speaking  Roumanian — a  phenomenon  which  the  indig- 


AUSTRIA -HUNGARY  29 

nant  Magyars  explain  by  saying  that  the  Roumanians, 
being  "too  stupid"  to  learn  Magyar,  the  Magyars  were 
obliged  to  learn  Roumanian.  Parallel  to  the  "Magyar- 
ization"  effort  in  Hungary  was  a  "Germanization"  pro- 
gram in  Austria.  The  resistance  of  the  Czechs  in 
Bohemia  to  the  attempt  to  turn  them  into  Germans  had 
developed  into  a  cultural  combat  of  such  bitterness  that 
it  may  almost  be  said  each  faction  counted  each  baby 
born  in  its  ranks  as  a  racial  victory.  A  smaller  cultural 
struggle,  but  of  a  similar  kind,  was  in  progress  between 
Italians  and  Slovenes,  around  Fiume  and  Trieste. 

In  case  no  war  had  broken  out,  it  is  difficult  to  esti- 
mate what  would  have  been  the  results  of  the  deter- 
mination of  Magyars  and  Germans  to  dominate  and 
absorb  the  other  peoples  of  the  dual  monarchy.  All 
these  peoples  were  showing  remarkable  vitality.  Even 
the  Italians  and  Roumanians  seem  to  have  been  making 
some  numerical  progress.  But  it  was  the  various  Slav 
elements  who  formed  the  real  danger.  Taken  to- 
gether, they  formed  nearly  half  of  the  total  popula- 
tion, and  they  exceeded  the  combined  total  of  Ger- 
mans and  Magyars.  The  principle,  "divide  and  rule," 
was  that  applied,  therefore,  by  the  government.  The 
Czechs  belonged  to  Austria,  the  Slovaks  to  Hungary; 
the  Poles  and  Slovenes  belonged  to  Austria;  the  Ru- 
thenians,  Serbs,  and  Croats  were  divided  between  the 
two  kingdoms;  and  the  Slavs  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina were  placed  under  still  a  third,  intermediate, 
regime  of  "crown"  administration.  Economic  and  re- 
ligious differences  were  cleverly  exploited.  The  town- 
dwelling  Galician  Poles,were  sent  against  the  Galician 
Ruthenian  peasants,  and  the  Roman  Catholic  Slovenes 
against  the  Greek  Orthodox  Croats.     In  Austria,  the 


80  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

Poles  were  politically  privileged  at  the  expense  of  the 
other  Slavs,  and  to  the  utter  disgust  of  the  Czechs.  In 
short,  no  means  of  preventing  the  Slavs  from  uniting 
In  a  common  cause  was  overlooked. 

The  economic  advantages  of  this  combination  of 
disparate  races  in  a  single  realm  were  obvious,  and  as 
the  government  had  the  upper  hand,  it  could,  I  believe, 
have  kept  the  monarchy  together,  had  there  been  no 
war,  by  a  deft  display  of  conciliation  and  firmness,  per- 
haps even  ending  in  a  large  measure  of  assimilation. 

But  with  the  war,  the  destruction  or  the  complete 
transformation  of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  became  in- 
evitable. If  the  Central  Powers  had  won,  Serbia,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  and  Russian  Poland,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  would  have  been  annexed,  thereby  enormously  in- 
creasing the  number  of  Slavs,  and  giving  them  not  only 
a  relative  but  an  absolute  majority;  a  fundamental 
transformation  could  not,  I  think,  have  been  avoided. 
But  as  it  was  the  allies  who  won,  the  other  alternative — 
destruction — was  that  which  came  into  play. 

It  is  the  fashion,  just  now,  in  all  countries  and  all 
societies,  to  criticize  the  decisions  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference as  regards  Central  Europe.  The  topic  is  like 
the  weather — something  regarding  which  every  one 
can  agree,  provided  the  discussion  is  not  carried  too 
far.  The  contradictions  and  absurdities  in  certain  at- 
tempted applications  of  economic  or  political  principles 
arc  obvious  to  any  one.  But  when  the  question  of  how 
these  could  have  been  avoided  comes  to  be  considered, 
probably  no  two  persons  will  be  found  in  accord.  Neg- 
ative criticism  is  easy;  constructive  criticism,  almost  im- 
possible. The  forces  of  national  feeling  and  racial  as- 
piration released  by  the  allies'  military  victory,  were 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  SI 

too  powerful,  too  deeply  instinctive,  to  be  controlled; 
and  though  it  is  legally  right  that  the  Three  Old  Men 
of  Paris  should  accept  the  responsibility  for  the  texts 
to  which  they  put  their  names,  I  suspect  that  not  they, 
but  incorrigible  circumstances,  were  the  real  authors 
of  these  treaties.  In  saying  sternly  to  the  defeated 
nations:  "Sign  here,"  the  Three  were  only  repeating 
the  imperative  admonition  which  Fate  had  already 
spoken  in  their  own  ears. 

The  sentiment  of  race  was  everywhere  strengthened 
by  the  war.  In  Austria-Hungary,  it  had  already  been 
aroused  by  the  "Magyarization"  and  "Germanization" 
tentatives  of  the  government.  And  just  as  the  Central 
Powers,  in  their  effort  to  weaken  Russia,  had  sought 
to  quicken  racial  feeling  in  the  Ukraine,  the  Caucasus 
and  the  Baltic  States,  so  the  allies,  particularly  the 
United  States,  which  had  a  formidable  tool  to  its  hand 
in  the  various  national  organizations  formed  by  immi- 
grants, were  quick  to  seize  the  opportunity  to  provoke 
and  stimulate  race  consciousness  in  the  Dual  Monarchy. 
Long  before  the  armistice,  engagements  had  been  taken 
which,  in  case  of  victory,  left  no  choice  save  the  break- 
up of  Austria-Hungary.  If  this  was  not  clear  at  the 
time,  it  is  so  now.  There  is  no  one  to  deny  that  France 
must  have  recovered  Alsace-Lorraine.  But  the  realiza- 
tion of  one  "irridentist"  aim  entails  the  realization  of 
all.  If  France  recovered  Alsace-Lorraine,  Italy  must 
recover  Trent  and  Trieste.  If  Italy  recovered  Trent 
and  Trieste,  why  should  not  Rouminia  occupy  Transyl- 
vania? Czech  and  Polish  legions  fought  in  the  allied 
armies.  An  independent  Poland  and  an  independent 
Czecho-Slovakia  were  foregone  conclusions.  But  if 
these  groups  of  Slavs  won  their  independence,  why  not 


82  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  others — the  Croats,  Serbs  and  Slovenes?  The 
thing  was  unavoidable.  Nothing  on  earth  could  have 
kept  the  peoples  of  the  old  monarchy  even  partially  fed- 
erated, save  perhaps  the  continuation,  in  all  due  honor, 
of  the  Hapsburg  dynasty;  and  this,  again,  was  one  of 
the  very  contingencies  the  allies  were  fighting  against. 
It  was  doubtless  impossible  in  any  event. 

Even  granting  this  much,  why,  it  may  be  asked,  was 
it  necessary,  in  breaking  up  the  doomed  Empire,  to 
draw  the  new  frontiers  so  badly?  But  I  think  I  have 
already  said  enough  about  racial  confusion  in  this  part 
of  the  world  to  indicate  that  to  draw  ideal  frontiers 
was  beyond  human  skill.  While  a  strictly  economic  line 
does  violence  to  the  principle  of  nationality,  an  even 
approximately  "national"  line  does  violence  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  economic  unity.  Both  these  factors  had  to  be 
taken  Into  consideration.  In  case  of  doubt  or  contest, 
perhaps  a  third,  a  strategic  reason,  turned  the  scales. 
Certainly,  in  all  such  cases,  the  victors  were  favored  to 
the  detriment  of  the  vanquished.  The  alternative  was 
to  favor  the  vanquished  at  the  expense  of  the  victors. 
No  middle  ground  was  possible. 

In  expressing  these  views  I  am  not  attempting  to 
defend  the  peace  treaties  but  to  convey  the  Impression 
resulting  from  extensive  travels  In  the  countries  chiefly 
concerned.  The  surgeon  who  has  a  major  operation 
to  perform  must  cut  boldly  and  cut  deep,  severing  such 
nerves  and  arteries  as  may  be  necessary.  In  the  trust 
that  all  will  heal  again  in  the  course  of  time.  The 
disintegration  of  Austria-Hungary  was  inevitable,  and 
to  the  Paris  Conference  fell  the  lot  of  acting  as  sur- 
geon. Without  some  loss  of  blood  there  can  be  no 
operation.    Certainly,  bad  wounds  remain — ^both  racial 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  33 

and  economic.  These,  too,  were,  for  the  most  part, 
inevitable.  But  the  flesh  is  alive  and  quivering.  In 
time,  one  way  or  another,  it  will,  I  am  confident,  heal. 
Nevertheless,  policies  of  federation,  which  dream 
merely  of  a  restoration  of  the  old  order;  which,  how- 
ever unfortunate  it  may  seem,  do  not  accept  the  "Bal- 
kanization" of  this  part  of  Europe  as  an  accomplished 
fact,  are  predestined,  in  my  opinion,  to  come  to  naught. 


SOME  RACIAL  DISTINCTIONS 

To  an  American,  it  seems  nothing  short  of  a  miracle 
that  the  fifteen  or  twenty  odd  races  and  remnants  of 
races  of  the  Balkans  and  Central  Europe  have  con- 
tinued to  live  thus  for  centuries  side  by  side,  over- 
lapping and  intertwined,  without  losing,  to  any  appre- 
ciable extent,  their  distinct  racial  characteristics.  In 
America,  national  absorption  has  been  speedy  and,  for 
the  most  part,  sure.  Caucasian  peoples  from  every 
clime  pour  into  the  port  of  New  York  by  thousands. 
If  they  came  in  regiments  and  marched  ashore  in  col- 
umn of  fours,  they  would  present  the  aspect  of  a  ver- 
itable invasion.  But  their  eyes  are  bewildered  and 
their  step  uncertain.  With  their  unkempt  clothes,  their 
cloth-bound  parcels  and  canvas  bags,  they  inspire  in 
the  native  American  a  feeling,  not  so  much  of  fear  as 
of  contempt.  They  scatter  away  through  the  vast 
spaces  of  the  continent,  settle  and  bear  children,  who 
go  to  American  schools,  forget  the  language  of  their 
parents,  intermarry  with  peoples  of  different  stocks, 
and  are  molded  afresh  in  the  spirit  of  the  new  world. 

It  is  still  too  soon,  perhaps,  to  descry  the  modifica- 
tions jv^hich  this  wave  upon  wave  of  diverse  foreign 
bloods  is  certain  to  have  been  bringing  about  in  the 
American  character,  as  it  existed,  say,  seventy  years 
ago.  The  modifications  which  the  American  spirit 
brings  about  in  the  character  of  the  immigrant,  how- 

34 


SOME  RACIAL  DISTINCTIONS  35 

ever,  are  almost  immediately  obvious.  Magyar  and 
Greek,  Italian  and  Pole  alike,  in  a  generation  or  two, 
are  found  to  have  lost  their  original  racial  identity. 
The  old  world  languages,  customs,  feuds  and  affections, 
all  are  forgotten.  The  same  communities  of  Bulgar  or 
Ruthenian  peasants  who,  in  Hungary,  might  live  on 
for  hundreds  of  years  in  the  midst  of  a  population  of 
Germans  or  Magyars,  without  changing  their  ways  by 
so  much  as  a  word  or  a  gesture,  if  they  emigrated  to 
America,  would  be  completely  assimilated  in  a  bare 
half  century.  Their  children  would  be  mono-lingual, 
chew  gum,  play  baseball,  scoff  at  emperors,  marry 
Swedes  or  Irish,  and  run  for  alderman.  What  makes 
this  enormous  difference  between  the  Old  World  and 
the  New? 

To  assume  that  American  culture  is  a  solvent  so 
much  more  powerful  than  any  European  culture,  or  that 
the  difference  is  merely  one  of  youth  and  age,  is  not 
enough.  There  are  plenty  of  peoples  in  Europe  at 
present  who  give  every  appearance  of  being  both  young 
and  amazingly  vital,  ambitious  as  adolescents,  and  op- 
timistic as  Californians.  Such,  for  example,  are  the 
Jugo-Slavs,  or  even  the  Greeks.  Italy  is  in  its  second 
renaissance.  The  Slavs,  everywhere,  are  dreamy  with 
a  growing  sense  of  latent  power.  It  is  not  by  any 
means,  therefore,  that  Europe  feels  its  role  to  be  ended, 
or  is  disposed  to  resign  in  favor  of  Its  trans-Atlantic 
offspring.  The  real  divergence,  I  will  venture  to  sug- 
gest, is  one  of  acceptance  on  the  part  of  the  peoples 
concerned. 

The  foreigners  who  emigrate  to  America  through 
desire  for  change,  or  in  search  of  better  economic  op- 
portunities, have  usually  broken  for  good  with  their 


36  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

former  life.  Like  the  Swiss  who  invaded  Burgundian 
Gaul,  they  have,  in  spirit  at  least,  burnt  their  villages 
behind  them,  and  think  of  no  return.  They  come  with 
open  minds  and  open  hearts,  converted  in  advance  to 
the  vita  nuova.  New  laws,  new  plays,  new  freedoms, 
new  restraints — they  accept  all,  accept  with  eagerness — 
and  many,  within  a  short  time,  have  become  more 
American  than  the  Americans. 

There  are,  in  Europe,  a  few  cases  of  individual  as- 
similation in  the  American  style.  There  are  Germans 
who  have  become  fervent  Magyars ;  Poles  who  have  be- 
come French;  and  Slavs,  Italian.  But  they  have  done 
so  of  their  own  free  will,  not  under  compulsion;  and 
they  are  the  exception.  As  a  rule,  no  sooner  does  one 
European  people  set  out  to  absorb  another,  either  vio- 
lently or  by  peaceful  means,  than  the  latter  begins  to 
resist,  and  race  consciousness  on  both  sides  is  merely 
strengthened.  The  races  are  too  numerous  for  any  one 
to  assimilate  the  others,  too  compact  to  be  easily  dis- 
integrated. Each  has  its  own  history,  its  traditions  of 
grandeur  and  glory.  They  live  on,  substantially  un- 
changed, on  the  very  ground  their  ancestors  conquered. 
In  the  village  graveyard  lie  the  forebears  of  the  present 
villagers.  Upon  this  field,  perhaps,  the  nation's  inde- 
pendence was  bloodily  maintained.  Bulgarians,  remem- 
bering the  distant  epoch  when  their  empire  filled  the 
Balkans,  will  never  yield  homage  to  the  Serbs;  who,  in 
turn,  recalling  their  own  days  of  domination,  would 
scorn  to  bow  to  Bulgars.  There  is  scarcely  a  race  in 
Europe,  however  low  it  may  have  fallen,  which  cannot 
refer  back  with  pride  to  a  time  when  its  name  was 
glorified,  and  its  sway  widespread.  Unless  their  con- 
sent is  won,  they  will  never  acquiesce  to  foreign  rule; 


SOME  RACIAL  DISTINCTIONS  37 

and  their  consent,  for  the  most  part,  is  stubbornly  with- 
held. If  there  is  any  dominating  to  be  done,  let  it  be 
done,  they  argue,  by  those  preeminently  equipped  by 
nature  for  this  task;  and  each,  I  need  scarcely  add,  is 
thinking,  in  this  connection,  of  itself.  The  achievement 
of  national  unity,  even  in  France,  Germany  and  Italy, 
has  been  the  work,  not  of  a  generation,  but  of  centuries. 
These  sentiments  of  distinction  are  continually  quick- 
ened by  differences  of  language,  dialect,  customs,  cul- 
ture, and  even  of  architecture.  America  is  relatively 
homogeneous;  Europe,  infinitely  diversified.  The 
Slovak,  who  speaks  a  dialect  of  Czech,  considers  Czech 
to  be  the  dialect,  and  Slovak  the  prototype.  The  Ma- 
gyar and  the  Austrian,  like  the  peoples  of  Western 
Europe,  nod  their  heads  to  affirm  and  shake  them  to 
deny.  The  Serb  and  the  Bulgar  shake  them  to  say 
yes,  and  nod  them  to  say  no.  The  Roumanian,  who 
frequents  cafes  in  the  company  of  women,  offends  the 
moral  sense  of  the  more  rigorous  Bulgar.  The  Hun- 
garian plows  with  an  iron  plow;  the  Serb  still  uses  a 
wooden.  The  Bulgars,  generally  speaking,  believe  in 
giving  education  to  women;  the  Greeks* do  not.  In 
Bosnia  the  Moslems,  in  Bohemia  the  Germans,  in  Tran- 
sylvania the  Magyars,  in  Galicia  the  Poles,  were  over- 
lords and  managers,  and  looked  down  upon  Croats, 
Czechs,  Roumanians  and  Ruthenians  as  being  in  every 
way  inferiors.  All  Czechs  can  read  and  write;  most 
Slovaks  cannot.  Religion  and  race  are  often  insepar- 
ably intertwined.  Poles  and  Ruthenians  are  both  Slavs, 
but  the  Poles  are  Roman  Catholic,  the  Ruthenians 
Greek  Orthodox.  The  Pole  is  smooth-shaven,  the  Pol- 
ish Jew  has  a  full  beard.  The  Bulgars,  in  order  to  dis- 
tinguish themselves  from  other  Greek  Orthodox  peo- 


88  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

pics,  established  a  secession  church,  called  the  Exar- 
chate. The  Croats  and  Serbs  are  Greek  church,  the 
Slovenes  Roman.  The  Moslem  wears  a  fez,  the  Chris- 
tian a  hat.  Such  divergences  which,  in  America,  may- 
come  to  mean  little  or  nothing,  in  Europe,  because  of 
what  they  symbolize,  mean  everything. 

Through  such  factors  as  these,  and  many  others 
deeper  and  less  tangible,  the  national  character  of  the 
various  European  peoples  has  been  formed.  National 
character  is  one  of  those  parodoxes  in  which  nature 
seems  to  delight.  Each  individual  man  is  at  the  same 
time  nothing,  and  everything;  an  insignificant  unit  in  the 
human  swarm,  and  the  center  of  the  universe.  Sim- 
ilarly, while  on  the  one  hand  every  individual  is  dif- 
ferent, and  each  race  produces  an  apparently  infinite 
variety  of  types,  on  the  other,  the  people  of  any  given 
race  are  seen  in  the  aggregate  to  possess  a  number  of 
definite  national  peculiarities.  My  friend,  M.  Leon 
Bazalgette,  swears  that  his  "hereditary  enemies"  live 
not  across  the  frontier,  but  in  the  same  street  with  him, 
and  trade  at  the  same  shops,  and  that  the  only  fellow- 
countrymen  he  recognizes  are  those  who,  wherever  they 
may  have  been  born,  feel  what  he  feels,  love  what  he 
loves,  hate  what  he  hates.  The  other  half  of  the  truth 
was  recently  presented  by  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell,  who, 
returning  from  a  visit  to  Soviet  Russia,  was  "convinced 
that  there  is  far  more  resemblance  between  Mr.  Smillie 
and  Mr.  Winston  Churchill  than  between  the  former 
and  Lenin,  or  the  latter  and  Kolchak."  The  two  view- 
points do  not  cancel,  they  complete  one  another.  How- 
ever different  we  may  feel  ourselves  to  be  from  a  host 
of  members  of  our  own  race,  we  live  in  the  spirit  of  that 
race  just  the  same  and  doubtless  exemplify,  without 


SOME  RACIAL  DISTINCTIONS  89 

knowing  it,  some  of  the  salient  national  traits.  It  is 
so,  that  if  people  are  kept  away  for  a  long  enough  time 
from  the  environment  in  which  flames  the  spirit  of  their 
race,  they  "lose  contact" — that  is  to  say,  they  fall 
under  the  influence  of  some  other  social  group,  and,  in 
the  end,  may  retain  only  so  much  of  their  original 
national  character  as  fell  to  them  through  heredity. 
But  so  long  as  the  contact  rem.ains  unbroken,  the  com- 
pelling influence  of  race  or  country  is  unescapable.  Man 
is  a  social  animal;  we  flatter  ourselves  that  our  thoughts 
and  actions  are  our  own ;  more  often  than  not,  they  are 
merely  those  of  our  class  and  clan. 

The  character  of  a  race,  like  the  character  of  a  man, 
is  complex.  It  is  composed  of  various  elements  which 
may  emerge  in  turn,  under  different  provocations,  there- 
by disconcerting  the  superficial  observer,  who  leaps  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  character  itself  has  changed.  I 
will  not  pretend  that  a  genuine  change  of  race  char- 
acter is  impossible,  but  the  process  is  tediously  slow, 
and  the  resistance  discouragingly  stubborn. 

"It  is  as  essential,"  said  Bismarck,  "to  know  nations' 
characters  as  to  know  their  interests."  The  peoples  of 
"Balkanized  Europe"  are  perhaps  even  more  distinct 
from  one  another  psychologically  than  linguistically. 

The  Austrians  are  decidedly  easy-going;  the  country- 
people  sincerely  religious,  the  towns-people  gentle  and 
kind.  Free  without  prudery,  artistic  and  musical  with- 
out affectation,  they  are  marked  by  a  spirit  of  genial 
culture  and  an  unusual  aversion  to  violence. 

The  Magyars  are  of  sterner  stuff.  They  are  farm- 
ers, officials,  soldiers,  with  no  taste  for  commerce. 
Careless  in  time  of  prosperity,  in  time  of  adversity  they 
are  sternly  energetic.    Polite,  elegant,  aristocratic,  pas- 


40  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

sionatc,  proud,  they  are  the  type  of  a  people  which  feels 
itself  born  to  rule. 

The  Czechs  seem  heavy  and  somewhat  slow,  but  their 
minds  are  active  and  they  reason  well.  They  are  prac- 
tical; the  mere  shows  of  life  do  not  interest  them. 
Athletic  exercises  mean  as  much  to  them  as  religion. 
They  are  liberal,  unwarlike,  law-abiding,  progressive, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  cautious. 

The  Poles,  though  also  Slavs,  are  as  different  from 
the  Czechs  as  March  from  August.  Here  you  have 
temperament,  and  to  spare.  A  deep,  almost  fanatical 
religious  and  patriotic  feeling  is  perhaps  their  chief 
characteristic.  They  take  to  the  life  of  the  soldier 
without  hesitation.  "O  little  war,  what  kind  of  siren 
are  you,  that  all  the  young  men  follow  you  away?"  runs 
a  Polish  folk  song.  They  are  jealous,  impulsive,  intel- 
ligent, individualistic,  and  so  sensitive  that  their  sus- 
ceptibilities are  continually  being  wounded. 

The  Serbs  are  Slavs  of  still  another  type.  With 
them,  the  primordial  virtue  is  bravery;  all  else  is  sec- 
ondary. And  this,  combined  with  their  exceptional  har- 
dihood, places  them  among  the  best  natural  warriors 
in  Europe.  Fond  of  dancing  and  of  song,  a  bit  unprac- 
tical, a  bit  intriguing  (like  all  Balkan  peoples),  they 
are,  on  the  whole,  serious  and  grave  in  character,  and 
naturally  democratic. 

A  fourth  type  of  Slavs  are  the  Bulgars.  Their  com- 
plete democracy  resembles  that  of  the  Serbs,  but  in 
other  respects  they  are  antithetical,  or,  as  I  like  to  put 
it,  the  two  peoples  complete  one  another.  Suspicious 
and  economical  in  practical  affairs,  the  Bulgars  are 
sober,  industrious,  moral.  Their  minds  are  realistic, 
and  their  temper  highly  disciplined. 


SOME  RACIAL  DISTINCTIONS  41 

The  Roumanians  claim,  and  indeed  seem,  to  be  a 
Latin  raee.  Their  senses  are  alert,  but  their  country 
is  naturally  so  rich  that  they  can  afford  to  be  somewhat 
indolent.  They  are  expansive,  poetic,  impulsive,  tol- 
erant, unmilitary,  fond  of  display. 

The  traditional  traits  of  the  Greeks  seem  to  have 
changed  very  little  in  the  course  of  a  long  history. 
Like  Ulysses,  they  are  ingenious  and  adaptable,  not  to 
say  sharp.  A  nation  of  lawyers,  merchants  and  sailors, 
they  are  eloquent,  courteous,  patriotic,  proud.  Politics 
play  a  great  part  in  their  waking  hours,  and  perhaps  in 
their  dreams.  They  are  not  a  military  people,  yet  they 
seem  to  be  unconquerable,  for  though  they  will  bend, 
they  always  recover;  and  an  advantage  once  gained, 
they  never  let  go. 

And  there  they  all  live,  in  the  south  and  the  middle 
of  Europe,  close  neighbors  for  more  than  a  thousand 
years,  but  strangers  still  to  one  another. 


HEGEMONY  OR  FEDERATION 

In  the  foregoing  pages  I  have  tried  to  revivify  some 
of  the  historic  causes  of  race  conglomerations  and  dis- 
tinctions in  eastern  and  southeastern  Europe,  and  to 
indicate  certain  fundamental  reasons  why  the  present 
situation  exists,  and  why  it  must  be  accepted  as  it  is. 
Just  how  bad  this  situation  has  become,  we  shall  pres- 
ently examine  into.  All  the  "defeated"  peoples,  and 
some  of  the  "victors,"  qualify  it  as  "impossible,"  and 
I  am  not  far  from  agreeing  with  them,  though  each  of 
us,  doubtless,  is  using  the  word  in  his  own  sense.  I  con- 
sider the  situation  "impossible,"  because  it  holds  eco- 
nomic necessities  of  small  account,  and  because,  if  it 
continues  unmodified,  it  will  further  Impoverish  the 
peoples  concerned,  both  materially  and  morally,  and 
will  lead  to  one  or  several  wars  which  will  ill  answer 
the  desires  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  is  morbid,  per- 
verse, and  dangerous  to  an  extent  even  greater  than 
that  of  the  Balkans  proper  in  19 14 — out  of  which 
issued  the  great  war. 

Ultimately,  there  are  two  conceivable  remedies. 
One  is  a  renewed  hegemony  of  one  state  over  the 
others.  The  unities  of  France,  Italy  and  Germany, 
which  a  few  centuries  ago  seemed  improbable,  were  in- 
deed forged  by  successions  of  wars  intermixed  with  a 
growing  sense  of  common  interest;  but  this  process  is 
so  slow  as  to  offer  lean  satisfaction  to  an  impatient  gen- 

42 


HEGEMONY  OR  FEDERATION  43 

eratlon.  Turkey  tried  hegemony  and  failed  through 
sheer  ineflficiency  and  lack  of  imagination.  Austria  and 
Hungary,  after  hundreds  of  years  of  strife,  won  joint 
hegemony,  attempted  forcible  assimilation,  and  failed, 
partly  from  lack  of  tact,  partly  from  lack  of  time.  It 
is  possible  that,  in  the  future,  one  or  more  of  the  new 
states,  as  Jugo-Slavia,  or  an  older  power,  as  Russia,  or 
Germany,  may  atempt  to  extend  its  influence  over  the 
rest.  But  this  means  war — perhaps  a  series  of  wars. 
From  the  standpoint  of  world-interest,  if  it  cannot  be 
prevented  by  the  international  machinery  at  our  dis- 
posal it  must  at  least  be  decried,  for  it  means  a  pro- 
longation, even  if  only  temporary,  of  the  very  condition 
requiring  to  be  cured. 

The  other  remedy,  in  my  opinion,  the  only  feasible 
one,  is  federation — a  voluntary  association  of  free  peo- 
ples for  self-protection,  and  the  furtherance  of  their 
common  political  and  economic  interests.  If  men  were 
guided  by  reason  rather  than  passion  and  sentiment, 
this  idea  would  undoubtedly  be  acted  upon  without  hesi- 
tation, for  it  is  obviously  to  the  advantage  of  all  con- 
cerned. Leaving  out  of  account  the  United  States  of 
America,  there  are  already  two  successful  examples  of 
its  realization:  Switzerland  and  Belgium — the  one 
composed  of  unequal  numbers  of  German-speaking, 
French-speaking  and  Italian-speaking  races,  without 
serious  grounds  for  complaint  on  the  part  of  racial 
minorities;  the  other  composed  of  almost  equal  parts 
of  French-speaking  and  Flemish-speaking  races,  organ- 
ized on  a  bi-lingual  system.  But  both  the  Swiss  and 
the  Belgians  are  politically  well  advanced,  and  there- 
fore perhaps  better  able  to  sacrifice  sentiment  to  rea- 
son than  the  more  backward  peoples  living  farther  east. 


44  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

A  federation  of  any  two  or  more  Danube  or  Balkan 
peoples  does  certainly  present  formidable  sentimental 
obstacles  which  it  would  be  foolish  to  underestimate. 
At  the  same  time,  the  advantages  are  so  obvious  that 
one  need  not  despair  in  the  long  run  of  making  them 
compellingly  apparent  even  to  the  fear-blinded  and  pas- 
sion-warped nations  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe. 

The  achievement  either  of  a  new  hegemony,  or  of  a 
series  of  federations,  will  of  course  require  a  consid- 
erable lapse  of  time.  In  the  meanwhile,  the  most  that 
can  be  hoped  for  is  a  combination  of  ententes  or  alli- 
ances, which  evolving  slowly  into  a  new  balance  of 
power,  will  gradually  eliminate  the  existing  anarchy, 
and  give  the  weary  continent  at  least  a  temporary  sta- 
bility. As  an  entente,  either  commercial  or  political, 
or  both,  may  normally  precede  the  conclusion  of  a  hard 
and  fast  alliance,  so  an  alliance  will  sometimes  prove 
to  be  the  first  step  toward  federation.  The  statesman's 
first  task  will  therefore  be  to  devise  and  conclude  ap- 
propriate accords.  Stability  is  the  first  desideratum. 
Federation  may  follow  later. 

But  before  discussing  the  actual  possibilities  in  this 
sense — for  certain  constructive  tendencies  have  already 
begun  to  appear — it  will  be  necessary  to  observe  in 
some  detail  the  nature  of  the  obstacles  which  are  op- 
posing the  course  of  more  general  harmony.  The  stu- 
dent of  diplomacy,  like  the  doctor,  must  diagnose  be- 
fore he  can  prescribe. 


PART  II 

PROBLEMS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION 


ECONOMICS  AND  POLITICS 

In  all  human  affairs  there  are  two  elements  which, 
whatever  their  ultimate  identity,  may  be  practically  re- 
ferred to  as  matter  and  mind,  and  which,  transferred 
into  the  realm  of  public  life,  become  economics  and 
politics.  The  two  are  intertwined  and  inseparable,  as 
many  a  modern  statesman  has  found  to  his  discom- 
fiture. Both  have  therefore  to  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration. Economic,  are  all  such  factors  as  the  distribu- 
tion of  raw-stuffs,  industrial  and  agricultural  produc- 
tion, finance,  the  search  for  markets,  transportations- 
political,  such  factors  as  the  struggle  of  parties  for 
power,  race  hatreds  and  jealousies,  national  character 
and  ambition.  Matter  limits  mind,  but  mind  tends 
often  to  oppose  and  overrule  matter.  If  people  al- 
lowed their  conduct  to  be  governed  solely  by  consid- 
erations of  economic  necessity,  no  doubt  the  world 
would  soon  subside  into  a  dead  level  of  reasonable 
materialistic  contentment.  But  to  this  empire  of  math- 
ematics man  has  never  been  willing  to  submit.  We  are, 
it  would  seem,  a  restless,  troublesome  breed,  scornful 
at  heart  of  mere  things,  swayed  by  dislikes  and  affec- 
tions, bitten  by  sudden,  uncontrollable  jealousies  or 
anger,  lured  on  ever  by  the  sphinx-like  fascination  of 
attempting  the  unknown,  or  the  fortunes  of  chance.  In 
the  very  teeth  of  probability,  great  deeds  have  been 

achieved.    More  than  once,  boldness  and  moral  cour- 

47 


48  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

age  have  conquered,  when  reason  could  predict  only 
defeat.  The  successful  defiances  of  the  rule  of  common 
sense  are  just  frequent  enough  to  keep  mankind  in  a 
fever  of  daring  hopes.  And  while  economic  necessity 
must  obviously  always  limit  political  policy,  the  latter 
is  continually  chafing  under  the  restraint,  when,  indeed, 
it  does  not  revolt  and  break  away  altogether. 

On  a  strictly  economic  basis,  it  was  possible  to  dem- 
onstrate, in  the  spring  of  19 14,  that  no  European 
war  could  occur.  Economically,  for  Germany  to  pro- 
voke the  war,  was  madness;  a  few  more  years  of 
peace,  and  she  would,  from  all  evidence,  have  been 
the  commercial  mistress  of  the  world.  But  there  en- 
tered into  play  the  fierce  itch  of  military  ambition,  the 
desire  for  forcible  domination,  and  mere  economic  rea- 
sons were  blown  to  the  winds.  In  the  same  way,  if 
the  United  States  had  followed  the  dictates  of  its 
material  interest,  which  was  to  secure  a  foundation  for 
world  trade  while  the  opportunity  was  favorable,  the 
Senate  would  have  ratified  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  with 
a  few  reservations,  to  which  the  President  would  have 
consented,  in  the  fall  of  19 19.  But  both  Senators  and 
President  were  filled  with  a  sense  of  injured  pride, 
and  the  mere  interests  of  the  nation  were  forgotten  in 
a  deadlock  of  conflicting  passions.  Once  more,  a 
purely  political  issue  proved  stronger  than  issues  of 
economics.  An  even  more  striking  example  is  that  of 
Ireland.  The  English,  betraying  an  ingrained  habit 
of  mind,  have  spared  no  pains  to  prove  both  to  the 
Irish  and  to  foreigners  that  Ireland  has  waxed  de- 
cidedly prosperous  under  British  rule.  But  here  again, 
the  economic  argument  is  weightless.  Ireland's  dis- 
content is  wholly  political. 


ECONOMICS  AND  POLITICS  49 

In  most  circumstances,  and  in  the  long  run,  it  is 
perhaps  generally  true — though  not  always — that  the 
drift  of  men's  political  sentiments  will  follow  the  urge 
of  their  pocketbooks;  and  to  underestimate  that  natural 
tendency  would  be  a  grave  error.  But  the  attempt  to 
explain  all  human  motives  in  terms  of  pocketbooks  is 
an  equally  grave  and,  at  the  present  time,  a  much  more 
common  mistake.  The  Russian  Soviet  dictators  have 
even  established,  as  an  axiom,  that  the  working  class 
does  not  know  its  own  best  interest,  and  that  this  is 
why — ^pending  the  period  of  one  generation  necessary 
to  its  education  in  the  matter — a  dictatorship  must  be 
exercised  by  those  who  do  understand  this  interest.  I 
am  inclined  to  agree  with  Mr.  Lenin,  that  the  working- 
class  does  not  always  know  what  is  best  for  it;  but 
neither  does  any  other  class,  or,  I  had  almost  said,  any 
individual.  Men,  nevertheless,  will  continue  to  act  in 
accordance  with  their  lights,  and  their  lights,  as  we 
have  seen,  will  be  distorted,  as  often  as  not,  from 
the  cold  line  of  economic  reason  by  the  intricate  prisms 
of  political  sentiment. 

Every  people,  in  its  domestic  affairs,  realizes  the 
necessity  of  accepting  the  reality  of  questions  of  pas- 
sion and  even  of  personalities ;  a  certain  school  of  prac- 
tical politicians  will  even  insist  that  these  are  the  only 
realities.  Yet  in  international  affairs,  it  is  assumed, 
particularly  by  American  and  English  contemporaries, 
that  nations  will  always  act  reasonably  in  accordance 
with  their  material  interests.  For  example,  when  the 
covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  was  being  drafted, 
both  the  British  and  the  American  delegations  were 
of  the  opinion  that  economic  penalties  applied  to  offend- 
ers would  be  sufficient  for  any  eventuality,  and  only 


60  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  French,  with  their  deeper  psychological  insight, 
opposed  this  view.  The  inclination  to  fix  the  attention 
on  economic  to  the  detriment  of  political  considerations 
has  marked  nearly  all  Anglo-Saxon  thought  concern- 
ing European  reconstruction.  The  same  bias  is  im- 
pressed deeply  into  the  organization  of  the  American 
Department  of  State,  which  receives  economic  reports 
of  the  first  quality  from  a  highly  trained  consular  and 
commercial  corps,  but  which  provides  no  adequate  ma- 
chinery for  the  accumulation  of  foreign  political 
Information. 

I  will  declare  at  once  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  sick- 
ness of  "Balkanized  Europe"  Is  largely  political,  that 
Is  to  say  psychological,  and  that  the  cure,  if  It  is  to 
succeed,  must  be  of  like  nature.  There  are,  however, 
a  number  of  serious  material  obstacles  to  reconstruc- 
tion which  must  be  reckoned  at  their  due  weight. 

Famine,  disease  and  war  have  wrought  terrible  rav- 
ages in  man,  beast  and  field.  The  farmer,  to  a  certain 
extent,  still  lacks  animals,  tools  and  fertilizer,  so  that 
crops  are  below  normal.  In  mine  and  factory,  ma- 
chinery has  deteriorated  without  having  been  replaced. 
Coal  production  in  Czecho-Slovakia  was  at  one  time 
considerably  retarded  merely  because  the  miners  could 
not  be  furnished  good  quality  oil  for  their  little  head- 
lamps, which  kept  going  out  as  they  worked.  Most 
industries  are  on  a  short  coal  allowance,  and  many  have 
been  unable  to  procure  raw  stuffs.  Rail  and  water  traf- 
fic Is  still  disorganized;  and  engines,  ill  repaired,  are 
reduced  in  efficiency.  It  has  not  yet  been  found  pos- 
sible, for  example,  to  restore  the  copper  parts  in  cer- 
tain former  Austro-Hungarian  locomotives  and  steam- 
boats which  the  government,  needing  the  copper  dur- 


ECONOMICS  AND  POLITICS  51 

Ing  the  war,  had  replaced  by  entirely  unsatisfactory 
iron  partv  Finally,  in  every  country,  public  finance 
is  in  a  deplorable  plight.  Hungary,  Austria  and  Bul- 
garia have  to  all  intents  been  declared  bankrupt,  and 
have  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver  known  as 
the  Reparations  Commission.  In  other  countries,  as 
well,  unsecured  paper  money  is  the  sole  circulating 
medium,  the  exchange  is  low  and  continually  fluctuating, 
and  the  budget  shows  a  deficit  more  or  less  grave. 

But  the  menace  of  famine  is  passing,  health  is  con- 
quering disease,  and  in  the  thinned  ranks  of  European, 
humanity,  a  surge  of  fresh  vitality  is  already  striving 
to  fill  up  the  gaps.  To  supply  the  farmer  with  animals 
and  tools  is  a  question  of  only  a  year  or  so,  and  to  sup- 
ply him  with  fertilizer  is  a  question  of  transport.  Ma- 
chinery for  factory  and  mine  is  gradually  being  made 
and  delivered,  and  by  now  the  Czecho-Slovak  coal- 
diggers,  I  believe,  have  got  the  proper  kind  of  illum- 
inating oil.  The  shortage  of  fuel  is  serious,  but  the 
distribution  could  be  improved  if  the  railroads  were 
more  efficient,  and  the  energy  derived  even  from  pres- 
ent allotments  could,  in  many  cases,  be  increased,  ex- 
perts tell  me,  by  forty  or  fifty  per  cent.,  if  the  coal 
were  burned  less  unscientifically.  Transportation  con- 
ditions are  steadily  improving.  Copper  has  been  or- 
dered from  America,  and  its  arrival  will  permit  of 
more  thorough  repairs  to  locomotives  and  steam-tugs. 
There  are  signs,  in  some  countries,  as,  for  example,  in 
Czecho-Slovakia,  of  a  really  constructive  preoccupation 
with  the  question  of  finances;  the  reorganization  of 
taxes  and  the  resumption  of  commerce  ought  gradu- 
ally to  permit  the  evolution  of  order  out  of  the  present 
budgetary  chaos.    Other  things  being  equal,  the  finan- 


62  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

cial  crisis  should  normally  begin  to  pass,  and  production 
and  business  be  reasonably  restored  by,  say,  the  end 
of  1922. 

But  the  trouble  Is,  other  things  are  not  equal.  Psy- 
chological considerations,  as  I  shall  now  endeavor  to 
show,  are  exercising  a  formidable  restraint  on  the 
natural  healthy  course  of  reconstruction  processes ;  and 
until  these  psychological  considerations  are  recognized 
and  properly  dealt  with,  there  can  be  no  real  solution 
of  the  European  problem. 


MORBID  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  present  state  of  mind  of  the  people  of  "Bal- 
kanized  Europe"  is  explicable,  and  perhaps  even  nat- 
ural; it  is  none  the  less  morbid,  that  is,  a  hindrance  to 
the  recovery  of  economic  and  political  health. 

The  first  symptoms  which  attract  the  attention  of 
the  observer  are  self-consciousness,  and  an  exaggerated 
sense  of  self-importance.  In  conversing  with  officials 
and  party-leaders  in  successive  capitals,  I  found  there 
was  one  question  which  would  be  put  to  me  almost 
invariably : 

"What  is  your  impression?" — ^meaning  "of  us  and 
our  affairs." 

Knowing  that  on  my  reply  I  should  be  judged  pene- 
trating or  hopelessly  dull,  and  much  might  depend,  I 
learned  to  pause  for  a  moment  in  careful  deliberation, 
and  then,  without  any  malice,  to  make  this  answer: 

"I  consider  that  right  here  is  the  key  to  the  whole 
situation." 

And  my  interlocutor  would  beam  with  pleasure.  I 
had  convinced  him  at  once  of  my  native  intelligence! 

For,  in  fact,  each  one  of  this  half-score  of  small 
and  struggling  nationalities,  intent  on  its  own  problems, 
does  feel  itself  and  these  problems  to  be  of  paramount 
importance  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  their  only  mis- 
giving is  that  the  stranger  may  fail  to  appreciate  their 
viewpoint.    This  viewpoint,  in  each  case,  is  set  forth 

53 


54  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

with  astonishing  force  and  lucidity.  Even  foreigners 
are  convinced,  provided,  that  is,  that  they  have  not 
had  occasion  to  hear  in  neighboring  countries  similar 
arguments  adduced  with  the  same  fervor  to  prove  an 
opposite  contention. 

The  Austrians  consider  Vienna  to  be  the  logical 
economic  and  political  center  of  Europe.  If  their  prob- 
lems were  solved,  all  would  be  solved.  The  Czechs 
feel  the  same  way  about  Prague,  and  the  Magyars 
about  Budapest.  All  three  of  these  cities  are  near 
enough  to  the  middle  of  the  continent  to  lend  color  to 
the  pretensions  of  their  inhabitants.  Warsaw  and  Bu- 
charest, though  separated  by  more  than  six  hundred 
miles,  are  both  "the  key  to  Eastern  Europe,"  and  the 
eastern  European  problem  is  considered  by  eastern 
Europeans  to  be  the  touchstone  on  which  depends  the 
future  of  modern  civilization.  Bucharest,  being  placed 
by  its  geographical  position  in  a  double  relation,  is  also 
felt  to  be  "the  key  to  the  Balkans" — a  preeminence 
which  is  equally  claimed  by  Belgrade,  Sofia,  Athens  and 
Constantinople.  The  disconcerting  element  is,  that  in 
each  of  these  claims  there  is  just  enough  truth  to 
justify  the  pretension;  and  he  would  be  an  over-bold 
critic  who  should  venture  to  deny  a  certain  fundamental 
importance  to  a  single  ore  of  these  countries.  At 
the  same  time,  the  persistent  refusal  of  each  to  share 
the  dignity  of  preeminence  with  any  of  the  others  is  a 
bit  delirious.  And  one  wonders  whether  at  heart  they 
are  not  governed  by  hidden  misgivings.  Peoples,  like 
the  English  or  the  French,  who  are  really  convinced 
by  long  tradition  and  experienie,  of  their  own  superi- 
ority, are  content  to  let  it  be  taken  for  granted  without 
making  a  stir. 


MORBID  PSYCHOLOGY  65 

The  second  symptom  which  appears  is  that  each  of 
the  smaller  countries  feels  itself  to  have  been  grievously 
wronged  at  the  hands  of  the  Peace  Conference,  and 
suffers  in  this  respect  from  what  the  nerve-doctors  call, 
I  believe,  the  persecution-mania.  The  enemy  countries 
feel  that  they  were  betrayed  by  the  promise  of  a  mod- 
erate peace,  which  was  never  accorded  them.  Each 
of  the  smaller  allies  complains  that  its  sacrifices  have 
gone  unappreciated,  that  the  vital  part  which  it  played 
in  winning  the  war  has  been  systematically  ignored, 
that  it  was  unjustly  excluded  from  the  Supreme  Council, 
that  its  notes  of  protest  received  no  more  attention  than 
its  suggestions  of  advice  or  warning,  that  its  rightful 
demands  were  not  granted,  that  it  was  kept  down  to 
the  profit  of  its  rivals,  that  its  motives,  though  honor- 
able and  pure,  were  regarded  with  suspicion,  and  alto- 
gether, that  it  was  completely  misunderstood.  Here 
again,  no  one  can  deny  that  there  is  a  good  deal  of 
truth  in  all  these  assertions.  But  to  dwell  on  them 
continually  is  to  exaggerate  them,  and  one  cannot 
avoid  remarking  that,  while  the  decisions  made  in  the 
favor  of  each  country  have  been  accepted  as  a  matter 
of  just  due,  and  promptly  put  out  of  mind,  contrary 
decisions  have  been  carefully  kept  in  the  memory, 
where  they  rankle  and  burn  at  the  least  provocation. 
Everybody,  in  short,  feels  bitter  and  hurt,  and  a  little 
bit  angry. 

To  make  matters  worse,  the  "principal  allied  pow- 
ers" have  perhaps  proceeded  too  confidently  in  the 
way  of  offering  "friendly  advice"  to  their  lesser  asso- 
ciates. French  military  missions,  composed  of  experi- 
enced technicians,  have  performed  invaluable  work  in 
reorganizing  and  training  the  Czech  and  Polish  armies; 


56  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

but  the  irritation  of  mind  of  the  beneficiaries  is  such 
that  I  feel  sure  these  services  have  not  been  adequately 
appreciated.  The  United  States,  for  its  part,  at  the 
instance  of  Mr.  Herbert  Hoover,  placed  skilled  Amer- 
ican engineers  at  the  disposal  of  several  states  to  help 
them  out  of  their  transportation  difficulties.  The  idea 
was  good  and  the  studies  and  suggestions  laid  before 
the  various  ministries  by  the  American  missions  are 
doubtless  of  great  value;  but  they  have  not,  to  any 
extent,  been  followed.  Again,  relief  organizations,  like 
the  Red  Cross,  have  frequently  had  inexplicable  dif- 
ficulties in  securing  anything  like  genuine  cooperation 
from  the  peoples  they  desired  to  serve.  And  I  could 
multiply  examples.  Advice  may  be  exactly  what  these 
countries  need;  it  is  the  last  thing  they  want.  They 
will  solicit  loans  of  money  or  raw  stuffs,  but  they  do 
not  want  to  be  told  how  they  shall  employ  them. 

The  basis  of  this  disinclination  to  take  advice  is  a 
growing  distrust  which  the  smaller  powers  have  con- 
ceived of  the  larger.  They  are  not  only  sensitive  under 
the  suspicion  of  criticism,  and  exceedingly  jealous  of 
their  independence,  but  they  incline  to  suspect  ungener- 
ous motives  under  even  the  friendliest  proposals.  A 
suggestion  which  seems  at  first  glance  intended  merely 
for  their  own  good,  must  be  weighed  and  analyzed 
from  every  point  of  view,  lest  it  be  found  to  contain 
a  double  import.  The  precaution  is  perhaps  well- 
founded,  but  it  might  be  exercised  with  more  discretion. 
There  have  been  some  over-heated  brains  which  have 
thought  they  detected  in  some  of  the  most  innocent 
charitable  endeavors  the  spirit  of  a  hostile  propaganda, 
or  the  forerunner  of  an  attempt  at  economic  enslave- 
ment.   All  in  all,  Mr.  Vesnitch  was  expressing  a  senti- 


MORBID  PSYCHOLOGY  67 

merit  by  no  means  unique  when,  as  premier  of  Jugo- 
slavia, he  said  to  me: 

"We  do  not  intend  to  take  orders  henceforth  from 
anybody — not  from  Moscow  any  more  than  from  Ber- 
lin, and  not  from  London  any  more  than  from  Paris. 
The  powers  must  understand  that  the  child  has 
grown  up." 

This  hjrpersensitive  independence  is  aggravated  by 
the  acute  fear  in  which  each  country  seems  now  to  stand 
of  all  its  neighbors.  Not  one  but  feels  itself  to  be 
entirely  surrounded  by  enemies,  whom  it  supposes  to  be 
plotting  against  it,  and  who,  as  a  fact,  generally  are; 
although  each  believes  itself  to  be  conspiring  solely  in 
self-defense,  and  would  indignantly  combat  the  charge 
that  it  was  contemplating  aggression. 

"My  neighbor  is  my  enemy,  but  my  neighbor's  neigh- 
bor is  my  friend."  So  runs  the  old  ironical  saying. 
And  this  is  indeed  the  political  principle  on  which  most 
of  the  nations  seem  to  be  acting.  Five  states — Italy, 
Jugo-Slavia,  Hungary,  Czecho-Slovakia  and  Poland- 
lie  in  a  row  up  through  the  middle  of  Europe.  Apply- 
ing the  foregoing  principle,  Italy  flirts  with  Hungary 
over  the  shoulder  of  Jugo-Slavia,  and  Hungary  winks 
understandingly  across  Czecho-Slovakia  to  Poland; 
while  Jugo-Slavia  and  Czecho-Slovakia,  squeezing  Hun- 
gary between  them,  sign  a  "defensive  alliance."  In 
the  same  way,  Greece  and  Roumania,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  Bulgaria's  antipathy,  become  the  warmest  of 
friends.  The  Czechs  sympathize  with  the  Russians 
against  the  Poles,  whom  the  Russians  are  of  one  mind 
with  the  Germans  in  desiring  to  crush. 

Between  this  fear  and  this  distrust,  the  sentiment  of 
xenophobia,  never  entirely  absent  in  any  people,  has 


68  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

reached  a  rare  intensity  in  the  south  and  the  center  of 
Europe,  and  is  extended  with  especial  vigor  to  racial 
minorities.  The  peace  treaties  tried  to  make  provision 
against  this  contingency  by  inserting  clauses  guarantee- 
ing minority  rights;  but  you  cannot  legislate  about  peo- 
ples' feelings,  and  where  the  law  contradicts  the  feel- 
ing, ways  of  evasion  of  the  spirit,  if  not  of  the  letter, 
of  the  law  will  always  be  found.  Within  their  own 
boundaries,  the  Roumanians  hate  the  Magyars,  Bul- 
gars  and  Russians;  the  Magyars  and  Poles  hate  the 
Jews;  and  the  Czechs  hate  the  Germans.  There  may 
even  be  alliances  of  minorities  against  majorities,  as, 
for  example,  that  of  the  Germans  and  Magyars  against 
the  Czechs  in  Czecho-Slovakia.  The  hatred  of  racial 
minorities  is  extended  in  less  degree  to  all  foreigners, 
whose  presence  is  looked  upon  with  more  or  less  sus- 
picion. Popular  speculation  regarding  a  foreigner  gen- 
erally runs  over  grounds  something  like  these :  he  may 
be  an  "enemy"  spy;  he  may,  although  politically  inno- 
cent, be  trying  to  crowd  some  native  out  of  a  job; 
taking  advantage  of  the  depreciated  currency,  he  may 
be  a  speculator,  a  usurer,  or  a  profiteer;  or  again,  it 
may  be  that,  in  spite  of  his  protestations  of  friendship, 
his  impressions  are  unjustly  unfavorable,  and  that  when 
he  leaves  the  country,  he  will  poison  public  opinion 
against  it;  in  any  case,  he  is  eating  food  and  drinking 
wine  which  are  none  too  plentiful,  and  thereby  helping 
to  increase  the  already  exorbitant  cost  of  living.  Such 
reasoning  may  be  naive ;  it  is  nevertheless  current.  For- 
eigners simply  are  not  welcome,  so  far,  at  least,  as  the 
masses  of  the  population  are  concerned. 

Finally,  not  only  is  each  country  unnaturally  sensi- 
tive as  to  its  own  importance,  smarting  under  a  sense 


MORBID  PSYCHOLOGY  69 

of  wrong,  unwilling  to  take  advice,  distrustful  of  its 
friends,  afraid  of  its  neighbors,  suspicious  of  everything 
and  everybody ;  but,  to  top  the  climax,  each  is  fervently 
and  ineradicably  convinced  of  its  own  essential  right- 
ness.  Always  and  always,  it  is  the  opponent  who  is  at 
fault.  The  confidence  of  these  various  peoples  in  this 
exceedingly  dubious  axiom  is  little  short  of  sublime. 
Their  hands  tremble,  their  eyes  flash,  their  voices  break, 
as  they  retail  to  you  the  story  of  their  injured  inno- 
cence. It  seems  impossible,  yet  it  is  so.  It  seems  like 
a  comedy,  but  it  is  tragic — the  age-long  tragedy  of 
human  frailty,  ever  ready  to  cry  out  against  the  failings 
of  others,  but  of  one's  own  shortcomings,  respectful 
and  shy.  The  real  trouble  with  Europe  is,  too  much 
human  frailty. 

This  morbid  psychology  is  further  accentuated  by 
two  factors — intensive  propaganda,  and  an  anxious  pre- 
occupation with  the  idea  of  national  defense,  the  work- 
ings of  each  of  which  in  turn  I  shall  now  go  on  to 
discuss. 


PROPAGANDA 

The  phenomena  of  modern  propaganda  are  so  ef- 
fective and  so  significant  that  they  are  worthy  of  the 
statesman's  keenest  study;  and,  indeed,  statesmen  have 
not  been  lax  in  putting  their  newly  acquired  knowledge 
Into  practice.  I  am  not  unfamiliar  with  the  official 
point  of  view:  in  countries  weakened  by  distress,  or 
countries  newly  created,  patriotism  is  life  itself.  It  is 
nervous  energy,  it  is  reserve  strength,  it  is  the  will 
to  survive.  Without  its  generous  support,  a  govern- 
ment can  do  nothing;  with  it,  everything  becomes  pos- 
sible. Where  national  sentiment  does  not  exist,  it  must 
be  stimulated  artificially.  For  example,  Austria's  pres- 
ent failure  to  realize  this  is  costing  it  dear.  Feeling  no 
common  bonds  of  sentiment  or  interest,  each  class  and 
each  locality  goes  its  own  egoistic  way;  the  result  Is 
disintegration,  mild  anarchy,  beggary — until  it  Is  only 
by  the  will  and  pleasure  of  other  states  that  Austria's 
existence  is  preserved.  Waving  the  flag,  cheering  the 
king  or  the  president,  celebrating  one's  own  virtues 
and  damning  the  foreigner,  are  therefore  political  ex- 
pedients of  genuine  value,  under  certain  conditions. 
They  can,  however,  be  overdone ;  and  what  might  have 
remained  a  virtue  becomes  a  vice. 

Slander,  distortion  and  deliberate  falsehood,  evoked 

for  the  double  purpose  of  strengthening  one's  own 

morale,  and  weakening  the  morale  of  the  enemy  by 

60 


PROPAGANDA  61 

provoking  internal  dissensions,  are  weapons  as  old  as 
history.  Their  development  in  the  late  war,  how- 
ever, was  based  on  something  quite  modern — the  new 
science  of  psychology,  as  professed  in  the  universities, 
and  as  popularized  in  the  great  recent  frenzy  of  com- 
mercial publicity.  We  are,  it  appears,  poor  creatures 
enough,  a  prey  to  the  hypnotics  of  every  charlatan,  and 
able  no  better  than  so  many  lunatics  to  resist  the  in- 
fluence of  repeated  suggestion.  Our  brains  are  like 
so  much  soft  wax,  to  be  scrawled  upon  ad  libitum  by 
the  reflex  of  colored-poster  or  large  black  type.  The 
image  of  a  clean  cow  on  a  label  convinces  us  that  the 
milk  is  pure;  and  it  suffices  to  repeat  over  a  large  num- 
ber of  billboards  that  "Benjamin's  Bacon  Is  Best,"  for 
us  to  believe  it.  The  "age  of  reason,"  whose  near 
advent  was  confidently  predicted  a  hundred  years  ago, 
has  been  ignominiously  preempted  by  the  "age  of 
advertising." 

The  Germans  were  the  first  to  grasp  the  potentiali- 
ties of  propaganda  in  the  war;  but  in  this,  as  in  mili- 
tary initiative,  the  allies  were  not  slow  to  follow;  and 
by  the  time  the  United  States,  with  its  genius  for  pub- 
licity, came  into  the  field,  the  moral  equilibrium  was 
definitely  broken.  It  may  almost  be  said  that  Presi- 
dent Wilson  gave  more  personal  attention  to  the  or- 
ganisation of  the  Committee  on  Public  Information 
than  he  did  to  the  organization  of  the  army.  There 
are  those  who  maintain  that  the  President's  notes  and 
speeches,  fired  boldly  Into  the  middle  of  Europe,  were 
more  powerful  than  the  largest  guns,  and  that  propa- 
ganda played  a  larger  part  than  strategy  in  the  enemy's 
defeat — a  view,  however,  which  must  be  received  with 
reserve. 


62  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

These  momentous  lessons  were  not  lost  on  the  gov- 
ernments concerned.  The  Peace  Conference,  conceived 
originally  as  a  great  court  of  public  opinion,  degen- 
erated into  an  orgy  of  after-dinner  speeches,  newspaper 
conferences,  communiques,  pamphlets  and  press  agents. 
Truth  cowered  colder  and  more  neglected  than  ever 
at  the  bottom  of  the  well,  and  "things  as  they  are"  were 
crowded  aside  in  the  struggle  of  a  hundred  conflicting 
presentations  of  "things  as  they  might  be  made  to 
seem."  From  such  distracting  contaminations  the  su- 
preme council  shrank  in  fright,  and,  on  the  whole,  I 
do  not  believe  that  its  decisions  were  much  influenced  by 
public  opinion;  but  these  great  press  campaigns  have 
had  a  permanent  effect,  nevertheless,  for  the  nations 
have  now  acquired  the  propaganda  habit.  "Control 
of  public  opinion"  has  become  a  function  of  state. 

How  is  this  control  exercised?  The  problem  falls 
naturally  under  two  heads:  home  opinion,  and  foreign. 
With  regard  to  home  opinion,  the  government's  first 
step  is  to  determine  what  it  wants  to  make  people  be- 
lieve; its  second  is  to  associate  as  many  political  lead- 
ers as  possible  with  its  viewpoint,  and  make  to  Im- 
portant opponents  such  concessions  as  may  seem  ex- 
pedient. Having  thus  assembled  the  necessary  pres- 
tige, it  may  now  proceed,  by  the  well-known  process 
of  affirmation  and  reiteration,  to  open  its  campaign,  in 
speeches,  press  editorials  and  Interviews,  and  In  the 
selection  and  pruning  of  news.  Mental  contagion  will 
do  the  rest. 

In  America,  the  pruning  of  news  Is  a  difficult  and 
dangerous.  If  not  an  Impossible  undertaking.  In  Amer- 
ica, the  press  is  still,  thanks  to  its  wealth  and  Its  In- 
itiative, relatively  free.    But  In  "Balkanlzed  Europe" 


PROPAGANDA  63 

the  newspapers  are  poor;  and  not  being  able  to  afford 
correspondents  of  their  own,  even  opposition  organs 
are  obliged  to  accept  such  reports  and  dispatches  as 
the  government,  controlling  the  telegraph  wires  and 
all  the  important  news  sources,  may  choose  to  dole  out 
to  them.  This  is  of  course  especially  true  regarding 
news  from  abroad.  In  theory,  the  censorship  is  now 
abolished  nearly  everywhere.  In  practice,  it  still  has 
ways  of  maintaining  itself.  Some  dispatches  "never 
arrive."  Others,  when  delivered,  are  found  to  be  so 
badly  garbled  in  transmission  that  to  reduce  them  to 
sense  is  beyond  editorial  skill. 

The  influencing  of  foreign  opinion  may  be  a  no  less 
desirable,  but  it  is  a  far  more  delicate  undertaking. 
The  Germans  who,  during  the  war,  placed  a  $50,- 
000,000  propaganda  credit  at  the  disposition  of  their 
ambassador  in  Washington,  and  who  were  ready  to 
spend  as  much  as  $1,400,000  to  buy  a  single  French 
newspaper,  found  to  their  cost  that  mere  money  is 
not  enough.  Crude  or  brutal  methods  are  apt  to  prove 
a  boomerang.  It  is  essential  to  study  the  mentality  of 
each  people,  and  adapt  one's  efforts  in  consequence. 
The  Bolshevist  dictators  seem  to  have  grasped  this 
principle  very  well.  They  talk  loan  reimbursements 
to  the  French,  commerce  and  concessions  to  Britain  and 
America,  wheat  to  Italy,  and  the  destruction  of  the 
Versailles  Treaty  to  the  Germans.  Their  tone  with 
financiers  differs  nicely  from  their  tone  with  the  prole- 
tariat. All  this  is,  of  course,  entirely  in  accordance 
with  the  precepts  of  the  new  science  of  publicity.  When 
it  is  decided  what  is  best  to  be  ladled  out  to  the  various 
countries,  distribution  is  effected  by  means  of  interviews 
to  foreign  correspondents,  the  speeches  of  official,  or 


64  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

semi-official  missions,  and  the  tentatives  of  press  agents 
attached  to  embassies  and  legations.  An  exchange  of 
professors  or  pastors,  reports  to  international  scien- 
tific or  charitable  bodies — all,  alas,  may  be  turned  to 
advantage.  The  presence  of  a  colony  of  loyal  emi- 
grants in  the  country  which  it  is  desired  to  influence  is 
especially  useful.  The  Greeks  in  America  are  merely 
one  case  in  point.  It  is  impossible  for  an  American 
paper  to  print  anything  critical  regarding  Greece  with- 
out at  once  receiving  one  or  a  series  of  letters  of  pro- 
test and  denial. 

If  I  were  to  classify  the  states  with  which  I  am  now 
chiefly  concerned,  in  the  order  of  their  advertising  ef- 
ficiency, I  should  rate  them  as  follows:  Hungary, 
Czecho-Slovakia,  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Poland,  Austria, 
Jugo-Slavia,  Roumania.  The  Roumanian  government 
does  not  maintain  so  much  as  a  press  bureau  in  the 
national  capital.  Roumanian  opinion,  apparently,  is 
little  inclined  to  get  out  of  hand.  As  regards  propa- 
ganda, Roumania  may  probably  be  considered  the 
most  backward  country  of  Europe,  but  whether  this 
is  to  its  credit,  or  its  discredit,  one  hesitates  to  say. 

A  good  specimen  of  a  nation  in  a  high  fever  of  pub- 
licity is  Hungary.  Before  the  war,  the  Hungarians 
had  scarcely  given  a  thought  to  such  matters.  But 
they  are  an  intelligent  people,  and  having  lost  two- 
thirds  of  their  country  through  what  they  believe  to 
have  been  the  sheer  ignorance  of  the  western  powers 
regarding  the  m&rits  of  their  case,  they  have  decided 
that  the  time  has  come  to  make  themselves  known. 
The  government's  endeavors  are  being  seconded  by  an 
organization  known  as  the  "Territorial  Integrity 
League,"  which  claims — perhaps  not  without  exaggera- 


PROPAGANDA  65 

tion — to  have  three  and  a  half  million  members. 
Pamphlets,  leaflets,  maps,  books  and  posters  are  being 
printed  in  every  language.  To  such  countries  as  Poland 
and  Italy,  with  which,  for  political  reasons,  it  is  de- 
sired to  form  special  ties,  lecturers  with  moving-pictures 
are  being  dispatched.  Hungary,  itself,  is  flooded  with 
posters  and  picture  postcards,  protesting  against  the 
dismemberment.  "Nem,  nem,  soha  1"  cry  the  bold- 
faced letters:  "No,  no,  never!"  And  in  this  spirit 
the  temper  of  the  people  is  being  firmly  forged. 

For  foreign  consumption,  the  following  arguments 
are  put  forth:  Hungary  is  a  thousand  years  old;  un- 
der the  Dual  Monarchy,  Austria  overshadowed  it,  and 
it  never  had  a  chance  to  win  the  sympathies  of  other 
powers;  it  accepted  the  war  solely  to  avenge  itself 
on  Russia  for  having  helped  Austria  to  crush  it  in 
1848;  it  is  a  complete  economic  and  geographical  unit, 
and  economic  unity  is  of  more  importance  than  the 
principle  of  nationality,  as  the  allies,  themselves,  rec- 
ognized, when  in  drawing  the  frontiers  of  Bohemia, 
they  included  a  couple  of  million  Germans;  within  this 
geographical  unit,  the  Magyars  ruled  solely  because 
they  happened  to  be  the  strongest,  numerically  and 
in  character,  of  seven  races;  plebiscites  should  have 
been  held — most  of  the  people  taken  away  from  Hun- 
gary would  have  preferred  to  remain;  the  allies,  in 
arousing  race  fanaticism,  are  stirring  a  volcano;  the 
Treaty  is  a  death-sentence;  the  loss  of  Pressburg,  the 
coronation  city,  and  of  Kassa,  Rakoczy's  birthplace, 
are  worse  than  the  loss  to  France  of  Metz  and  Strass- 
burg  in  1871 ;  Hungary  will  never  rest  until  it  recovers 
its  natural  frontiers;  it  will  give  up — reluctantly — 
Croatia   and  Slavonia,  which  lie  beyond  the   rivers 


66  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

Drave  and  Danube;  but  the  rest  of  its  fortified  terri- 
tories— ^no,  no,  never  1 

This  is  good  strong  material,  well  conceived.  The 
Magyars,  however,  have  opposed  to  them  two  groups 
of  hostile  propagandists,  who  are  not  to  be  disdained — 
the  Czechs,  whose  able  president,  Mr.  Thomas  Ma- 
saryk,  is  well  aware  that  there  is  in  existence  an  inge- 
nious machine  known  as  a  printing-press;  and  the 
refugee  Jew  communists,  who,  after  the  fall  of  Bela 
Kun,  fled  from  Budapest  and  took  refuge  in  Vienna. 
Publicity  seems  to  be  a  communist  specialty;  this  group 
is  no  exception.  Provided,  apparently,  with  ample  funds 
from  headquarters  at  Moscow,  well-organized,  and 
possessing  a  newspaper  or  two,  they  have  devoted  them- 
selves relentlessly  to  the  purpose  of  blackening  Hun- 
gary's name  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  in  general,  and  of 
the  Austrians  in  particular.  In  the  present  disorgan- 
ized state  of  Central  European  communications,  they 
occupy  a  strong  strategic  position.  No  wires  can  go 
out  of  Hungary  without  passing  through  hostile  ter- 
ritory. The  emigre  communists  are  free  to  invent  what 
yarns  they  please  regarding  the  Magyars.  Their  in- 
ventions are  maliciously  reproduced  in  the  Viennese 
papers,  and  are  thence  cabled  all  over  the  world,  in 
more  or  less  good  faith,  by  the  representatives  of  for- 
eign press  agencies. 

Their  masterpiece  was  the  "white  terror"  propa- 
ganda. There  was  just  enough  truth  in  the  assertion 
that  the  Magyars,  exasperated  by  their  experience  of 
the  "red  terror"  under  communism,  were  maltreating 
the  Jews  in  Budapest,  to  permit  full  play  to  the  un- 
scrupulous imaginations  of  hatred  and  malice.  I  hap- 
pened to  visit  Budapest  at  a  time  when  the  so-called 


PROPAGANDA  67 

"white  terror"  was  supposed  to  be  at  its  height.  From 
assurances  given  me  in  Vienna  I  had  even  expected  to 
run  personal  danger.  I  was  warned,  for  example,  not 
to  venture  in  the  streets  after  dark  on  pain  of  my 
life.  It  was  with  considerable  astonishment,  therefore, 
that  I  found  absolute  order  and  perfect  quiet  prevail- 
ing in  Btidapest.  The  streets  at  night  were  thronged 
with  peaceful  pedestrians.  I  had  occasion  to  pass  sev- 
eral times  through  the  Jewish  quarter,  and  it  was  as 
calm  and  as  crowded  and  active  as  the  rest  of  the  city. 
There  had,  indeed,  been  several  hundred  executions, 
official  and  otherwise,  of  workmen  and  Jews,  in  the 
troubles  following  the  overthrow  of  Bela  Kun,  and 
there  were  some  two  thousand  of  his  partisans  await- 
ing trial  in  a  concentration  camp.  There  had  been,  I 
was  told,  cases  of  assault  against  Jews  in  the  streets 
of  the  capital,  but  I  talked  to  a  good  many  people, 
and  I  did  not  meet  one  who  had  actually  happened  to 
see  anything  of  the  kind.  Yet  so  effective  was  the 
"information"  invented  by  the  Vienna  refugees  that 
the  various  foreign  legations  in  Budapest  were  asked 
by  their  governments  to  make  personal  investigations; 
and  the  Austrian  workmen,  who  are  half-starved,  were 
induced,  by  way  of  protest  against  the  "white  terror," 
to  declare  a  futile  blockade  against  Hungary,  which 
had  food  to  export  I 

Propaganda  wars  of  a  similar  description  are  con- 
stantly breaking  out  at  present  in  Central  Europe  and 
the  Balkans,  and  do  much  to  increase  the  general  ner- 
vous tension.  The  number  of  falsehoods,  which  some- 
times in  good  faith,  but  oftener  in  bad,  are  continually 
being  set  in  circulation  by  each  country  regarding  the 
others,  must  be  enormous.    Everything  that  goes  wrong 


68  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

at  home  is  laid  to  enemy  propaganda,  and  everything 
that  goes  wrong  abroad  becomes  an  occasion  for  re- 
doubling one's  own  propagandist  activities.  The  air 
seethes  with  rumors,  none  of  which  are  seriously  in- 
vestigated, and  all  of  which  are  more  or  less  believed. 

Though  the  word  has  acquired  an  evil  connotation, 
there  is  nothing  essentially  objectionable  about  pro- 
paganda. It  may  be  good  as  well  as  bad.  It  may  be 
used  to  arouse  sentiments  of  friendship  as  well  as  senti- 
ments of  hate.  I,  personally,  do  not  object  to  even 
the  most  violent  tracts  provided  I  am  able  to  procure 
the  equally  violent  tracts  of  the  other  side,  and  con- 
front the  two.  If  I  read  in  one  street  that  "Benjamin's 
Bacon  is  the  Best"  and  in  another  that  "Bolliver's 
Bacon  is  Unexcelled,"  I  flatter  myself  that  either  I,  or 
any  other  normal  human  being,  would  have  the  critical 
sense  to  compare  the  two  before  deciding  between  them. 

It  is  only  when  it  excludes  altogether  the  opposing 
viewpoint;  when,  instead  of  serving  the  cause  of  friend- 
ship and  better  understanding,  it  is  put  to  the  opposite 
uses,  as  in  much  of  Europe  to-day,  that  its  results  be- 
come truly  nefarious.  Through  its  potent  agency,  self- 
glorification  is  abused  to  the  point  of  indecency;  the 
sense  of  wrong  is  stung  to  an  incessant  fever;  the 
paralyzing  spirit  of  distrust  and  fear  is  fostered,  and 
the  peoples  walk  in  blind  self-righteousness.  The  only 
consoling  thought  is  that  a  day  may  come  when  this 
mighty  force  will  be  set  conscientiously  to  the  task  of 
improving,  rather  than  embittering,  international  rela- 
tions. 


THE  NEW  MILITARISM 

As  If  by  a  kind  of  fatal  irony,  out  of  the  war  which 
was  to  have  ended  all  wars,  there  has  sprung  up  in 
"Balkanized  Europe"  a  new  militarism,  which,  in  its 
psychological  effects,  is  no  less  important  than  propa- 
ganda has  been  shown  to  be. 

To  countries  which,  rightly  or  wrongly,  imagine 
themselves  to  be  surrounded  by  enemies,  preoccupations 
of  national  defense  are  of  the  first  importance. 

It  was  commonly  believed,  at  the  time  of  the  armis- 
tice, that  the  formation  of  a  League  of  Nations  would 
be  succeeded  by  a  general  disarmament ;  but  the  failure 
of  the  League  to  provide  a  system  of  international 
police  precluded  this  happy  eventuality.  I  consent  to  go 
out  at  night,  unarmed,  only  when  I  know  that  in  every 
street  is  a  fully  equipped  policeman  whose  business  it 
is  to  defend  me  in  case  I  am  attacked.  The  fact  that 
many  of  the  pronunciamentos  of  the  allies  in  council 
could  not  be  enforced  for  lack  of  available  troops  was 
not  lo^  on  the  smaller  states.  In  the  face  of  repeated 
summons  from  the  conference,  Poles  and  Ruthenians 
only  stopped  fighting  after  the  Poles  were  victorious. 
The  Roumanians  who,  having  defeated  the  Hungarian 
communists,  were  ordered  by  the  conference  not  to 
enter  Budapest,  disregarded  this  order  with  complete 
impunity.  The  Poles,  In  August,  1920,  had  only  them- 
selves to  rely  upon  to  save  their  capital  from  the 

69 


70  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

onslaught  of  Russian  Bolshevists;  and  the  Germans,  in 
the  opinion  of  some  European  statesmen,  are  fulfilling 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  only  because  of  the  menace  of 
a  French  army  on  the  Rhine. 

It  is  considered  to  be  clear,  therefore,  that  as  the 
larger  powers  can  at  present  accord  the  smaller  no  real 
guarantee  of  safety,  the  smaller  must  look  to  themselves 
as  best  they  are  able.  A  national  army,  moreover,  in 
these  times  of  social  convulsions,  is  deemed  necessary 
for  the  preservation  of  internal  order.  In  countries 
like  Roumania,  Poland,  and  Jugo-Slavia,  whose  internal 
unity  is  still  far  from  complete,  military  service  is  re- 
garded as  a  powerful  solvent  for  the  different  new  ele- 
ments comprised  in  the  nation. 

Only  two  of  the  countries  of  "Balkanized  Europe," 
— namely  Roumania  and  Jugo-Slavia,  have  frontiers 
which  are  militarily  defensible,  and  even  they  are  not 
satisfied.  Greece,  Bulgaria,  Czecho-Slovakia,  Poland, 
and  especially  Hungary  and  Austria — all  feel  them- 
selves to  lie  practically  at  the  mercy  of  their  inimically- 
minded  neighbors.  Consequently,  they  endeavor,  as  I 
have  explained,  to  conclude  alliances  with  their  neigh- 
bor's neighbor  against  their  neighbor,  and  for  the  rest, 
they  build  up  their  army,  gathering  arms  and  material 
wherever  and  however  they  can. 

Bulgaria,  Austria  and  Hungary  being  "enemy"  coun- 
tries, the  size  of  their  military  establishments  has  been 
definitely  limited  by  the  peace  treaties,  and  only  recruit- 
ing by  voluntary  enlistment  for  a  long  term  of  years  Is 
permitted.  Bulgaria  Is  accorded  a  maximum  of  20,000 
soldiers  and  10,000  police;  the  Hungarian  army  is  set 
at  35,000  men,  and  the  Austrian  Is  similarly  reduced. 

Austria's  situation  is  special.    Austria  differs  funda- 


THE  NEW  MILITARISM  71 

mentally  from  the  other  countries  in  having  seemingly 
lost  even  the  desire  to  live.  Its  feeble  socialist  govern- 
ment was  recently  feeding  an  army  of  something  like 
30,000  men,  of  whom  people  said  that  they  wore  uni- 
forms because  they  had  no  other  clothes,  and  carried 
guns  for  lack  of  picks  and  shovels.  They  were  poorly 
disciplined  and  of  small  military  value.  At  the  same 
time  the  "red"  government  resisted  all  efforts  to  force 
it  to  transform  the  exclusively  socialist  character  of  this 
army;  and  when  the  allies  insisted  that  recruiting  must 
be  regional,  the  government  simply  distributed  its  work- 
men soldiers  over  the  provinces,  and  saw  to  it  that  of 
all  the  volunteers  who  presented  themselves,  these  only 
were  accepted.  It  thus  appears  that  the  Austrian  army, 
such  as  it  is,  is  social  in  character  rather  than  national. 

Bulgaria,  being  a  community  of  farmers,  is  having 
considerable  trouble  in  recruiting  troops  by  voluntary 
enlistment.  The  people  are  used  to  conscription,  and 
prefer  it.  With  this  in  mind,  the  government  is  putting 
into  effect  a  scheme  of  universal  "labor"  conscription, 
male  and  female,  for  a  two-year  period,  which,  while 
it  is  supposedly  industrial  rather  than  military,  does  ob- 
viously maintain  the  whole  machinery  of  full  mobiliza- 
tion, and  extends  it  even  to  women,  the  value  of  whose 
labor,  in  time  of  war,  has  been  sufficiently  attested. 

Hungary  has,  I  believe,  only  about  22,000  men  at 
present  under  arms,  but  they  are  as  fine  troops  as  one 
could  wish  to  see,  alert,  fiery  and  well  in  hand.  The 
task  of  restoring  discipline  after  the  communism  of  the 
Bela  Kun  regime,  was  no  slight  one;  but  it  has  been 
successfully  accomplished.  The  Magyars  are  a  vigor- 
ous and  war-like  people.  They  have  all  had  sufficient 
military  training  in  the  late  war  to  last  them  the  rest 


7«  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

of  their  lives.  It  Is  only  the  question  of  how  to  train 
the  young,  new  classes  without  infringing  the  treaty 
which  is  perplexing  the  government. 

Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Hungary  have  all  nominally 
surrendered  their  surplus  arms  to  the  Entente;  but  in 
Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  if  I  am  properly  informed, 
there  are  still  hidden  arsenals,  and  weapons  privately 
concealed,  throughout  the  country. 

Poland,  Czecho-Slovakia,  Roumania,  Jugo-Slavia 
and  Greece,  being  rated  as  members  of  the  Entente, 
have  been  left  free  to  develop  whatever  military  system 
they  choose,  and  indeed  have  been  materially  assisted 
in  the  task  by  the  larger  powers.  Britain,  Italy,  the 
United  States  and  France  have  furnished  them  arms 
or  equipment.  France  has  supplied  staffs  of  military 
technicians  for  purposes  of  training  and  organization. 

Poland  was  born  Into  war.  Its  prime  necessity  was 
to  raise  an  army,  first  by  volunteers,  then  by  conscrip- 
tion. Until  August,  1920,  when  a  general  mobiliza- 
tion was  proclaimed  for  the  defense  of  Warsaw,  there 
had  been  six  classes  under  arms — all  men  from  the 
ages  of  eighteen  to  twenty-five — a  total  of  something 
like  half  a  million.  The  army  particularly  lacks  tech- 
nicians and  experienced  superior  officers,  but,  under 
the  Influence  of  a  devout  patriotism.  Its  discipline  is 
good.  General  Joseph  Pilsudskl,  the  commander-in- 
chief,  is  also  the  chief-of-state.  One  of  the  burning 
questions  of  Polish  politics  today  Is  whether.  In  the 
future,  these  two  decisive  functions  may  safely  be  en- 
trusted to  the  same  man. 

Czecho-Slovakia,  when  Its  demobilization  is  com- 
pleted, will  have  a  standing  army  of  150,000,  some- 
what lacking  in  experienced  upper  officers,  and  some- 


THE  NEW  MILITARISM  73 

what  honeycombed  by  internal  politics  (soldiers  here 
are  allowed  to  vote),  but  good  sound  material, 
although  the  Czechs  are  not  essentially  a  military 
people.  Military  service  is  compulsory  for  a  period  of 
two  years,  though  it  is  said  that  this  term  is  to  be 
gradually  reduced  in  the  future. 

In  Roumania,  the  period  of  conscription  is  also  two 
years,  giving  a  standing  army  of  150,000.  Owing  to 
the  necessity  of  keeping  troops  of  occupation  in  the  new 
provinces — Transylvania,  the  Banat,  the  Boukovina 
and  Bessarabia — there  are  still  nearly  double  this  num- 
ber of  men  in  uniform  (September,  1920).  The  Rou- 
manians are  not  conspicuous  for  military  genius,  but 
they  have  been  working  hard  at  army  reorganization, 
and  are  said  to  have  accomplished  good  results. 

The  Greek  army  of  the  future  will  probably  also  be 
based  on  two  years'  conscription.  This  army  has  shown 
itself,  in  its  campaigns  of  occupation  in  Thrace  and 
Asia-Minor,  to  be  unexpectedly  competent  and  well-led. 
There  are  at  present,  I  believe,  something  like  200,000 
men  under  arms. 

All  in  all,  the  best  army  in  "Balkanized  Europe"  is 
probably  that  of  Jugo-Slavia.  The  framework  is  that 
of  the  Serbian  establishment  which  has  now  experienced 
eight  consecutive  years  of  campaign  service.  The  com- 
mand is  said  to  be  excellent,  and  the  quality  of  the 
soldiers  has  been  well  proved.  The  Serbian  peasant 
takes  naturally  to  military  life;  bravery  in  battle  is  the 
national  ideal;  and  as  for  the  Croats,  they  were  con- 
sidered the  best  soldiers  of  Austria.  Conscription  is 
for  two  years  In  the  cavalry  and  artillery,  a  year  and 
a  half  in  the  infantry.  In  addition,  in  the  new  provinces 
—Croatia,  Slovenia,  Bosnia,  Montenegro,  Dalmatia, 


74  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  Banat — all  men,  up  to  the  age  of  thirty-two,  are 
being  conscripted  for  two  months'  periods,  to  accustom 
them  to  the  Serbian  system.  There  is  a  standing  army 
of  150,000,  but  full  mobilization  would,  it  is  declared, 
give  a  million  and  a  half.  Despite  the  disasters  and 
hardships  of  the  great  war,  this  army  is  in  fine  fettle, 
and  would  fight,  one  is  led  to  believe,  at  the  drop  of 
a  hat.  In  this  respect,  it  is  probably  unique  in  Europe 
to-day. 

The  financial  burden  of  these  important  armies  on 
small  and  impoverished  states  is  very  heavy;  but  it  is 
accepted  without  a  murmur.  The  tendency  is  rather  to 
increase  than  to  diminish  military  efficiency.  For  the 
peoples  of  this  part  of  the  world  are  unanimous  in  the 
belief  that  the  latest  war  was  by  no  means  the  last. 

It  is  out  of  this  belief  that  the  new  militarism  has 
risen;  and  preoccupations  of  national  defense  react  in 
turn  on  the  national  psychology  to  strengthen  the  belief. 
Bulgaria  and  Hungary  are  especially  irritable.  Not 
only  are  these  countries  now  filled  with  professional 
officers  -who,  having  no  longer  any  employment,  are 
ready  for  any  kind  of  patriotic  adventure,  but  the  whole 
population  smarts  under  the  reductions  of  armament 
imposed  by  the  treaties,  the  spirit  of  which  they  are 
far  from  accepting.  The  neighboring  countries,  keenly 
aware  of  this  explosive  discontent,  disquieted  further 
by  national  propaganda,  impressed  by  Poland's  struggle 
with  Russia,  and  nervous  over  Jugo-Slavia's  quarrel 
with  Italy,  to  say  nothing  of  half  a  dozen  minor  quar- 
rels, are  taking  their  precautions  accordingly,  and  live 
to-day  rather  in  an  atmosphere  of  war  than  of  peace. 

To  the  confused,  overwrought,  unhealthy  and 
dangerous  state  of  mind  which  I  have  attempted  to 


THE  NEW  MILITARISM  75 

describe,  one  other  element  of  disturbance  must  be 
added.  Across  the  currents  of  nationalist  and  racial 
unrest  there  blows  a  wind  of  social  unrest — a  myste- 
rious sirocco  which  may  be  said  to  leave  no  brain  en- 
tirely untouched  by  its  cunning  trouble.  Although  not 
so  strong  as  national  sentiment,  class-feeling,  quickened 
by  the  war,  is  still  sufficient  to  set  workman  against 
manufacturer,  and  peasant  against  proprietor.  I  shall 
have  occasion  later  to  discuss  the  great  social  tendencies 
of  the  present  time  in  more  detail.  Let  it  suffice  for 
the  moment  to  state  that,  while  these  tendencies,  in 
their  constructive  phases,  are  really  less  developed  in 
the  culturally  backward  nations  of  "Balkanized  Eu- 
rope" than  in  the  advanced  civilizations  of  the  West, 
they  are  nevertheless  a  serious  complication. 

The  morbid  psychology  which  we  have  been  study- 
ing may  now  be  defined  as  follows:  A  nervous  exag- 
geration, affecting  whole  peoples,  of  distrust,  fear,  self- 
pity,  self-glorification  and  self-righteousness,  accentu- 
ated by  propaganda  and  militarism,  and  complicated 
by  social  unrest. 

It  is  this  condition  of  mind,  and  not  simply  the  ma- 
terial effects  of  the  war,  which  is  delaying  the  normal 
processes  of  reconstruction.  Considering  presently  its 
action  on  finance,  commerce,  industry,  and  agriculture, 
particularly  in  the  form  of  government  control,  we 
shall  see  the  extraordinary  perversion  and  paralysis 
into  which  it  has  contorted  a  large  part  of  Europe. 


ECONOMIC  SELF-SUFFICIENCY 

It  is  the  idea  of  national  defense  which  gives  birth 
to  the  idea  of  economic  self-sufficiency.  If  a  state  were 
indeed  in  no  possible  danger  of  external  aggression, 
then  it  would  be  far  more  difficult  to  reply  to  those 
economists  and  radicals  who  assert  that  free  trade  is 
the  only  rational  regime.  As  among  individuals,  so 
among  the  nations:  each  would  devote  itself  to  pro- 
ducing what  it  can  furnish  easiest  and  best,  procuring 
the  rest  of  its  needs  by  exchange  with  other  peoples. 
But  suppose  that,  following  out  this  economy,  certain 
nations  should  become  almost  entirely  industrial,  while 
the  rest  devoted  themselves  exclusively  to  agriculture. 
The  day  has  passed  when  it  was  sufficient  to  forge 
plowshares  into  swords  to  arm  a  legion.  Modern  war 
is  essentially  industrial.  Caesar's  Balearic  slingers  could 
be  recruited  among  shepherds  and  could  make  their 
own  slings.  But  modern  projectiles,  themselves  a  com- 
plicated factory  product,  can  only  be  discharged  by 
the  force  of  special  chemicals,  from  large  and  complex 
machines. 

The  tendency  Is  for  war  to  become  more  and  more 

industrial.    The  gradual  industrialization  of  the  French 

army,  for  example,  in  the  late  war  is  well  illustrated  by 

the  following  tables  published  recently  by  Col.  Fabry, 

formerly  of  the  French  general  staff: 

76 


ECONOMIC  SELF-SUFFICIENCY  77 

igz4  igtS           igig 

(projected) 

Rifles   900,000  260,000  

Machine  guns  4,000  20,000  

Heavy  cannon  300  4,000  

Aeroplanes   200  3i400           6,000 

Tanks    2,300           4*600 

Camions    9iOOO  100,000  

Aviation  service  (men) 6,000  100,000  250,000 

Rear  services    (men) 50,000  1,700,000  

Effectives  (percentage  of  total) 
1914  J918 

Infantry  66%  44% 

Artillery    16%  26% 

"In  1914,"  concludes  Col.  Fabry,  "men — especially 
infantry;  in  191 8,  machines — and  specialists,  mechan- 
ics, to  work  them." 

History  shows  on  almost  every  page  how  hard  it  is 
for  powerful  nations  to  abstain  from  abusing  their 
power.  At  the  present  time,  an  agricultural  nation  may 
be  said  to  be  almost  at  the  complete  mercy  of  an  in- 
dustrial one.  However  bravely  France  might  have  de- 
fended itself,  it  would  have  been  overwhelmed  within 
three  months,  without  the  aid  of  British  and  American 
industry,  by  the  output  of  the  superior  German  muni- 
tion factories.  Almost  the  first  preoccupation  of  Japan, 
in  its  ambition  to  become  a  modern  state,  has  been  to 
create  industries;  and  Russia  has  proved  to  its  cost  that 
a  great  metallurgical  establishment  is  indeed  essential 
to  a  great  power. 

It  has  always  been  the  custom  for  the  great  powers, 
either  as  a  matter  of  business  or  of  political  policy,  to 
sell  arms  to  the  smaller,  which  have  no  manufactories 
of  their  own.  In  the  chess  game  of  diplomacy,  even 
a  pawn  may  play  a  role  of  prime  importance.  A  small 
state  has  had  only  to  begin  intriguing  to  wrest  a  con- 
cession of  arms  from  either  one  side  or  the  other. 


78  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

Albania,  which  is  the  most  backward  country  in  Europe, 
has  of  late  years  abounded  in  rifles  of  the  latest  pattern, 
bearing  the  mark  of  three  or  four  rival  powers.  The 
first  act  of  the  allies,  after  the  armistice,  was  to  equip 
the  armies  of  their  friends  in  Eastern  Europe;  and 
there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  any  of  the  "Balkan- 
ized"  states  will  ever  be  left  entirely  without  means  of 
self-defense. 

But  this  semi-dependence  no  longer  satisfies  the 
smaller  states.  They  are  ambitious,  they  are  distrust- 
ful, and  they  want  to  be  completely  free.  The  Serbs, 
it  is  true,  boast  that  they  can  always  take  sufficient 
weapons  from  the  enemy  in  the  first  battle  to  complete 
their  supplies.  Yet  even  the  Serbs  are  planning  to 
develop  industries.  The  big  powers  set  the  pace,  and 
the  others  follow  as  best  they  can,  breathless,  but  never 
disheartened.  There  Is  not  one  among  them  which 
does  not  dream  of  ultimately  achieving  complete  eco- 
nomic self-sufficiency.  It  is  true  that  a  small  school  of 
economists  has  arisen  in  Italy  who  decry  this  costly 
mania  for  industrialization,  and  who  advocate  a  league 
of  agricultural  states,  which,  by  controlling  the  world's 
food  supply,  could  stand  successfully  against  the  pres- 
sure or  attempted  extortions  of  the  industrial  states. 
Thus  Spain,  Italy,  Bulgaria,  Jugo-Slavia,  Roumania, 
Russia,  Hungary  would  form  a  sort  of  wheat  trust 
which  would  be  able  to  deal  on  equal  terms  with  the 
steel  trust  of  Britain,  Germany  and  France.  But  while 
this  scheme  might  work  in  time  of  peace,  it  leaves  the 
armament  question  unsolved.  The  industrial  state 
could  invade  the  agricultural  state  at  will,  and  seize  by 
force  the  food  that  it  required.     For  this  reason,  if 


ECONOMIC  SELF-SUFFICIENCY  79 

for  no  other,  the  "league  of  agricultural  states"  will 
never,  I  think,  be  realized. 

But  how  are  undeveloped  nations,  or  nations  poorly 
endowed  with  coal  and  iron,  to  create  a  great  metallur- 
gical establishment?  The  United  States,  having  the 
resources,  attained  the  development  under  cover  of 
high  protective  tariffs.  Japan,  lacking  both,  is  at- 
tempting to  obtain  the  resources  by  annexations  on  the 
Asiatic  mainland,  and  the  development  by  the  combina- 
tion of  tariffs  and  subsidies.  Italy,  which  is  in  much  the 
same  plight  as  Japan,  has  indeed  created  factories,  but 
still  finds  itself  dependent  on  foreign  countries  for  fuel 
and  ore.  If  Italy  and  Japan,  which  are  relatively  large, 
have  had  such  difficulties  in  creating  industries,  how  are 
smaller  power  peoples  to  succeed?  I  myself  am  con- 
vinced that  they  cannot.  Czecho-Slovakia  inherited 
sixty  per  cent  of  Austria's  industries,  and  is  therefore 
born  industrial;  Poland  has  rich  resources  and  plenty 
of  cheap  labor,  and  may  succeed  in  becoming  industrial; 
the  present  Austria  has  still  some  industries  and  may 
develop  more,  though  it  lacks  coal.  The  others — Hun- 
gary, Jugo-Slavia,  Roumania,  Bulgaria,  Greece — 
though  they  all  have  fine  industrial  programmes  on 
paper,  will  simply  ruin  themselves,  I  fear,  in  the  effort 
to  do  what  nature  has  not  fitted  them  for. 

As  we  have  seen,  however,  the  fact  that  a  thing  may 
appear  impossible  does  not  necessarily  deter  either  an 
individual  or  a  nation  from  attempting  it.  All  the 
nations  are  determined  to  be  absolutely  independent. 
Independence  hinges  on  national  defense,  and  national 
defense  hinges,  in  the  last  analyses,  on  the  achievement 
of  economic  self-sufficiency.  Economic  self-sufficiency 
has  therefore  become  a  universal  aim.    Instead  of  fed- 


80  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

crating  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  a  division  of  labor 
between  them  possible  and  profitable,  the  nations  of 
"Balkanized  Europe"  have  hastened  to  surround  them- 
selves with  air-tight  economic  barriers.  And  each  with- 
in its  own  little  enclosure  has  instituted  complete  gov- 
ernment control  over  all  of  the  machinery  of  foreign 
trade  and  most  of  the  machinery  of  internal  production. 
I  will  not  pretend  that  a  certain  amount  of  control  is 
not  necessary.  The  food  shortage — the  need  for  set- 
ting the  domestic  price  of  bread  lower  than  the  market 
price,  fluctuations  of  exchange,  the  abuses  of  speculation 
and  profiteering,  the  lack  of  coal  and  rolling-stock, — all 
make  obligatory  the  exercise  of  strict  vigilance  on  the 
part  of  governments.  The  peoples  of  Europe  became 
accustomed  during  the  war  to  the  idea  of  government 
control,  and  they  have  accepted  its  present  extension, 
and  the  corresponding  loss  of  individual  liberty,  with 
docility.  The  energy  and  initiative  of  its  citizens,  how- 
ever, is  perhaps  the  chief  strength  of  the  state.  The 
paralysis  of  this  initiative,  under  government  control, 
and  the  almost  complete  stoppage  of  ordinary  com- 
mercial activity,  is  a  tremendous  price  to  pay  for  the 
small  amount  of  national  economic  independence  ac- 
tually obtained. 

A  government,  after  all,  is  composed  merely  of 
human  beings  who  are  neither  all-wise  nor  all-eflicient. 
A  man  will  work  harder,  and  exercise  more  ingenuity 
in  his  own  interest  than  in  that  of  the  state,  even  though 
he  be  a  patriot;  for  state  salaries  are  relatively  modest 
and  advancement  is  slow.  Government  control  means 
simply  control  by  a  bureaucracy;  and  even  if  the  gov- 
ernment's intentions  were  wholly  scientific  and  right, 
they  would  still  be  in  danger  of  miscarriage  by  reason 


ECONOMIC  SELF-SUFFICIENCY  81 

ot  the  doubtful  ability  of  the  officials  entrusted  with  the 
execution.  Trained  functionaries — themselves  per- 
haps never  entirely  satisfactory — cannot  be  created  in 
a  day.  Bulgaria,  Austria  and  Hungary,  who  now  have 
least  need  for  them,  all  have  experienced  corps  of  offi- 
cials, and  to  spare ;  but  of  the  countries  which  need  them 
most,  Greece,  Jugo-Slavia  and  Roumania  have  not 
nearly  enough,  and  Czecho-Slovakia  and  Poland,  at  the 
time  of  their  formation,  had  none  at  all.  A  certain 
amount  of  centralized  supervision  under  present  condi- 
tions is  unavoidable;  but  the  results  of  attempting  to 
exercise  an  exaggerated  control  of  nearly  all  things 
through  the  agency  of  ignorant  or  incompetent  public 
servants,  and  under  the  influence  of  a  mentality  of  dis- 
trust and  fear,  are  little  short  of  ruinous. 


GOVERNMENT  CONTROL 

I  SHALL  not  go  into  the  intricacies  of  the  clacking, 
squeaking  machinery  by  which  those  in  power  are  at- 
tempting to  regulate  all  the  public  activities  of  their 
nationals;  decree  has  followed  decree,  and  the  require- 
ments have  reached  a  complexity  which  even  the  offi- 
cials themselves  have  difficulty  in  expounding.  For 
present  purposes,  a  survey  of  the  broad  generalities  will 
suffice;  these,  despite  local  variations,  are  now  every- 
where essentially  the  same,  for  one  government  has 
copied  another,  each  determined  not  be  outdone  in  the 
exercise  of  centralized  authority.  In  this  respect  there 
is  no  sensible  difference  between  the  socialism  of 
Prague,  and  the  monarchism  of  Budapest.  The  one 
exception  is  Greece,  which  entered  the  war  late,  which 
has  made  few  restrictions  on  trade,  and  whose  economic 
situation  is  relatively  excellent.  Financially,  but  not  in 
other  respects,  allowance  should  also  be  made  for  the 
special  situation  of  Austria,  Hungary  and  Bulgaria, 
which  have  practically  been  declared  insolvent,  and 
whose  future  is  in  the  hands  of  the  all-powerful  repara- 
tions commission. 

All  the  "Balkanized"  countries  have  heavy  and  in- 
creasing debts.  A  part  of  these  debts  is  healthful,  cor- 
responding to  a  sinking  fund  for  reconstruction  pur- 
poses. A  larger  part  Is  due  to  diminished  production, 
necessitating    repeated    and    unprofitable    purchases 

82 


GOVERNMENT  CONTROL  83 

abroad,  and  to  continual  excess  of  public  expenditures 
over  receipts.  To  prevent  these  debts  from  growing 
indefinitely,  it  is  necessary  to  increase  production  and 
to  equilibrate  budgets.  The  governments  are  doing 
neither.  Of  production  I  shall  speak  presently.  The 
budget  deficit  equals  fifty  per  cent  of  the  receipts  in 
Czecho-Slovakia ;  in  Roumania  it  is  no  less  than  three 
times  the  receipts,  and  in  Poland  it  is  so  large  I  doubt  if 
it  has  ever  been  estimated.  With  public  opinion  in  its 
present  nervous  condition,  internal  loans  are  out  of  the 
question.  The  only  sound  way  to  equilibrate  a  budget 
is  to  readjust  taxes  so  as  to  increase  revenues,  and  to 
cut  down  expenditures  to  a  minimum.  But  the  govern- 
ments are  afraid  to  increase  taxes  radically  lest  they 
plunge  the  irritated  populace  into  serious  social  dis- 
order. They  run  public  services,  such  as  railways  and 
the  post,  at  a  deficit,  from  the  same  kind  of  fear.  The 
two  largest  items  of  expense  are  the  salaries  of  gov- 
ernment employees,  and  the  military  establishment.  In 
Poland,  the  cost  of  the  war  against  Russia  has  come  to 
a  half  of  the  entire  budget.  Even  in  Jugo-Slavia  the 
army  absorbs  a  third  of  the  budget.  But  in  some 
states  the  government  employees  are  already  threaten- 
ing revolt  because  they  are  underpaid;  and  in  others, 
under  the  influence  of  socialistic  ideas,  they  will  not 
readily  relinquish  the  pecuniary  advantages  they  have 
won.  As  for  reducing  the  cost  of  the  army,  I  have 
already  shown  that  this,  for  the  time  being,  is  a 
psychological  impossibility. 

In  these  circumstances,  what  do  the  governments  do? 
They  borrow  money  abroad,  which  increases  the  debt. 
They  print  floods  of  unsecured  paper  money  which, 
in  addition  to  increasing  the  debt  still  further,  lowers 


84  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  exchange  to  a  point  where  purchases  abroad  become 
exorbitantly  costly.  For  the  rest,  they  launch  the 
state  into  the  banking  business,  and  into  commerce,  in 
the  hope  of  saving  the  financial  situation  by  the  result- 
ing profits.  They  manipulate  the  exchange  market 
by  buying  and  selling  their  own  money,  speculating  like 
so  many  profiteers,  and  thus  adding  to  the  fluctuations 
of  exchange  which  already  have  contributed  so  much 
to  the  difliculties  of  resuscitating  commerce.  The  latest 
Jugo-Slav  budget  report  (July,  1920)  even  carried  the 
following  naive  item,  under  the  heading  of  receipts: 
"900,000,000  dinars,  profit  on  exchange."  Within 
their  own  frontiers  they  refuse  to  recognize  the  inter- 
national exchange  rate.  They  set  one  of  their  ovm, 
four  to  six  per  cent  higher,  enforce  it  upon  the  banks, 
and  collect  a  part  of  the  difference  as  a  special  tax.  In 
Roumania,  on  a  letter  of  credit,  I  was  unable  to  obtain 
better  than  eight  per  cent  less  than  the  real  rate.  In 
Czecho-Slovakia,  a  respected  bank  paid  me  only  two- 
thirds  of  the  sum  due  me,  explaining  that  if  I  would 
return  in  two  days  I  could  have  the  balance,  which,  if 
the  exchange  had  risen  in  the  meantime,  would  be  com- 
puted at  the  rate  on  the  day  of  the  first  payment,  but  if 
it  had  fallen,  then  at  the  new  rate  I  And,  finally,  they 
prohibit  the  export  of  currency  altogether.  Even  the 
traveler  may  not  carry  more  over  the  frontier  than 
a  sum  barely  large  enough  for  one  day's  expenses.  Pay- 
ments abroad  can  only  be  made  by  special  permission. 
In  consequence  of  these  and  other  similar  measures, 
the  whole  mechanism  of  credit  and  exchange  has  ceased 
to  function. 

In  establishing  a  complete  control  over  imports  and 
exports,  so  that  no  one  can  carry  on  foreign  trade  with- 


GOVERNMENT  CONTROL  85 

out  continually  applying  for  import  and  export  licenses, 
the  idea  of  the  government  seems  to  be  three-fold:  first, 
to  keep  the  country  from  being  drained  of  its  wealth; 
second,  to  make  profits;  third,  to  reinforce  political  poli- 
cies. It  is  felt  that  were  commerce  left  free  not  only 
would  the  people  buy  more  luxuries  than  they  could 
afford,  but  the  country  would  be  disadvantageously 
drained  of  some  of  its  most  valuable  assets  by  foreign- 
ers taking  advantage  of  the  low  rate  of  exchange.  The 
importer,  before  he  can  procure  a  license  to  bring  in  his 
shipment,  must  prove  that  the  goods  are  of  public  util- 
ity. The  exporter  must  sign  an  engagement  to  employ 
within  the  country,  within  a  given  number  of  months, 
the  amount  of  the  payment  which  he  expects  to  receive 
abroad.  Frontier  examinations  are  stringent.  Nothing 
appearing  new  can  be  brought  in  or  taken  out.  The 
Poles  even  try  to  take  jewelry  off  the  persons  of  women 
who  are  leaving  Poland,  the  pretext  being  that  if  the 
jewelry  was  carried  in  by  the  wearer,  she  should  have 
had  an  import  license,  and  if  she  procured  it  within  the 
country,  export  being  forbidden,  the  attempt  at  export 
is  illegal,  and  the  jewelry  may  be  confiscated.  The 
fact  that  food  is  sometimes  sold  by  the  government 
to  the  people  below  the  market  price  is  considered  to  be 
another  reason  for  forbidding  free  export. 

Regarding  the  import  of  raw  stuffs  and  fuel,  the  gov- 
ernments have  taken  this  into  their  own  hands  in  order^ 
as  they  think,  first  to  obtain  better  terms  than  individ- 
uals could  get;  second,  to  limit  purchases  to  essentials, 
and  third,  to  redistribute  them  according  to  genuine 
economic  needs.  But  the  export  of  fuel  and  raw-stuffs 
is  controlled  for  the  sake  of  the  profits.  Britain  itself 
sells  coal  abroad  at  four  times  the  domestic  price,  the 


86  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

government  collecting  the  difference.  The  countries  of 
Balkanized  Europe  all  desire  to  emulate  this  shining 
example.  Countries  which  export  wheat  requisition  it 
from  the  peasants  at  a  relatively  low  price,  and  sell  it 
high  in  the  open  market.  In  Czecho-Slovakia,  which 
exports  sugar,  the  government  made  nearly  3,000,000,- 
000  crowns  last  year  on  this  one  item  alone.  In  ac- 
cording an  export  license  to  a  private  individual,  the 
governments  also  clap  on  export  surtaxes  in  such  a  way 
as  to  make  up  the  difference  in  exchange,  in  case  it  is 
unfavorable  to  the  seller.  In  Czecho-Slovakia,  for  ex- 
ample, this  scale  of  surtaxes  runs  as  follows:  60%  on 
the  price  of  sale,  to  the  United  States,  Holland,  Swit- 
zerland and  Portugal;  50%  to  Britain,  Scandinavia, 
Finland;  35%  to  France  and  Belgium;  25%  to  Ger- 
many; 15%  to  Roumania,  Bulgaria,  Russia,  the 
Ukraine;  10%  to  Jugo-Slavia  and  Hungary.  Though 
nominally  for  the  purpose  of  "correcting  the  ex- 
change," these  surtaxes  also  show  a  certain  political 
bias.  Jugo-Slavia,  Czecho-Slovakia's  ally,  whose 
money  is  even  better  than  that  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  is 
given  a  preferential  treatment,  being  taxed  only  as 
much  as  Hungary,  Czecho-Slovakia's  enemy,  whose 
money  is  very  low.  The  tendency  everywhere  is  to 
favor  one's  friends,  and  to  refuse  to  deal  with  one's 
enemies.  As  one's  enemies  are  usually  one's  neighbors, 
the  complications  ensuing  from  this  incursion  of  politics 
into  business  can  easily  be  imagined. 

Transportation  is  another  important  factor  with 
which  short-sighted  governmental  political  policies  are 
playing  havoc.  There  Is  of  course  an  absolute  short- 
age of  both  engines  and  cars  as  a  result  of  the  war.  No 
country  has  enough.    Austria,  Hungary  and  Bulgaria, 


GOVERNMENT  CONTROL  8T 

being  "enemy"  states,  have  been  stripped  of  their  roll- 
ing-stock to  the  profit  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  Poland,  and 
especially  Jugo-Slavia  and  Roumania.  Most  of  this 
war-worn  rolling  stock  is  in  bad  repair.  For  Jugo- 
slavia and  Roumania,  which  have  no  adequate  machine- 
shops,  the  nearest  repair  stations  are  in  Austria  and 
Hungary.  But  they  hesitate  to  send  the  stock  to  be 
repaired,  first  because  they  are  afraid  it  might  never 
come  back,  and  second,  because  they  dislike  doing 
business  with  their  "enemies."  Their  side-tracks  are 
therefore  crowded  with  useless  cars  and  engines,  which 
lie  rotting  and  rusting  under  the  weather,  pillaged 
and  mutilated  by  vandals.  The  waste  seems  little  short 
of  criminal.  For  a  long  time  the  Serbs  would  not  even 
take  an  inventory  of  their  cars,  tugs  and  barges,  for 
fear  that  if  the  Entente  knew  how  many  they  had,  it 
would  try  to  take  some  away  from  them.  At  the 
present  time  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  Jugo- 
slavs have  twelve  hundred  engines,  eight  hundred  of 
which  are  not  in  use;  twenty-six  thousand  cars,  two- 
thirds  of  which  are  broken  down;  eighteen  Danube  pas- 
senger steamers,  forty-five  tugs,  and  eight  hundred 
barges,  most  of  which  are  lying  idle.  The  Serbs,  with 
their  primitive  railway  organization,  are  apparently  in- 
capable of  repairing  or  utilizing  their  transport  units, 
but  neither  will  they  allow  any  one  else  to  use  them. 
This  is  the  typical  spirit  of  "Balkanized  Europe." 

Let  me  return  now  to  the  fundamental  question  of 
production.  Why  does  it  not  increase  more  rapidly? 
Except  perhaps  in  Poland,  and  to  a  less  degree  in 
Roumania,  neither  the  mines  nor  the  factories  in  this 
part  of  the  world  were  seriously  damaged  by  the  war. 
In    the    mines,    if   it   were    not    for   repeated   labor 


88  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

troubles,  due  to  the  general  social  unrest,  the  re- 
turns would  probably  already  be  very  nearly  nor- 
mal. In  the  factories,  the  labor  problem  is  even 
more  acute,  on  account  of  the  irregularity  of  employ- 
ment under  existing  conditions.  It  has  moreover  been 
noted  that,  in  most  factories,  while  the  number  of  work- 
men has  been  increased,  their  actual  accomplishment 
has  decreased.  In  other  words,  influenced  by  radi- 
cal ideas,  they  do  not  work  so  hard  as  before  the  war. 
But  labor  troubles,  annoying  as  they  may  be,  are  not  a 
sufficient  explanation  of  low  productivity.  The  manu- 
facturer's first  problem  is  to  get  coal  and  raw  materials. 
This  he  must  do  through  the  government  bureaucracy. 
It  may  take  weeks.  He  may  fail  altogether.  Then, 
having  procured  the  permit,  he  must  see  to  the  trans- 
port of  his  fuel  and  rawstuffs  to  his  factory.  This 
usually  means  more  delay,  for  cars  are  hard  to  pro- 
cure. If  he  can  market  his  produce  at  home,  well  and 
good;  but  if  he  is  manufacturing  for  export,  he  has 
first  to  find  a  client  with  whom  he  can  agree  as  to  pay- 
ment— ^no  easy  task  with  exchange  fluctuating  as  it  does 
from  day  to  day.  He  has  next  to  apply  for  an  export 
license.  Finally,  when  he  gets  his  license,  he  must  find 
cars  or  barges,  and  if  he  really  wants  the  shipment  to 
reach  its  destination,  he  must  send  with  it  an  armed 
guard ;  for  theft  from  railway  cars  has  become  a  steady 
source  of  income  to  a  large  number  of  people. 

The  net  results  of  these  various  natural  and  artificial 
restrictions  is  that  ordinary  business  has  been  almost 
entirely  replaced  by  a  system  of  joint  speculation  and 
corruption,  in  which  the  risks  are  so  great  that  the 
merchant  is  scarcely  content  with  less  than  one  hun- 
dred per  cent  profit.     No  wonder  the  cost  of  living 


GOVERNMENT  CONTROL  89 

soars  I  The  fixing  of  food  prices  by  governments  pre- 
pares the  way  for  the  food  speculator  and  for  the 
clandestine  traffic  known  generally  as  the  "sleichhand- 
lung."  The  fixing  of  artificial  exchange  rates  offers  an 
easy  living  to  the  exchange  speculator.  The  difficulty 
of  procuring  fuel  and  rawstuffs  from  the  governments, 
and  the  institution  of  import  and  export  licenses,  open 
wide  the  doors  to  a  vast  scale  of  corruption.  "Before 
the  war,"  an  eminent  professional  man  remarked  to  me 
in  Vienna,  "our  Austrian  officials,  while  perhaps  not 
comparable  for  sterling  integrity  with  those  of  Eng- 
land and  Prussia,  were  about  equal  to  those  of  France 
and  the  United  States,  and  were  superior  to  those  of 
Italy  and  Russia.  Now — it  is  the  corruption  of  Asia  I" 
Even  in  agriculture,  the  lowered  production,  though 
due  to  some  extent  to  such  material  causes  as  the  in- 
sufficiency of  tools  and  animals,  and  the  lack  of  cars 
for  distributing  fertilizer  and  for  hauling  the  crops  to 
market,  is  attributable  still  more  to  psychological 
causes.  In  the  first  place,  the  governments  have  fixed 
the  price  of  grain  at  a  rate  well  below  the  price  in 
the  world  market.  They  requisition  the  grain,  which, 
if  they  export  it,  yields  them  a  handsome  profit,  and  if 
they  consume  it  at  home,  represents  a  considerable 
saving.  In  either  case,  it  is  the  peasant  who  is  the  loser. 
In  his  indignation  at  this  treatment,  he  refuses  to  sow 
more  than  enough  grain  for  his  own  needs,  or  else  he 
hides  it  from  the  government  officials  and  sells  it  to 
speculators.  In  the  second  place,  nearly  every  agri- 
cultural country  is  now  in  the  throes  of  some  kind  of 
land  reform.  The  claim  of  the  large  landowners,  that 
a  large  property  can  produce  more  and  cheaper  than  a 
number  of  small  properties  covering  the  same  surface, 


90  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

is  perhaps  specious.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  not  the 
slightest  doubt  that  with  the  present  world  shortage 
of  food,  this  wave  of  land  reforms,  though  perhaps  in 
the  abstract  an  excellent  thing,  is  most  inopportune. 
For  in  the  period  preceding  the  execution  of  the  re- 
form, the  large  landowner  is  indisposed  to  invest  money 
in  property  which  he  is  about  to  lose,  and  the  farms 
are  allowed  to  run  down.  And  in  the  period  just  after 
the  reform,  the  peasant,  inexperienced  in  management, 
and  perhaps  even  ignorant  of  the  advantages  of  a 
large  surplus,  is  inclined  to  raise  only  sufficient  grain 
for  himself.  This,  for  example,  is  the  reason  why 
Roumania,  formerly  a  great  wheat  exporting  country, 
has  this  year  barely  enough  grain  for  its  own  needs. 
The  Roumanian  peasant  is  not  interested  in  export.  He 
asks  only  to  live.  A  long  education  will  perhaps  be 
necessary  to  arouse  him  to  a  sense  of  his  new  responsi- 
bilities. 


FRONTIERS 

Under  the  influence  of  these  multiple  restrictions, 
frontiers  have  ceased  to  be  merely  imaginary  lines  of 
demarcation.  They  have  become  more  Impenetrable 
than  Chinese  walls.  They  are,  so  to  speak,  sealed  her- 
metically. If  It  were  possible,  I  have  no  doubt  the 
various  countries  would  even  attempt  to  prevent  the 
birds  from  flying  over,  and  the  rivers  from  flowing 
freely  through.  A  frontier  is  now  a  place  where  every- 
thing must  stop.  Approaching  by  rail,  the  traveler 
quickly  recognizes  that  he  has  reached  the  boundary 
line  by  the  characteristic  jam  of  cars,  extending  back 
sometimes  for  miles  along  the  sidetracks.  On  navigable 
rivers,  the  frontier  is  marked  by  a  similar  congestion 
of  barges;  and  on  roads  there  are  barricades  and 
armed  guards.  Rustic  communities,  which  for  centur- 
ies have  commerced  amicably  together,  may  now  find 
themselves  separated  as  by  an  abyss,  and  the  unlucky 
countryman  who  is  espied  trying  to  run  a  frontier  is 
promptly  challenged  and  fired  upon.  No  longer  may 
the  mountaineers  of  the  South  Tyrol  go  down  to  Inns- 
bruck to  market,  or  the  mountaineers  of  Slovakia  go 
harvesting  in  the  Hungarian  plains.  New  frontiers 
have  been  drawn;  and  to  attempt  to  cross  them  without 
due  authorization  is  to  risk  instant  death. 

There  are,  it  is  true,  certain  avenues  of  travel  which 
are  nominally  open.     The  Danube  and  the  principal 

91 


92  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

railroad  lines  are  at  the  disposition  of  the  public.  Boats 
do  run  between  Vienna  and  Budapest  without  hind- 
rance, but  between  Austria  and  Jugo-Slavia,  and  be- 
tween the  latter  and  Roumania,  it  is  necessary  to 
change  at  the  frontier.  There  are  now  even  a  few 
through  trains.  The  French  expresses  which  radiate 
from  Paris  to  Warsaw,  Bucharest  and  Constantinople, 
seem  almost  miraculous  to  people  who  have  become 
accustomed  to  local  trains  and  frontier  changes.  There 
is  also  a  through  train  between  Vienna  and  Berlin,  by 
Prague.  But  I  know  of  no  other.  As  late  as  the  sum- 
mer of  1920,  the  surest  way  to  go  from  Slovakia  to 
Hungary  was  by  Prague,  Vienna  and  Budapest;  and 
from  Hungary  to  Transylvania,  by  Belgrade  and 
Bucharest — tremendous  detours !  Government  couriers, 
experimenting  with  what  appeared  to  be  more  direct 
routes,  were  sometimes  delayed  three  days  or  a  week. 
As  the  volume  of  travel  is  already  far  too  large  for 
the  available  accommodation,  no  doubt  the  various  re- 
strictions to  which  the  traveler  must  submit  do  serve  a 
purpose,  in  discouraging  a  certain  number  of  appli- 
cants. These  restrictions,  while  not  insurmountable, 
are  tedious  in  the  extreme  I  I  estimate  that,  in  the 
course  of  a  three  months'  trip,  about  half  my  time  was 
taken  up  mainly  with  making  traveling  arrangements. 
I  had  no  sooner  reached  a  country  than  I  had  at  once 
to  set  in  motion  the  meticulous  processes  which  would 
enable  me,  perhaps  a  fortnight  later,  to  leave  it — and  I 
may  add  that  to  American  newspaper  correspondents, 
special  facilities  are  granted;  the  ordinary  mortal  re- 
ceives far  less  consideration.  The  traveler's  first  diffi- 
culty, on  arriving  in  a  given  country,  will  be  to  find 
hotel  accommodations.     With  the  exception  of  Con- 


FRONTIERS  9S 

stantinople  and  Athens,  I  know  of  no  large  city  in 
**Balkanized  Europe"  where  a  room  can  be  had  merely 
for  the  asking.  If  he  has  written  or  telegraphed  ahead, 
he  will  probably  find  that  his  letter  or  telegram  has  not 
been  received.  The  desk  clerk  will  insult  him,  the 
manager  will  turn  a  cold  shoulder.  In  the  end  he  will 
probably  succeed  by  bribing  the  hotel  porter,  who  has 
become  a  rich  and  all-powerful  personage  in  European 
capitals.  I  have  heard,  however,  of  people  having  to 
pass  a  week  or  more  in  makeshift  quarters  before  they 
.could  succeed  in  getting  into  a  genuine  hotel.  The 
Czechs,  with  laudable  initiative,  have  established  a 
"Foreigners'  Bureau,"  under  government  auspices, 
whose  business  is  to  requisition  rooms  for  strangers. 
The  only  trouble,  under  this  arrangement,  is  that  you 
cannot  choose  your  own  hotel  or  room,  but  must  ac- 
cept the  one  assigned  to  you,  no  matter  how  unsatis- 
factory. 

The  traveler  must  next  go  to  the  police-station  and 
register.  Sometimes  photographs  are  required,  some- 
times not.  He  must  then  estimate  the  probable  length 
of  his  stay,  and  draw  from  the  bank  as  much  money  as 
he  thinks  he  will  need.  If  he  expects  to  leave  within 
ten  days,  he  must  make  application  at  once  for  the 
necessary  visas.  He  will  require  first  the  visa  of  his 
own  country,  second,  that  of  the  country  to  which  he  is 
going,  third,  that  of  all  the  others  which  he  may  be 
obliged  to  pass  through  on  the  way,  and  finally,  the  visa 
of  the  country  he  is  leaving.  Each  passport  bureau  is 
open  only  about  two  hours  a  day,  and  at  each  there  is 
always  a  line  of  applicants  many  yards  long.  Unless 
some  such  expedient  as  that  of  bribing  the  door-keeper 
be  adopted,  one  may  have  to  return  two  days  in  sue- 


94  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

cession  merely  for  one  visa.  Desiring  to  go  from  War- 
saw to  Budapest,  I  had  to  obtain  in  Warsaw  five  differ- 
ent visas — ^American,  Czech,  Austrian,  Hungarian, 
Polish.  By  dint  of  much  corruption  and  a  little  official 
assistance,  I  managed  to  complete  the  task  in  two  days ; 
but  it  took  the  whole  of  my  time. 

After  being  sure  of  his  visas  the  traveler  may  next 
apply  for  a  railroad  ticket  and  a  place  in  the  train.  If 
there  are  no  places  left,  as  is  generally  the  case,  no 
ticket  may  be  sold.  To  obtain  a  place  under  these  con- 
ditions, it  is  sometimes  necessary  to  get  a  government 
order  through  a  friend;  or  perhaps  a  swift  and  informal 
transfer  of  a  few  banknotes  will  do  the  trick.  As  a  last 
resort,  the  traveler  can  always  go  to  the  train  and  trust 
to  the  chance  of  being  able  to  corrupt  the  conductor. 
In  any  case,  the  ticket  sold  him  will  take  him  only  as  far 
as  the  frontier.  There,  he  must  buy  a  new  one,  and 
as  for  this  purpose  he  must  be  furnished  with  a  sum 
of  the  currency  of  the  country  he  expects  to  enter,  as 
well  as  of  those  he  will  merely  traverse,  once  more  he 
must  visit  the  bank  or  the  money-changer. 

Before  leaving  he  will  make  sure  that  he  has  no 
new  articles  in  his  baggage,  and  that  his  total  residue 
of  money  does  not  exceed  the  small  sum  which  he  is 
allowed  to  take  out  of  the  country.  He  had  best  pro- 
vide himself  also  with  something  to  eat,  in  case  of 
emergencies;  for  the  only  trains  with  dining-cars  are  the 
special  French  expresses.  Now,  barring  the  ever-pres- 
ent possibility  of  a  strike  or  an  unannounced  change  or 
schedule,  he  may  go  and  crowd  himself  into  the  train 
and  endeavor  to  claim  the  place  to  which  he  believes 
himself  entitled. 

At  the  frontier  the  train  will  stop.    It  will  even  stop 


FRONTIERS  96 

a  long  time.  The  traveler  will  be  invited  to  get  out 
with  his  baggage.  He  will  stand  in  line.  He  will  stand 
in  line  a  long  time.  He  will  stand  till  his  feet  ache  and 
his  back  is  lame.  During  the  war  he  would  have  been 
searched  for  secret  military  information.  Now  he  will 
be  searched  for  stocks  and  bonds,  money  and  jewels. 
When  his  turn  finally  comes,  he  will  be  thrust  into  a 
small  cabin,  and  an  impervious  functionary  will  go 
through  his  pockets,  run  a  finger  in  his  hat-band,  and 
feel  inside  his  shoes.  He  may  even  be  asked  to  un- 
dress, though  this  is  becoming  rare.  If  he  has  money 
about  him  in  excess  of  the  amount  permitted,  but  de- 
clares It,  it  will  be  taken  from  him  and  a  receipt  given 
so  that  he  can  get  it  back  if  he  ever  returns  the  same 
way.  If  he  fails  to  declare  it,  it  will  be  taken  from 
him  just  the  same  and  he  will  be  fined.  He  will  now 
be  graduated  into  another  cabin  where  his  visas  will  be 
verified.  Finally,  his  baggage  will  be  opened  and  thor- 
oughly examined.  If  he  is  found  to  be  taking  out  any 
new  articles  for  which  he  cannot  show  an  export  license, 
the  articles  are  confiscated,  and  if  he  has  not  declared 
them,  he  is  fined.  From  some  countries,  it  is  forbidden 
even  to  take  out  a  cake  of  chocolate.  Three  or  four 
hours  will  now  have  elapsed.  The  traveler  may  re- 
sume his  place  in  the  train,  which  in  the  course  of  time 
"wdll  steam  over  the  frontier  and  stop  at  the  first  station 
on  the  other  side,  where  the  entire  operation  will  be  re- 
peated by  a  new  set  of  customs  officers — passport  exam- 
ination, personal  search,  inspection  of  baggage.  I  may 
add  that  if  he  is  carrying  any  letters  and  they  are  dis- 
covered they  will  be  opened  and  read.  If  the  official 
disapproves  of  their  tenor  they  may  be  confiscated. 
Some  frontier  officials  appear  to  possess  human  intelli- 


96  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

gence,  but  many  do  not.  Some  frontiers  are  worse  than 
others — not  according  to  any  system,  so  far  as  I  have 
been  able  to  judge,  but  in  an  arbitrary  way.  They  are 
all  bad  enough.  They  are  the  sign  and  symbol  of  the 
morbid  psychology  of  "Balkanized  Europe." 

Within  these  tightly  closed  boundaries,  the  peoples 
live  in  an  isolation  resembling  that  of  the  islanders  of 
Oceania.  They  do  not  know  and  do  not  seem  very 
much  to  care  what  is  going  on  In  the  outside  world. 
They  see  only  the  local  newspapers,  which  present  their 
limited  budgets  of  news  in  a  very  special  way.  The  few 
people  who  do  really  want  information  depend  largely 
upon  travelers,  whom  they  will  probe  and  question  for 
hours  together,  as  in  the  old  days  when  newspapers  and 
a  fast  mail  service  did  not  exist.  Indeed,  it  may  also  be 
said  that  those  days,  for  the  time  being,  have  returned. 
The  international  mails  are  as  slow  as  if  they  were 
carried  by  coach-and-f  our  Instead  of  by  train ;  and  what 
with  secret  censorships.  Ill-will,  carelessness  and  Ineffi- 
ciency, they  are  far  less  certain.  There  seems  to  be 
no  definite  rule :  It  has  simply  to  be  accepted  that  some- 
times letters  arrive  and  sometimes  not.  The  prudent 
man  will  post  his  correspondence  In  triplicate  at  Inter- 
vals of  several  days.  International  telegrams  are  even 
more  precarious.  Rates  are  high,  and  the  telegraph  of- 
fices will  gladly  accept  as  many  messages  as  may  be 
brought  to  them,  taking  payment  and  returning  re- 
ceipts; but  If  there  Is  any  doubt  as  to  Its  contents,  or 
perhaps  If  the  address  happens  to  displease  the 
operator,  the  message  may  be  dropped  Into  the  waste- 
basket.  Or  again.  If  the  wires  are  crowded.  It  may  be 
forwarded  by  mall.  Here  again,  inefficiency,  ill-will 
and  carelessness  play  a  leading  role.     I  dispatched  a 


FRONTIERS  97 

considerable  number  of  telegrams  in  the  course  of  my 
last  trip,  some  of  which  never  reached  their  destination, 
and  some  of  which  arrived  too  late  to  be  of  any  use. 
The  worst  is  the  complete  uncertainty.  You  never 
know  whether  your  letter  or  telegram  has  been  received 
or  not,  unless  you  chance  miraculously  to  receive  a  reply 
to  it  before  the  lapse  of  so  many  weeks  that  you  have 
forgotten  what  it  was  about.  The  American  minister 
in  Bucharest,  having  temporarily  to  leave  his  post,  was 
to  be  replaced  by  a  secretary  from  the  Berne  legation. 
But  though  many  messages  were  sent  forth  into  the 
void  of  telegraphic  space  by  both  of  these  diplomats 
neither  was  able  to  receive  a  reply  as  to  when  the 
other  expected  to  travel.  When  even  official  communi- 
cations are  in  these  straits,  what  is  one  to  expect  of 
private  communications?  The  only  sure  way  for  one 
business  man  to  get  a  message  to  another  is  to  send 
a  personal  emissary,  or  go  himself.  It  is  the  Dark 
Ages  over  again. 


THE  RESTORATION  OF  CONFIDENCE 

If  specific  remedies  could  be  applied  to  the  Ills  from 
which  "Balkanized  Europe"  is  suffering,  these  remedies 
might  now  be  envisaged  as  follows: 

Restore  internal  order  by  restraining  the  disturbing 
opposition  of  social  and  racial  minorities.  Equilibrate 
the  budget  so  as  to  arrest  the  multiplication  of  public 
debts.  For  this  purpose,  stimulate  production,  so  as 
to  increase  wealth  and  permit  the  reorganization  of 
taxes;  which  in  turn  will  permit  gradual  deflation  of 
currency,  which  will  ameliorate  the  exchange.  In- 
creased production,  moreover,  will  repair  the  damages 
of  the  war,  give  regular  employment  to  workers,  renew 
the  food  supply  and  give  a  surplus  of  commodities  for 
foreign  exchange.  Diminish  armament  expenses  for 
the  sake  of  economy,  and  pay  government  employees 
adequately,  so  as  to  remove  the  necessity  for  official  cor- 
ruption. Reduce  government  control  to  a  minimum,  so 
as  to  permit  larger  play  to  the  tremendous  powers  of 
individual  initiative.  Stimulate  this  initiative  by  letting 
private  Individuals  make  the  profits  on  big  business,  in- 
stead of  the  government;  the  money  can  always  be 
taken  from  them  again,  if  necessary,  in  the  form  of 
taxes,  and  abuses  of  power  by  individuals  can  always 
be  regulated  by  the  state.  Stop  requisitioning  grain; 
pay  the  peasants  the  market  price,  and  help  them  to 
see  the  advantage  of  producing  the  largest  possible 

98 


THE  RESTORATION  OF  CONFIDENCE      99 

crops.  Replace  the  idea  of  economic  self-sufficiency, 
which  is  utterly  unpractical  for  groups  of  small  coun- 
tries, by  the  idea  of  mutually  beneficial  trade.  Restore 
the  mechanism  of  international  credit.  Reduce  travel 
restrictions  and  re-open  frontiers.  Insure  International 
postal  and  telegraphic  communications.  Resume 
through  transit,  and  contract  for  car  and  engine  re- 
pairs wherever  necessary,  so  as  to  enlarge  the  quantity 
of  available  rolling-stock.  This  is  no  doubt  a  vast 
and  difficult  programme  in  itself,  for  many  of  its 
features  are  interdependent,  and  the  one  helps  or  hind- 
ers the  other,  making  for  extreme  complexity. 

But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  specific  remedies  are  not  ap- 
plicable. What  is  required  first  is  a  general  tonic,  and 
this  tonic  must  be  political  in  character  rather  than 
economic;  for  Individual  health  here  depends  on  the 
general  health,  and  this  in  turn  depends  on  one  essential 
factor:  the  restoration  of  confidence.  For  you  can- 
not establish  Internal  order  as  long  as  social  and  racial 
minorities  are  continually  being  acted  up  :n  and  even 
subsidized  by  foreign  influences  hostile  to  the  state. 
You  cannot  trade  with  neighbors  whom  you  consider 
to  be  enemies  and  you  cannot  elaborate  a  credit  system 
with  them.  You  cannot  reduce  travel  restrictions  and 
open  frontiers  so  long  as  you  are  suspicious  of  every 
traveler.  You  cannot  ensure  postal  and  telegraphic 
communications,  or  resume  through  transit  across 
hostile  territory;  and  you  cannot  entrust  your  rolling- 
stock  for  repairs  to  countries  which  perhaps  will  neglect 
to  return  it.  Moreover,  without  having  done  these 
things,  you  cannot  successfully  stimulate  that  increase 
of  production  on  which  depends  the  reorganization  of 
finances  and  the  amelioration  of  exchange.     It  is  a 


100  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

vicious  circle;  and  it  all  turns  about  one  point:  the 
first  solution  to  be  sought  is  a  political  solution,  for  on 
this,  and  this  alone,  the  restoration  of  confidence  and 
goodwill  is  wholly  dependent. 

I  am  glad  to  be  able  to  add  that  certain  Central 
European  statesmen  are  beginning  to  realize  this  truth, 
and  to  act  upon  it.  Mr.  Edward  Benes,  the  able  young 
Foreign-Minister  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  in  a  speech  be- 
fore the  permanent  parliamentary  commission  on  Sep- 
tember I,  1920,  of  which  I  have  just  received  a  copy, 
declares  that  as  a  result  of  the  "terrible  complication" 
of  government  control  of  customs  and  exchange,  the 
economic  difficulties  of  these  (Central  European) 
states  has  merely  increased,  and  is  still  increasing  .  .  . 
"There  is  no  doubt,"  he  continues,  "that  the  present 
tendencies  toward  moral  dissolution,  the  economic  dis- 
tress, and  in  great  part,  the  social  anarchy  can  only 
disappear  through  the  reestablishment,  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  of  normal  economic  relations  between  the 
states,  which  should,  from  this  point  of  view,  mutually 
complete  one  another."  This  exaggerated  government 
control,  he  considers,  is  due  to  "political  nationalism, 
supplemented  by  extreme  economic  nationalism."  And 
the  root  of  the  whole  matter,  he  conceives  to  be  fear— 
"fear  of  revolution,  dissolution  and  anarchy;  fear  of 
armed  conflict  with  this  or  that  neighbor ;  fear  of  a  re- 
turn to  the  old  situation ;  fear,  especially  of  a  monarch- 
ist, or  some  other  kind  of  reaction.  It  is  clear,"  he 
argues,  "that  neither  individuals  nor,  especially,  nations 
can  live  any  longer  in  such  a  state  of  mind.  This  sit- 
uation would  end  by  provoking  complete  moral  dissolu- 
tion, and  the  ruin  of  the  entire  political  order,  both 
social  and  economic." 


THE  RESTORATION  OF  CONFIDENCE    101 

The  first  step  to  be  taken,  as  Dr.  Benes  so  wisely 
concludes,  is  some  acceptable  and  appropriate  form  of 
entente,  or  federation.  Of  the  Czech  minister's  famous 
"petite  entente,"  and  of  other  possible  schemes  of  al- 
liances, I  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  in  greater  detail, 
in  another  part  of  this  book. 


PART  III 

PHYSICAL  AND  SOCIAL  HEALTH 


EPIDEMICS 

The  question  has  frequently  been  raised,  whether, 
before  the  necessary  economic  and  political  reconstruct- 
ive policies  can  be  put  into  effect,  all  Europe  will  not 
have  succumbed  irrevocably  under  the  ravages  of  dis- 
ease and  social  disorder — epidemics,  famine,  revolu- 
tion, bolshevism.  Of  the  two,  the  social  danger  is  un- 
doubtedly greater  than  the  physical;  but  I  must  con- 
fess that  in  neither  respect  do  I  share  the  general  pes- 
simism. I  am  afraid  that,  in  both,  the  popular  anxiety 
is  sustained  largely  by  interested  propaganda. 

Certainly,  to  ignore  the  facts  is  to  double  the  peril. 
But  is  it  not  possible  that  the  facts  have  been  exag- 
gerated? The  Russian  Soviets  have  declared  repeated- 
ly that  their  aim  is  world  revolution,  for  which  they 
assume  that  the  hour  is  ripe,  and  by  reiteration,  they 
seem  even  to  have  convinced  many  otherwise  intelli- 
gent people.  But  is  the  hour  ripe?  Will  it  ever  be 
ripe  ?  This  is  something  which  deserves  to  be  looked 
into  very  closely. 

Again,  the  great  allied  charitable  bodies  developed 
during  the  war  feel  that,  affiliated  perhaps  with  the 
League  of  Nations,  their  role,  profitably  for  the  wel- 
fare of  mankind,  should  be  indefinitely  extended.  For 
this  prolongation  of  life,  they  need  public  support,  and 
they  realize  perfectly  that  the  best  way  to  enlist  this 

support  is  by  widespread  propaganda.    Their  agents, 

105 


106  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

men  and  women  trained  in  the  sanitary  principles  of 
the  western  world,  taking  as  a  matter  of  course  such 
novelties  as  personal  cleanliness,  porcelain  plumbing, 
and  active  indignation  against  all  forms  of  disease, 
have  penetrated,  for  the  first  time  in  their  lives,  into 
the  age-long  filth  and  fatalism  of  Eastern  Europe. 
They  are  shocked  and  excited.  They  want  to  clean 
it  all  up  without  a  moment's  delay.  Typhus  flourishes, 
people  lie  around  dying  miserably  in  the  midst  of 
general  indifference,  and  the  western-trained  charity 
workers  emit  a  great  cry  of  alarm  and  warning.  The 
press  department  gets  to  work,  a  slogan  is  invented, 
as,  that  all  Europe  is  starving  or  dying,  and  there  is 
an  appeal  for  funds  to  "save  Europe."  But  are  these 
startling  generalizations  to  be  taken  at  their  face 
value?    Are  they  really  accurate? 

It  is  with  considerable  hesitation  that  I  raise  these 
questions.  The  impulse  of  mutual  aid,  the  gentle  spirit 
of  charity — these  are  among  the  finest  qualities  of  our 
race,  and  he  would  be  an  evil  genius  indeed  who  should 
seek  to  blunt  them  by  ill-founded  scepticism.  Again, 
what  more  ungrateful  task  could  one  assume  than  to 
pretend  to  weigh  and  measure  the  immense  anguish 
of  millions  of  people?  The  work  of  relief  is  neces- 
sary and  good.  It  was  far  more  necessary  a  year  ago 
than  it  is  now,  but  it  must  still  be  continued.  And 
those  who  contribute  funds  to  it  are  aiding  a  splendid 
cause.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  entirely  possible  that  all 
this  generous  effort  has  not  been  directed  with  com- 
plete wisdom.  A  better  understanding  of  the  real  con- 
ditions, a  closer  analysis  of  the  facts,  would  perhaps 
enable  a  concentration,  an  economy,  a  perfection  of 
method,  which  have  heretofore,  to  a  certain  extent, 


EPIDEMICS  107 

been  absent.  I  shall  be  gratified,  moreover,  if  I  can 
help  to  free  sensitive  and  sympathetic  minds  from  a 
nightmare  of  distress,  when  I  venture  the  opinion 
that  the  crisis  is  passed,  and  that  Europe  will  go  under 
neither  to  bolshevism  nor  to  disease. 

I  shall  not  attempt  a  history  of  the  two  terrible  epi- 
demics which  have  depopulated  Europe  since  19 14. 
By  far  the  deadliest  of  these  was  the  influenza,  which 
was  of  course  world-wide,  and  which  now  seems  to  be 
extinguishing  itself.  The  only  other  really  great  epi- 
demic is  that  of  typhus,  which,  though  it  still  continues, 
seems  also  to  be  on  a  sort  of  natural  decline,  due  to  in- 
creased immunity,  and  which  fortunately  has  been 
strictly  localized.  The  fear  has  lately  been  expressed 
that  the  typhus  may  sweep  the  whole  continent.  But 
it  should  not  be  overlooked  that  those  same  hermeti- 
cally sealed  frontiers,  which  play  such  havoc  econom- 
ically, are  a  sure  guarantee  against  the  spread  of  con- 
tagious disease.  In  fact,  thanks  to  these  frontiers, 
never,  probably,  has  there  been  so  httle  contagious  dis- 
ease in  most  of  the  countries  concerned,  as  at  present. 
Austria,  Hungary,  Jugo-Slavia,  Greece,  Bulgaria,  Rou- 
mania,  are  all  practically  free,  at  the  present  time, 
from  diseases  of  this  description.  In  Czecho-Slovakia, 
the  provinces  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia  are  also  free. 
But  in  the  mountain  villages  of  Eastern  Slovakia  and 
Sub-Carpathian  Ruthenia,  where  the  people  from  time 
immemorial  have  been  accustomed  to  live  in  verminous 
filth,  men,  women,  children,  cows,  chickens  and  pigs, 
all,  as  it  were,  sleeping  in  the  same  bed,  typhus  is 
endemic.  The  Czech  health  authorities,  however,  are 
confident  of  their  ability  to  handle  the  situation,  and 
though  they  estimate  that  it  may  take  ten  years  to 


108  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

clean  up  these  infected  villages  thoroughly,  they  express 
no  uneasiness  whatever  as  to  the  possible  spread  of  the 
contagion. 

There  remains  to  consider  Poland — Poland,  to- 
gether with  Eastern  Galicia,  parts  of  the  Ukraine, 
Western  Russia,  and  the  Baltic  states.  This  is  the  real 
typhus  area.  And  here  again,  let  me  say  at  once  that 
there  seems  to  be  no  likelihood  of  its  extending  farther 
westward:  the  frontier  authorities  are  too  vigilant 
and  too  strict.  The  problem  is  therefore  pretty  well 
circumscribed. 

Even  in  Poland,  one  entire  district  has  escaped — 
Posnania,  former  German  Poland,  which  is  precisely 
that  part  where  the  standard  of  living  is  highest. 
Typhus,  indeed,  is  a  "dirt"  disease,  flourishing  only 
among  overcrowded  and  verminous  peoples.  It  is 
propagated  almost  exclusively  by  the  body-louse.  The 
epidemic  was  at  its  worst  in  former  Russian  Poland 
in  the  winter  of  19 18-19,  and  in  Galicia  in  the  winter 
of  1919-20.  The  Poles  are  a  hardy  stock,  with  ex- 
ceptional powers  of  resistance,  else  the  death-rate, 
relatively  low,  might  have  run  much  higher.  At  the 
present  time,  thanks  to  the  enlarged  immunity,  the 
disease  seems  to  be  on  the  decline,  not  only  in  Poland, 
but  also  in  Russia  and  the  Baltic  States,  although 
sporadic  recurrences  are  to  be  expected  for  perhaps  a 
number  of  winters  to  come. 

For  more  than  a  year  now,  various  allied  sanitary 
organizations  have  been  struggling  to  find  a  way  to 
eradicate  the  typhus  from  Poland.  They  have  spent 
a  good  deal  of  money  and  a  great  deal  of  effort,  but 
my  opinion  is  that,  up  to  the  present,  except  in  the 
way    of    merely    temporary    relief,    they    have    ac- 


EPIDEMICS  109 

complished  little  or  nothing;  and  this,  as  I  shall  ex- 
plain, through  no  fault  of  their  own.  The  first  idea 
of  the  American  and  other  foreign  experts  was  to 
establish  a  "cordon"  behind  the  army  which  was  fight- 
ing the  Russians  on  the  eastern  front,  the  theory  being 
that  the  disease  was  being  brought  in  principally  by 
refugees,  and  that  if  the  refugees  were  isolated  the 
disease  could  soon  be  stamped  out.  But  gradually  they 
perceived  that,  not  only  the  refugees,  but  a  large  part 
of  the  population  were  infected.  To  stamp  out  typhus 
in  Poland  would  require  nothing  short  of  an  army  of 
foreign  doctors,  nurses  and  workers.  Such  an  army 
being  out  of  the  question,  the  experts  were  obliged  to 
fall  back  for  assistance  on  the  Poles  themselves.  And 
here  they  met  two  formidable  obstacles  which,  up 
to  the  present,  it  has  seemed  impossible  to  overcome: 
first,  the  indifference  of  the  Polish  government,  and, 
second,  the  superstition  and  fatalism  of  the  Polish 
masses. 

This  indifference  and  this  fatalism  seem  to  be  based 
largely  on  the  fact  that  not  only  typhus  but  many  other 
forms  of  human  misery  are  endemic  in  Poland.  The 
villages  are  dirty  and  poor,  the  towns  overcrowded, 
seeming  to  consist  largely  of  slums.  The  following 
"case,"  which  I  copied  from  the  notebook  of  an 
American  relief  worker,  is  perhaps  typical: 

"Joseph  Zurek,  Krochmalna  II,  Warsaw.  Has  two 
children.  One  miserable,  dirty  room — no  chair,  table 
or  cloth.  In  bed,  covered  only  with  straw,  woman  with 
new-born  babe,  both  wrapped  in  dirty  rag.  Baby  cry- 
ing. Had  no  milk  since  born.  Man  sitting  near  wife, 
pale,  tired,  face  hidden  in  hands.  Was  porter  hut 
got   asthma.     Woman  before   child-bed  earned   few 


110  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

marks  a  day,  overworked,  fell  ill.  Despair.  Mother's 
dream  is  buy  chemise  for  baby.  Confessed  had  had 
no  warm  food  for  several  weeks.  Lived  on  bits 
bread  and  potatoes  given  by  neighbors." 

Such  dull  and  long-sustained  tragedies  being  of  com- 
mon occurrence,  how  should  the  Poles  get  excited  over 
them?  They  are  accepted  as  a  matter  of  course.  Is 
not  life  itself  a  tragedy,  and  death  often  enough  a 
happy  release?  So  the  funerals  pass  endlessly  through 
the  streets  of  Warsaw;  now  a  hearse  with  a  few  people 
in  black  walking  behind,  now  a  one-horse  cart  with  a 
lonely  woman  weeping  after;  now  a  lone  man  trund- 
ling the  corpse  of  his  wife  to  the  graveyard  on  a  wheel- 
barrow. The  foreign  relief  workers,  dismayed,  count 
the  coffins  as  they  go  by :  eleven  in  front  of  one  window 
in  the  lapse  of  half  an  hour,  twenty-one  in  the  course  of 
a  two-hours  walk!  But  the  people  of  Warsaw  look 
calmly  on,  unable  to  understand  the  indignant  alarm  of 
the  foreigner  at  the  aspect  of  death — an  alarm  which 
seems  to  them,  perhaps,  a  bit  un-christian,  a  kind  of 
modern  ^paganism. 

In  October,  19 19,  Col.  H.  L.  Gilchrist,  head  of  the 
American  Typhus  Mission,  presented  to  the  Polish 
government  the  following  formal  recommendations 
for  the  extermination  of  the  epidemic:  (i)  a  cordon 
along  the  eastern  border  to  isolate  infected  refugees; 
(2)  a  campaign  of  publicity  to  educate  the  inhabi- 
tants toward  cleanlier  habits;  (3)  the  establishment  of 
a  complete  hospital  system;  (4)  the  establishment  of 
a  complete  ambulance  service  in  connection  with  the 
hospitals;  (5)  the  organization  of  a  number  of  dis- 
infection crews  to  clean  up  the  houses  where  cases 
were  reported;    (6)    the  installation  of  bathing  and 


EPIDEMICS  111 

delousing  plants  In  every  community,  and  the  passage 
of  laws,  making  the  use  of  them  obligatory;  (7)  the 
establishment  of  a  complete  local  quarantine  wherever 
necessary;  (8)  the  exaction  of  an  official  personal 
cleanliness  certificate  with  each  demand  for  a  rail- 
road ticket.  This  is  probably  an  ideal  program.  If 
carried  out  it  could  hardly  fail  to  accomplish  its  aim. 
It  is  no  less  practical  and  no  more  stringent,  I  am 
told,  than  the  regimes  successfully  enforced  in  some 
of  the  American  army's  sanitary  campaigns  in  Cen- 
tral America,  the  West  Indies  and  the  Philippines. 
But  the  Polish  government,  while  wholly  approving  it 
in  the  abstract,  has  not  even  begun  to  carry  it  out. 
For  Poland  has  been  at  war.  It  has  been  at  war  from 
the  first.  Between  two  dangers,  that  of  the  typhus 
epidemic,  and  that  of  the  hostile  "red  army,"  no  Pole 
could  be  found  who  would  not  instantly  affirm  the 
latter  to  be  by  far  the  more  formidable.  Not  having 
enough  energy  or  equipment  to  fight  both  simulta- 
neously, the  government  has  felt  obliged,  for  the  time 
being,  to  let  the  typhus  run  its  own  course.  The  greater 
part  of  the  nation's  sanitary  personnel  and  equipment 
being  needed  for  the  army,  there  was  not  enough  left 
to  combat  the  epidemic.  What  with  the  fuel  shortage 
and  the  transport  crisis  due  to  the  prolongation  of 
hostilities,  most  of  the  time,  even  the  delousing  ap- 
paratus supplied  by  foreign  Initiative  has  been  with- 
out coal  and  Is  therefore  useless.  Moreover,  the  en- 
tire Polish  administration  is  so  Inexperienced,  so  torn 
by  personal  jealousies  and  lack  of  coordination,  that 
the  few  measures  which  the  government  has  en- 
deavored to  enforce  have  remained  dead  letters. 
There  Is,  for  example,  a  decree  which  makes  the  scrub- 


112  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

bing  of  all  railway  stations  obligatory;  but  as  yet,  no 
hose  has  been  provided  to  carry  a  free  flow  of  water, 
and  there  are  neither  brushes  nor  rags  nor  soap.  The 
disorganization  is  such  that,  in  spite  of  the  regulations 
of  the  department  of  hygiene,  it  is  still  possible  for 
the  railway  authorities  to  unload  a  train  of  t)^hus- 
infected  refugees  in  the  Warsaw  station,  and  an  hour 
later,  without  the  cars  having  even  been  so  much  as 
swept,  send  it  forth  again  as  a  regular  passenger  train. 
But  even  more  favorable  to  the  epidemic  than  the 
government's  preoccupation  with  other  matters,  is  the 
attitude  of  the  people  themselves — the  crowded  popu- 
lation of  the  slums,  the  very  ones  who  suffer  and  die. 
In  vain  the  foreign  workers  have  endeavored  to  teach 
them  to  bathe;  In  vain  they  have  been  told  of  the 
dangers  of  vermin.  There  is  a  time-honored  super- 
stition in  Poland,  among  Jews  and  Christians  alike, 
that  body-lice  ward  off  disease.  What  is  the  word  of 
a  foreigner  against  the  traditional  wisdom  of  one's 
ancestors?  The  ordinary  common-sense  Pole  feels 
nervous,  apparently,  so  long  as  he  has  not  a  few  pro- 
tective lice  on  his  person.  Again,  the  very  fact  that 
the  government  orders  them  to  bathe  is  sufficient  reason 
for  the  Poles  to  evade  the  order,  if  they  can.  For 
generations,  the  only  government  these  unhappy  people 
have  known  has  been  a  government  of  oppression.  For 
generations,  they  have  been  accustomed  to  suspect  a 
hidden  motive  of  oppression  In  every  edict,  and  a 
hostile  trap  In  every  decree.  They  have  therefore  de- 
veloped to  a  high  degree  the  quality  of  passive  resist- 
ance, and  even  knowing  that  the  present  government 
is  wholly  different  from  the  old,  they  cannot  change 
their  attitude  in  a  day. 


EPIDEMICS  113 

In  the  matter  of  hygiene,  as  in  the  matter  of  eco- 
nomics, it  would  appear,  then,  that  the  first  solution  to 
be  sought  for  is  political.  The  task  of  cleaning  up 
Poland  is  too  vast  for  even  a  combination  of  foreign 
agencies  to  undertake  without  the  help  of  the  Poles 
themselves.  So  long  as  all  its  energies  were  occupied 
by  war,  the  government  was  incapable  of  lending 
real  assistance;  and  after  peace  is  declared,  its  first 
care,  properly  enough,  must  be  to  perfect  and  coordi- 
nate the  administration,  which  will  be  no  small  under- 
taking. After  that,  it  may  be  able  to  enforce  its  sani- 
tary regulations  and  begin  the  patient  work  of  educat- 
ing the  people  out  of  their  harmful  superstitions,  and 
into  a  spirit  of  confidence  toward  the  government  and 
its  decrees.  What  is  true  of  Poland  is  true  of  the 
Baltic  states,  the  Ukraine  and  Western  Russia. 

Apart  from  typhus,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  Is 
pretty  well  localized  and  little  likely  to  spread,  the 
only  other  maladies  which  are  general  in  "Balkanized 
Europe"  are  tuberculosis  and  rickets.  Both  of  these 
affect  principally  children,  and  both  are  due  chiefly  to 
malnutrition.  I  shall  accordingly  discuss  them  in  con- 
nection with  the  danger  of  famine,  with  which  they 
are  intimately  associated.  On  the  whole,  in  reviewing 
the  general  sanitary  situation,  one  is  struck  not  so 
much  by  how  bad  it  is  as  by  how  goodl  After  four 
and  a  half  years  of  war  and  blockade,  supplemented  by 
two  years  of  dislocation  and  disorder,  one  might  well 
expect,  in  each  of  these  countries,  to  see  a  large  part 
of  the  population  drag^ng  itself  about  in  utter  misery. 
There  is  misery  enough,  heaven  knows.  But  the 
miracle  is,  how  quickly  the  instincts  of  life  and  health 
seem  to  have  covered  up  the  devastations  of  death  and 


114  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

disease.  There  are  plenty  of  hopeless  cripples,  there 
are  widows  and  orphans  unnumbered;  yet  so  com- 
pletely are  these  objects  of  pity  in  the  minority  that 
they  seem  to  be  lost  in  the  great  masses  of  sun-burned, 
toiling  peasantry,  and  active,  crowding  city  folk.  I 
will  make  one  exception — ^Austria;  and  in  Austria, 
particularly  Vienna.  Everywhere  else,  even  in  Poland, 
death  is  losing  the  contest.  Life  is  forging  doggedly 
ahead.  Since  the  war  there  have  been  an  enormous 
number  of  marriages.  Everywhere  the  birth-rate  is 
soaring.  In  Czecho-Slovakia,  the  death-rate,  which 
had  actually  doubled  during  the  war,  has  fallen  now 
to  below  the  pre-war  level,  and  the  number  of  children 
born  exceeds  the  average  of  before  the  war.  I  cite  this 
example  because  the  Czechs  are  almost  the  only  people 
who  have  succeeded  as  yet  in  collecting  current  vital 
statistics.  From  what  I  have  observed,  I  suspect  that 
similar  phenomena  are  taking  place  in  most  of  the 
other  countries. 


FAMINE 

In  the  matter  of  food  shortage,  as  in  the  matter  of 
epidemics,  the  crisis  appears  to  have  passed,  and  con- 
ditions are  improving  steadily,  if  slowly.  The  worst 
period  was  the  two  last  years  of  the  war,  with  the 
year  19 19.  Throughout  Central  and  Eastern  Eu- 
rope, malnutrition  was  general,  and  in  its  train  came 
the  inevitable  consequences — ^widespread  tuberculosis 
among  adults,  tuberculosis  and  rickets  among  children. 
In  Warsaw,  in  19 17,  seVen  hundred  and  thirty-two 
persons  out  of  every  hundred  thousand  died  of  some 
form  of  tuberculosis,  and  in  Cracow,  nine  hundred  out 
of  every  hundred  thousand.  Fortunately,  most  of  the 
numerous  cases  which  still  subsist  have  not  reached 
an  acute  stage.  With  proper  feeding,  the  victim, 
especially  the  child,  recovers  his  strength.  There  is  a 
lack  of  hospitals  and  sanitaria  for  the  more  advanced 
cases,  but  in  the  main,  the  problem  is  simply  one  of 
food. 

At  the  present  time,  the  peasants  nearly  everywhere, 
that  is  to  say,  the  vast  majority  of  the  population,  have 
enough  to  eat.  It  is  the  cities  which  suffer,  partly  from 
ill  will  on  the  part  of  peasants,  partly  from  faulty 
transportation  entailing  faulty  distribution,  and  partly 
from  the  faulty  circulation  of  money.  In  the  cities  the 
rich  need  not  complain.  In  even  the  worst  moments, 
they  have  always  been  able  to  procure  whatever  they 

"5 


116  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

liked  by  the  contraband  of  speculators.  Of  the  work- 
people, those  who  have  employment  have  generally 
had  substantial  increases  of  wages  and  can  get  along; 
it  is  those  who  are  jobless,  and  hence  penniless,  who 
go  on  short  rations.  The  shop-keepers,  exacting  large 
profits,  have  in  many  cases  become  the  wealthy  class 
of  this  new  era.  The  people  who  seem  to  have  suf- 
fered most  are  the  former  middle-class — lawyers,  doc- 
tors, teachers,  musicians,  artists,  writers,  army  officers, 
officials  in  government  bureaus.  These  are  everywhere 
the  new  poor.  Earning  next  to  nothing,  they  sell  their 
rugs,  pictures,  furniture,  jewelry,  clothing,  to  buy 
food;  and  their  pride  is  such  that  until  all  their  little 
capital  is  gone  they  hesitate  to  take  advantage  of  the 
charity  kitchens  which  every  city  now  maintains  for 
the  needy.  In  every  capital,  men  and  women  of  emi- 
nent families  are  to  be  found  entirely  destitute,  inuring 
themselves  to  the  menial  erafpl'oyment  which  is  often 
the  only  work  they  can  find.  The  resultant  waste  of 
educated  ability  is  far  too  great. 

An  indication  of  the  betterment  of  the  general  food 
situation  is  the  way  in  which  the  Child-Feeding  Fund 
of  the  American  Relief  Administration  has  recently 
restricted  its  activities.  By  the  winter  of  1919-1920 
this  organization,  an  outgrowth  of  Mr.  Herbert  Hoo- 
ver's experience  in  revictualing  Belgium  and  occupied 
France  during  the  war,  was  feeding,  with  admirable 
skill  and  economy,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  children 
in  Finland,  Esthonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland, 
Czecho-Slovakia,  Hungary,  Jugo-Slavia  and  Austria. 
The  work  was  suspended  in  the  Baltic  states  in  the 
spring  of  1920.  In  June  it  was  suspended  in  Czecho- 
slovakia, Hungary  and  Jugo-Slavia.     The  only  coun- 


FAMINE  117 

tries  where  it  has  seemed  necessary  to  continue  are 
Poland  and  Austria.  Compared  to  this  really  re- 
markable organization,  all  other  revictualment  chari- 
ties appear  insignificant.  Its  judgment  may  therefore 
be  taken  as  decidedly  reassuring. 

Glancing  over  the  map  of  Balkanized  Europe,  and 
excepting  Poland  and  Austria,  of  which  I  shall  speak 
later,  and  also  Russia,  where  there  is  said  to  be 
famine,  but  concerning  which  detailed  information  is 
lacking,  one  arrives  at  the  following  observations: 
Greece,  though  never  self-sufficing,  is  unusually  pros- 
perous this  year  and  well  able  to  purchase  its  own 
food.  Bulgaria  has  a  big  surplus  of  wheat,  and  Jugo- 
slavia has  both  grain  and  live-stock  to  export.  Rou- 
mania  has  enough  wheat  for  its  own  needs,  and  an 
export  of  corn.  Hungary  has  a  grain  surplus.  Czecho- 
slovakia lacks  bread  but  abounds  in  other  foods,  and 
has  a  large  enough  sugar  export  to  buy  as  much  wheat 
as  it  likes.  The  child-feeding  charts,  kept  by  the 
American  Relief  Administration,  show  that  in  the  last 
months  of  the  extra  meal  regime,  the  children  in  cer- 
tain parts  of  Bohemia  were  developing  far  above  nor- 
mal in  both  height  and  weight.  As  for  the  Baltic 
states,  they  seem  now  to  be  self-sufficing. 

In  several  of  the  countries  mentioned,  there  are  cer- 
tain inaccessible  regions  where  the  people  are  underfed. 
Eastern  Slovakia  and  Sub-Carpathian  Ruthenia,  whose 
inhabitants  for  centuries  have  been  accustomed  to  re- 
ceive their  food  up  the  river  valleys,  from  the  Hun- 
garian plains,  are  now  cut  off  from  this  rich  granary 
by  an  iron-bound  frontier.  Communications  across 
mountains  with  Moravia  and  Bohemia  being  still  very 
difficult,  they  do  not  receive  enough  to  eat.    Again,  on 


118  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

parts  of  the  Dalmatian  coast,  in  the  mountains  of 
Bosnia  and  of  northern  Macedonia,  and  in  Monte- 
negro, certain  communities  are  so  isolated  that  with 
transport  conditions  in  Jugo-Slavia  as  disorganized  as 
at  present,  it  is  hard  for  the  government  to  revictual 
them.  At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
neither  in  Czecho-Slovakia,  nor  in  Jugo-Slavia,  is  there 
a  real  shortage  of  food.  The  famine  of  these  isolated 
communities  is  a  problem  of  distribution,  requiring  not 
so  much  foreign  aid  as  better  administrative  measures 
on  the  part  of  the  governments  concerned. 

As  v^ith  disease,  so  with  famine ;  the  danger  is  strictly 
limited.  Poland  and  Austria  are  the  only  two  coun- 
tries which  need  stir  the  active  pity  of  the  foreigner. 
What  with  the  long  war  and  its  continuation  in  hos- 
tilities with  Russia,  Poland  at  present  is  dependent,  to 
a  large  extent,  on  imported  food,  and  as  the  country 
has,  for  the  time  being,  no  money,  and  no  produce  to 
exchange,  it  must  live  on  foreign  credit.  Thus  Norway 
has  given  twenty-eight  million  crowns  credit  in  the 
form  of  salt  herrings,  and  the  United  States  has  made 
advances  of  flour  and  wheat.  The  American  Relief 
Administration,  or  its  successor,  is  still,  I  believe,  pro- 
viding one  substantial  meal  a  day  for  over  a  million 
children,  and  there  are  other  charitable  agencies  which 
are  active.  However,  if  peace  could  be  made  per- 
manent, and  the  land  reform  settled,  and  efficient  ad- 
ministration developed,  Poland  would  soon,  no  doubt, 
be  able  to  feed  itself.  Galicia  and  the  so-called  "East- 
ern" districts  are  normally  self-sufficing.  Congress,  or 
former  Russian,  Poland  is  not;  but  Posnania,  former 
German  Poland,  is  one  of  the  richest  agricultural  re- 
gions in  Europe.     Its  surplus  ought  normally  to  fill 


FAMINE  119 

the  deficit  of  Congress  Poland.  Both  in  the  latter 
provinces,  and  in  Galicia,  a  gradual  improvement  in 
the  methods  of  farming  ought  very  nearly  to  double 
the  present  production.  In  respect  of  food,  the  first 
necessity  for  Poland  is  therefore  to  make  a  satisfactory 
peace  with  Russia,  and  to  get  to  work  at  interior  re- 
construction. 

The  only  state  in  Europe  which  can  really  be  said 
to  be  overwhelmed  by  famine  is  Austria.  Even  here 
the  country  people  have  enough,  but  the  plight  of  the 
cities,  and  especially  of  Vienna,  with  its  two  million 
population,  is  truly  heart-rending.  Diplomats  are  not 
noted,  as  a  rule,  for  sentimentality,  but  I  know  one 
who  told  me  that  if  he  thought  he  would  have  to  wit- 
ness such  sights  of  misery  this  winter  as  last  he 
would  resign  his  post.  No  visitor,  I  think,  could  pene- 
trate a  little  into  the  life  of  this  unhappy  city  without 
being  appalled.  For  six  years  now  the  people  have 
been  gradually  cutting  down  their  rations  until  they 
seem  actually  to  have  lost  their  appetites.  They  are 
no  longer  hungry.  They  seem  to  arise  satisfied  from 
a  meal  which  would  not  fill  half  the  modest  require- 
ments of  a  normal  person.  And  their  half-starved 
condition  expresses  itself,  not  in  food-riots — they  have 
not  enough  energy  for  that — ^but  in  the  kind  of  listless- 
ness  and  despair  which  seems  to  leave  them  all  but  in- 
different to  their  own  fate.  Considering  three  units  as 
the  normal  daily  food  requirement  of  a  normal  person, 
the  government  provides  the  equivalent  of  one  and  a 
half  units  to  all  citizens  at  a  low  price.  For  the  other 
unit  and  a  half,  the  Viennese  must  devise  as  best  they 
can.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  children  have  been 
a1>solutcly  saved  by  the  American  Relief  Administra- 


120  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

tion.  Estimating  that  there  were  240,000  school  chil- 
dren in  Vienna  before  the  war,  it  may  be  said  that 
40,000  have  been  moved  away,  and  40,000  more  have 
been  given  temporary  hospitality  in  Italy  and  other 
charitable  countries.  Of  the  remaining  160,000,  there 
are  perhaps  10,000  which  do  not  need  aid.  The  other 
150,000  are  all  being  fed  by  the  American  Relief  Ad- 
ministration, or  by  its  recent  successor,  which  was  to 
have  been  the  Society  of  Friends. 

If  you  ask  the  Austrians  what  is  the  cause  of  the 
famine,  they  will  tell  you  that  it  Is  due  to  the  peace 
treaty,  which  cuts  them  off  from  their  natural  food 
supplies  in  Hungary  and  Jugo-Slavia,  and  condemns 
them  to  death  by  slow  starvation.  I  am  glad  to  say 
that  I  cannot  entirely  accept  this  bitter  explanation. 
The  truth  seems  to  be  that  Austria,  even  as  now  con- 
stituted, could  come  very  near  to  feeding  itself  if  it 
would.  Austria,  unfortunately,  is  at  present  in  com- 
plete dissolution.  Its  people  are  listless  and  hopeless, 
its  government  is  inefficient.  There  is  perhaps  even 
more  food  in  the  country  than  there  is  thought  to  be; 
for  so  bitter  is  the  opposition  of  the  conservative  Ro- 
man Catholic  peasants  to  the  socialist  government  that 
they  refuse  to  send  in  food  to  "red"  Vienna,  pre- 
ferring to  hide  it  away.  Moreover,  the  government,  in 
requisitioning  their  grain,  pays  them  so  low  a  price 
that  they  are  angry  and  discouraged  and  inclined  to 
cease  producing.  A  competent  American  official  has 
proved  to  me,  on  a  basis  of  pre-war  statistics,  that 
Austria,  instead  of  supplying  barely  forty  per  cent,  of 
its  own  food,  as  at  present,  could,  if  it  only  would,  pro- 
.duce  eighty  to  ninety  per  cent.  The  remainder  could 
be  purchased  in  exchange  for  the  products  of  its  fac- 


FAMINE  121 

tories.  In  short,  even  the  present  Austria  can  live  if 
it  really  wants  to.  It  must  indeed  be  fed  on  credit,  or 
charity,  for  some  time  to  come.  But  the  principal 
thing  is  to  persuade  it,  and  help  it,  to  esta-blish  a  stable 
government  which  has  the  confidence  of  all  the  people. 
The  peasants  must  be  paid  properly  for  their  food 
stuffs,  and  encouraged  to  produce.  And  the  factories 
must  be  put  in  a  way  to  obtain  raw  materials.  But 
even  these  measures  will  remain  without  effect,  so  long 
as  the  people  themselves  remain  convinced,  as  now, 
that  whatever  their  effort,  it  will  prove  to  be  vain. 
The  first  necessity  is  the  restoration  o»f  confidence. 

The  observations  which  apply  to  Poland  and  Aus- 
tria in  particudar  apply  as  well  to  "Balkanized  Europe" 
as  a  whole.  Some  of  the  countries  are  not  and  never 
wjU  be  self-feeding,  others  ought  to  produce  a  sur- 
plus ;  and  the  surplus  of  the  latter  ought  easily  to  equal 
the  deficit  of  the  former.  If  all  goes  well,  Poland  and 
the  Baltic  States  gradually  should  be  able  to  supply 
their  own  needs.  Czecho-Slovakia  will  have  to  ex- 
change sugar,  Austria  will  have  to  exchange  manu- 
factured goods,  and  Greece  will  have  to  exchange  ship- 
ping facilities,  for  grain.  Hungary,  Roumania,  Jugo- 
slavia and  Bulgaria  should  be  able  to  export  consid- 
erable quantities  of  food.  At  the  present  time  the  ex- 
isting surpluses — amounting  to  many  thousands  of  car- 
loads of  grain  in  Hungary,  Jugo-Slavia  and  Bulgaria — 
cannot  be  fully  utilized,  owing  to  administrative  in- 
efficiency and  the  lack  of  rolling-stock.  Once  more,  it 
is  clear  that  a  general  political  solution  must  precede 
the  specific  economic  solution. 


THE  AMERICAN  ERROR 

When  American  representatives,  soon  after  the  ar- 
mistice, made  their  way  into  Central  Europe,  and  re- 
ported their  findings,  it  was  quickly  realized  that  the 
task  of  reconstruction  was  so  enormous  that  without 
allied  help  it  might  drag  interminably,  thereby  delay- 
ing the  return  of  that  genuine  peace  for  which  the 
world  was  sighing.  The  American  who  showed  most 
vision  in  the  matter  was  Mr.  Herbert  Hoover,  though 
it  must  be  said  that  he  had  the  sympathetic  support  of 
the  President,  and  of  the  President's  chief  adviser.  Col. 
E.  M.  House.  Mr.  Hoover  organized  the  Child-Feed- 
ing Fund  of  the  American  Relief  Administration.  He 
furthermore  persuaded  the  Czech,  Polish,  Jugo-Slav 
and  Austrian  governments  to  allow  the  American  gov- 
ernment unofficially  to  place  missions  of  American  rail- 
road experts  at  their  disposition.  The  places  which 
fell  to  the  United  States  on  the  various  allied  plebiscite 
and  surveillance  commissions  were  filled  largely  by 
technicians.  A  special  American  army  typhus  mission 
was  sent  to  Poland.  Col.  House  had  the  Navy  or- 
ganize a  system  of  private  telegraph  wires  from  vari- 
ous Central  European  capitals  to  Paris,  thereby  restor- 
ing transcontinental  communications.  Finally,  on  the 
initiative,  I  believe,  of  Mr.  H.  P.  Davison,  the  Amer- 
ican Red  Cross  organized  and  even  financed  the  allied 
League  of  Red  Cross  Societies,  in  conjunction  with  the 

122 


THE  AMERICAN  ERROR  128 

League  of  Nations,  and  its  agents  invaded  every  region 
of  Europe,  reporting  conditions  and  distributing  food, 
clothing  and  medical  supplies.  On  the  whole,  it  is  a 
record  of  generous  effort  to  be  proud  of;  no  other 
nation  could  have  done  so  much;  no  other  nation  even 
attempted  such  vast  programmes. 

If  I  have  analyzed  correctly  the  mind  of  the  ad- 
ministration and  its  advisers,  this  American  effort  may 
be  said  to  have  had  three  purposes:  The  first  was 
humanitarian.  A  large  part  of  Europe  was  perishing 
of  famine  and  disease.  The  war  being  over,  these  mis- 
erable populations,  especially  the  children,  made  dumb 
but  eloquent  appeal  to  the  responsive  American  heart, 
which  felt  that  they  must  be  cared  for  whatever  the 
cost.  The  second  purpose  was  technical.  Fresh  from 
their  brilliant  achievement  in  the  war,  our  administra- 
tors and  engineers  felt  confident  of  their  ability  to  re- 
store the  arteries  of  exchange,  on  which  peace,  and  the 
health  of  Europe,  may  be  said  to  depend.  The  third 
purpose  was  psychological.  The  administration  saw 
correctly  that  the  great  obstacle  to  reconstruction  was 
the  prolongation,  after  the  end  of  hostilities,  of  the 
war  mentality.  It  was  felt  that  by  a  display  of  re- 
sponsive and  whole-hearted  kindness  to  the  vanquished 
this  morbid  mentality  could  be  allayed,  and  the  way 
opened  to  a  spirit  of  genuine  peace. 

In  the  light  of  the  diagnosis  of  Europe*s  ills  which 
I  have  tried  to  give  in  the  foregoing  pages,  it  is  both 
interesting  and  instructive  to  inquire  how  far  the  three 
purposes  envisaged  by  the  American  government  were 
actually  achieved.  The  humanitarian  effort  was  a  mag- 
nificent success,  which  has  moved  and  has  aroused  the 
admiration  of  all  competent  foreign  observers.    "Your 


124  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

country,"  said  a  French  diplomat  to  me,  "has  literally 
saved  the  city  of  Vienna.  It  is  one  of  the  finest  achieve- 
ments in  history."  Sincere  panegyrics  have  poured  In 
from  every  side.  One  could  give  a  long  list  of  them. 
But  the  essential  fact  is  that  in  its  humanitarian  aspect 
the  American  effort  left  nothing  to  be  desired. 

The  success  of  our  technical  programme  is  more  du- 
bious. On  the  material  side  our  experts  were  quick  to 
grasp  the  fundamentals  of  the  situation,  and  their 
specific  recommendations  were  undoubtedly  excellent. 
In  many  ways,  they  have  probably  accomplished  much 
good.  Nevertheless,  I  am  afraid  that  in  their  main 
purpose  they  have  been  a  failure.  In  the  face  of 
merely  material  obstacles  the  American  mind  is  in  its 
element.  But  fully  as  important  as  the  material  ob- 
stacles which  our  missions  encountered  were  the  po- 
litical obstacles.  And  here  the  American  mind  showed 
itself  to  be  almost  wholly  at  sea.  Whether  in  Jugo- 
slavia, or  in  Siberia,  the  story  is  the  same.  The  aims 
of  our  engineers  were  largely  frustrated  by  purely  po- 
litical interventions  which  they  themselves  had  never 
expected,  and  with  which  they  were  not  trained  to  deal. 
Even  the  Navy's  wire  service  was  continually  hampered 
by  jealous  or  sinister  political  interference. 

As  for  our  psychological  effort,  it  has  probably  been 
the  least  successful  of  all.  When  one  hears  the  chil- 
dren of  Vienna  or  Warsaw  cheering  America's  name, 
one's  breast  fills  with  pride.  But  it  is  to  be  feared  that 
the  impulsive  gratitude  of  the  children  by  no  means 
expresses  the  complex  sentiment  of  Pole  or  Austrian 
regarding  America.  Not  only  has  American  gener- 
osity failed  In  the  perhaps  impossible  task  of  reconcil- 
ing the  various  peoples  among  themselves;  it  has  not 


THE  AMERICAN  ERROR  125 

even,  so  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  judge,  Increased  the 
popular  prestige  of  America.  I  found  many  American 
relief  workers  disillusioned  and  somewhat  bitter  be- 
cause of  the  lack  of  appreciation  which  they  seemed  to 
sense  in  their  foreign  environment.  Too  often,  this 
atmosphere  may  have  been  due  largely  to  a  certain  lack 
of  tact  on  the  part  of  some  Americans.  At  the  same 
time,  the  question  arises  imperiously  whether  the  aver- 
age European  really  looks  upon  life  in  the  same  way 
the  average  American  does.  Of  our  standard  of  com- 
fort and  general  well-being,  the  European  has  no  con- 
ception. He  seems  to  be  less  affected  by  material  mis- 
ery. It  Is  difficult  to  Interest  him  in  material  reforms. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  responds  far  more  quickly  than 
does  the  American  to  purely  political  considerations, 
which,  In  some  countries  at  least,  are  as  the  breath  of 
his  life.  I  feel  absolutely  sure,  for  example,  that  there 
are  peoples  in  "Balkanized  Europe"  who  have  not  had 
so  much  as  an  inlding  of  understanding  of  what  Amer- 
ican charity  Is  really  about.  Unable,  In  most  cases,  to 
assign  to  it  a  hidden  political  motive,  they  have  appar- 
ently put  it  down  as  a  kind  of  strange  but  probably 
harmless  mania.  "If  America,"  they  seem  to  say  with 
a  shrug  of  the  shoulders,  "wants  to  go  on  feeding  and 
doctoring  all  these  poor  folks  and  refugees,  why  should 
we  make  objections?"  Yet  at  bottom.  In  almost  every 
event,  I  am  convinced  that  they  would  far  rather  have 
had  our  political  support  than  our  material  aid.  The 
defeated  states  have  not  entirely  forgiven  America  for 
not  having  insisted  upon  the  kind  of  peace  which  they 
had  been  led  to  expect  would  be  accorded  them.  Even 
In  Austria,  which  owes  us  so  much,  there  is  a  sentiment 
among  more  intelligent  people  that  if  the  same  amount 


1«6  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

of  money  that  has  been  spent  on  food  had  been  given 
the  country  in  the  form  of  fuel  and  raw  stuffs  for  its 
industries,  it  might  now  have  become  almost  self-sup- 
porting, instead  of  having  still  to  be  "spoon-fed."  The 
smaller  allies,  as  well,  with  the  possible  exception  of 
Czecho-Slovakia,  all  have  their  petty  grievances 
against  us.  The  Greeks  and  Jugo-Slavs  suspect  us 
of  being  "Bulgarophile" — in  their  eyes  just  cause  for 
every  sort  of  suspicion.  The  Roumanians  feel  that  we 
were  most  unsympathetic  with  them  in  their  invasion 
of  Hungary  in  the  spring  of  19 19,  and  they  are  surely 
against  the  American  oil  interests  which  are  installed 
in  their  country.  The  Poles,  while  they  are  no  doubt 
grateful  for  our  food,  cannot  understand  why  we  should 
be,  as  they  think,  "pro-Jewish,"  or  why  we  have  never 
given  them  greater  material  aid  in  what  they  regard  as 
their  noble  and  chivalrous  crusade  against  the  world- 
danger  of  bolshevism.  As  for  our  excitement  over  the 
typhus  epidemic,  it  perplexes,  and  I  sometimes  think, 
annoys  them  a  little.  These  are  of  course  not  suf- 
ficient reasons  to  make  us  regret  our  effort,  whose  hu- 
mane accomplishment  is  properly  its  own  reward; 
nevertheless  they  may  well  give  us  pause. 

I  attended  a  luncheon  in  Paris  last  spring  at  which 
I  heard  Mr.  Henry  P.  Davison  say,  in  the  course  of  a 
speech  on  the  work  of  the  Red  Cross,  that  this  work 
must  be  kept  clear  of  all  political  considerations,  and 
must  be  carried  on  for  its  own  sake ;  there  is  too  much 
politics  in  Europe,  he  said;  and  added  that  peace  will 
come,  not  through  politics,  but  through  the  eradication 
of  epidemics  and  famine,  and  the  restoration  of  nor- 
mal economic  relations.  This  attitude  betrays  what 
seems  to  me  a  serious  error  in  American  thinking.    Wc 


THE  AMERICAN  ERROR  127 

are  prone  to  regard  "European  politics"  as  a  futile, 
complicated,  troublesome  kind  of  nonsense  by  which 
large  numbers  of  otherwise  sensible  people  are  incom- 
prehensibly obsessed.  If  they  would  only  forget  poli- 
tics and  go  to  work,  we  feel,  then  all  would  be  well. 
But  European  politics — unfortunately,  it  may  be — can 
no  more  be  obliterated  by  a  mere  impatient  wave  of  the 
hand  than  can  American  politics.  Our  prejudice  seems 
not  so  much  to  extend  to  domestic  politics,  in  which  we 
have  had  ample  experience,  as  to  international  politics, 
into  whose  mysteries  our  happy  circumstances  have  not 
heretofore  driven  us  to  initiate  ourselves.  Our  incom- 
prehension of  European  politics  is  the  real  explanation 
of  our  lack  of  success  in  two  of  the  three  aims  of  our 
European  reconstruction  programme.  It  is  no  use  pro- 
posing an  exchange  of  rolling-stock  between  countries 
which  hate  each  other.  However  clearly  the  material 
benefit  in  such  an  exchange  may  be  proved  to  them, 
they  will  still  refuse,  from  psychological  impulses. 
What  must  first  be  found  is  a  formula  which  will  mol- 
lify their  hate.  In  the  same  way,  while  it  is  a  laudable 
thing  to  extend  assistance  to  typhus  ridden  refugees, 
how  much  more  charitable  to  strive  to  find  that  po- 
litical solution  which  would  stop  the  flow  of  refugees 
altogether,  by  removing  the  causes  which  make  them 
leave  their  homes.  Those  Austrians  are  doubtless 
right  who  argue  that  the  only  sure  stay  for  the  famine 
which  is  sapping  their  country's  strength  would  be  a 
decision  settling  once  for  all  the  country's  political 
future,  instead  of  leaving  it  indefinitely  in  suspense  as 
at  present.  The  true  relief-worker,  then,  is  that  states- 
man who  will  devise  means  of  curing  these  peoples  of 
their  morbid  mentality.     Only  when  their  minds  have 


128  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

been  cleared  of  the  fumes  of  war  will  they  be  really 
receptive  to  ideas  of  economic  and  sanitary  reconstruc- 
tion. And  so  long  as  Americans,  indifferent  to,  or  im- 
patient of,  what  they  hold  to  be  "minor  political  con- 
siderations," continue  to  make  to  Europeans  proposals 
which,  however  excellent  in  themselves,  are  neverthe- 
less psychologically,  that  is  politically,  impossible,  just 
so  long  will  the  American  seem  to  the  European  a 
being  good-hearted,  no  doubt,  and  well-intentioned, 
but  naive — an  ardent,  impulsive  and  idealistic  youth 
among  sober  and  disillusioned  men  of  the  world. 


BOLSHEVISM 

The  latest  synon3rm  for  revoJution  and  internal  dis- 
order is  Bolshevism.  Of  all  the  various  social  trans- 
formations which  are  being  urged,  this  is  the  most 
violent  and  the  most  extreme.  It  is,  in  a  sense,  the 
pacemaker  for  other  advanced  reforms.  An  inquiry 
into  its  real  nature  seems  therefore  indicated,  before 
attempting  to  answer  the  question  of  how  far  it  may 
be  expected  to  spread. 

There  is  no  longer  any  mystery  about  Bolshevism. 
A  good  many  journalists,  a  good  many  foreign  delega- 
tions and  more  or  less  disinterested  individuals  have 
visited  soviet  Russia.  Besides,  the  mass  of  soviet  lit- 
erature at  the  disposition  of  the  foreign  student  has 
been  continually  increasing,  and  while  there  is  pro- 
found disagreement  as  to  the  significance  of  the  facts, 
these  facts  themselves  are  no  longer  greatly  disputed. 

The  Kerensky,  or  democratic,  revolution  in  Russia, 
made  possible  by  war  fatigue  and  the  consequent  de- 
feat and  disintegration  of  the  army,  failed  to  remain 
in  power  because  the  country  was  obviously  not  ready 
for  democracy.  What  was  needed  was  a  strong  hand, 
and  this  is  precisely  what  was  supplied  by  the  Bol- 
shevist leaders.  But  instead  of  using  their  power  for 
the  immediate  good  of  the  entire  commonwealth,  they 
exercised  it  solely  in  the  interest  of  the  workmen. 
The  town  and  city  populations  looked  on  apathetically 

while  the  Bolshevists  were  organizing  their  forces. 

139 


130  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

The  peasants,  intent  solely  on  gaining  possession  of  the 
land,  began  by  supporting  the  Soviets.  But  by  the 
time  the  great  bulk  of  the  people,  both  rural  and  urban, 
awakened  to  what  had  really  happened,  it  was  too  late. 
The  "dictatorship  of  the  proletariat"  was  firmly  es- 
tablished, and  was  showing  every  intention  of  main- 
taining itself  by  force. 

The  soviet  leaders  were  doctrinaire  to  the  core. 
Their  original  intention  was  to  institute  a  regime  of 
complete  communism,  wherein  all  private  commerce 
should  be  suppressed,  and  the  state  itself  should  be 
direct  purveyor  to  the  wants  of  every  individual.  To 
prevent  any  possible  reaction,  they  set  out  cold-blood- 
edly to  destroy  the  last  shadow  of  intellectual  and  aris- 
tocratic Russia,  suppressing  free  speech,  grinding  down 
the  upper  class  and  coddling  their  own  supporters. 
The  administration  and  operation  of  such  industries  as 
subsisted  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  councils  of  work- 
men. On  its  destructive  side,  the  Bolshevist  pro- 
gramme has  proved  a  triumph.  Intellectual  and  aris- 
tocratic Russia  is  almost  completely  scattered,  in  exile 
or  in  death.  But  in  its  constructive  aspects,  being  dis- 
cordant with  some  of  the  deepest  human  instincts,  it 
has  collapsed  totally.  The  peasants,  after  securing 
possession  of  the  land,  refused  to  surrender  it  again 
for  communistic  or  any  other  purposes.  The  attempt 
to  overcome  this  resistance  by  setting  the  poorer 
against  the  richer  peasants  was  abortive.  The  effort 
of  ignorant  workmen  to  preside  over  the  complex  fac- 
tory organisms  ended  farcically,  tragically,  in  the  par- 
alysis of  industrial  life.  The  retail  shops  remained 
closed,  but  the  people  continued  nevertheless  to  trade 


BOLSHEVISM  131 

clandestinely.  Shameless  speculation  replaced  the  or- 
dinary food  traffic,  and  the  government,  finding  itself 
incapable  of  supplying  the  townspeople  with  even  a 
third  of  the  normal  ration,  could  not  but  close  an  eye 
to  the  efforts  of  the  starving  people  to  find  their  food 
by  forbidden  devices.  Forced  thus  to  adopt  a  spirit 
of  practical  opportunism,  the  leaders  were  gradually 
obliged  to  postpone  the  pure  application  of  doctrine. 
In  order  to  defend  the  regime  against  its  enemies,  it 
was  necessary  to  keep  the  railways  going,  and  to  start 
up  the  munition  factories.  The  technicians  essential 
to  these  enterprises  were  enticed  back  into  service  by 
the  promise  of  large  emoluments  of  goods  and  privi- 
leges. As  the  workmen  proved  reluctant  to  accept  thd 
return  of  the  old  system,  they  were  mobilized  by  force 
on  the  pretext  that  the  revolution  was  in  danger,  and 
made  to  work  willy-nilly.  Against  the  growing  oppo- 
sition of  the  peasants,  who  form  over  eighty  per  cent, 
of  the  population,  and  of  the  workmen  themselves, 
who  objected  to  the  iron  discipline  imposed  upon  them, 
the  leaders  turned  to  the  ruthless  mechanism  of  an  iron 
terror.  The  old  Czarist  secret  police  have  entered  the 
employ  of  the  new  regime.  The  spy  system  is  even 
more  extensive  than  under  the  empire.  Whoever  is 
suspected  of  opposing  Bolshevism  is  imprisoned  or 
executed.  The  world  has  seldom  witnessed  a  mors 
complete  autocracy.  Aside  from  a  few  fanatics  and 
opportunist  profiteers,  almost  the  only  popular  sup- 
port the  regime  has  been  able  to  enlist,  outside  its 
police  and  its  regiments  of  mercenaries,  is  that  of  a 
few  Russian  patriots,  who  feel  that  much  as  they  may 
dislike  Bolshevism,  it  is  nevertheless  performing  a 


132  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

useful  service  in  defending  Russia's  territorial  integrity 
against  foreign  encroachments. 

Even  the  Bolshevists  now  admit  these  things.  I 
have  before  me  the  text  of  an  interview  dated  Prague, 
October  i,  1920,  between  my  careful  and  reliable 
friend,  L.  Weiss,  editor  of  a  liberal  French  review,  and 
Mr.  Gillerson,  chief  of  the  Russian  soviet  propaganda 
for  Central  Europe. 

"According  to  my  information,"  my  friend  began, 
"the  Russian  peasants  who,  since  the  decline  of  the 
towns,  represent  ninety-five  per  cent,  of  the  popula- 
tion of  your  country,  are  absolutely  anti-communist 
in  tendency,  and  are  opposed  to  the  present  Moscow 
regime." 

"That  is  so,"  admitted  Gillerson.  "The  peasants 
have  shown  themselves  to  be  blackly  ungrateful.  We 
gave  them  the  land,  and  now  that  they  have  it  they 
no  longer  wish  to  make  any  sacrifice  for  the  triumph  of 
the  ideas  to  which  they  owe  their  well-being." 

"But  how  can  you  go  on  governing  without  their 
support?" 

"We  will  force  them  to  accept  our  doctrine." 

"You  will  not  succeed." 

"Yes,  we  will." 

"There  is  no  sign  of  it." 

"Not  yet.    But  the  peasants  will  soon  understand." 

"That  is  your  faith?" 

"Yes;  that  is  our  faith." 

"If  I  am  correctly  informed,"  continued  my  friend, 
"neither  the  freedom  of  the  press  nor  any  other  free- 
dom now  exists  in  Russia.  The  only  opposition  organ 
which  appears  is  an  anarchist  sheet  which  is  even 
more  extreme  than  Lenin,  and  which  is  very  useful  to 


BOLSHEVISM  133 

you,  as  a  kind  of  bugaboo.  Therefore,  interdiction 
of  free  criticism,  interdiction  of  personal  judgment, 
prison,  an  intellectual  prison  for  everybody  I" 

"That  is  so,"  said  Gillerson. 

"But  is  not  this  singularly  opposed  to  the  doctrines 
of  Marx?" 

•'I  do  not  deny  it." 

"Well,  then?" 

"To  attain  the  ideal  aim  which  we  have  set  our- 
selves, by  means  of  revolution — ^the  only  means  which 
conform  to  present  necessities — ^we  have  been  obliged 
to  adopt  war  measures.  The  present  period  is  one  of 
transition  during  which  all  measures,  even  the  most 
draconian,  are  justified,  like  martial  law  during  a  state 
of  siege." 

"If  I,  or  an  inhabitant  of  Moscow,  should  venture 
to  express  a  contrary  opinion?" 

"We  would  not  tolerate  it." 

"By  what  right?" 

"By  right  of  our  convictions." 

"And  pending  the  realization  of  the  paradise  which 
you  promise,  the  Russian  proletariat  are  dying  of  pov- 
erty and  disease." 

"That  is  so,"  admitted  Gillerson  again.  "The  birth 
of  our  revolution  will  have  taken  place  under  the  most 
frightful  material  conditions.  Corruption  is  rife. 
Famine  continues  its  ravages.  But  we  are  only  at  the 
beginning  of  our  experiments.  Soon  things  will 
change.  Some  credit  must  be  opened  for  the  future 
happiness  of  humanity." 

"The  death  of  thousands  of  your  people  is  a  ter- 
rible responsibility." 

"Responsibility  does  not  frighten  us.    We  shall  tri- 


184  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

umph,  because  we  stand  for  justice  and  happiness  for 
the  greater  number." 

If  I  have  properly  understood  the  official  doctrine, 
as  now  modified,  it  is  that  while  pure  communism  is 
the  ideal,  its  realization  must  be  postponed  tempo- 
rarily, partly  because  of  foreign  military  attacks,  partly 
because  the  proletariat  itself  does  not  seem  to  under- 
stand its  own  interests.  With  the  present  generation 
there  is  little  to  be  done.  The  hope  of  communism 
is  in  the  children.  But  pending  the  period  of  one 
generation  necessary  to  raise  up  a  new  young  Russia 
steeped  in  the  true  doctrine,  a  dictatorship,  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  word,  must  be  maintained,  which  will  gov- 
ern by  force,  and  in  trust,  as  it  were,  for  the  commun- 
ists of  the  future,  who  will  no  longer  be  a  small  minor- 
ity, but  the  entire  population ;  and  in  that  day,  Bolshev- 
ism will  have  become  as  completely  democratic  as  it 
is  now  undemocratic. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  felt  that  soviet  Russia,  being 
the  avowed  enemy  of  private  property,  all  states  in 
which  the  property  ideal  subsists  will  necessarily  be 
the  enemies  of  Russian  bolshevism.  Accepting  this  as 
inevitable,  the  Bolshevist  leaders  from  the  first  have 
preferred  boldly  to  carry  the  war  into  the  enemy's 
camp  by  means  of  propaganda,  declaring  that  only  by 
world  revolution  can  capitalism  be  destroyed  and  the 
emancipation  of  the  proletariat  be  realized,  and  call- 
ing upon  the  workers  to  follow  the  Russian  example. 
They  are  recommended  to  seize  the  power  by  force, 
and  to  have  no  fear  of  bloodshed  in  so  good  a  cause; 
to  arm  the  proletariat  and  to  disarm  everybody  else; 
to  establish  a  dictatorship  on  the  Russian  model,  and 
beg^n  the  education  of  the  new  generation  in  the  com- 


BOLSHEVISM  135 

munist  ideal.  The  propaganda  offensive,  financed 
from  the  old  Russian  and  Roumanian  gold  reserve, 
and  by  the  sale  of  confiscated  jewels,  has  been,  on  the 
whole,  amazingly  effective.  While  it  had  in  its  favor 
the  upheaval  and  mental  disturbance  caused  by  the 
war,  nevertheless  the  odds  of  common  sense  against 
it  were  tremendous.  Yet  it  has  succeeded  in  troubling 
the  whole  world. 

Such,  summarily  described,  is  Bolshevism.  With 
something  like  nine-tenths  of  the  population  opposed  to 
it,  it  nevertheless  subsists,  thanks  to  what  the  Italian 
socialist,  Serrati,  has  euphemistically  called  "the  Rus- 
sian's natural  inclination  for  the  contemplative  life" — 
in  other  words,  his  lack  of  organizing  ability,  and  his 
extraordinary  apathy.  But  it  will  not,  cannot,  in  my 
opinion,  last  indefinitely.  Sooner  or  later,  if  not  this 
year,  then  next  year,  or  in  five  years,  by  one  means  or 
another,  it  will  be  brought  to  an  end,  and  one  more  of 
man's  fond  impossible  dreams  will  have  been  shattered 
under  the  pressure  of  realities.  There  are  three  pos- 
sibilities. Pursuing  the  policy  of  opportunism,  already 
begun,  Bolshevism  may  gradually  evolve  into  an  ordi- 
nary democratic  government,  remaining  communistic 
in  name  only.  Or,  developing  rather  in  the  national- 
istic sense,  it  may  grow  into  a  kind  of  Napoleonic  mili- 
tarist empire.  Or,  finally,  it  may  be  overthrown  by 
force — a  revolt  in  the  army,  a  strong  regional  uprising, 
the  hand  of  the  assassin — who  knows?  I  myself  con- 
sFder  its  overthrow  by  force  to  be  the  most  probable. 

In  any  case,  it  will  be  immensely  interesting,  after 
the  dust  and  the  blood  and  the  glamor  have  cleared 
away,  to  observe  just  what  are  the  real  transforma- 
tions which  Bolshevism  has  wrought  in  Russian  society. 


186  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

For  with  this,  as  with  other  great  revolutionary  move- 
ments, it  may  well  be  that  the  actual  results  will  bear 
little*  or  no  resemblance  to  the  avowed  intentions. 
Even  now  it  may  perhaps  be  permitted  to  indulge  in 
speculations  on  this  fascinating  theme.  Before  the 
revolution,  Russia  was  a  country  consisting  roughly 
of  only  two  classes,  an  aristocracy  of  nobles,  landed 
proprietors,  government  officials,  intellectuals;  and  a 
lower  class  of  disinherited  peasants  and  of  workmen 
who  were  themselves  half  peasant.  The  peasants 
lived  in  communities  still  under  the  influence  of  a  kind 
of  tribal  communism.  At  the  present  time,  all  this 
has  changed.  The  aristocracy  has  been  destroyed,  root 
and  branch.  The  peasants,  abandoning  their  primitive 
communism,  have  divided  the  land  between  them  and 
each  is  jealously  defending  his  own  holdings,  sometimes 
even  by  force  of  arms.  This  newly  quickened  instinct 
of  property,  coupled  with  the  terror  under  its  various 
forms,  has  called  out,  seemingly,  in  the  Russian  char- 
acter, a  sense  of  initiative  and  self-reliance  hitherto 
latent.  At  the  same  time,  workmen,  deserting  the  fac- 
tories and  taking  their  tools  with  them,  have  set  up 
small  shops  for  themselves,  back  In  their  own  villages. 
In  a  word,  for  the  first  time  in  Russian  history,  one  sees 
the  germs  appear  of  a  genuine  middle-class.  What  a 
curious  paradox,  if  it  should  turn  out  in  the  end  that 
the  Bolshevists,  intending  to  establish  communism, 
have  destroyed  its  last  vestiges;  intending  to  destroy 
the  sense  of  property,  have  established  it;  and  by  de- 
stroying the  aristocracy  at  the  same  time  that  they 
awaken  in  the  masses  a  sentiment  of  individualism  and 
ambition,  have  opened  the  way  for  the  rise  of  a  true 
middle-class,  in  the  western  sense  of  the  word! 


5 

THE    NIGHTMARE 

A  DISTURBANCE  of  the  magnitude  of  the  war  could 
not  but  have  shaken  the  social  structure  of  western 
civilization.  Long  after  the  storm  has  passed,  the 
awakened  waves  growl  and  thunder  on  the  beach. 
There  is  profound  discontent,  both  of  individuals  and 
of  groups.  Having  put  in  five  years  acquiring  the  art 
of  butchery  and  the  comradeship  of  death,  men  no 
longer  hesitate  as  before  at  the  thought  of  violence. 
Except  with  a  few  strong  natures,  military  life  tends 
to  lower  moral  standards.  In  particular,  the  soldier 
is  apt  to  lose  the  sense  of  property,  the  sense  of  other's 
rights,  and  the  habit  of  industry.  Even  the  ordinary 
chronic  discontent  of  the  ordinary  individual  is  there- 
fore more  dangerous  than  heretofore.  In  the  course 
of  hostilities,  governments,  desiring  to  strengthen  the 
morale  of  the  civil  and  military  population,  indulged 
in  much  fine  rhetoric,  and  made  vast  vague  promises 
of  a  better  world  to  come.  The  governments,  en- 
grossed in  more  immediate  affairs,  have  forgotten 
these  promises,  whose  purpose  has  now  been  served; 
but  the  people  have  not.  Finding  life  to  be  harder 
instead  of  easier  than  before,  their  confidence  in  those 
who  lead  them  is  perilously  strained.  Moreover,  when 
the  struggle  was  at  its  height,  and  the  supreme  sacri- 
fice was  demanded  continually  of  all  classes  in  concert, 
each  dass  consoled  itself  by  the  thought  that  this 

137 


188  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

sacrifice  would  justify  it  in  demanding  the  realization 
of  its  own  particular  political  program  as  soon  as  the 
war  should  be  over.  "Our  dead  cry  outl"  they  say. 
But  even  the  dead  are  human,  and  seem  not  to  agree 
among  themselves.  The  great  and  brutal  god  of  cir- 
cumstance, impoverishing  and  ruining  thousands 
through  no  fault  of  their  own,  has  raised  other  thou- 
sands almost  without  their  personal  effort  to  a  new 
affluence;  thus  still  another  factor  is  introduced  of 
jealousy  and  hatred.  Finally,  having  passed  unscathed 
through  the  valley  of  death,  men  have  emerged  at 
last,  not  purified,  as  some  might  have  supposed,  but 
energized  by  a  ruthless  individualism.  The  time  has 
come,  each  seems  to  think,  to  reap  the  reward  of  his 
sufferings  and  sacrifices.  Cash  in  I  cash  in  I  And  devil 
take  the  hindermosti 

To  this  individual  anarchy  must  be  added,  so  far, 
at  least,  as  a  large  part  of  "Balkanized  Europe"  is 
concerned,  a  kind  of  political  anarchy.  Bulgaria, 
where  the  peasants  have  seized  the  power,  is  the  only 
state  whose  government  is  solidly  based  upon  the  sup- 
port of  an  absolute  majority.  In  all  the  others,  no 
single  party  being  effectively  predominant,  "coalition" 
or  "concentration"  ministries  have  been  formed,  whose 
chief  concern  is  to  keep  the  support  of  numerous  shift- 
ing groups,  and  which,  in  most  instances,  are  about 
as  instable  as  clouds,  one  combination  following  an- 
other with  perplexing  rapidity.  The  cohesion  of  con- 
flicting groups  into  two  or  three  well  organized  parties 
is  a  sign  of  political  maturity  not  yet  revealed  in  these 
regions.  On  the  contrary,  even  the  numerous  existing 
groups  seem  to  be  continually  splitting  apart,  under  the 
impulse  of  bitter  struggles  for  party-leadership  which 


THE  NIGHTMARE  139 

tend  even,  at  times,  to  place  questions  of  personality 
above  questions  of  national  interest.  In  Poland,  all 
the  old  pre-war  parties  of  German,  Austrian  and  Rus- 
sian Poland  still  exist,  and  still  others  have  sprung  up 
— about  twenty  in  all.  In  Czecho-Slovakia  there  are 
almost  as  many.  Austria  boasts  about  a  dozen,  Jugo- 
slavia fifteen,  and  Hungary  six  or  eight.  The  so- 
called  "people's  treaty,"  led  by  General  Avarescu,  has 
indeed  an  absolute  majority  among  the  ten  or  twelve 
Roumanian  parties,  but  it  is  so  new,  so  inchoate,  that 
in  the  interests  of  the  country,  the  leaders  of  the  two 
chief  opposition  parties.  Take  Jonesco  and  Jean  Bra- 
tiano,  have  consented  to  participate  in  the  ministry, 
which  thus  acquires  at  least  a  temporary  stability.  In 
Greece,  party  politics  may  almost  be  said  to  be  the 
national  sport.  All  this  internal  confusion  is  ill  cal- 
culated to  develop  social  strength. 

Sown  in  this  harrowed  soil,  the  propaganda  of  Bol- 
shevist revolution  seemed  destined,  not  long  since,  to 
germinate  with  fierce  energy.  The  fact  that  govern- 
ments were  against  it  was  sufficient  reason  for  many 
people,  workmen  and  intellectuals  alike,  to  give  it 
their  favor,  before  they  had  even  so  much  as  tried  to 
analyze  what  it  might  mean.  In  consequence,  there 
spread  through  the  circles  of  power  and  responsibility 
a  great  fear.  The  peace  conference  itself  was  chilled 
and  enervated  by  the  fear  of  Bolshevism,  and  this  fear 
Is  not  yet  dead. 

But  in  my  opinion,  Bolshevism  is  not  going  to 
spread.  Conditions  have  changed  within  the  last  year. 
The  worst  of  the  unrest  and  indolence  is  over;  people 
are  gradually  settling  down,  even  in  the  countries 
ruined   by    defeat.      Moreover,    much   to   its   disad- 


140  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

vantage,  Bolshevism  has  lost  its  glamor  of  mystery. 
Men  have  begun  to  consider  it  not  as  at  first,  in  its 
merely  destructive  aspect,  as  the  easiest  instrument  of 
menace  and  opposition  to  established  power  which  came 
to  hand,  but  in  its  constructive  pretensions.  And 
many  there  are  now  who  ask  themselves  if,  after  all, 
even  the  present  regime,  with  all  its  faults,  is  not  prefer- 
able to  the  bloodshed  and  utter  destruction  which  seem 
the  necessary  prelude  to  the  soviet  Utopia.  For  the 
present  generation,  it  is  small  consolation  to  be  told 
that  those  who  shall  come  after  will  be  happier.  What 
they  want  is  to  be  happy  themselves,  and  besides,  that 
song  about  the  happy  future  no  longer  thrills  the  audi- 
tor. It  has  an  old  familiar  ring.  Even  the  socialists 
and  labor  delegates  who  have  lately  visited  Russia 
have  returned  more  or  less  disillusioned,  some  frankly 
hostile  to  Bolshevism,  which  they  say  is  the  negation 
of  true  socialism;  some  as  its  apologists,  though  as 
such,  lame  enough.  The  recent  effort  of  the  Russian 
leaders,  under  cover  of  the  so-called  third,  or  Moscow, 
Internationale,  to  dictate  to  the  labor  federations  of 
the  world  how  they  shall  act,  and  under  what  con- 
ditions, has  pretty  well  succeeded  in  turning  even  the 
workpeople  away  from  the  Moscow  mirage.  There 
remains  as  its  apostles  only  the  smaller  number  of  fa- 
natics and  fiery  visionaries  who  in  each  country  are 
banded  together  under  the  name  of  "communist 
party,"  and  who  form,  in  most  cases,  a  noisy  but  im- 
potent majority. 

But  even  in  Russia,  It  may  be  pointed  out,  the  com- 
munists have  never  been  more  than  a  handful,  yet 
they  are  firmly  ensconced  in  power.  To  this  I  would 
reply  that  the  conditions  in  Russia — anarchy,  indif- 


THE  NIGHTMARE  141 

ference,  absence  of  organized  opposition — which  en- 
abled the  communists  to  seize  and  consolidate  the 
power  of  government,  were  entirely  exceptional,  and 
will  not  recur  elsewhere.  The  apathy  of  the  Russian 
masses  is  not  comparable  to  the  spirit  of  the  more  truly 
occidental  peoples.  Suppose  that  among  these  peoples 
the  communist  minority  should  attempt  a  coup  d'etat. 
The  defenders  of  the  existing  regime  would  instantly 
rally  their  forces.  There  would  be  civil  war,  which 
in  every  case,  as  nearly  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  would 
end  in  the  defeat  of  the  communists. 

Survey  the  countries  of  Europe.  There  is  still  great 
unrest.  There  is  a  wave  of  true  social  and  political 
reform  of  which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  all  in 
good  time.  But  it  is  difficult  to  descry  a  single  state 
which  offers  elements  promising  durable  success  to  Bol- 
shevist tentatives — that  is,  to  the  forcible  seizure  of 
power,  the  arming  of  the  proletariat,  the  disarming  of 
everyone  else,  the  destruction  of  the  upper  and  middle 
classes,  and  the  exercise  of  a  dictatorship  of  terror 
pending  the  conversion  of  a  majority  to  the  communist 
doctrine. 

Consider  first  Poland.  The  proletariat  here  con- 
sists of  workmen  and  the  poorer  Jewish  element. 
There  are  a  few  communists  among  the  former,  but  on 
the  whole,  the  Polish  workman  may  be  reckoned  among 
the  most  docile  in  Europe.  As  for  the  Jews  their 
sympathies  may  well  be  Bolshevist.  Obliged  under 
Czarism  to  dwell  outside  the  pale,  that  is,  west  of  the 
river  Dnieper,  intelligent,  visionary,  unhappy  and  op- 
pressed, they  absorbed  extreme  ideas  out  of  Germany 
like  so  much  blotting  paper.  Indeed,  it  may  be  said 
that  it  was  through  the  Jews,  living  as  they  did  near 


142  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  German  border,  that  socialism  first  penetrated  into 
Russia.  The  "eastern  front,"  again,  lay  beyond  the 
pale,  in  the  midst  of  the  Jewish  districts,  and  the  Jews, 
by  this  environment,  may  have  contributed  to  the  moral 
collapse  of  the  Russian  armies.  But  even  if  the  Jews 
desired  to  attempt  communism  in  Poland,  they  would 
be  crushed,  for  the  entire  .country  is  bitterly  hostile  to 
them,  and  the  very  fact  that  the  Jews  are  suspected  of 
favoring  it  is  sufficient  to  render  it  repugnant  to  the 
Poles.  The  tenets  of  the  Roman  Catholic  religion  are 
Incompatible  with  Bolshevism.  The  Poles  are  not 
only  fervent  Catholics,  they  are  ardent  patriots.  Bol- 
shevism to  them  means  simply  a  Russian  army  which 
tried  to  overwhelm  them,  and  very  nearly  succeeded. 
It  is  the  "hereditary  enemy"  disguised  In  a  social  for- 
mula. Seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  Polish  people  are 
peasants,  and  the  delay  In  effecting  the  much-needed, 
oft-promised  land  reform  has  disaffected  them  to  a 
certain  extent.  But  their  patriotism,  their  religion, 
their  distrust  of  the  Jews,  and  their  hatred  of  the 
Russians,  are  stronger  than  their  temporary  disaffec- 
tion.   Socially,  Poland  is  safe. 

To  Roumania,  as  to  Poland,  Bolshevism  signifies 
two  dangers — one,  an  Internal  disturbance;  the  other, 
an  external  attack  by  an  army  of  Russians  desiring,  as 
the  Roumanians  Imagine,  to  reconquer  Bessarabia.  In 
both  these  forms,  Bolshevism  may  be  said  to  be 
at  present  the  government's  chief  preoccupation. 
Broadly  speaking,  there  are  only  two  classes  In  Rou- 
mania, the  wealthy  landowners  and  the  peasants.  The 
former  are  of  course  conservative.  The  latter,  under 
the  Influence  of  soviet  propaganda,  might  have  become 
menacing,  though  they  are  an  easy-going  people;  but 


THE  NIGHTMARE  143 

the  land-reform,  which  is  now  being  carried  out,  has 
effectively  precluded  this  eventuality.  There  remains 
only  the  small  group  of  genuine  communists  who  con- 
tinue to  agitate  in  Bucharest.  The  police  are  vigilant. 
They  have  caught  numerous  Bolshevist  agents  carrying 
both  gold  and  propaganda.  Some  of  this  latter  was 
printed  in  Seventh  Avenue,  New  York,  and  was 
brought  over  by  returning  emigrants.  Raids  on  com- 
munist headquarters  have  discovered  a  considerable 
correspondence  with  Moscow,  and,  ironically  enough, 
a  store  of  that  same  gold  reserve  which  the  Rouma- 
nians, during  the  war,  at  the  allies'  suggestion,  had 
sent  to  Russia  for  safety.  In  short,  there  is  suf- 
ficient evidence  of  conspiracy  to  arouse  the  whole  coun- 
try; and  a  good  part  of  the  Roumanian  army  is  still 
mobilized  along  the  eastern  frontier,  in  case  of  an 
armed  attack  by  the  Soviets.  Roumania,  like  Poland, 
might  possibly  go  Bolshevist  by  conquest,  but  never 
otherwise,  and  not  without  a  hard  fight. 

As  for  Germany,  it  may  truthfully  pose  as  the  real 
instigator  of  Bolshevism  in  Russia.  The  veteran  Rus- 
sian socialist,  Bourtseff,  who  is  something  of  an  expert 
in  matters  of  the  kind,  declares  that  from  19 14  on,  the 
Kaiser's  imperial  government  paid  Lenin  personally 
more  than  seventy  million  marks  to  make  Bolshevist 
propaganda  in  Switzerland  and  Russia  for  the  purpose 
of  sapping  the  Russian  morale.  When  the  Russian 
revolution  came,  the  German  government  sent  him 
from  Switzerland  to  Russia  in  a  special  train.  And 
Ludendorff,  who  knows  full  well  his  country's  part  in 
the  affair,  wrote  in  his  memoirs  not  long  after:  "Al- 
though the  soviet  government  exists  only  thanks  to  us, 
we  can  expect  nothing  from  it.  .  .  .    The  Bolshevists 


144  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

must  recognize  in  us  now,  as  before,  their  absolute 
master,  and  must  do  our  bidding."  But  Lenin  and  his 
fellow-dictators  are  no  longer  under  German  tutelage. 
The  reich,  at  the  present  time,  is  in  the  anomalous  po- 
sition of  having  to  struggle  vigorously  against  internal 
Bolshevism  while  remaining  friendly  with  external,  and 
particularly  with  Russian,  Bolshevism.  In  Germany's 
highly  developed  industrial  regions  like  the  Ruhr  basin, 
there  are  many  communist  groups  whose  activities  are 
facilitated  by  the  prevalent  conditions  of  poverty  and 
want.  Opposed  to  these  are  the  conservative  agri- 
culturists of  Bavaria  and  East  Prussia.  Both  factions 
are  militant,  both  determined;  but  though  the  present 
evolution  seems  to  be  away  from  the  moderate  middle 
position  toward  one  or  the  other  of  the  extremes,  there 
are  still  apparently  enough  moderates  to  keep  the  bal- 
ance, and  prevent  either  faction  from  seizing  complete 
control.  The  combination  of  conservatives  and  mod- 
erates was  sufficient  to  put  down  the  Ruhr  communist 
uprising  of  April,  1920,  without  great  difficulty;  and 
a  possible  combination  of  communists  and  moderates 
seems  to  be  a  sufficient  guarantee  against  tentatives  of 
violent  junker  reaction.  It  is  possible  that,  as  time 
goes  on,  if  Germany's  economic  situation  continues 
critical,  the  moderates  will  incline  more  and  more  to 
take  sides,  until  there  remain  only  the  two  extremist 
parties,  who  would  sooner  or  later  have  to  fight  out 
the  issue  between  themselves.  But  as  a  communist  suc- 
cess would  almost  certainly  mean  the  secession  of 
Bavaria,  and  after  Bavaria,  of  the  Rhineland,  entail- 
ing thus  the  disintegration  of  the  reich,  it  seems  likely 
that  the  good  sense  of  all  the  leaders  will  restrain 
them    from    precipitating    this    redoubtable    contest. 


THE  NIGHTMARE  145 

There  may  be,  there  probably  will  be,  further  out- 
breaks of  both  sorts  of  extremists;  but  the  chances  are 
that  they  will  be  localized  and  will  quickly  burn  them- 
selves out. 

The  question  is  complicated,  however,  by  Germany's 
foreign  policy.  Russia  is  Germany's  one  great  hope — 
any  Russia,  soviet  or  reactionary,  so  long,  that  is,  as 
this  Russia  remains  aloof  from,  or  inimical  to,  the 
Entente.  For  Germany,  Russia  is  at  once  a  vast 
and  much-needed  market,  a  field  for  future  emigration 
and  colonization,  and  a  natural  political  support 
against  the  whole  Versailles  Treaty,  and  particularly 
against  Poland.  When  the  Reds  were  at  the  gates 
of  Warsaw,  in  August,  1920,  the  German  government 
actually  considered,  and  has  admitted  that  it  consid- 
ered, throwing  in  its  lot,  militarily,  with  the  Russians. 
Counsels  of  prudence,  luckily  for  the  reich,  carried 
the  day.  But  the  idea  of  essaying  a  period  of  tempo- 
rary Bolshevism,  in  the  hope  of  provoking  internal 
disorders  in  the  countries  of  the  Entente,  and  thus 
forcing  a  revision  of  the  Treaty,  still  haunts  the  minds 
even  of  the  junkers.  If  they  could  be  sure  of  folding 
up  their  false  Bolshevism  and  putting  it  away  after  it 
had  served  its  purpose,  doubtless  they  would  try  it. 
But  nothing  is  less  sure.  There  are  enough  real  com- 
munists in  Germany  to  make  it  exceedingly  difficult  to 
dislodge  them,  once  they  had  got  into  power.  The 
whole  country  might  be  ruined  in  the  course  of  this 
dangerous  gamble.  And  if  still  further  argument 
against  attempting  it  be  needed,  there  is  the  example 
of  Hungary. 

In  order  to  escape  from  the  fatal  dismemberment 
looming  before  the  country,  and  thinking  perhaps,  that 


146  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

in  conservative  Hungary  a  spell  of  Bolshevism  would 
be  harmless  enough,  the  interim  government  of  Count 
Michael  Karolyi  naively  turned  over  the  state,  in  the 
spring  of  19 19,  to  a  group  of  Hungarian  communists, 
the  chief  of  whom,  Bela  Kun,  had  been  trained  in 
Russia,  under  Lenin.  They  armed  the  proletariat, 
disarmed  all  other  people,  nationalized  the  banks,  fac- 
tories, and  even  the  retail  stores,  imprisoned  or  exe- 
cuted their  political  opponents,  and  organized  a  "ter- 
ror" on  the  Russian  model.  Hungary  was  perhaps 
the  belligerent  state  which  had  suffered  least  during 
the  war.  The  people  still  had  plenty  of  food.  But 
under  Bolshevism  everything  went  swiftly  to  pieces. 
Famine  pinched  the  city  populations,  and  the  peasants 
lapsed  into  sullen  resistance.  The  war  had  cost  Hun- 
gary eight  million  crowns  a  day;  the  Bolshevists  soon 
ran  up  expenses  to  sixty-eight  million  crowns  a  day. 
The  Roumanians,  seeking  to  avenge  the  invasion  of 
their  territory  by  the  Germans,  Austrians  and  Hun- 
garians during  the  war,  attacked  the  Hungarian  com- 
munists, defeated  the  undisciplined  "red"  army,  en- 
tered Budapest,  overthrew  the  regime  and  sacked  the 
whole  country.  One  hundred  and  thirty-two  days  of 
communism  cost  Hungary  ten  billion  crowns,  of  which 
the  "red  guards"  had  received  five  hundred  and  four- 
teen millions,  and  the  "red  army"  three  thousand  three 
hundred  and  seven  millions.  Where  the  present  gov- 
ernment spends  forty-eight  millions  a  month,  the  Sov- 
iets had  been  spending  one  hundred  and  forty-four  mil- 
lions. From  a  condition  of  relative  affluence,  Hun- 
gary had  plunged  with  dizzying  speed  into  a  condition 
of  utter  misery.  Without  communism,  the  Roumanian 
invasion  would  have  been  impossible.    What  the  one 


THE  NIGHTMARE  147 

began,  the  other  finished.  Count  Michael  Karolyi's 
ingenuous  expedient  not  only  failed  to  stave  off  the 
dismemberment,  it  completely  ruined  the  country. 
There  is  not  one  Hungarian  who  does  not  realize  this 
fact.  In  consequence,  Hungary  is  to-day,  without  any 
doubt,  the  most  reactionary  country  In  Europe.  Nine- 
tenths  of  the  people  are  royalists.  Even  the  small 
group  of  Hungarian  socialists  have  hastily  switched 
back  out  of  the  Third,  or  Moscow,  Internationale,  into 
the  moderate  Second,  or  Amsterdam,  Internationale. 
So  strong  is  the  feeling  of  the  Hungarians  In  the  mat- 
ter that  they  would  ask  nothing  better  than  an  oppor- 
tunity to  fight  any  communists  they  might  happen  to 
find,  Russian  or  otherwise.  Karolyl  Is  hated  In  Hun- 
gary almost  as  much  as  Bela  Kun.  Both  are  now  refu- 
gees living  In  exile. 

In  sharp  contrast  with  Hungary  is  Austria,  which 
immediately  after  the  armistice  set  up  a  half  commun- 
istic government  which  was  only  partially  modified 
after  the  recent  election.  But  this  government  never 
had  any  real  authority.  Its  edicts  were  simply  Ignored. 
There  was  a  "minister  of  socialization,"  but  nothing 
much  was  "socialized."  In  the  Vienna  region.  It  Is 
true,  every  Industrial  plant  with  more  than  twenty 
workmen  had  a  shop  council,  which  elected  a  delegate 
to  the  central  workmen's  council,  which  In  turn  was 
very  Influential  with  the  government.  But  the  prov- 
inces refused  to  permit  the  establishment  of  shop  coun- 
cils or  to  obey  Vienna  In  any  respect.  All  the  peasants 
and  the  majority  of  the  townspeople  were  opposed  to 
the  quasl-communlst  regime.  They  tolerated  It  from 
apathy  Induced  by  famine  and  despair,  and  their  pres- 
ent trend  is  away  from  this  vague  radicalism.     Mean- 


148  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

while  the  Austrian  government  is  to  all  intents  help- 
less, apparently,  for  either  good  or  evil. 

Czecho-Slovakia,  liberal,  socialistic  and  democratic, 
sympathizes  warmly  with  Russia,  but  for  reasons  of 
race  affinity  and  foreign  policy  rather  than  for  social 
reasons.  There  is  in  the  country  a  small  and  noisy 
group  of  communists,  but  as  there  is  no  aristocracy, 
and  almost  no  reaction,  and  as  the  government  and  the 
majority  of  the  people  are  already  strongly  committed 
to  revolutionary  socialism,  these  communists  have,  so 
to  speak,  no  fulcrum  for  their  lever.  The  Czechs  are 
not  a  revolutionary  people.  Their  minds  are  steady, 
slow  and  cautious.  Their  resources  are  rich,  they  are 
visibly  prospering  and  I  do  not  expect  to  see  them 
tempted  into  hazardous  experiments  of  any  kind. 

Jugo-Slavia  is  a  peasant  democracy.  Strictly  speak- 
ing, there  is  here  no  "proletariat."  The  peasants,  who 
form  eighty  per  cent,  of  the  population,  are  nearly 
all  land-owners.  It  is  true  that  in  the  recent  elections 
the  "communist"  party  carried  several  cities,  including 
Belgrade;  but  these  "communists"  are  simply  govern- 
ment employees — railwaymen,  postmen,  clerks — who 
seek  thus  to  express  their  resentment  against  an  ad- 
ministration which  does  not  pay  them  a  living  wage. 
The  movement  Is  protestatory,  not  revolutionary.  In- 
crease their  stipend  to  a  reasonable  figure  and  their 
"communism"  will  vanish.  The  new  "peasants'  party," 
organized  by  Mr.  Mika  Avramovitch,  after  the  Bul- 
garian model,  is  perhaps  more  significant,  but  as  the 
peasants  here  are  not  as  yet  class-conscious,  it  has 
made  little  headway. 

In  Bulgaria,  which  Is  also  a  democracy  of  small  land- 
owners, the  peasants,  exasperated  at  their  defeat  in 


THE  NIGHTMARE  149 

two  wars  under  the  leadership  of  a  czar  and  of  pro- 
fessional statesmen,  have  taken  things  into  their  own 
hands,  and  have  formed  a  government  of  their  own, 
without,  however,  expelling  their  figurehead  of  a  young 
new  czar.  The  Russian  soviet  leaders  had  been  con- 
fident that  Bulgaria,  in  the  bitterness  of  its  defeat  and 
amputation,  would  go  communist.  A  communist  party, 
consisting  of  poor  peasants,  poor  or  discharged  gov- 
ernment employees,  and  other  malcontents,  was  en- 
couraged and  subsidized.  The  party  felt  itself  to  be 
strong,  but  instead  of  attempting  a  coup  d'etat  in  the 
prescribed  Bolshevist  manner,  it  presented  itself  at  the 
elections  last  spring,  and  seated  forty-two  deputies  in 
the  sobranje,  the  national  parliament,  out  of  a  total  of 
about  two  hundred  and  ten.  Such  communists,  who 
consent  to  sit  as  a  powerless  minority  in  a  regular  par- 
liament, are  obviously  not  very  dangerous.  It  Is,  as  I 
have  said,  the  peasants'  party  which  has  the  absolute 
majority.  This  party  is  initiating  a  number  of  rather 
socialistic  experiments,  but  the  peasants'  pride  in  land- 
ownership  is  so  deep  that  the  principle  of  private  prop- 
erty in  Bulgaria  may  be  considered  relatively  safe. 

Greece,  the  remaining  Balkan  state,  is  socially  as 
sound  as  a  bell.  If  there  is  to  be  any  serious  Internal 
trouble  here,  which  is  not  likely,  It  will  be  of  a  strictly 
political  character. 

To  complete  this  rapid  survey,  the  relation  of 
France,  Britain  and  Italy  to  a  possible  Bolshevist  up- 
rising should  perhaps  now  be  considered,  for  a  revolu- 
tion In  any  one  of  these  states  would  exert  a  disturbing 
Influence  throughout  Europe. 

The  French  socialist  party  Is  revolutionary  and  com- 
munistic, but  In  becoming  so  It  has  lost  all  its  former 


160  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

prestige.  It  used  to  lead  the  labor  movement.  But 
since  the  war  this  movement  has  detached  itself  from 
socialism  as  being  a  political  rather  than  an  economic 
doctrine,  and  hence  unacceptable  for  the  trades  unions. 
Without  the  support  of  labor,  the  socialists  can  do 
nothing,  and  labor,  in  its  last  annual  congress,  Oc- 
tober, 1920,  has  again  pronounced  itself,  by  a  three- 
fourths  majority,  in  favor  of  evolutionary  rather  than 
revolutionary  methods,  and  against  the  Moscow  "In- 
ternationale." Not  only  is  the  French  middle-class 
strong  and  combative,  but  the  rural  population,  which 
forms  from  sixty  to  seventy  per  cent,  of  the  total,  is 
in  the  main  conservative  and  ardently  devoted  to  the 
principle  of  private  property.  In  short,  France,  solidly 
settled  in  its  liberal  democratic  republicanism,  appears 
as  a  citadel  of  social  strength. 

The  one  country  where  labor  can  boast  a  clear  ma- 
jority of  the  population  is  industrial  Britain.  This 
alone  is  sufficient  reason  for  labor  here  to  seek  to 
realize  its  ends  by  democratic  methods.  The  British 
people  are  not  revolutionary  in  spirit.  They  are  prac- 
tical. They  have  had  a  long  political  education,  and  they 
know  that  there  is  more  to  be  gained  on  both  sides  by 
transactions  of  concession  and  compromise  than  by  re- 
sorts to  violence.  The  sense  of  law  and  order  is  strongly 
rooted  In  the  middle  and  upper  classes.  If  necessary, 
the  government  would  not  hesitate  to  meet  violence 
with  repression.  Civil  war  at  home  would  shake  the 
foundations  of  an  already  unstable  empire.  Every  Brit- 
isher knows  what  that  means.  Therefore,  though  labor 
may  bluster  and  threaten,  I  do  not  expect  it  to  carry  the 
Issue  to  the  barricades.  Britain's  safeguard  is  its  prac- 
tical common-sense,  extending  through  all  classes. 


THE  NIGHTMARE  161 

Finally,  there  is  Italy,  which  has  lately  passed 
through  a  series  of  significant  social  convulsions — ^Au- 
gust and  September,  1920 — and  which  appears,  out- 
wardly, to  be  involved  in  a  dangerous  turmoil.  Italian 
labor  is  nominally  led  by  the  socialist  party,  which  has 
accepted  the  dictation  of  Moscow.  The  doctrine  of 
the  Italian  radicals  is  that  the  industries,  like  the  land, 
really  belong  to  the  nation,  and  are  merely  delegated 
to  the  proprietors,  who,  if  they  cease  to  work  the  land 
or  to  operate  the  factories,  automatically  surrender 
their  rights.  Following  a  dispute  over  wages,  the 
Italian  metalworkers,  early  In  August,  began  a  form 
of  tactics  new  in  class  warfare.  They  call  it  "obstruc- 
tionism." They  did  not  strike.  They  simply  began 
to  dawdle  systematically,  and  while  on  the  one  hand 
production  fell  almost  to  zero,  on  the  other,  the  work- 
ers passed  before  the  pay-windows  at  the  week's  end 
as  regularly  as  even  After  a  couple  of  weeks  of  this, 
the  employers  retaliated  with  a  lockout.  This,  ac- 
cording to  the  workers'  doctrine,  amounted  to  a  sur- 
render of  proprietorship.  It  was  what  they  had  ex- 
pected and  desired.  They  invaded  the  factories  by 
force,  kidnaped  a  few  engineers  and  managers,  whom 
they  forced  to  work,  and  thus  began  to  operate  the 
factories  themselves.  The  government.  Instead  of  en- 
forcing the  law  and  evicting  the  workers,  declared 
itself  "neutral."  No  doubt  M.  Giollttl,  fearing  a 
Jugo-Slav  attack  following  the  declaration  of  Flume's 
independence,  and  knowing  the  army  to  be  honey- 
combed with  disaffection,  dreaded  an  internal  con- 
flict. The  workers'  attempt  to  operate  the  factories 
was  of  course  unsuccessful,  but  the  negative  support 
given  them  by  the  government  proved  sufficient  to  en- 


162  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

able  them  to  wrest  an  Important  salary  concession  from 
the  employers.  The  extremists  even  urged  a  Bol- 
shevist coup  d'etat,  but  the  majority  very  sensibly  re- 
jected this  Idea.  At  the  same  time,  If  the  history  of 
previous  labor  troubles  Is  a  criterion,  the  workers' 
success  on  this  occasion  will  soon  lead  them  to  try 
something  else.  If  they  do,  I  myself  expect  blood  to 
flow.  The  Italian  nationalists  and  conservatives  are 
furious  at  the  government's  abdication  before  the 
workers'  invasion  of  the  factories.  If  the  thing  hap- 
pens again,  they  will  take  the  enforcement  of  the  law 
into  their  own  hands.  The  police,  the  gendarmerie,  a 
part  of  the  army  and  most  of  the  navy  would  follow 
them.  The  workers  would  be  crushed,  and  there  might 
even  be  a  conservative  coup  d'etat.  Italy,  Itself  a  poor 
country,  exhausted  by  the  war,  has  no  doubt  a  troublous 
period  ahead  of  It.  Despite  the  liberal  professions  of 
the  government,  Italy  Is  far  behind  France  and  Britain 
In  social  organization.  It  has  overdeveloped  Its  metal- 
lurgical Industry  during  the  war.  Having  neither  coal 
nor  Iron,  It  must  buy  them  at  usurious  prices  from 
abroad.  To  compete  under  these  conditions  with 
other  countries,  the  manufacturers  have  to  keep  down 
salaries,  or  else  go  out  of  business.  Moreover,  a  large 
part  of  the  land  Is  in  great  estates,  and  there  Is  an 
increasing  agitation  for  a  genuine  land  reform.  The 
upshot  of  all  the  disorder  will  doubtless  be,  not  Bol- 
shevism, but  the  collapse  of  certain  industries,  better 
conditions  for  the  workers  In  the  others,  and  a  more 
equable  distribution  of  the  land.  The  Italians  are 
among  the  most  mdlvldualistic  people  in  Europe.  They 
could  never  endure  the  enforced  discipline  of 
communism. 


6 

THE  NEW  FORMULA 

But  if  Europe  is  not  going  to  be  overrun  by  Bol- 
shevism, neither  is  it  going  to  return  to  the  era  of  19 14. 
That  the  world  steadily  progresses  is  debatable;  but 
that  it  steadily  changes  is  apparent  to  every  one.  Out 
of  the  shock  and  turmoil,  material  and  mental,  of  the 
war,  new  regimes  are  beginning  to  emerge.  A  wave  of 
vast  social  and  political  reforms  is  sweeping  the  con- 
tinent. The  day  is  one  of  blind  gropings,  of  bold 
initiatives,  of  radical  experiments. 

Politically,  the  outstanding  feature  is  the  triumph 
of  democracy.  There  is  now  no  country  in  Europe,  I 
believe,  which  does  not  accept  this  principle,  either 
under  the  form  of  a  republic,  or  of  a  constitutional 
monarchy;  and  in  so  far  as  a  people  can  be  democratic 
without  long  political  experience  and  a  high  level  of 
education,  they  are  all  democratic.  Full  manhood  suf- 
frage, by  direct  and  secret  ballot,  is  now  general;  and 
if  one  except  Russia,  is  effective  in  practice  as  well  as 
in  theory.  Germany,  Austria  and  Czecho-Slovakia 
and  Hungary  have  extended  the  right  of  suffrage  to 
women  as  well;  and  in  Jugo-Slavia,  widows  and  women 
of  high  education  will  doubtless  be  authorized  to  vote 
in  communal  elections.  Systems  of  proportional  rep- 
resentation are  being  adopted  nearly  everywhere.  In 
Czecho-Slovakia,  Roumania  and  Hungary  the  casting 
of  a  vote  on  election  day  is  compulsory  for  all  qualified 

153 


164  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

persons.  The  rights  of  racial  minorities  are  in  most 
cases  guaranteed  by  the  peace  treaties,  and  liberalism 
is,  as  it  were,  in  the  air,  so  that  abuses  of  its  tenets 
are  shamefacedly  covered  up,  or  are  softened  by 
apologetic  explanations,  as  if  the  perpetrators  suffered 
from  a  guilty  conscience. 

The  constitutions  which  are  being  drawn  up  in  the 
new  countries,  and  the  constitutional  reforms  which 
are  the  order  of  the  day  even  in  the  older  states,  are 
all  of  a  liberal  tendency.  Czecho-Slovakia  already  has 
Its  new  national  charter,  a  novel  feature  of  which  is 
that  the  government,  on  occasion,  may  decree  a  plebi- 
scite with  regard  to  any  question.  In  Jugo-Slavia,  a 
commission  of  jurists  is  now  engaged  in  drafting  a  new 
constitution  for  submission  to  parliament;  the  great 
question  here  Is  whether  the  legislation  shall  consist 
of  two  chambers  or  of  only  one,  as  at  present.  There 
seems  to  be  a  feeling  among  the  peasants  that  two 
chambers  would  be  less  democratic  than  one.  In 
Poland,  the  constitutional  debates  are  soon  due;  the 
nobility,  no  doubt,  will  be  formally  abolished,  and  the 
republic  consecrated.  Greece  was  to  have  convened 
a  constitutional  assembly  this  fall,  to  consider,  among 
other  things,  the  land  reform,  a  reform  of  the  elec- 
tion laws,  and  the  women's  suffrage  Issue.  The  present 
Hungarian  parliament  Is  in  effect  a  constitutional  as- 
sembly. It  apparently  Intends  to  substitute  a  demo- 
cratic senate  for  the  old  house  of  lords.  Perhaps  the 
most  radical  political  reform,  however.  Is  that  which 
has  already  been  voted  in  Bulgaria,  exacting  two  years' 
compulsory  service  from  all  men  of  twenty,  and  all 
women  of  eighteen,  not  for  military  purposes,  but  for 
various  kinds  of  government  labor,  such  as  road-build- 


THE  NEW  FORMULA  155 

ing,  forestry  and  public  construction,  the  women  sew- 
ing, cooking  and  gardening  for  the  needs  of  the  men, 
and  all  subjected  to  a  strict  physical  culture  under  a 
sort  of  segregated  barracks  regime.  The  progress  of 
this  very  novel  but  very  democratic  experiment  will  be 
watched  with  critical  interest  throughout  the  world. 

Not  less  significant  politically  than  all  these  trans- 
formations is  the  firm  hold  which  the  idea  of  the  ac- 
ceptability of  government  control  seems  everywhere  to 
have  obtained  upon  the  popular  mind.  The  present 
exaggeration  of  control  will  doubtless  result  soon  in  a 
laxative  reaction.  Nevertheless,  the  old  French  rev- 
olution ideal — ^that  of  Jeffersonian  democracy — ^the 
ideal  of  "the  least  possible  government,"  seems  defi- 
nitely to  have  been  superseded  by  the  principle  that 
there  are  no  private  rights  which  can  be  maintained 
against  the  general  well-being,  and  that  the  state, 
within  the  limits  of  expediency,  may,  in  attempting  to 
serve  the  general  well-being,  expropriate,  seize  and 
administer  at  will,  and  may  command  not  only  the 
property  of  every  citizen,  but  his  labor  and  his  very 
life.  Recent  socialistic  experiments  would  seem  to 
raise  a  serious  warning,  however,  against  the  expedi- 
ency of  carrying  this  idea  too  far,  however  democratic 
it  may  be  in  essence.  No  state  can  afford  to  excite 
the  active  discontent  of  powerful  minorities  without 
long  and  carefully  weighed  consideration.  Experience 
alone  will  determine  how  far  the  idea  of  state  control 
can  be  safely  and  efficiently  put  Into  effect.  Through- 
out Europe  the  state  owns  and  administers  railroads, 
the  post,  the  telegraph  and  the  telephone,  Czecho- 
slovakia has  nationalized  Its  munition  plants,  and  talks 
of  nationalizing  the  mines.     Bulgaria,  in  its  effort  to 


156  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

overcome  the  housing  crisis,  has  executed  widespread 
expropriations,  either  in  part  or  in  full.  And  many 
other  examples  of  the  tendency  might  be  given. 

Of  current  social  reforms,  the  most  important  are 
those  appertaining  to  agriculture.  The  absolute  ruler 
has  become  no  more  of  an  anachronism  than  the  large 
estate.  There  is  a  general  feeling  that  the  people  who 
work  the  land  should,  in  the  interests  of  order  and  sta- 
bility, own  the  land.  With  the  exception  of  Austria, 
where  the  peasants  refuse  to  acknowledge  the  author- 
ity of  Vienna,  and  of  Albania,  which  as  yet  has  scarcely 
assured  its  own  existence,  every  state  in  "Balkanized 
Europe"  is  now  making  a  land  reform.  A  more  equit- 
able distribution  of  this  general  heritage  of  man  is 
being  sought  no  less  in  Bulgaria,  where  the  peasants 
were  already,  for  the  most  part,  proprietors,  than  in 
Hungary,  where  it  was  possible  for  men  like  Count 
Pallavicini  to  own  a  200,000-acre  estate,  or  in  Rou- 
mania,  where  one  half  of  the  total  arable  land  was  in 
the  hands  of  some  two  thousand  wealthy  proprietors. 
In  Hungary,  all  parties  agree  as  to  the  necessity  for  a 
reform,  though  they  still  differ  over  its  modalities. 
The  same  is  true  of  Poland.  In  Roumania,  the  main 
outlines  of  the  new  law  are  already  fixed.  In  Rou- 
mania proper,  all  surplus  holdings  over  five  hundred 
hectares  have  been  confiscated,  and  are  being  culti- 
vated— ^badly  enough — ^by  commissions,  pending  the 
redistribution  to  landless  farm  laborers.  In  the  new 
provinces,  such  as  Bessarabia  and  Transylvania,  all 
over  one  hundred  hectares  have  been  seized,  largely 
from  German,  Hungarian,  Polish  or  Russian  landlords, 
and  given  to  Roumanians.  Theoretically,  the  state 
places  a  nominal  valuation  on  the  land  preempted,  and 


THE  NEW  FORMULA  167 

the  new  possessor  pays  for  it  at  the  rate  of  two  per 
cent,  a  year  for  fifty  years,  plus  an  annual  interest  of 
five  per  cent. ;  but  of  the  total  burden,  the  government 
assumes  thirty-five  per  cent.,  in  order  to  help  the  peas- 
ants. Practically,  it  is  doubtful  if  the  peasants  can  be 
forced  to  pay  even  the  remaining  sixty-five  per  cent. 
In  Bulgaria,  each  family  is  now  supposed,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  old  Henry  George  theory,  to  possess 
only  so  much  land  as  it  can  actually  till,  that  is  to  say, 
in  general,  from  thirty  to  fifty  hectares.  In  Jugo- 
slavia, a  "reform"  not  yet  consecrated  by  act  of  legis- 
lation has  been  effectively  carried  out  by  the  peasants 
themselves,  especially  in  the  new  provinces  of  the  Voi- 
vodina,  Croatia-Slavonia  and  Bosnia,  where  foreigners 
have  been  dispossessed  in  favor  of  Slavs;  and  the  ad- 
ministration has  had  no  recourse  but  to  acquiesce. 
This  "reform,"  however,  distorted  by  every  form  of 
graft  and  corruption,  and  darkened  by  violent  dis- 
orders, has  left  neither  peasant  nor  landlord  satisfied, 
and  the  whole  question  of  indemnities  is  still  to  be 
studied.  In  Czecho-Slovakia,  all  over  one  hundred  and 
fifty  hectares  of  arable,  or  two  hundred  and  fifty  hec- 
tares of  non-arable  land  has  been  confiscated,  and  is 
being  redistributed  by  an  all-potent  Land  Bureau. 
Even  in  Greece,  particularly  in  Thessaly  and  southern 
Macedonia,  Mr.  Venizelos,  looking  to  the  future,  had 
taken  pains  to  effect  a  very  radical  reform,  dispossess- 
ing large,  or  foreign  or  absentee  landlords  completely, 
taking  one-fifth  of  the  surplus  of  all  other  holdings 
above  one  hectare  of  arable  or  five  of  non-arable  land, 
and  giving  it  to  communities  or  groups  of  families, 
who  may  either  work  it  in  common,  or  divide  it  be- 
tween them.    These  allocations  are  untransferable  and 


168  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

unseizable.  They  descend  intact  to  one  child  of  each 
family,  chosen  either  by  agreement  or  by  lot;  but  the 
heir  must  duly  indemnify  his  brothers  and  sisters  for 
their  loss.  In  short,  everywhere,  the  long-inhibited 
idea  that  he  who  works  the  land  should  own  the  land 
is  being  brusquely  realized. 

However,  the  corresponding  idea  that  they  who 
work  in  the  factory  should  own  the  factory  has  not 
made  the  same  progress,  and  will  not,  in  my  opinion, 
for  it  is  based  on  false  logic.  A  large  estate  can  be 
parcelled  out  to  individual  farm  laborers  without  any 
great  loss  of  efficiency;  a  factory  cannot;  it  cannot  be 
parcelled  out  at  all;  it  is  an  organized  whole.  More- 
over, the  land  may  be  said  to  be  the  common  heritage 
of  all  men ;  it  has  been  there  from  the  beginning,  and 
no  man  created  it.  But  a  factory  is  essentially  a  real- 
ization of  the  human  brain — a  product  of  some  man's 
inventive  vision,  and  of  some  other  man's  skill  in  or- 
ganization. It  has  been  often  said,  but  it  remains  nev- 
ertheless true,  that  without  the  incentive  of  personal 
reward,  men  of  inventive  or  administrative  talent 
would  not  take  the  trouble  to  put  forward  the  great 
exertion  demanded  of  them  by  their  native  gifts.  To 
turn  the  factories  over  to  the  state  or  to  the  workmen, 
on  any  but  the  most  limited  scale,  is  to  ensure  the  slow 
decline  of  all  existing  plants,  and  effectively  to  prevent 
the  conception  and  development  of  new  ones.  All 
leaders  of  experience  realize  this  truth,  and  even  in 
Czecho-Slovakia,  where  advanced  socialism  rules,  there 
is  no  immediate  movement  either  to  "nationalize"  in- 
dustry, or  to  take  it  out  of  the  hands  of  individuals  and 
turn  it  over  to  the  workmen.  The  desirability  of  so 
doing  is  recognized  by  the  Czech  socialists  as  an  ortho- 


THE  NEW  FORMULA  159 

dox  theory,  but  they  know  full  well  the  danger  of  try- 
ing to  put  it  into  practice,  at  a  time  when,  more  than 
ever,  the  well-being  of  the  country  depends  on  in- 
creased production.  Of  all  present-day  reforms,  those 
proposed  in  the  field  of  industry  seem  to  me  the  ones 
least  likely  to  bear  fruit.  I  suspect  that  out  of  all  the 
industrial  turmoil,  nothing  more  will  come  than  a 
series  of  compromises  between  employer  and  em- 
ployees, establishing  a  means  which,  while  improving 
the  material  and  moral  position  of  the  latter,  will  leave 
the  former  sufficient  profit  and  control  to  keep  him 
interested.  What  this  means  may  be  in  various  cases 
can  be  ascertained  only  by  the  intelligent  continuation 
of  the  negotiations  and  experiments  which  have  already 
been  going  on  for  the  last  twenty  years.  From  every 
point  of  view,  the  most  successful  regime  will  be  that 
which  guides  and  encourages  private  initiative,  thereby 
enabling  the  community  to  profit  by  the  endeavors  of 
gifted  individuals,  yet  keeps  this  initiative  under  suf- 
ficient restraint  to  prevent  its  abuse. 

All  in  all,  it  seems  obvious  nevertheless — and  per- 
sonally I  write  these  words  with  deep  regret — that 
on  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  an  era  died — the  era  of 
individual  liberty  as  opposed  to  state  control.  Po- 
litically, economically,  and  socially,  throughout  Eu- 
rope, true  statesmen  are  groping  toward  that  new 
formula  which  all  feel  to  be  inevitable,  but  which  none, 
as  yet,  is  confident  that  he  has  grasped.  The  one  thing 
which  appears  certain  is  that  this  new  formula  is  not 
Bolshevism.  The  "dictatorship  of  the  proletariat"  has 
failed  in  Hungary  and  Austria,  and  is,  in  all  likelihood, 
failing  even  in  Russia.  The  hour  has  passed  for  mi- 
nority rule  of  any  description.     Democracy,  far  from 


160  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

having  abdicated,  is  perhaps  only  now  coming  into  its 
own,  and  the  new  formula  will  perhaps  turn  out  to  be 
not  less  democratic,  but  more  so,  than  anything  hith- 
erto known. 

The  glamor  which  the  Russian  revolution  has  cast 
upon  the  minds  of  reformers  and  liberals  in  western 
countries  is  a  curious  psychological  phenomenon.  Cul- 
tured people  who  have  never  been  in  Russia  and  know 
little  or  nothing  about  it,  have  accepted  almost  as 
axiomatic  that  it  is  toward  the  east  that  civilization 
must  look  for  the  light.  And  as  a  cloud  far  off  is  glori- 
fied by  the  sun,  but  near  is  perceived  to  be  only  a  dense 
fog,  so  men  are  lost  in  admiration  before  a  distant 
social  movement  which,  if  they  were  in  its  midst,  would 
fill  them  with  repugnance.  The  Russian  adventure  is 
of  course  well  worth  observation;  but  the  more  one 
examines  into  it,  the  more  obvious  it  becomes,  I  think, 
that  for  the  west  it  can  have  little  actual  significance. 
For  when  all  is  said  and  done,  the  peoples  of  eastern 
Europe  are  backward  peoples.  With  all  their  new 
liberal  constitutions,  they  are  only  just  beginning  to 
apprehend  the  meaning  of  democracy.  A  long  experi- 
ence will  be  necessary,  a  long  political  education,  be- 
fore they  can  put  into  effect  the  spirit  as  well  as  the 
letter  of  their  new  charters.  A  nation  can  no  more 
escape  from  the  law  of  gradual  growth  than  an  in- 
dividual. Russia's  effort  to  create  democracy  in  a  day, 
without  previous  preparation,  has  resulted  merely  in 
twisting  the  top  to  the  bottom  and  the  bottom  to  the 
tof>— the  establishment  of  a  new  privileged  class,  and 
a  new  autocracy.  To  omit  whole  phases  of  normal 
political  evolution,  and  advance  at  one  leap  from  the 


THE  NEW  FORMULA  161 

darkness  of  absolutism  to  the  clarity  of  liberal  democ- 
racy is  plainly  impossible.  And  I  would  even  go  so 
far  as  to  say  that  the  invention  and  successful  applica- 
tion of  a  new  order  which  gave  satisfaction  and  pros- 
perity to  the  peoples  of  the  east  would  be  no  assurance 
whatever  that  the  same  order  could  be  applied  with 
equal  success  to  the  peoples  of  the  west.  In  the  same 
way,  neither  would  the  adoption  of  advanced  ideas  by 
backward  peoples  be  a  fair  criterion  of  the  applicability 
of  these  same  ideas  to  a  more  advanced  society. 

It  is  in  the  west  that  modern  civilization  has  reached 
its  highest  development.  In  the  west  is  concentrated 
the  peculiar  culture  which  gives  its  character  to  our 
age — the  age  of  coal  and  iron.  And  just  as  surely  as 
the  nations  of  Western  Europe  and  North  America 
are  still  the  patterns  and  pacemakers  for  all  the  others, 
who  struggle  and  strain  to  imitate  them,  just  so  surely 
must  these  nations  look  to  themselves,  and  not  to  some 
less  developed  society,  for  the  germs  of  fresh  endeavor, 
fresh  advancements. 

The  sociologists,  the  economists  and  the  political 
scientists  of  the  west  are  not  effete.  Our  intellectual 
atmosphere  is  throbbing  with  bold  initiatives,  precise 
analyses,  and  constructive  criticisms.  It  is  because  we 
are  so  close  to  them,  perhaps,  and  because  we  are  be- 
wildered by  the  clash  of  conflicting  ideas,  that  we  do 
not  see  the  strength  of  our  new  thinkers.  Yet  it  is  in 
the  middle  of  this  very  clash,  this  same  bewilderment, 
that  the  immediate  future,  I  am  convinced,  is  taking 
form.  Some  day,  as  if  a  mist  had  fallen  from  it,  the 
subtle  and  completed  architecture  of  the  New  Idea  will 
emerge  against  the  sky  right  beside  us,  and  we  shall 


16«  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

stand  astonished  that  in  our  preoccupation  with  the 
turmoils  of  the  backward  East  we  had  not  perceived  it 
sooner. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  discuss  here  the  relative  merits 
of  the  many  proposals  for  constructive  reforms  which 
are  being  put  forward  at  present  in  Italy,  France,  Eng- 
land and  America.  However,  having  ventured  to  pro- 
fess so  confidently  my  faith  in  the  leadership  of  west- 
cm  thought,  I  can  hardly  in  fairness  refrain  from  indi- 
cating briefly  which  of  these  proposals  seem  to  me  just 
now  to  be  the  most  significant.  I  may  add  that  I  am 
not  the  man  of  any  group  or  any  party.  A  protracted 
effort  of  objective  observation,  such  as  is,  or  should  be, 
required  in  American  journalism,  tends  perhaps  to 
crush  out  those  generous  or  combative  impulses  which 
lead  one  to  give  his  full  support  to  this  political  move- 
ment or  that,  tends,  it  may  be,  toward  a  certain  calm 
disillusionment  ill-calculated  to  make  one  an  active  par- 
ticipant in  politics.  There  is  an  old  French  proverb 
which  says  that  "plus  ?a  change,  plus  c'est  la  meme 
chose" — the  more  it  changes,  the  more  it  stays  the 
same — and  I  must  confess  that  this  is  rather  how  I  feel 
as  regards  most  political  and  social  reforms,  in  so  far, 
at  least,  as  they  are  to  be  judged  by  a  standard  of 
human  happiness.  But  whether  societies  do  or  do  not 
progress  in  happiness,  they  undoubtedly  do  change. 
And  at  the  present  time  there  is  every  indication,  as  I 
have  said,  of  the  imminence  of  a  change.  Considering, 
then,  the  various  proposals  of  reform  with  what  ob- 
jectivity I  can,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  most  promis- 
ing among  them  is  that  which  seeks  to  supplement  the 
merely  geographical  political  representation  of  the 


THE  NEW  FORMULA  163 

present,  by  an  economic  or  professional — in  short,  a 
guild — representation. 

So  far  as  I  am  aware,  the  idea,  though  susceptible  of 
many  variations,  has  been  carried  to  its  most  concrete 
form  by  the  leaders  of  the  French  labor  movement, 
who  call  themselves  syndicalists,  but  who  have  nothing 
in  common  with  the  older  syndicalists  of  the  "sabot- 
age" days.  These  leaders  know  that  French  labor  is 
not,  and  will  not  for  many  years  be,  strong  enough  to 
impose  its  will  on  the  rest  of  the  country.  They  have 
therefore  adopted  the  principle  of  democracy  In  its 
fullest  implications.  They  declare  themselves  to  stand 
for  the  common  and  general  good,  against  all  privi- 
leges of  class,  whether  the  class  be  high  or  low.  In 
the  first  place,  they  want  the  government  to  supple- 
ment the  present  legislature  by  a  sort  of  third  chamber, 
which  they  call  an  economic  council,  which  should  be 
composed  of  representatives  of  all  the  great  economic 
organizations — the  labor  unions,  the  corporations,  the 
manufacturers,  the  farmers,  and  so  on,  and  whose  ad- 
vice should  be  sought,  though  not  necessarily  followed, 
on  all  economic  questions.  This  suggestion  is  not  in- 
harmonious with  the  country's  present  social  evolution. 
In  which  not  only  are  capital  and  labor  organizing  to 
defend  their  interests,  but  every  economic  group  In 
France,  Including  even  the  artists  and  so-called  "intel- 
lectuals." In  the  second  place  they  demand  the  "In- 
dustrial nationalization"  of  great  natural  resources, 
such  as  the  mines,  and  of  great  public  utilities,  such  as 
the  railroads.  But  "nationalization"  with  them  has  a 
particular  meaning.  They  hold  that  the  railway  work- 
ers, for  example,  have  no  more  right  to  own  the  rail- 


164  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

ways  merely  because  they  operate  them,  than  the  finan- 
ciers have  merely  because  they  furnish  the  capital. 
The  railways  should  belong  to  the  commonwealth,  and 
should  be  run,  they  maintain,  in  the  commonwealth's 
interests.  They  consider,  however,  that  previous  ex- 
periments in  state  ownership  and  operation  have 
proved  the  incompetence  and  indifference  of  the  ordi- 
nary state  bureaucracy.  "We  have  not  yet  found  the 
formula,"  said  one  of  the  French  leaders  to  me, 
*'which  will  make  a  man  work  as  hard  and  conscien- 
tiously for  the  general  good  as  he  would  work  for  him- 
self." They  have  therefore  drawn  up  a  new  plan  for 
state  operations,  not  by  bureaucrats,  but  by  guild-dele- 
gates. Specifically,  they  propose  that  each  industry  so 
"nationalized"  shall  be  managed  by  an  autonomous 
board  of  directors,  composed  of  delegates  of  the  state, 
the  workers  and  the  consumers,  in  the  interests  of 
neither  the  state,  the  workers  nor  the  capitalists,  but 
of  the  commonwealth.  Their  slogan  is  maximum  pro- 
duction in  minimum  time,  at  a  maximum  wage;  but  it 
is  equally  fundamental  with  them  that  the  workers 
must  exert  themselves  even  more  when  working  for 
the  general  good  than  they  do  in  the  service  of  private 
employers.  Among  other  things,  they  have  drawn  up 
a  plan  for  "nationalizing"  the  railroads  which,  while 
not  complete  in  its  details,  will  nevertheless  serve  well 
as  an  example  of  their  trend  of  mind.  All  lines  are  to 
be  organized  into  a  single  system.  Their  actual  value 
is  to  be  determined  by  a  commission  of  three  repre- 
sentatives for  the  government,  three  for  the  companies, 
and  three  technicians  chosen  by  the  labor  unions.  On 
a  basis  of  this  evaluation,  all  shares  will  be  called  in, 
and  a  new  issue  made,  guaranteed  by  the  state,  bearing 


THE  NEW  FORMULA  165 

a  fixed  interest  and  redeemable  at  par,  in  series  drawn 
by  lot.  They  aim  thus  to  eliminate  all  shares  in  a 
few  years,  without  injustice  to  the  present  sharehold- 
ers. Meanwhile,  the  administration  of  the  entire  sys- 
tem is  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  commission  of 
twelve :  three  government  delegates,  to  wit,  one  for  the 
ministry  of  war,  one  for  the  ministry  of  finance,  and 
one  for  the  ministry  of  public  works ;  three  labor  dele- 
gates, all  experts,  one  for  rolling-stock,  one  for  trac- 
tion, one  for  despatching;  and  six  delegates  of  the 
"consumers" — representing  respectively  the  manufac- 
turers' association,  the  farmers'  association,  the  cham- 
bers of  commerce,  the  touring  clubs,  the  trades  unions, 
and  the  cooperatives.  The  commission  shall  hold  of- 
fice for  two  years,  shall  be  well  remunerated,  and 
shall  have  practically  absolute  administrative  power. 
However,  at  the  demand  of  four  of  its  members,  it 
may  be  dissolved  by  the  government;  and  there  shall 
be  a  state  supervisory  board  composed  of  three  finan- 
cial experts.  If  there  is  a  deficit,  the  state  must  meet 
it;  if  a  profit,  part  shall  go  to  the  redemption  of  out- 
standing shares,  part  to  the  improvement  of  working 
conditions  for  employees,  particularly  as  regards  hy- 
giene, and  the  residue  to  the  state  to  build  new  lines 
and  to  initiate  the  exploitation  of  new  sources  of 
wealth. 

To  distinguish,  in  the  complex  play  of  imponderable 
psychological  forces,  those  which  are  destined  to  pre- 
vail from  those  destined  to  die  out,  is  a  task  perhaps 
requiring  rather  the  gift  of  prophesy  than  a  taste  for 
analysis.  Nevertheless,  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that 
this  French  guild  idea,  in  a  modified  form  at  least,  will 
make  its  way.    The  chief  prerequisite — that  of  wide- 


166  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

spread  professional  and  economic  association — is  al- 
ready being  accomplished.  And  already,  though  such 
bodies  as  the  national  chamber  of  commerce  or  the 
bankers'  association  have  no  governmental  standing, 
they  are  nevertheless  frequently  consulted  by  govern- 
ments, as  are  also  the  labor  federations.  To  take  one 
step  more  and  formalize  their  relation  to  the  govern- 
ment, seems  to  me  by  no  means  beyond  the  realm  of 
possibility;  for  as  these  guilds,  or  associations,  grow  in 
membership  and  experience,  their  power  in  the  com- 
munity is  certain  to  increase.  Moreover,  unlike  many 
other  radical  proposals,  the  guild  idea  is  democratic, 
and  in  professing  to  aim  at  the  general  good  rather 
than  at  the  good  of  a  single  class,  it  tends  to  disarm 
opposition.  In  France,  M.  Millerand  himself  is  known 
to  favor  the  creation  of  a  corporative,  in  addition  to 
the  present  merely  political,  chamber  in  the  legislature. 
"I  should  like  the  Senate,"  he  is  quoted  as  saying,  "to 
be  composed  in  part  of  representatives  elected  by  the 
professional  associations;  so  that  besides  the  senators 
chosen  directly,  as  now,  by  the  municipal  and  general 
councils,  there  should  be  senators  named  by  the  cham- 
ber of  commerce,  the  great  employers'  and  workers' 
syndicates,  both  rural  and  urban,  by  the  general  labor 
confederation,  and  by  the  universities  and  academies. 
They  would  be  qualified  to  defend  authoritatively  in 
the  parliament  the  ideas  which  their  respective  corpora- 
tions may  esteem  to  be  just  and  useful."  Similar  pro- 
posals are  beginning  to  be  made  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe.  There  is  a  serious  suggestion  in  Hungary 
that  with  the  abolition  of  the  house  of  lords,  the  new 
senate  shall  be  composed  of  representatives  of  the 


THE  NEW  FORMULA  167 

counties,  the  universities,  the  churches,  the  chamber  of 
commerce,  the  labor  unions  and  the  employers'  and 
professional  associations.  In  Poland  the  minority  re- 
port on  the  formation  of  the  senate  recommends  that 
this  body  be  composed  of  fifty  members  chosen  by  the 
lower  house,  two  by  the  supreme  court,  two  by  the 
universities  and  scientific  institutions,  two  by  the  gen- 
eral councils,  one  by  the  chamber  of  commerce,  one 
by  the  manufacturers'  association,  one  by  the  labor 
unions,  two  by  the  bar  association,  one  by  the  notaries 
public,  and  one  by  the  journalists'  association.  Czecho- 
slovakia has  established  a  series  of  regional  economic 
councils  which  elect  delegates  to  a  supreme  national 
economic  council. 

As  a  corollary  to  the  theory  of  biological  evolution, 
there  has  arisen,  in  the  last  half  century,  a  theory  of 
political  evolution  which  holds  that  a  state,  like  an  in- 
dividual, has  a  life-history,  passing  regularly  from 
youth  to  maturity,  and  from  maturity  into  the  decline 
of  age.  It  was  perhaps  with  this  theory  in  mind  that 
the  venerable  Japanese  statesman.  Count  Okuma,  ex- 
pressed the  opinion,  after  the  war,  that  the  decline  of 
European  civilization  was  at  hand,  and  its  end  near. 
But  while  there  is  no  doubt  much  truth  in  the  theory 
of  political  evolution,  it  is  apt  to  be  misleading.  For 
not  only  does  history  reveal  remarkable  resurrections, 
or  reincarnations,  such  as  that  of  Italy,  twice  crushed 
and  twice  rearisen,  but  a  state  can  apparently  prolong 
its  period  of  maturity  indefinitely  if  it  will  only  adapt 
itself  to  changing  circumstances.  With  regard  to  Eu- 
rope, therefore,  the  question  is,  will  its  leading  states 
be  able  to  conform  quickly  and  surely  to  the  new  con- 


168  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

ditions  imposed  by  the  war  and  the  peace  settlements? 
I  myself  believe  they  will.  Already,  in  most  regions, 
the  crisis  of  lassitude  and  indolence  has  passed.  Both 
physically  and  socially  Europe  is  manifesting  strong 
vitality;  health  is  conquering  disease,  and  the  spirit  of 
reform  is  overcoming  the  spirit  of  revolution. 


PART  IV 

NATIONAL  PROBLEMS 


AUSTRIA 

In  discussing  general  conditions  in  "Balkanized  Eu- 
rope," I  have  endeavored  to  indicate  that  the  immedi- 
ate hindrances  to  economic  reconstruction  being  in 
large  part  psychological,  the  first  solutions  to  be  sought 
must  of  necessity  be  political ;  for  until  peoples'  minds 
are  well  disposed  by  political  understandings,  all  effcwts 
to  persuade  them  to  undertake  those  collaborations 
which  seem  so  essential  are  destined  to  impotence. 
But  before  attempting  to  describe  and  analyze  the 
larger  political  movements  which  have  already  begun 
to  develop  in  this  sense,  it  will  be  prudent  to  consider 
the  various  countries  individually,  with  respect,  in  par- 
ticular, to  their  chief  internal  and  external  political 
problems.  For  each  state,  naturally  enough,  is  pre- 
eminently engrossed  with  its  own  affairs;  and  it  will 
listen  to  proposals  of  entente  or  alliance  only  when 
they  take  account  of  and  give  promise  of  furthering 
these  affairs.  The  statesman,  in  his  task  of  forming 
a  new  and  harmonious  European  mosaic,  has  no  other 
tiles  to  work  with ;  he  must  therefore  familiarize  him- 
self thoroughly  with  the  peculiar  color  and  outline,  so 
to  speak,  of  each  country. 

There  are,  in  the  region  to  which  I  am  limiting  my- 
self, three  "enemy"  states — Austria,  Hungary,  Bul- 
garia; and  five  "allied"  states — Czecho-Slovakia,  Po- 
land, Roumania,  Jugo-Slavia,  Greece.     I  shall  deal 

171 


17«  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

first  with  the  enemy  states,  which  have  this  in  common, 
that  all  have  suffered  defeat  and  amputation,  and  all 
are  living  under  the  shadow  of  treaties  holding  them 
accountable  for  vast  reparations;  but  otherwise,  both 
in  character  and  in  attitude  of  mind  they  are  strikingly 
different.    Let  me  begin,  then,  with  Austria. 

This  state,  beyond  any  doubt,  is  the  weakest,  the 
most  miserable,  the  most  apathetic  and  the  most  help- 
less in  Europe  to-day.  In  Hungary  and  Bulgaria  de- 
feat has,  if  anything,  strengthened  the  interior  unity 
of  the  people,  and  stimulated  national  consciousness. 
But  the  present  Austria  does  not  even  feel  itself  to  be 
a  nation.  Indeed,  the  old  Austrian  Empire  was  never, 
strictly  speaking,  a  nation;  it  was  merely  a  state.  The 
arbiters  of  peace,  having  carved  out  of  this  Empire  a 
number  of  new  nations,  or  parts  of  nations,  found  that 
there  remained  still  a  great  city,  Vienna,  and  a  long 
strip  of  mountain  valley  reaching  from  Vienna  west- 
ward to  Switzerland,  of  which  no  satisfactory  dis- 
position could  be  made.  This  remnant  is  the  present 
Austria — a  monster,  consisting,  like  a  tad-pole,  of  a 
huge  head  attached  to  a  kind  of  tail;  for  of  the  total 
population  of  six  millions,  a  third — two  millions — are 
crowded  in  Vienna,  the  head,  and  only  four  millions 
are  left  to  form  the  tail-like  body.  Nor  are  the  head 
and  tail,  strictly  speaking,  made  of  the  same  stuff. 
The  people  of  the  provinces — Upper  Austria,  Salz- 
burg, Steiermark,  Carinthia,  the  Tyrol  and  the  Vorarl- 
berg — are  of  an  old  and  pure  German  stock,  similar  to 
the  Bavarian.  Vienna,  on  the  contrary.  Is  a  cosmopoli- 
tan city,  German  in  language,  but  having  a  tradition 
and  culture  distinctly  its  own.    If-  was  the  cultural  and 


AUSTRIA  173 

business  capital  for  a  large  part  of  Central  Eastern  and 
Southeastern  Europe.  There  was  probably  no  portion 
of  the  Empire  with  which  Vienna  had  fewer  relations 
than  with  the  provinces  now  left  to  it.  Commercially, 
most  of  its  dealings  were  with  Bohemia  and  Galicia, 
where  the  Empire's  principal  industries  were  situated. 
Its  inhabitants  are  a  conglomeration  of  Germans, 
Czechs,  Poles,  Magyars,  Italians,  Jugo-Slavs  and  Jews. 
As  the  city  of  Haydn,  Mozart,  Beethoven  and  Schu- 
bert, it  developed  a  high  musical  culture  which  drew 
students  from  all  the  neighboring  countries,  and  its 
scientific  institutions  were  scarcely  less  magnetic.  In 
short,  its  roots  were  spread  out  far  in  all  directions; 
but  in  its  present  provinces  were  less  deeply  embedded 
than  elsewhere. 

The  first  problem  which  the  Austrians  have  to  face, 
if  their  country  is  to  continue  its  independent  existence, 
is  the  achievement  of  interior  unity  and  the  develop- 
ment of  a  national  consciousness.  Without  these  there 
can  be  no  concerted  effort,  and  without  concerted  effort 
nothing  can  be  accomplished. 

The  Viennese,  like  all  the  defeated  peoples,  com- 
plying with  President  Wilson's  suggestions,  in  the  hope 
of  getting  better  peace  terms,  made  a  revolution  after 
the  armistice,  and  set  up  a  socialist  government  of 
pronounced  communist  tendencies.  But  what  with  the 
easy-going  nature  of  the  people,  and  the  widespread 
.misery  adduced  by  famine,  this  government,  now  des- 
tined, no  doubt,  to  be  somewhat  modified,  has  never 
been  able  to  enforce  its  decrees  even  in  Vienna.  As 
for  the  provinces,  they  refused  absolutely  to  recognize 
its  authority.  The  peasants,  who  are  fervent  Roman 
Catholics,  called  the  capital  "red"  and  "godless,"  and 


174  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

withheld  their  food  from  it.  The  provincial  towns  ac- 
cused it  of  extravagance  and  incompetence.  The  Vor- 
arlberg  wants  to  unite  with  Switzerland,  the  Tyrol 
leans  toward  Bavaria.  All  the  provinces  demand  re- 
gional autonomy,  and  are  not  far  from  having  taken 
it  for  themselves.  Thus  Linz  and  Salzburg  declined 
to  adopt  even  the  "summer  time"  decreed  by  Vienna. 
Innsbruck  endeavored  to  negotiate  an  understanding 
with  Bavaria  whereby  German  marks  would  pass  cur- 
rent in  that  town.  Several  provincial  cities  forbid 
"strangers,"  particularly  the  Viennese,  to  remain 
within  their  precincts  for  more  than  three  days  with- 
out special  permission. 

All  in  all,  it  appeared  impossible  for  Austria  to  pull 
itself  together  so  long  as  the  socialist  government  re- 
mained in  power.  With  the  exception  of  a  few  social- 
ists in  the  towns,  all  the  people  in  the  provinces  were 
against  it.  There  was  even  doubt  as  to  how  far 
Vienna,  itself  a  city  not  only  of  workmen  but  of  small 
capitalists  and  merchants,  was  really  "red."  The 
.  social-Democrats  were  the  largest  single  party,  but  they 
did  not  have  an  absolute  majority.  The  moderacC  and 
conservative  parties,  chief  of  which  are  the  so-called 
Christian-Socials,  outnumbered  them.  The  Christian- 
Socials  even  heretofore  have  collaborated  in  the  gov- 
ernment to  a  limited  extent,  holding  such  constructive 
posts  as  the  ministers  of  finance,  education  and  jus- 
tice; and  the  probaLilities  were  that  when  they  judged 
the  time  to  be  ripe  they  would  endeavor  to  take  control 
of  the  administration.  If  they  had  not  done  so  sooner 
it  was  partly,  perhaps,  from  apathy,  and  partly  from 
a  disinclination  to  accept  responsibility  under  con- 
ditions so  adverse,  so  apparently  hopeless,  as  those  of 


AUSTRIA  175 

the  day.  The  programme  which  they  promise  to  put 
ultimately  into  effect  aims  to  win  back  the  provinces 
by  a  show  of  strong  central  authority,  for  which  the 
country-people  are  supposed  to  be  secretly  longing;  to 
repeal  radical  social  legislation  so  as  to  attract  foreign 
capital;  to  reorganize  taxation;  to  stabilize  the  crown 
at  its  present  value  of  about  half  a  cent,  thus  greatly 
reducing  the  war  debt  which  is  reckoned  in  a  fixed  num- 
ber of  crowns  without  question  as  to  their  value;  and, 
finally,  to  demand  $200,000,000  credit  from  the  rep- 
arations commission,  for  three  years,  against  such  re- 
sources as  the  railways,  customs,  forests  and  art-works, 
for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  raw-stuffs  and  putting 
the  factories  to  work.  Austria's  chief  lack  is  coal. 
There  is  a  little  in  the  Tyrol,  but  not  nearly  enough. 
Potential  water-power  is  plentiful,  but  to  develop  it 
would  require  both  time  and  capital.  Wood  is  plen- 
tiful, and  there  is  ore  in  Styria.  The  chief  commod- 
ities needed  are  coal,  iron,  hides  for  the  highly-devel- 
oped leather  industry,  and  hemp,  which  can  be  worked 
here  in  large  quantities.  The  Austrian  machine-shops 
are  by  no  means  negligible ;  France,  for  example,  has 
ordered  from  them  fifty  locomotives.  What  is  wanted 
is  credit,  and  organization.  The  Christian-Social  pro- 
gramme seems  therefore  well  adapted  to  the  country's 
real  needs. 

As  was  expected  by  all  careful  observers,  this  party, 
in  the  recent  elections  (October  17,  1920),  made  a 
considerable  gain.  The  socialists,  hitherto  predom- 
inant, lost  eight  seats,  returning  only  sixty-four  depu- 
ties, whereas  the  Christian-Socials  returned  eighty-two 
— an  increase  of  thirteen !  Both  the  extremist  parties 
lost  ground,  the  communists  failing  to  elect  a  single 


176  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

deputy,  and  the  pan-Germans,  expecting  to  win  forty 
or  fifty,  returning  only  twenty-one,  a  diminution  of 
three.  This  result  is  the  first  serious  sign  which  Aus- 
tria has  thus  far  given  of  a  will  to  live.  Nevertheless, 
it  remains  ambiguous;  for  the  Christian-Socials, 
though  they  are  now  the  strongest  party,  have  not  yet 
an  absolute  majority,  and  being  unable  to  collaborate 
with  the  pan-Germans,  will  still  have  to  share  the  min- 
istry, to  some  extent,  with  the  socialists.  The  next 
six  months  should  show  how  far,  thus  hampered,  they 
will  be  able  to  put  their  promising  programme  into 
effect. 

The  question  of  Austria's  future  is  one  of  the  most 
momentous  in  Europe,  and  I  shall  have  occasion  to 
discuss  It  fully,  in  all  its  far-reaching  complications, 
when  I  come  to  treat  of  general  political  problems. 
There  are  two  ultimate  possibilities — alliance  or  fed- 
eration with  other  small  Central  European  states, 
which  is  that  desired  by  France  and,  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent, by  Britain;  or  union  with  Germany,  which  is  that 
desired  by  Italy,  and — for  the  time  being,  at  least — 
by  most  of  the  Austrians  themselves.  But  as  the  for- 
mer would  take  perhaps  several  years  to  realize,  and 
as  the  latter  is  forbidden  by  the  peace  treaty,  there  is 
every  probability  that  Austria,  willy-nilly,  will  be 
obliged,  one  way  or  another,  to  exist  alone  for  several 
years  to  come.  In  so  doing  it  will  ascertain,  beyond 
doubt,  whether  such  an  isolated  existence  is  really  im- 
possible for  it,  as  most  people  seem  to  think.  This 
common  thesis  has  not  been  proved.  I  have  already 
indicated  that,  if  agricultural  production  were  brought 
up  to  the  pre-war  level,  Austria  could  supply  about 
eighty  per  cent,  of  Its  own  food,  instead  of  forty  per 


AUSTRIA  177 

cent.,  as  at  present.  If  its  factories  would  be  started 
again,  by  giving  it  credit  for  raw-stuffs,  it  could  ex- 
change manufactured  goods  for  the  remainder  of  its 
alimentary  requirements.  But  will  the  Austrians  them- 
selves, disheartened,  disillusioned,  miserable,  make  the 
necessary  effort?    This  remains  to  be  seen. 

The  strongest  pro-German  parties  are  the  pan-Ger- 
mans, for  obvious  reasons,  and  the  socialists,  who  hope 
by  union  to  win  the  support  of  the  German  socialists 
and  thereby  reinforce  their  weakening  position.  The 
gain  of  the  Christian-Socials  in  the  elections  is  in  re- 
ality a  blow  to  the  idea  of  union;  for  although  the 
majority  of  Christian-Socials  have  hitherto,  by  a  kind 
of  despite,  favored  this  solution,  they  have  done  so 
only  as  a  last  resort.  They  realize,  in  any  case,  the 
necessity  of  at  least  a  tentative  independence.  The 
history  of  Austria  is  long,  and  not  inglorious.  For  the 
country  to  disappear — to  be  absorbed  into  a  powerful 
German  federation — would  be,  sentimentally  at  least, 
a  serious  loss  to  Europe,  from  several  points  of  view. 
Vienna,  in  particular,  is  a  city  of  peculiarly  pleasing 
individuality,  and  of  real  cultural  strength.  Surely, 
for  it  to  become  merely  one  more  provincial  German 
town  would  be  a  pityl  More  than  any  other  faction, 
the  Christian-Socials  are  sensitive  to  these  considera- 
tions. They  will,  I  expect,  make  a  genuine  effort  to 
save  Austrian  independence.  Meanwhile,  for  my  pres- 
ent purpose,  it  will  be  sufficient  briefly  to  indicate  the 
country's  sentiment  toward  its  various  neighbors,  as 
this  sentiment  may  play  an  important  part  in  future 
developments. 

With  both  Switzerland  and  Germany,  relations  are 
cordial.     With   Czecho-Slovakia,   they   are   officially 


178  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

good,  but  in  reality  the  Austrians  despise  the  Czechs, 
whom  they  wrongly  consider  an  inferior  and  stupid 
people,  and  they  are  devoured  by  jealousy  at  Czecho- 
slovakia's sudden  rise  to  relative  affluence.  Between 
Austria  and  Hungary,  there  is  bad  blood,  partly  be- 
cause of  the  conservative  reaction  in  Hungary,  which 
alarms  socialism,  partly  because  of  a  quarrel  over  the 
territory  known  as  West  Hungary,  which  the  Peace 
Conference  gave  to  Austria  as  "compensation"  for  the 
South  Tyrol,  ceded  to  Italy.  With  Jugo-Slavia,  rela- 
tions are  also  bad.  Austria's  unexpected  victory  in  the 
Klagenfurth  basin  plebiscite  is  ill-calculated  to  concili- 
ate the  Jugo-Slavs  who,  for  a  long  time,  refused  to  sell 
their  surplus  food  to  starving  Austria,  a  fact  which 
the  Austrians  will  not  forget.  The  Jugo-Slavs  will  not 
even  let  their  rolling-stock  enter  Austria,  and  they 
have  put  a  heavy  tax  on  exports  to  Austria.  With 
Italy,  despite  the  annexation  by  this  power  of  the 
South  Tyrol,  inhabited  almost  exclusively  by  Austrians, 
Austria  is  already  on  good  terms  again.  Italy  is  sup- 
porting Austria's  sentiment  for  union  with  Germany, 
and  it  has  opened  its  frontiers  and  its  port  of  Trieste  to 
its  northern  neighbor  in  exchange  for  transit  privileges 
across  Austria  to  Germany.  Despite  their  past  enmity, 
Italy  and  Austria  have  now  a  number  of  common  po- 
litical and  economic  interests.  In  the  worst  days  of 
the  Viennese  famine,  the  Italians,  themselves  short  of 
food,  did  not  hesitate  to  invite  several  thousand  Aus- 
trian children  to  Italy,  where  they  were  sympathetically 
nourished  and  cared  for. 


HUNGARY 

In  order  to  understand  present-day  Hungary,  it  is 
necessary  to  recall  what  Hungary  was  before  the  war 
— a  great  fertile  plain  bounded  on  the  north,  east  and 
southeast  by  the  Carpathian  mountains,  and  on  the 
south  and  southwest  by  the  rivers  Danube  and  Drave. 
Beyond  these  rivers  lay  the  provinces  of  Slavonia  and 
Croatia,  across  which  Hungary  reached  the  sea,  at  the 
port  of  Fiume;  but  excepting  these  two  provinces,  the 
remainder — the  great  plain  ringed  round  by  moun- 
tains— formed  what  geographers  considered  a  perfect 
natural  unity.  All  the  rivers  flowed  inward.  The 
thickly  populated  plain  exchanged  its  food  produce  for 
the  wood  and  minerals  of  the  mountains,  whose  in- 
habitants came  down  in  summer  to  help  with  the  har- 
vest. For  stock-breeding  the  highlands  furnished  pas- 
turage, and  the  lowlands  fodder.  The  land  was  a 
unity,  but  the  people  were  not.  Within  these  borders 
dwelt  seven  distinct  races.  The  Magyars,  an  Asiatic 
tribe  of  the  Touranian  family,  akin,  probably,  to  the 
Turks,  Finns  and  Bulgars,  had  settled,  early  in  the 
Tenth  century,  in  the  central  plain,  and  in  the  course 
of  time  extended  their  sway  over  all  the  border  races. 
"The  peoples  of  the  borderlands,"  wrote  Elise  Reclus, 
the  great  French  geographer,  "must  gravitate  toward 
the  predominant  nationality  by  force  of  all  their  ma- 
terial  interests."     The   census   of    19 lo   showed   a 

179 


180  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

nucleus  of  10,050,575  Magyars,  around  whom  were 
grouped  2,949,032  Roumanians,  2,037,435  Germans, 
i>967»970  Slovaks,  1,833,162  Croats,  1,106,477  Serbs, 
477,587  Ruthenians,  and  469,255  others.  Magyars 
thus  formed  about  half  of  a  total  population  of  twenty 
millions.  Considering  themselves  a  superior  race,  they 
ruled  with  a  firm  hand.  They  were  peasants,  soldiers, 
officials,  landowners,  but  they  had  little  taste  for  busi- 
ness, or  the  liberal  professions,  which  they  held  in  a 
kind  of  contempt,  leaving  these  largely  in  the  hands 
of  Germans  or  Austrians,  and  of  Magyarized  Jews. 
In  19 14,  five  per  cent,  of  the  total  number  of  inhab- 
itants were  Jews,  many  of  whom  had  been  baptized. 
They  furnished  fifty-two  per  cent,  of  the  doctors;  forty- 
six  per  cent,  of  the  lawyers,  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  jour- 
nalists, nineteen  per  cent,  of  the  large  landowners, 
forty-eight  per  cent,  of  the  owners  of  tracts  of  over 
one  hundred  acres.  Most  of  the  factories,  banks  and 
business  houses  were  under  their  influence.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  they  controlled  ninety-eight  per  cent,  of  the 
country's  free  capital,  and  for  Budapest  the  sneering 
name  of  "Judapest"  was  often  substituted  in  conversa- 
tion. The  other  races,  excepting,  of  course,  the  Ger- 
mans and  Austrians,  were  by  no  means  satisfied  under 
the  Magyar-Jewish  regime,  which  aimed  more  and 
more  openly  at  assimilating  them  altogether. 

The  peace  treaties  have  reduced  Hungary  to  one- 
third  of  its  former  size.  From  twenty  millions,  the 
population  has  been  cut  to  eight  and  a  half.  All  the 
borderlands,  with  their  wood,  their  minerals  and  their 
pasturage,  have  been  lopped  away,  leaving  only  the  cen- 
tral plain,  in  which  the  Magyars  can  no  longer  control 
even  the  flood  and  irrigation  system,  the  headwaters  of 


HUNGARY  181 

the  streams  being  now  beyond  their  boundaries.  Of 
the  lost  population,  the  Roumanians  have  received  six 
millions,  the  Czecho-Slovaks  and  Jugo-Slavs  each 
two  and  a  half  millions,  and  Austria  half  a  million. 
Unfortunately,  owing  to  the  mixture  of  races,  these 
amputations  include,  according  to  Hungarian  statis- 
tics, some  three  and  a  half  million  Magyars,  and  nearly 
two  million  Germans  who  would  prefer  Magyar  sov- 
ereignty. Fifty-one  and  seven-tenths  per  cent,  of  the 
lost  population,  the  Magyars  claim,  is  even  now  under 
foreign  rule,  to  wit:  3,658,995  Magyars,  1,179,808 
Germans,  159,009  Slovaks,  1,894  Roumanians,  255,- 
703  Ruthenians,  58,453  Croats,  21,735  Serbs,  and 
300,405  others.  Within  the  present  Hungary,  ten  per 
cent,  of  the  population  is  Jewish;  there  are  about 
200,000  Slovaks,  and  500,000  Germans;  the  rest  are 
Magyars. 

These  Magyars  are  furious.  They  consider  the 
partition  an  anomaly  and  an  outrage.  They  declare 
that  they  will  never  accept  their  present  situation.  I 
have  told  elsewhere  of  the  great  campaign  of  propa- 
ganda which  they  have  launched  upon  the  world.  For 
the  present,  they  seem  definitely  to  have  abandoned 
Slavonia  and  Croatia,  the  provinces  which  lay  beyond 
the  Drave  and  Danube,  and  which  have  gone  to  Jugo- 
slavia. Nor  do  they  speak  much  of  West  Hungary, 
ceded  to  Austria,  nor  the  fertile  Banat,  divided  be- 
tween Jugo-Slavia  and  Roumania.  Their  principal  ef- 
forts are  centered  upon  Slovakia,  and  upon  Transyl- 
vania. In  both  these  regions  they  are  keeping  up  a 
seditious  agitation,  through  the  Magyar  elements, 
against  whom  both  Czecho-Slovaks  and  Roumanians 
are  duly  retaliating.     With  regard  to  Slovakia,  the 


18?  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

Magyars  say  that  its  union  with  the  Czechs  Is  an  eco- 
nomic impossibility.  Slovakia  lies  on  the  south  slope 
of  the  Carpathians.  Its  roads  and  streams  run  not 
across  the  ranges  to  Moravia,  but  straight  down  into 
Hungary.  They  profess  to  feel  sure  that  Slovakia  will 
of  necessity  ultimately  come  back  to  them,  even  leav- 
ing out  of  account  that  thirty  per  cent,  of  its  popula- 
tion is  Magyar.  Of  Transylvania  they  say  that  though 
it  is  itself  a  small  geographical  unity,  a  ring  of  moun- 
tains around  an  amphitheater  of  green  valleys,  it  can 
communicate  far  more  easily  with  Hungary  than  with 
Roumania.  They  claim,  besides,  that  though  fifty  per 
cent,  of  the  population  is  indeed  Roumanian,  thirty- 
four  and  a  third  per  cent,  is  Magyar,  of  the  oldest, 
finest  stock,  and  eight  and  a  seventh  per  cent,  are 
Magyarophile  Germans. 

Just  how  they  are  going  to  regain  their  lost  terri- 
tories they  do  not  profess  to  know.  The  one  certainty 
is  that  they  intend  to  regain  them.  Any  means  will  be 
good  means — alliances  with  no  matter  whom,  federa- 
tions, compromises,  even  war — ^provided  there  is  a 
chance  of  success.  Hating  and  harboring  designs 
against  all  four  of  their  neighbors,  the  only  combina- 
tion which  they  have  been  tempted  to  essay  up  to  the 
present  is  an  alliance  with  Italy  and  Poland,  the  idea 
being  that  if  Italy  could  counterbalance  the  Jugo-Slavs, 
and  Pola^nd  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  the  Magyars  might 
then  be  free  to  attack  the  Roumanians  without  having 
at  the  same  time  to  defend  their  indefensible  frontiers 
in  the  south,  west  and  north.  To  this,  the  Czechs, 
Jugo-Slavs  and  Roumanians  have  replied  by  forming 
the  so-called  "Petite  Entente,"  a  defensive  alliance 
against  Hungary.     The  Magyars'  contemptuous  as- 


HUNGARY  188 

sumption  of  the  complete  helplessness  of  Austria  is 
significant.  In  addition  to  flirting  with  Italy  and  Po- 
land, the  Magyars  have  sought  to  win  the-  sympathy 
first  of  Britain,  then  of  France,  but  with  what  real 
success  it  is  still  difficult  to  estimate.  Unless  Central 
Europe  should  fall  into  a  kind  of  general  armed  quar- 
rel, which  is  altogether  unlikely,  I  myself  do  not  expect 
to  see  the  Magyars  take  up  arms — not  for  the  present, 
at  least.  Despite  their  supposed  individual  military 
superiority  over  the  Czechs  and  Roumanians,  they  are 
surrounded  and  hopelessly  outnumbered.  Their 
chances  of  success  are  inconsiderable.  Their  policy 
will  probably  be  one  of  vigilant  calm,  supplemented  by 
endless  propaganda  and  intrigue  for  the  purpose  of 
annoying  and  weakening  their  neighbors. 

There  is  one  possibility  which  I  may  mention  in 
passing.  Much  as  the  Magyars  and  Roumanians  hate 
one  another,  both  are  strongly  conscious  of  being  non- 
Slav  peoples,  isolated  in  an  ocean  of  Slavs.  If  the 
pan-Slav  movement  should  grow,  it  is  not  at  all  unlikely 
that  an  entente  would  ensue  between  Hungary  and 
Roumania,  on  a  basis  of  some  kind  of  transaction  re- 
garding Transylvania,  as,  for  example,  the  bestowing 
of  a  kind  of  autonomy  upon  the  province,  under  Rou- 
manian sovereignty. 

The  Magyar  propagandists  have  outdone  them- 
selves in  the  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  existence  for 
the  present  Hungary  is  an  impossibility;  their  argu- 
ments are  inconclusive.  It  is  true  that  the  country  has 
lost  its  forests,  its  upland  pasturage,  its  iron,  oil  and 
natural  gas,  two-fifths  of  its  coal  mines,  and  a  large 
proportion  of  its  factories,  becoming  thus  once  more 
a  strictly  agricultural  state.     The  attempt,  however, 


184  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

to  prove  that  the  loss,  in  addition,  of  their  irrigation 
and  flood  control,  through  the  cession'  of  the  head- 
waters, will  ruin  even  agriculture,  fails.  Despite  the 
disorders  attending  the  talk  of  land  reform,  and  de- 
spite the  fact  that,  owing  to  the  Roumanians  having 
requisitioned  the  seed,  twenty-five  per  cent,  of  the  land 
was  not  cultivated  this  year,  there  is  nevertheless  even 
now  a  considerable  grain  surplus  for  export.  After 
Minneapolis,  Budapest  is  the  largest  milling  center  in 
the  world,  and  the  quality  of  its  flour  is  unexcelled. 
By  the  exchange  of  grain  and  flour  for  other  com- 
modities, Hungary  can  satisfy  its  needs.  The  question 
of  flood  control  has  been  laid  before  the  League  of 
Nations,  and  will  doubtless  be  settled  by  international 
agreement. 

The  war,  followed  by  the  communist  revolution,  the 
Roumanian  invasion,  and  the  partition,  has  plunged 
Hungary's  internal  affairs  into  great  confusion.  There 
has  arisen,  for  example,  a  violent  sentiment  against 
the  Jews,  the  reasons  for  which  are  complex.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  popularly  believed  to  have  been  proved 
in  the  days  of  Bela  Kun  that  the  mainsprings  of  com- 
munism are  Jewish.  In  the  second  place,  there  is  the 
antagonism  of  the  country-dwelling  Magyars  against 
the  town-dwelling  Israelites,  who  are  accused  of 
profiteering.  Finally,  there  is  the  traditional  resent- 
ment of  the  careless  borrower  against  the  hard-headed 
money  lender  when  the  date  of  foreclosure  comes 
around.  The  Magyar,  unable,  seemingly,  to  keep 
from  falling  into  the  clutches  of  usurers,  reacts  with 
violence  when  he  suddenly  finds  himself  ruined.  The 
feeling  is  particularly  strong  against  recent  immi- 
grants.   I  was  told  of  a  Galician  Jew  who  arrived  in  a 


HUNGARY  185 

Magyar  town  ten  years  ago,  with  an  umbrella  as  his 
sole  baggage,  and  who,  in  the  last  year  of  the  war, 
paid  one  million  crowns  in  taxes  alone.  The  anti- 
Semite  extremists  talk  wildly  of  eliminating  commerce 
from  Hungary  altogether,  and  the  Jews  with  it.  A 
more  moderate  party  distinguishes  between  the 
Magyarized  Jews  and  the  "undesirable"  new-comers. 
Sager  heads,  however,  and  among  them  most  of  the 
party  leaders,  will  admit  in  private  conversation  that 
the  country  simply  could  not  get  along  without  the 
Jews,  who,  as  I  have  said,  practically  monopolize  busi- 
ness and  finance.  An  alliance  between  the  two  races 
is  essential  to  the  nation's  immediate  efficiency.  For 
this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  it  seems  likely  that  the 
quarrel  will  gradually  subside. 

Another  source  of  social  discontent  is  the  superfluity 
of  jobless  functionaries,  landlords,  and  army  officers, 
occasioned  by  the  reduction  of  the  country's  size,'  and 
their  immigration  out  of  the  ceded  provinces  rather 
than  swear  fealty  to  new  foreign  administrations. 
These  malcontents  are  the  more  dangerous  as  they 
are  men  of  education  and  character.  Having  lost 
everything,  they  are  ready  for  anything,  and  they  can 
be  tempted  into  the  most  unprofitable  adventures.  In 
Budapest,  these  immigres  are  so  numerous  that  they 
have  nearly  doubled  the  population;  hundreds  of  them 
— people  of  culture,  schoolteachers,  former  govern- 
ment officials  from  Slovakia  or  Transylvania — are 
still  living  with  their  families  in  boxcars  at  the  edge  of 
the  city.  In  the  rural  districts,  there  are  bands  of 
officers  who,  disagreeing  in  some  detail  with  the  policy 
of  the  government,  refuse  to  submit  to  its  authority. 
This  situation  makes  it  easy  for  the  first  agitator — ^pro- 


186  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

vided  he  Is  a  conservative  or  a  reactionary — to  enlist 
a  following.  It  is  these  unfortunates  who  are  guilty 
of  most  of  the  outrages  which  have  occurred  against 
the  Jews.  Their  presence  in  the  country  is  a  serious 
problem.  A  long  time  must  doubtless  elapse  before 
they  all  can  settle  down  again  to  new  employ,  new 
modes  of  life. 

Hungary,  at  the  present  time,  is  a  kingdom  without 
a  king.  Temporarily,  Admiral  Miklos  Horthy,  for- 
mer commander-in-chief  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  navy, 
is  acting  as  governor.  He  lives  in  the  "castle,"  and 
despite  the  modest  simplicity  of  his  personality,  is  ac- 
corded royal  honors.  Probably  nine-tenths  of  the 
people  are  sincere  royalists.  They  believe  that  a  con- 
stitutional monarchy  is  the  form  of  government  best 
suited  to  their  present  needs,  and  they  expect  in  time 
to  choose  a  monarch  from  one  of  Europe's  royal 
houses.  There  has  been  some  talk  of  crowning  Hor- 
thy, but  this  step  is  unlikely,  as  he  is  not  of  princely 
blood.  At  one  time  the  Duke  of  Connaught  was  given 
to  understand  he  could  have  the  throne;  an  English 
sovereign  would  have  been  popular  with  all  parties; 
but  no  doubt  France  and  Italy  would  have  opposed 
this  choice,  and  the  duke  himself,  moreover,  showed 
no  enthusiasm  in  the  matter.  It  is  therefore  not  un- 
likely that  some  member  of  the  Hapsburg  family  will 
one  day  reign  again.  Admiral  Horthy  himself  is  anti- 
Hapsburg,  but  his  influence  Is  not  sufficiently  great  to 
safeguard  the  throne  against  the  Influence  of  this  his- 
toric dynasty,  still  powerful  by  its  centuries  of  pres- 
tige. The  large  landowners  favor  Charles  Hapsburg; 
the  army  and  the  malcontents  incline  toward  Joseph. 
Italy,  with  its  dread  of  a  restoration  of  the  old  em- 


HUNGARY  187 

pire,  would  oppose  a  Hapsburg  reaccession  with  all 
its  might,  but  certain  French  and  British  diplomats, 
intent  on  building  up  a  Danube  confederation,  rather 
favor  this  solution  as  being  a  first  step  in  such  a  con- 
struction. A  Hapsburg  coup  d'etat  is  by  no  means  an 
impossibility. 

All  in  all,  Hungary's  role  in  Central  European  af- 
fairs seems  destined  to  be  very  important.  Seated 
squarely  midway  the  Danube,  it  occupies  a  strategic 
position  of  the  first  order.  The  energetic  and  warlike 
spirit  of  the  people,  long  accustomed  to  consider  them- 
selves as  natural  rulers,  is  a  continual  threat  to  its 
enemies,  and  a  factor  of  material  strength  to  its 
friends.  For  at  least  several  years  to  come,  this  coun- 
try will  be  worthy  of  the  closest  observation. 


BULGARIA 

Like  Hungary,  Bulgaria  is  an  agricultural  country. 
It  has  practically  no  industries.  It  lies. in  the  same 
latitude  as  Central  Italy,  but  is  considerably  cooler. 
It  consists  of  two  valley  plains  and  two  mountain 
ranges,  all  running  from  east  to  west,  and  all  parallel : 
first  the  south  Danube  plain,  then  the  Balkan  moun- 
tains, then  the  Maritza  valley  plain,  then  the  Rhodope 
mountains.  In  this  temperate  and  variegated  climate 
nearly  everything  will  grow — wheat,  rye,  cotton,  rice, 
tobacco,  opium,  beets,  pomegranates.  The  ex-Czar 
Ferdinand,  who  had  a  strong  penchant  for  botany, 
raised  successfully  on  his  private  estate,  near  Sofia,  not 
only  trees  and  plants  from  every  part  of  the  world — 
Siberia  and  the  Amazon,  Canada  and  Egypt — but  also 
camels,  elephants,  wolves  and  llamas. 

Its  people,  though  still  primitive,  are  in  several  re- 
spects notable,  rivalling  the  Serbs  in  military  valor, 
and  the  Greeks  in  education.  Indeed,  the  Bulgars 
boast  that  they  spend  more  money  per  capita  on  educa- 
tion, and  have  a  larger  number  of  students  for  each 
thousand  inhabitants,  than  any  other  Balkan  state. 
In  1880,  two  years  after  their  liberation  from  Turkey, 
ninety-five  per  cent,  of  the  men,  and  ninety-eight  per 
cent,  of  the  women  were  illiterate.  Twenty-five  years 
later,  nearly  sixty  per  cent,  of  the  men,  and  twenty-six 

per  cent,  of  the  women  could  read  and  write.     The 

188 


BULGARIA  189 

people  are  hard-headed  and  hard-working — "a  race," 
says  Bousquet,  in  his  "History  of  the  Balkan  People," 
"patient  and  thorough,  tenacious  and  rough,  sober  and 
laborious,  proud  and  warlike."  I  have  read  that  in  the 
proportion  of  inhabitants  actively  employed,  Bulgaria 
is  surpassed  by  only  one  other  country  in  the  world — 
France,  the  figure  given  for  Bulgaria  being  52.5  per 
cent.,  and  for  France  53.3  per  cent. 

Though  these  are  in  themselves  valuable  qualities, 
I  suspect  that  a  good  part  of  Bulgaria's  remarkably 
rapid  development  is  due  to  the  ex-czar,  Ferdinand  of 
Saxe-Coburg  Gotha.  It  was  he  who  gave  the  country 
a  competent  administration,  who  stimulated  public  in- 
struction and  road-building,  and  who  made  Sofia  a 
neat,  clean  modern  town  with  vitrified  brick  pavements, 
and  pleasant  parks  and  gardens.  In  organizing  the 
Balkan  alliance,  which  crushed  Turkey  in  19 12,  he 
played  a  part  no  less  important  than  that  of  Venizelos. 
And  if,  through  the  unpardonable  error  which  brought 
Bulgaria  into  the  great  war  on  the  side*  of  Germany, 
he  is  to-day  an  exile  with  no  hope  of  return,  his  people 
are  nevertheless  still  conscious,  I  think,  of  how  much 
of  practical  good,  as  well  as  of  political  evil,  they  will 
always  owe  to  this  man's  bold  initiative.  He  was  in 
every  respect  the  most  remarkable  ruler  in  the  Balkans. 

The  Bulgars,  confident  of  their  superiority  over 
their  neighbors  in  both  war  and  peace,  have  twice,  in 
recent  years,  dreamed  of  hegemony,  once  in  19 13, 
when  they  attacked  their  Greek  and  Serb  allies  in  the 
quarrel  over  the  partition  of  Macedonia,  and  again  in 
19 1 6,  when,  with  Germany's  help,  they  crushed  and 
overran  Serbia.  The  peace  terms  which  the  Bulgar 
imperialists  would  have  imposed  in  case  of  victory 


190  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

would  have  left  them  the  undisputed  masters  of  the 
Balkans,  with  many  subject  peoples,  west,  south  and 
north.  But  in  their  defeat  it  is  they  themselves  who, 
in  accordance  with  the  firmly  established  Balkan  tra- 
dition, have  been  trimmed  and  shorn.  In  consequence, 
their  present  preoccupation  is  first  to  reestablish  their 
interior  strength  by  hard  work  and  wise  policies,  and 
then  to  devise  means  of  regaining  the  territories,  more 
or  less  inhabited  by  Bulgars,  to  which  they  believe  they 
have  a  preeminent  right. 

The  present  population  is  4,337,500,  of  whom 
3,500,000  are  Bulgars,  and  the  rest  Turks,  Pomaks, 
Gypsies,  Roumanians,  Greeks,  Jews  and  Russians. 
Eighty-two  per  cent,  of  the  people  are  peasants. 
There  are  indeed  500,000  families  of  independent 
farmers.  These  peasants,  holding  Ferdinand  re- 
sponsible for  the  country's  defeat,  immediately  after 
the  armistice  forced  him  to  abdicate,  and  seated  in  his 
stead  his  son  Boris,  whom  they  consider  a  good  honest 
young  man,  but  not  yet  experienced  enough  to  influ- 
ence affairs  of  state.  Boris  is  said  to  resemble  his 
Bourbon  mother  more  than  his  Saxe-Coburg  father. 
My  personal  impression  of  him  was  good.  He  re- 
ceived me  simply,  in  a  plain  business  suit,  and  asked 
me  intelligent  questions  regarding  the  countries  I  had 
visited,  seeming  particularly  interested  in  social  prob- 
lems. He  spoke  with  feeling  pity  of  humanity's  pres- 
ent plight,  and  expressed  a  hope  in  salvation  through 
work.  He  has  admitted  his  willingness  to  abdicate  at 
any  time  if  he  can  be  shown  that  he  stands  in  the 
country's  way,  but  the  chances  are  Bulgaria  will  prefer 
to  remain  a  constitutional  monarchy.  This  seems  to 
be  the  meaning  of  Stamboulisky's  saying,  that  he  con- 


BULGARIA  191 

siders  the  czar  to  be  "the  best  possible  president  of 
the  republic."  Stamboulisky,  as  premier,  and  as  head 
of  the  all-powerful  peasants'  party,  is  the  real  chief- 
of-state.  Like  all  his  ministers,  he  is  himself  a  peasant. 
It  is  a  curious  fact  that  at  the  present  moment  (No- 
vember, 1920),  there  are  two  peasant  premiers  in 
Europe,  one  in  Poland,  one  in  Bulgaria;  but  while 
Witos,  the  Pole,  who  never  wears  a  necktie,  is  really 
little  more  than  a  shrewd  party  leader,  Stamboulisky 
shows  signs  of  genuine  statesmanship.  Not  only  is 
he  venerated  by  the  peasants,  but  the  older  statesmen, 
now  superseded,  and  the  permanent  government  of- 
ficials, whom  he  has  had  the  good  sense  to  maintain 
in  their  positions,  all  seem  to  think  of  him  with  re- 
spect. All  political  offices  in  Bulgaria  are  at  present 
filled  by  inexperienced  peasants.  In  Rouschouk,  a 
lively  municipality  of  forty  thousand  inhabitants,  I  met 
the  prefect,  the  chief-of-police  and  several  members  of 
the  city  council.  All  were  rustics,  from  the  neighbor- 
ing villages.  Even  the  Minister  of  Finance,  Mr.  Tour- 
lakoff,  is  a  peasant.  This  situation  is  not  without  its 
ludicrous  sides ;  nor  are  these  peasants,  suddenly  grown 
class-conscious,  without  a  certain  tendency  to  discrim- 
inate against  the  urban  population  by  clapping  dispro- 
portionate taxes  on  such  objects  as  pianos,  oil  paint- 
ings and  factory  buildings.  At  the  same  time,  it  must 
be  said  that  with  all  their  mistakes  and  their  ignorance, 
the  peasants  are  shrewd  and  sensible.  The  old  trained 
functionaries  remain,  of  course,  the  backbone  of  the 
administration. 

Stamboulisky  is  resolutely  anti-communist.  His  In- 
terior policy  envisages  certain  radical  social  reforms, 
such  as  obligatory  industrial  service  for  both  sexes, 


192  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  stimulation  of  production,  and  the  reestablishment 
of  the  country's  shattered  finances.  The  outcome  of 
the  social  reforms  is  still  dubious.  As  for  production, 
despite  the  fact  that  the  peasants  still  use  four  wooden 
plows  to  one  steel  one,  the  country  has  this  year  some 
seven  hundred  thousand  tons  of  grain  for  export,  which 
is  more  than  its  depleted  transport  facilities  will  be 
able  to  carry;  there  is  even  a  movement  to  lift  the 
present  export  restrictions  so  as  to  give  the  peasants 
themselves  the  benefit  of  the  full  market  price,  and  en- 
courage them  to  cultivate  still  more  intensively.  At 
the  same  time,  realizing  that  no  efforts  can  avail  so 
long  as  the  reparations  commission  continues  to  hold 
an  annual  charge  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  million 
francs  against  the  country  (two  and  a  half  billion 
francs  gold  in  ninety-seven  years,  beginning  in  192 1, 
at  5  per  cent.),  Stamboulisky  is  sparing  no  pains  to 
win  the  friendship,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  the  prin- 
cipal allies,  in  the  hope  of  regaining  their  confidence 
by  a  show  of  repentance  and  sincere  goodwill,  and  ulti- 
mately, of  obtaining  some  kind  of  remission,  without 
which  it  is  considered  that  Bulgaria  will  have  been 
reduced  to  perpetual  servitude. 

Bulgaria's  "irredentism"  is  centered  upon  three 
regions,  in  which  it  is  claimed  that  a  third  of  the  Bul- 
garian race  is  now  living  under  foreign  rule :  the  lower 
Doubroudja,  now  Roumanian,  with  134,331  Bulgars; 
Macedonia,  with  1,500,000  Bulgars,  300,000  of  whom 
are  in  Greek  territory,  and  the  rest  is  Serbian;  and 
Eastern  and  Western  Thrace,  both  now  Greek,  where 
in  1912  there  were  294,555  Bulgars,  and  116,170 
Moslem  Bulgars,  or  Pomaks,  but  from  which  many 
Bulgars  have  since  been  driven  out.    The  Lower  Dou- 


BULGARIA  193 

broudja  is  chiefly  coveted  because  of  its  water  front 
on  the  Danube  and  the  Black  Sea.  Thrace,  particu- 
larly Western  Thrace,  is  claimed  not  so  much  because 
of  the  Bulgarian  population  (there  are  as  many  Greeks 
as  Bulgarians)  as  because  Bulgaria  considers  it  has  an 
inherent  right  to  an  outlet  on  the  JEgezn  Sea.  It  did 
obtain  Dedeagatch,  in  19 13,  but  it  would  have  much 
preferred  the  superior  port  of  Cavalla,  which  went  to 
Greece  in  the  same  year.  Now  it  has  lost  even  Dedea- 
gatch. The  apple  of  Bulgaria's  eye,  however,  its  Al- 
sace-Lorraine, the  birth-place  of  many  of  its  leading 
men,  to  win  which  it  has  fought  and  lost  two  wars,  is 
Macedonia.  The  population  of  this  mixed  and  vio- 
lently contested  region,  according  to  Bulgarian  statis- 
tics, is  as  follows:  1,500,000  Bulgars,  540,000  Turks, 
253,000  Greeks,  184,000  Albanians,  117,000  Rou- 
manians. To  obtain  this  region,  whose  mountain  val- 
leys are  the  cradles  of  some  of  Bulgaria's  purest  pa- 
triotism, and  where  the  Bulgars  seem  in  reality  to  be 
the  predominant  race,  they  have  built  up  a  powerful 
propaganda  and  combat  organization  which  has  rami- 
fications throughout  Bulgaria,  and  is  able,  on  occasion, 
to  defy  the  government  itself.  There  are  tall,  somber, 
fiery-eyed  men  south  of  the  Balkan  range,  who  live  for 
nothing  else  than  Macedonia,  and  who,  if  they  thought 
all  hope  of  freeing  it  were  lost,  would  scarcely  hesi- 
tate, like  passionate  and  despairing  lovers,  to  destroy 
themselves,  life  having  lost  for  them  its  sole  purpose. 
It  would  be,  however,  a  suicidal  policy  for  Bulgaria 
to  remain  openly  hostile  to  all  three  of  its  neighbors. 
A  large  part  of  the  population,  sick  of  war,  or  rather, 
of  defeat  in  war,  is  getting  tired  of  the  continual  agita- 
tion of  the  Macedonian  organization,  whose  enmity 


194  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

toward  both  the  Serbs  and  the  Greeks  is  apparently 
eternal.  The  formation  of  the  powerful  Jugo-Slav 
state  in  fact  has  changed  the  entire  outlook  in  the 
Balkans.  For  the  Bulgars  to  conquer  Macedonia  from 
the  Serbs  seemed  not  outside  the  realm  of  possibility; 
but  to  dream  of  conquering  it  from  the  Jugo-Slavs, 
who  are  three  times  as  numerous  as  the  Bulgars  and 
are  no  less  warlike,  is  madness.  The  Bulgars,  after 
all,  are  Slavs.  As  against  the  Greeks  and  Roumanians, 
their  affinities  with  the  Serbs  are  deep  and  genuine. 
The  Stamboulisky  government,  therefore,  supported, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  the  Macedonian  or- 
ganization, by  the  entire  country,  has  asked  to  be  al- 
lowed to  join  the  Jugo-Slav  confederation,  on  equal 
terms  with  Croatia  and  Slovenia;  for  while  the  Bul- 
gars hate  the  Serbs,  they  have,  as  they  say,  no  quarrel 
with  the  Croats  or  Slovenes.  The  Jugo-Slavs  have 
not,  as  yet,  accepted  Bulgaria's  offer;  they  have  more 
immediate  problems  to  deal  with.  But  the  promise 
of  power  involved  in  forming  a  single  Slav  state  which 
would  reach  from  the  Adriatic  to  the  Black  Sea,  and 
would  have  nearly  20,000,000  inhabitants,  is  a  for- 
midable temptation,  before  which  even  the  Serbs'  deep 
hatred  of  the  Bulgars  will  perhaps  in  time  dissolve. 
Such  a  combination,  holding  all  the  hinterland  of  Mace- 
donia and  Western  Thrace,  would  undoubtedly  be  a 
serious  menace  to  Greece,  which,  occupying  only  a  thin 
strip  of  coast,  would  have  difficulty  in  keeping  the 
Slavs  away  from  the  ^gean.  Bulgaria's  present  for- 
eign policy  is  therefore  to  seek  the  friendship  of  Rou- 
mania,  and  particularly  of  the  Jugo-Slavs,  and  to  center 
all  its  active  resentment  against  the  Greeks. 

The  French  are  becoming  more  popular  in  Bulgaria 


BULGARIA  195 

because  they  are  believed  to  be  the  friends  of  all  the 
Slavs,  and  the  British  are  losing  popularity  for  the 
opposite  reason.  Through  Roberts  College  and  vari- 
ous American  religious  schools,  the  United  States  has 
probably  a  greater  immediate  influence  in  Bulgaria 
than  in  any  other  European  country,  though  the  fiasco 
of  the  Wilson  peace  programme  was  a  stiff  blow  to 
American  prestige.  Italy's  effort  to  involve  Bulgaria 
in  an  intrigue  against  the  Jugo-Slavs  has  been  coldly 
repulsed.  By  all  odds  the  most  significant  psycholog- 
ical factor  in  Bulgarian  affairs  at  present  is  the  strong 
revival  of  pan-Slav  feeling  manifest  not  only  in  the 
desire  to  federate  with  the  Jugo-Slavs,  but  in  the  com- 
mercial treaty  said  to  have  been  recently  concluded  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  Czecho-Slovakia,  and  particularly 
in  the  warm  feeling  of  sympathy  for  the  Russian  peo- 
ple. Russia,  in  the  war  of  1878,  freed  the  Bulgars 
from  the  Turks.  The  finest  monument  in  Sofia  is  the 
great  bronze  equestrian  statue  of  gratitude  to  Alex- 
ander II,  "the  Liberating  Czar."  The  country  is 
fully  conscious  that  its  present  misery  and  shame  are 
due  solely  to  having  taken  arms  on  the  opposite  side 
from  Russia  in  the  last  war;  there  is  a  strong  feeling 
that  this  must  never  happen  again  and  that,  for  better 
or  for  worse,  Bulgaria's  destiny  is  henceforth  inti- 
mately bound  up  with  that  of  all  Slavdom.  The  Bul- 
garian Exarchate,  though  jealously  independent,  is 
none  the  less  Greek  Orthodox.  Above  the  roofs  and 
green  treetops  of  Sofia  bulge  the  domes  of  a  cathedral 
which  is  said  to  be  the  largest  Greek  church  outside  of 
Russia.  Its  interior  is  a  gorgeous  wonder  of  marble 
and  of  rarely  artistic  iconography.  It  has  stood  com- 
pleted now  for  some  time,  but  it  has  never  been  in- 


196  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

augurated.  The  Bulgarians  are  waiting.  They  are 
waiting  with  patient  confidence  for  the  fall  of  Bol- 
shevism and  the  restoration  of  order  in  Russia.  For 
the  church  is  dedicated  to  the  liberator,  "Alexander 
Nevsky,"  and  it  is  felt  that  to  open  it  otherwise  than 
in  the  presence  of  official  representatives  of  the  Russian 
government  and  church,  would  border  on  sacrilege. 


CZECHO-SLOVAKIA 

I  COME  now  to  the  "lesser  allies" — Czecho-Slovakia, 
Poland,  Jugo-Slavia,  Roumania  and  Greece.  The  first 
two  have  been  resurrected  by  the  general  victory  from 
a  long  death  under  foreign  rule;  the  last  three  have 
been  so  enlarged  by  this  same  victory  that  they  as  well 
are  to  all  intents  new  states:  Jugo-Slavia  has  three 
times  the  population  of  pre-war  Serbia;  Roumania  has 
doubled,  and  Greece  (since  19 12)  has  tripled,  the 
number  of  its  inhabitants.  All  five  are  therefore  con- 
fronted with  complex  and  difficult  problems  of  ad- 
ministrative organization.  And  all,  unfortunately,  are 
burdened  with  large  hostile  racial  minorities,  to  as- 
similate which  will  require  the  exercise  of  rare  strength 
and  tact.  Externally,  the  "lesser  allies"  are  left  by 
the  peace  treaties  in  relatively  strong  positions;  they 
are  not  oppressed  by  reparation  debts,  and  they  have 
large  armies.  Their  chief  weaknesses  are  internal,  and 
have  to  do  not  only  with  questions  of  interior  racial 
unity,  but,  in  the  case  of  Czecho-Slovakia  and  Greece, 
with  an  abnormal  and  difficult  geographical  constitu- 
tion. The  prudent  mind  will  be  disposed  to  wait  a 
number  of  years  before  expressing  a  definite  judgment 
as  to  the  durability  of  states  so  constituted. 

Czecho-Slovakia,  a  reincarnation  of  the  ancient  king- 
dom of  Bohemia,  is  composed  of  three  former  Austrian 

197 


198  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

provinces — Bohemia,  Moravia,  a  part  of  Silesia — and 
two  former  Hungarian  provinces — Slovakia,  and  Sub- 
Carpathian  Ruthenia.  Its  peculiarly  elongated  shape, 
which  the  inhabitants  proudly  compare  to  that  of 
Britain,  lies  east  and  west,  across  the  middle  of  Eu- 
rope, for  a  matter  of  some  five  hundred  and  fifty 
miles,  though  its  average  width,  from  north  to  south, 
is  only  a  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  Its  western  ex- 
tremity is  thrust  like  a  wedge  into  the  southeastern 
flank  of  Germany;  its  eastern  extremity  touches  the 
northern  border  of  Roumania.  Bohemia,  the  western- 
most province,  known  once  as  "the  pearl  of  Austria," 
is  not  only  the  widest  and  most  densely  populated;  it 
is  the  seat  of  the  capital,  Prague,  and  the  country's 
most  vital  part.  Bohemia,  with  the  adjoining  prov- 
inces of  Moravia  and  Silesia,  forms  geographical  unity. 
They  are  inhabited  by  Czechs  and  Germans,  with  a 
high  standard  both  of  education  and  of  efficiency.  But 
east  of  Moravia  begins  the  Carpathian  mountain 
range.  Slovakia  and  Sub-Carpathian  Ruthenia,  the 
one  inhabited  by  Slovaks,  a  race  close  akin  to  the 
Czechs,  and  the  other  by  Ruthenians,  both  poor  and 
of  a  low  standard  of  culture,  lie  side  by  side  on  the 
south  slope  of  this  great  range,  looking  not  westward 
toward  Moravia  and  Bohemia,  but  south,  into  the 
plains  of  Hungary.  It  is  important  to  remember  this 
geographical  anomaly,  for  upon  it  depend  some  of 
Czecho-Slovakia's  most  urgent  problems. 

Within  these  frontiers  dwell  five  different  races. 
The  total  population  is  something  over  thirteen  mil- 
lions, divided,  according  to  Czech  statistics,  roughly 
as  follows:  Czechs,  8,000,000;  Slovaks,  2,500,000; 
Germans,  2,700,000;  Magyars,  200,000;  Ruthenians, 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA  199 

400,000.  The  Czechs  and  Slovaks,  who,  for  most  pur- 
poses, may  be  lumped  together,  form  the  dominant 
race;  but  the  Germans  and  Magyars,  who  may  also 
be  considered  together,  are  an  exceedingly  active  mi- 
nority, powerful  in  quality  even  more  than  in  quantity. 
As  for  the  Ruthenian  mountaineers  who  inhabit  the 
easternmost  Carpathians,  their  province  has  been  given 
autonomy  under  a  governor,  and  they  play  little  part 
in  either  the  political  or  the  economic  life  of  the 
country. 

Czecho-SIovakia  has  inherited  over  sixty  per  cent, 
of  the  industries  of  the  former  Austrian  Empire.  Bo- 
hemia is  one  of  the  most  highly  industrial  regions  of 
Europe.  The  great  Skoda  ironworks  at  Pilsen  pro- 
vided all  Austria's  war  equipment,  including  the  fa- 
mous 42-centimeter  howitzers.  The  Bohemian  glass- 
works alone  employ  fifty  thousand  people.  There  is  a 
well-developed  textile  industry  and  a  great  beet-sugar 
industry,  which  in  19 13  purchased  eighteen  per  cent, 
of  the  world's  entire  supply  of  beet-sugar.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  country's  manu- 
factured goods  should  be  available  for  export.  There 
are  coal  and  iron  mines.  There  are  great  forests  in 
Slovakia,  and  there  is  an  intensive  agriculture  which 
is  very  nearly  sufficient  to  feed  the  entire  population. 
Altogether,  theirs  is  a  magnificent  heritage,  and  the 
Czechs  evidently  intend  to  make  the  most  of  it.  It  is 
true  that  the  country  is  far  from  salt-water;  but  the 
peace  treaties  have  given  it  the  important  port  of 
Pressburg  on  the  Danube,  and  the  freedom  of  the 
Elbe  through  Germany  to  Hamburg  and  the  North 
Sea.  Moreover,  the  reorganization  of  its  railroads 
is  proceeding  rapidly.     Economically  it  may  already 


200  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

be  considered,  both  actually  and  potentially,  as  one  of 
the  strongest  states  in  Europe. 

Its  political  organization  has  also  made  great 
strides.  A  democratic  republican  constitution  has  been 
adopted  and  Professor  Thomas  G.  Masaryk  has  been 
elected  president  for  a  term  of  seven  years.  There 
are  innumerable  political  parties  in  Czecho-Slovakia, 
where  the  preoccupation  with  politics  is  such  that  it 
is  said  every  family  in  the  land  reads  at  least  two  po- 
litical journals  a  day.  In  Slovakia,  the  clericals,  or 
Roman  Catholic  church  party,  predominate;  but  Bo- 
hemia and  Moravia  are  given  over  to  social-democrats, 
and  it  is  they  who  lend  the  government  its  present  so- 
cialistic color.  Under  President  Masaryk's  cultured 
and  respected  initiative,  a  number  of  moderate  social 
reforms  have  been  begun  which,  on  the  whole,  are  of 
commendable  liberality. 

The  first  great  aim  of  the  new  government  will 
doubtless  be  to  amalgamate  the  still  partially  isolated 
Slovak  element  with  the  Czechs.  These  two  peoples, 
as  I  have  said,  are  closely  related,  both  in  race  and  in 
language.  However,  the  Czechs,  who  were  under  Aus- 
trian rule,  are  culturally  more  advanced  than  the  Slo- 
vaks, who  were  under  Hungarian,  and  among  whom 
the  percentage  of  illiteracy  is  still  high.  Moreover, 
whereas  the  Czechs  are  socialists,  and  incline  to  in- 
difference as  regards  the  church,  the  Slovaks  are  de- 
vout clericals,  and  are  strongly  influenced  by  their 
priests.  But  the  chief  factors  tending  to  separate  the 
two  races  are  geographical  and  economic.  By  every 
road  and  every  valley  the  Slovaks  are  bound  to  the 
Hungarian  plain,  across  which  from  their  mountain- 
sides they  have  looked  out  for  many  generations,  and 


CZECHO-SLOVAKIA  201 

from  which  they  are  now  separated  by  a  closed  fron- 
tier. In  summer,  they  were  accustomed  to  go  down  into 
the  plains  to  help  with  the  harvest.  In  winter,  they 
cut  timber  in  the  mountains,  which  they  then  hauled  or 
floated  down  the  valleys  into  Hungary.  With  the 
money  they  thus  earned,  they  could  buy  the  food-stuffs 
of  the  plains,  to  eke  out  the  scanty  produce  of  the 
mountains.  Now  all  this  ancient  commerce  of  moun- 
tainside and  plain  is  interrupted.  There  are  two  rail- 
roads connecting  Slovakia  with  Moravia  and  Bohemia, 
but  these  are  as  yet  inadequate  to  bind  the  two  parts 
together.  The  Slovaks,  unable  to  find  as  much  work  as 
before,  unable  to  market  their  timber  readily,  lacking 
money  and  lacking  food  even  when  they  have  the 
money  to  buy  it,  have  nevertheless  cast  in  their  lot 
whole-heartedly,  for  the  time  being,  with  the  Czechs, 
their  kinsmen,  partly  no  doubt  to  be  free  of  the  hard 
hand  of  the  Hungarian  administration,  but  largely, 
perhaps,  because  the  Czechs,  by  a  land  reform,  have 
given  them  the  land,  held  principally,  heretofore,  by 
the  great  Hungarian  proprietors.  The  difference  in 
culture  between  Czechs  and  Slovaks  can  in  time  be 
narrowed  out  by  education;  the  political  difference 
can  be  rendered  innocuous  if  the  Czech  socialists  will 
adopt  a  tolerant  attitude  toward  Slovak  religious  con- 
victions ;  but  to  overcome  the  geographic  and  economic 
differences  is  a  far  more  complicated  problem.  So 
long  as  it  remains  impossible  to  turn  the  valleys  around 
and  make  them  run  the  other  way,  it  is  probable  that, 
however  much  the  government  may  strive  to  develop 
communications  around  and  over  the  spurs  and  hill- 
tops, and  into  the  mountain  regions,  it  can  never  en^ 
tirely  succeed  in  breaking  the  natural  bonds  between 


202  BALKA.NIZED  EUROPE 

the  Slovak  highlands  and  the  Hungarian  plains.  The 
only  clear  solution  is  the  one  which,  while  doubtless  in- 
expedient for  the  moment,  seems  ultimately  almost 
inevitable,  namely,  an  agreement  with  Hungary  which 
will  reopen  the  frontier. 

Grave  as  is  the  Slovak  problem,  that  of  the  Ger- 
man minority  is  even  more  serious.  The  Germans 
form  nearly  a  fourth  of  the  total  population  and  to 
them  must  be  added  a  few  hundred  thousand  Magyars 
of  Slovakia  and  the  Danube  (Pressburg)  region,  who 
have  rallied  under  German  leadership.  The  strong- 
hold of  the  German  element  is  Bohemia,  which  is  also 
the  stronghold  of  the  Czechs  themselves.  The  German 
immigration,  extending  back  over  several  centuries,  has 
settled  all  the  northern,  western  and  southern  outskirts 
of  this  province,  framing  thus  a  kind  of  half-moon 
around  the  Czech  element.  These  outskirts,  the  site 
of  most  of  the  mines,  are  the  site  as  well  of  most  of  the 
industries.  The  Germans  of  Bohemia  were  perhaps 
the  most  influential  element  in  the  Austrian  Empire. 
As  foremen,  skilled  workmen,  managers,  engineers  or 
owners  they  controlled  all  the  country's  industries,  look- 
ing down  with  scorn  upon  the  Czechs,  whom  they  con- 
sidered stupid  and  inferior.  But  the  Czechs,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  are  on  the  whole  the  most  advanced,  both 
in  national  feeling  and  in  culture,  of  all  the  former 
Austrian  Slavs.  The  Slovenes,  Croats  and  especially 
the  Galician  Poles  compromised  with  Hapsburg  rule; 
the  Czechs,  in  their  opposition  to  it,  never  wavered. 
Their  powerful  Sokols  (Falcons),  or  gymnastic  so- 
cieties, aimed  at  cultivating  not  only  their  bodies,  but 
their  patriotism.  In  the  years  prior  to  the  war,  the 
struggle  between  the  German  and  Czech  cultures  in 


CZECHO-SLOVAKIA  203 

Bohemia  had  reached  a  bitter  intensity.  The  two 
races  lived  side  by  side,  yet  absolutely  apart.  There 
were  German  theaters  and  Czech  theaters;  a  German 
university  and  a  Czech  university;  German  shops, 
Czech  shops;  and  so  through  all  phases  of  life. 

After  being  so  long  the  masters,  the  feelings  of  the 
Germans  at  seeing  the  reins  of  government  placed  sud- 
denly in  the  hands  of  the  despised  Czechs  can  readily 
be  imagined.  Their  anger  knows  no  bounds.  Nation- 
alists and  socialists  alike  are  banded  in  a  stubborn 
political  opposition  to  everything  the  Czechs  attempt 
to  do.  The  fact  that  the  Czechs  have  given  them  full 
political  rights,  and  the  privilege  of  retaining  German 
as  an  official  language  in  all  communities  where  the 
Germans  number  over  twenty  per  cent,  seems  merely 
to  have  increased  their  fury.  They  demand  local 
autonomy,  like  that  accorded  to  the  Sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenians.  They  demand  to  be  reintegrated  into 
Austria.  They  demand  to  be  annexed  to  Germany — 
anything,  in  short,  to  escape  from  the  Czechs.  The 
latter,  on  the  whole,  have  exhibited  a  commendable 
tolerance.  However,  if  a  German  is  thought  to  be 
insolent,  he  is  liable  to  be  beaten  in  the  street.  And 
though  all  Czechs  of  course  know  German,  having 
been  forced  to  learn  it,  they  are  still  stubbornly  loathe 
to  speak  it.  Not  until  the  foreigner,  ignorant  of 
Czech,  has  vainly  tried  to  address  them  in  French  or 
English  or  Patagonian,  will  the  people  of  Prague 
condescend  to  converse  in  German.  In  time  this  im- 
practical prejudice  will  no  doubt  wear  off,  but  for  the 
present  it  continues  to  be  very  active. 

As  the  Germans  declare  that  nothing  will  satisfy 
them  short  of  political  independence,  a  solution  of  the 


«04  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

German  problem  Is  not  easy  to  prescribe.  The  Ger- 
mans declare  that  Czecho-Slovakia  is  an  anomaly,  that 
it  cannot  last.  Meantime  they  will  of  course  do  what 
they  can  to  break  it  up.  If,  however,  contrary  to 
their  passionate  predictions,  the  Czecho-Slovak  state 
should  not  only  live  but  prosper,  it  is  not  impossible 
that  the  force  of  their  national  interests  will  overcome 
their  political  discontent,  and  that  to  the  state  which 
brings  them  prosperity  they  will  gradually  accord  their 
sufferance. 

Feeling  themselves  to  be  dangerously  isolated  in  a 
hostile  Germanic  world,  the  Slavs  of  Czecho-Slovakia 
went  to  the  peace  conference  with  two  main  purposes. 
They  wanted  a  "corridor"  of  territory  which,  passing 
between  Austria  and  Hungary,  would  connect  them 
with  their  brothers,  the  Jugo-Slavs.  This  corridor 
was  refused  them;  but  they  were  given  a  port  on  the 
Danube,  at  Hungary's  expense,  which  enables  them 
to  communicate  by  river  across  Hungary  with  Jugo- 
slavia. In  the  second  place,  they  wanted  a  corridor 
between  Poland  and  Hungary  to  Roumania  and  Rus- 
sia. This  corridor  was  granted  them;  but  the  an- 
nexation of  Eastern  Galicia  by  Poland  makes  it  at 
present  a  corridor,  not  to  Russia,  but  merely  to  Rou- 
mania. Because  of  this,  because  also  of  tempera- 
mental differences  and  of  the  long-drawn-out  dispute 
over  the  Teschen  coalfields,  the  Czechs  hate  the  Poles, 
whom  they  consider  renegades  to  the  pan-Slav  cause. 
Almost  the  first  act  of  the  Czechs  as  regards  foreign 
policy  has  been  to  form  a  defensive  alliance  with  Jugo- 
slavia against  the  supposed  Hungarian  menace,  and 
at  the  same  time,  to  declare  that,  come  what  may,  the 
Czechs  will  never  take   arms   against  their  Russian 


CZECHO-SLOVAKIA  JI05 

brothers.  Prague,  indeed,  has  become  more  than  ever 
one  of  the  great  centers  of  pan-Slav  emotion. 

The  Czechs  are  afraid  of  Hungary  because  of  the 
Magyars'  repeated  threats  that  some  day,  by  one 
means  or  another,  they  mean  to  regain  Slovakia.  And 
they  still  hate  Austria  because  it  was  the  seat  of  the 
government  which  so  long  oppressed  them,  and  of  the 
business  and  industrial  administrations  which  directed 
the  Bohemian  industries.  This  hate  is  not  un- 
grounded; for  despite  their  fervent  efforts  to  free 
themselves  from  Vienna's  subtle  tentacles,  they  have 
not  yet  been  able  to  do  so.  They  now  have  possession 
of  the  industries,  but  Vienna  still  has  the  complicated 
selling  organization,  and  most  of  Czecho-Slovakia's 
exports  pass  still  of  necessity  through  the  hands  of 
the  Viennese  middlemen.  It  is  because  they  know  so 
well  the  attractive  power  of  the  great  Danubian  city 
that  the  Czechs  are  so  averse  to  any  kind  of  "Danube 
Confederation"  scheme  which  might  increase  this 
power.  Their  slogan,  on  the  contrary,  is  "Vienna  must 
fall."  And  the  fact  that  there  are  something  like 
400,000  Czechs  resident  in  Vienna  leaves  them  un- 
moved. 

With  Germany,  Czecho-Slovakia,  without  being 
exactly  cordial,  is  on  good  terms,  as  indeed  behooves 
a  state  whose  principal  outlet  to  the  sea  is  the  river 
Elbe.  With  Roumania,  relations  are  amicable; 
though  the  Czechs  well  know  that  the  Roumanians, 
not  without  reason,  are  suspicious  of  the  Slav  move- 
ment, and  in  general  of  all  the  Slavs. 

From  all  that  I  have  said  it  now  becomes  clear,  I 
think,  that  more  than  any  other  state  in  Central 
Europe,    Czecho-Slovakia    has   profound   interest    in 


206  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

keeping  the  peace  with  all  its  neighbors.  For  in  the 
first  place,  it  is  burdened  with  some  three  millions  of 
Germans  whose  disloyalty,  in  case  of  war,  is  assured. 
In  the  second  place,  its  shape  is  such  that  its  frontiers 
are  indefensible.  A  hostile  army  could  cut  the  country 
in  two  almost  before  the  Czechs  could  mobilize.  In 
the  third  place,  being  an  industrial,  that  is  an  export- 
ing, state,  having  no  sea  coast,  and  being  therefore  at 
the  mercy  of  its  neighbors  as  regards  the  transit  of  its 
goods,  it  simply  cannot  afford  to  run  the  risk  of 
trouble.  A  war  with  Germany  would  mean  the  clos- 
ing of  the  Elbe;  a  war  with  Hungary,  the  closing  of 
the  Danube.  If,  like  Switzerland,  it  could  have  its 
territorial  integrity  and  its  independence  guaranteed  in 
exchange  for  permanent  neutrality  this  solution  would 
no  doubt  suit  it  perfectly.  But  this  being  impossible, 
its  only  recourse,  obviously,  is  to  seek  to  associate 
itself  in  defensive  alliances  of  such  strength  that  its 
smaller  enemies,  at  least,  will  not  dare  to  attack  it. 
This  is  the  meaning  of  the  "Petite  Entente,"  the  al- 
liance of  Czecho-Slovakia,  Jugo-Slavia  and  Roumania, 
in  the  formation  of  which,  M.  Benes,  the  Czech  for- 
eign minister,  has  taken  the  initiative.  But  one  al- 
liance calls  forth  another;  in  assuring  oneself  of  cer- 
tain friendships,  one  inevitably  loses  certain  others. 


POLAND 

So  far  as  is  known,  the  cradle  of  the  Polish  people 
was  the  Warta  valley,  in  what  is  now  Posnania.  The 
Baltic  to  the  north,  the  Carpathians  to  the  south,  form 
natural  barriers  to  their  expansion;  but  on  the  east  and 
the  west  they  have  found  no  natural  frontiers.  Their 
history  Is  one  of  ceaseless  struggles  with  the  Germans 
and  the  Moscovites.  They  lost  Pomerania  in  1 140,  and 
the  order  of  Teutonic  Knights  took  possession  of  East 
Prussia.  But  though  repelled  in  the  west,  the  Poles 
spread  out  rapidly  eastward,  and  in  the  latter  half  of 
the  XV  Century,  were  the  principal  power  in  Eastern 
Europe.  Then  the  Turks  assailed  them,  and  the 
Russians  drove  them  in.  The  Moscovites  recaptured 
Moscow,  the  Turks  conquered  the  Ukraine  and 
Podolia.  In  1655,  came  the  devastation  and  ruin  of 
the  Swedish  invasion.  The  sun  of  Poland's  glory 
was  declining.  In  1772,  Prussia,  Russia  and  Austria 
effected  the  first  partition;  in  1793,  they  trimmed  down 
the  helpless  state  still  further;  and  in  191 5,  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna,  they  divided  its  last  remnant  be- 
tween them. 

At  the  time  of  its  expiration,  the  Polish  state  was  a 
unity.  But  a  century  of  partition  has  not  been  with- 
out its  effect.  The  reconstituted  Poland  of  to-day 
consists    of   three    distinct   provinces   which,    though 

cemented  firmly  together  by  the  strong  bonds  of  a 

207 


208  BALRANIZED  EUROPE 

common  religion  and  a  common  patriotism,  neverthe- 
less differ  profoundly  in  experience  and  in  organiza- 
tion. Posnania,  under  German  rule,  became  one  of 
the  granaries  of  Europe.  Its  yield  of  wheat  per  acre 
is  double  that  of  other  parts  of  Poland.  Its  houses 
are  neat  and  trim,  its  people  can  all  read  and  write. 
And  though  the  Poles  here  were  oppressed  in  many 
ways — none  of  them  for  example  were  allowed  to  hold 
official  positions,  while  shortly  before  the  war  the  Ger- 
mans even  began  evicting  them  in  favor  of  German 
colonists, — they  have  nevertheless  enjoyed  real  pros- 
perity. Congress  Poland,  which  was  Russia's  share 
in  the  last  partition,  is  both  the  most  miserable  and  the 
most  densely  populated  province.  The  hand  of  im- 
perial Russia  lay  heavy  on  this  unfortunate  people, 
who  not  only  could  take  no  part  in  the  government  but 
who  were  kept  purposely  in  misery  and  ignorance.  Il- 
literacy is  here  the  rule.  The  villages  are  squalid,  the 
farms  poor.  Galicia,  Austria's  part  in  the  plunder,  is 
not  inhabited  entirely  by  Poles.  The  peasants,  par- 
ticularly in  Eastern  Galicia,  are  Ruthenians,  or  Little 
Russians.  The  Poles  here  represent,  on  the  whole,  a 
superior  caste — townspeople  and  rich  landowners. 
For  political  reasons,  Austria  favored  the  Galician 
Poles,  who  were  not  only  allowed  to  hold  office,  but 
who  played  a  very  important  part  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Empire.  By  way  of  precaution,  however,  the  Haps- 
burgs  took  care  to  encourage  by  every  possible  means 
the  national  sentiment  of  the  Ruthenians,  so  as  to  be 
able  to  play  them  off,  in  case  of  need,  against  the 
Poles;  and  at  the  present  time  Ruthenian  (Little  Rus- 
sian or  Ukrainian)  national  feeling  is  stronger  in  East- 
ern Galicia  than  in  the  Ukraine  itself.    Galicia,  under 


POLAND  209 

Austria,  was  fairly  prosperous  and  fairly  contented. 
Illiteracy  is  estimated  at  forty  per  cent,  and  affects 
chiefly,  I  believe,  the  Ruthenians.  The  population  of 
Posnania  is  7,500,000;  of  Congress  Poland,  12,500,- 
000  and  of  Galicia,  8,000,000. 

East  of  Congress  Poland  and  Galicia,  between  the 
rivers  Bug  and  Dnieper,  lies  a  great  region  of  forest, 
lake  and  marshy  plain  which  is  claimed  by  both  Poland 
and  Russia.  The  population,  which  is  scant,  is  mixed, 
about  one-tenth  being  Polish,  and  the  rest  Ruthenian, 
White  Russian,  Lithuanian  and  Jewish.  Prior  to  the 
first  partition  in  1772,  all  this  territory  belonged  to 
Poland.  It  formed,  in  later  times,  what  might  be 
called  the  "back-woods"  of  modern  Russia.  Hither, 
west  of  the  "pale,"  which  followed  roughly  the  line  of 
the  River  Dnieper,  the  Russians  drove  the  Jews,  who 
now,  in  some  of  the  towns,  form  over  sixty  per  cent  of 
the  inhabitants.  Here,  too,  in  the  great  war,  the  east- 
ern front  was  stabilized  and  added  its  devastation  of 
barbed-wire,  trench  and  shell-hole  to  an  already  half- 
barren  waste.  Being  so  thinly  populated  and  eco- 
nomically so  poor,  this  region  seems  admirably  adapted 
to  a  compromise ;  and  as  I  write  it  appears  not  unlikely 
that  the  future  Polish-Russian  frontier  will  follow  ap- 
proximately the  line  of  the  old  Russian-German 
trenches.  Perhaps  the  chief  importance  to  Poland  of 
these  so-called  Eastern  Districts  is  as  a  field  for  future 
colonization.  The  density  of  population  in  Congress 
Poland  is  270  inhabitants  to  the  square  mile,  which  is 
something  like  six  times  that  of  the  United  States.  The 
birth-rate  being  high,  emigration  was  inevitable.  Be- 
tween 1903  and  1 9 12,  over  a  million  Poles  went  to  the 
United  States  alone.     Some  600,000  farm  laborers 


210  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

were  accustomed  to  migrate  temporarily  every  year. 
It  is  estimated  that  Poles  living  abroad  sent  home  no 
less  than  forty  million  dollars  annually.  The  assign- 
ment of  a  part  of  the  Eastern  Districts  to  Poland 
would  enable  the  government  to  direct  thither  at  least 
part  of  its  formidable  surplus  and  prevent  to  some  ex- 
tent the  complication  of  what  might  otherwise  become 
a  serious  problem. 

When  all  questions  of  frontiers,  including  that  of 
Upper  Silesia,  are  finally  decided,  the  total  popula- 
tion of  Poland  will  probably  be  about  30,000,000,  and 
its  area  nearly  equal  to  that  of  France.  About  thirty 
per  cent  of  this  population  will  be  non-Polish, — ^to  wit, 
800,000  Germans,  3,000,000  Ruthenians,  5,000,000 
Jews  and  a  scattering  of  White  Russians  and  Lithuan- 
ians. None  of  these  racial  minorities  are  likely  to  be 
a  cause  of  serious  trouble  except  the  Jews,  who  form 
an  unassimilated  and  utterly  foreign  body,  in  language, 
customs  and  religion  no  less  than  in  sentiment.  Ac- 
cording to  the  estimates  of  19 10,  there  are  in  the  entire 
world  something  over  11,000,000  Jews;  of  that  total 
one-half  are  in  Poland.  No  other  explanation  is  needed 
of  the  friction  which  has  manifested  itself  between  the 
two  races,  both  prolific,  both  intelligent,  both  religious 
and  both  stubborn.  No  doubt  a  large  number  of  Jews 
will  migrate;  but  many  will  remain.  Assimilation, 
which  is  not  impossible,  may  truly  begin  only  when  the 
Poles,  on  their  part,  will  adopt  a  liberal  policy,  as  in- 
deed they  now  seem  inclined  to  do,  and  when  the  Jews, 
on  theirs,  will  frankly  accept  Polish  sovereignty  and 
cease  their  subtle  agitations  against  the  newly  founded 
state. 

The   new   Poland   is    a    republic.     The   sovereign 


POLAND  211 

authority  is  vested  in  the  Seym,  or  national  diet,  which, 
by  resolution  of  February  20,  19 19,  appointed  General 
Joseph  Pilsudski  chief-of-state,  pending  the  drafting 
and  adoption  of  a  constitution.  General  Pilsudski  is 
not  only  a  popular  hero ;  he  is  at  the  same  time  a  social- 
ist and  an  ardent  nationalist,  so  that  he  attracts  sup- 
port from  several  shades  of  opinion.  Political  intrigue 
is  developed  to  the  point  of  vice  in  Poland,  as  in  some 
other  Eastern  European  countries.  Pilsudski  is  not 
without  opposition.  There  is  a  conservative  faction 
grouped  under  the  discreet  and  intelligent  leadership 
of  Roman  Dumowski;  there  is  a  moderate  liberal 
Paderewski  faction.  But  on  the  whole,  Pilsudski  has 
shown  himself  to  be  the  strongest  man  in  the  country. 
Given  the  weakness  of  the  various  ministries  which 
have  succeeded  one  another  in  power,  he  is  perhaps  vir- 
tually a  dictator,  for  the  time  being,  for  he  is  head 
both  of  the  civil  administration  and  of  the  army.  Some 
of  his  admirers,  in  their  enthusiasm,  call  him  the 
greatest  man  produced  by  the  war,  Foch  being  re- 
garded by  them  as  a  mere  technician.  Politically,  Po- 
land is  still  in  that  stage  of  transition  wherein  old  out- 
worn parties  subsist  side  by  side  with  young  new 
parties.  Fusions  and  scissions  succeed  one  another 
with  dizzying  complexity.  The  largest  single  party  is 
that  of  the  peasants,  headed  by  Witos,  himself  a  peas- 
ant. The  elections  to  the  Seym,  called  soon  after  the 
armistice,  were  conducted  under  socialist  inspiration  in 
such  a  way  that  the  peasants  were  perhaps  unduly 
favored  at  the  expense  of  the  city  populations,  with 
the  result  that  the  business  and  industrial  elements  are 
slenderly  represented,  while  there  are  perhaps  sixty  or 
seventy  peasant  deputies  who  can  barely  manage  to 


«1«  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

read  and  write.  The  peasants'  party,  however,  has 
not  an  absolute  majority.  And  doubtless  the  new  con- 
stitution will  redraft  the  election  law  so  that  the  cities 
will  assume  in  the  future  a  more  important  role,  as 
befits  their  higher  standard  of  culture. 

Up  to  the  present,  the  war  against  Russia  has  com- 
pletely absorbed  Poland's  young  energies.  To  raise, 
equip  and  lead  important  armies,  in  a  country  newly 
formed  and  still  disunited,  is  a  feat  of  no  small  sig- 
nificance, and  proves — if  further  proof  were  needed, — 
Poland's  stern  will  to  live.  Each  of  the  three  prov- 
inces still  has  a  separate  administration;  even  the 
postal  and  railway  systems  are  not  yet  entirely  central- 
ized. Each  province  is  conscious  of  its  own  superiority, 
and  somewhat  jealous  of  the  others.  The  only  trained 
officials  available  for  administrative  posts  were  Galician 
Poles  imbued  with  the  traditions  of  the  old  Austrian 
bureaucracy,  and  the  impression  which  they  have  made 
in  other  parts  of  the  country  has  not  always  been  of  the 
best.  At  the  same  time,  the  fervent  Roman  Catholic 
religious  feeling  of  the  Poles,  mingled  with  their  no 
less  fervent  patriotism,  forms  a  powerful  cement.  I 
myself  have  no  doubts  whatever  as  to  the  final  unifica- 
tion of  the  country. 

The  war  against  Russia,  which  from  the  viewpoint 
of  unification  has  perhaps  been  rather  a  good  thing, 
from  every  other  viewpoint  has  been  deplorable.  Pend- 
ing the  reorganization  of  taxation,  public  finance  is  in 
a  disastrous  condition.  The  railways,  used  only  for 
the  war,  have  not  as  yet  been  rendered  available  for 
ordinary  commerce.  Except  for  war  purposes,  there 
is  neither  import  nor  export,  and  industry  stands  para- 
lyzed.   However,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 


POLAND  213 

with  the  conquest  of  genuine  peace,  an  era  of  prosperity 
will  open  out  before  the  country.  Its  agriculture,  as  I 
have  shown  in  another  place,  is  normally  sufficient  to 
feed  the  entire  population,  and  is  susceptible  of  great 
intensification.  A  few  years  of  judicious  development 
would  furnish  it  with  a  good  system  of  waterways, 
centering  upon  the  broad  artery  of  the  Vistula  and 
reaching  the  sea  at  the  free  port  of  Dantzig,  easy  ac- 
cess to  which  is  absolutely  essential  to,  Poland's  pros- 
perity. It  has  zinc,  iron,  potash,  lead  and  salt  deposits. 
The  Galician  oil-fields  are  among  the  most  productive 
in  Europe.  It  has  extensive  forests,  and  it  has  coal. 
If  it  wins  the  Silesian  plebiscite  it  will  even  have  coal 
to  export,  as  its  total  production  will  then  reach  58,- 
000,000  tons  a  year,  instead  of  14,000,000  without 
Silesia.  There  are  moreover  coal  deposits  in  Galicia 
which  as  yet  have  never  even  been  opened.  Poland 
has  considerable  miscellaneous  industries;  but  its  great 
industrial  asset  is  its  textile  mills,  centering  around  the 
city  of  Lodz,  known  as  the  "Polish  Manchester." 
These  mills,  four  hundred  and  twenty-two  in  number, 
employed  before  the  war  some  ninety-three  thousand 
workmen,  and  attained  an  annual  output  of  one  hun- 
dred and  seventeen  million  dollars.  They  are  said  to 
be  the  best  on  the  Continent  of  Europe,  and  to  produce 
some  of  the  world's  finest  textiles.  The  value  of 
certain  mills  is  estimated  at  thirty  million  dollars  each. 
The  Germans,  pursuing  in  Poland  the  same  systematic 
plan  of  devastation  carried  out  in  France,  stripped 
the  Polish  factories  of  their  copper,  their  leather  belt- 
ing and  parts  of  their  machines;  but  with  a  very  little 
effort  they  can  be  fully  restored,  and  as  soon  as  they 
are  provided  with  coal  and  raw-stuffs,  they  can  resume 


214        '  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

operations.     Labor  in  Poland  is  plentiful,  cheap  and 
still  docile. 

With  Poland,  the  Catholic  civilization  of  Rome 
leaves  off,  and  the  Greek  orthodox  civilization  of  By- 
zantium begins.  The  Poles  consider  that  their  special 
mission  in  Europe  is  to  act  as  cultural  interpreter  and 
commercial  agent  between  east  and  west.  They  par- 
ticularly look  forward  to  the  time  when  the  return  of 
peace  will  enable  them  to  utilize  once  more  their  ex- 
tensive knowledge  of  the  Russian  language,  charac- 
ter and  institutions  for  the  purpose  of  endeavoring  to 
conquer  a  large  share  of  the  great  Russian  market. 
They  believe  that  a  large  part  of  the  hostility  which 
Germany  and  particularly  Britain  have  ceaselessly 
manifested  toward  them  arises  from  fear  of  their  com- 
petition in  the  Eastern  European  trade.  They  arc 
confident  that  they  will  ultimately  be  able  to  produce 
more  cheaply  than  any  other  European  country.  They 
hope  for  the  assistance  of  French,  Italian  and  Ameri- 
can capital  in  the  furtherance  of  their  great  commercial 
and  industrial  projects. 

Now,  as  in  centuries  gone  by,  the  main  fact  in  de- 
termining Poland's  foreign  policy  must  be  that  the 
country  lies  between  two  powerful  peoples,  the  Ger- 
mans on  the  west  and  the  Russians  on  the  east,  both  of 
whom  covet  its  territory,  and  with  neither  of  whom 
it  has  any  natural  frontier.  If  these  two  peoples  ally 
themselves  permanently  against  it,  its  very  existence 
will  be  rendered  precarious.  The  question  arises, 
therefore,  whether  it  cannot  succeed  in  conciliating 
either  one  or  the  other.  There  is  indeed  a  faint  possi- 
bility that  Poland  and  Germany  may  one  day  combine 
for  the  purpose  of  invading  the  Russian  market.    On 


POLAND  S15 

the  whole,  however,  the  separation  of  East  Prussia 
from  the  rest  of  Germany  by  the  Polish  "corridor" 
along  the  Vistula  would  seem  to  insure  the  undying 
hostility  of  Germany,  especially  if  Poland,  in  addition, 
should  win  the  Silesian  plebiscite.  There  is  a  feeling 
among  certain  Poles,  particularly  the  Galician  military 
faction,  that  the  friendship  of  Russia  is  equally  chi- 
merical, and  that  on  the  east,  Poland's  best  policy 
would  be  to  initiate  the  formation  of  a  series  of  buffer 
states — Lithuania,  White  Russia,  the  Ukraine  which, 
so  far  as  possible  should  be  brought  under  Polish  in- 
fluence. I  believe  that  General  Pilsudski  himself  rather 
favors  this  plan.  Certainly,  as  long  as  Bolshevism  con- 
tinues to  rule  Russia,  Poland  must  continue  to  be  on 
its  guard  in  the  east.  And  almost  as  certainly,  after 
Bolshevism  falls,  a  decade  or  two  at  the  least  will 
necessarily  elapse  before  a  new  Russian  power  can 
begin  to  make  itself  felt.  Most  educated  Poles  be- 
lieve, however,  that  a  day  will  come  when  Russia 
will  once  more  rearise,  strong  and  great.  In  that  day, 
what  will  become  of  the  little  Baltic  states,  the  Caucas- 
ian states,  the  Ukraine,  a  possible  small  White  Russia  ? 
As  a  defense  against  Bolshevism  they  might  serve  a 
purpose,  no  doubt.  But  once  a  new  regime,  which  wins 
the  recognition  of  the  western  nations,  is  inaugurated, 
they  will  almost  inevitably  drift  back  under  the  power- 
ful sway  of  Moscow.  Is  it  better,  therefore,  for 
Poland  to  risk,  not  only  the  immediate  but  the  perma- 
nent hostility  of  Russia,  by  attempting  too  wide  an  ex- 
pansion toward  the  east;  or  should  it  not  rather  en- 
deavor even  now  to  prepare  the  way,  if  possible,  for 
future  friendship  ?  On  the  answer  which  Poland  finally 
makes  to  this  question,  much  will  depend. 


216  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

The  Poles  are  the  only  Slavs  who  are  free  from  the 
present  recrudescence  of  pan-Slav  feeling.  With  "their 
brothers,"  the  Czechs,  indeed,  their  relations  are 
frankly  bad,  not  only  because  of  the  Teschen  quarrel 
and  settlement,  which  has  left  the  Poles  with  an  imag- 
inary grievance,  but  because  of  Czecho-Slovakia's 
sympathy  for  Soviet  Russia.  The  Poles  believe  that 
the  Czechs  stopped,  in  transit,  munition  trains  destined 
for  Poland,  and  accuse  the  Czechs  of  having  thus 
"stabbed  them  in  the  back."  A  number  of  years  will 
no  doubt  pass  before  these  wounds  of  relationship  can 
heal.  With  Roumania,  on  the  contrary,  which,  like 
Poland,  borders  Russia,  and  fears  not  only  the  Soviets 
but  future  Russian  expansion,  Poland  has  many  politi- 
cal interests  in  common. 


ROUMANIA 

The  Kingdom  of  Roumania  seems  destined  to  play 
an  important  part  In  the  new  Europe.  Not  only  does 
it  control  both  banks  of  the  lower  Danube  and  the  out- 
let of  this  great  waterway  into  the  Black  Sea,  but  by  its 
geographical  position,  it  forms  a  kind  of  keystone,  be- 
longing at  the  same  time  to  Central  Europe,  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  Balkans.  No  alliances  or  federations 
in  any  of  these  regions  can  be  projected  without  taking 
Roumania  into  account.  Its  population,  7,500,000  be- 
fore the  war,  now  verges  close  upon  16,000,000.  Bas- 
tioned  strongly  on  the  north  and  west  by  the  Car- 
pathian mountains,  protected  by  the  Danube  on  the 
south,  and  by  the  Dniester  on  the  east,  its  potential 
military  strength  has  also  more  than  doubled.  The  de- 
velopment, either  by  native  effort,  or  by  external  aid, 
of  a  greater  capacity  for  organization,  would  perhaps 
make  it  one  of  the  chief  military  powers  of  Europe; 
though  there  are  some  critics  who  hold  that  the  Rou- 
manians, lacking  a  certain  iron  temper  of  mind  and 
character,  will  never  make  such  perfect  soldiers  as, 
say,  their  warlike  neighbors,  the  Bulgars,  Serbs  and 
Magyars.  The  fact  nevertheless  remains  that  Rou- 
mania, within  its  new  natural  frontiers  of  mountain 
and  broad  river,  is  a  fortress  not  lightly  to  be  assaulted 
in  the  future. 

The  racial  antecedents  of  the  modem  Roumanians 

217 


218  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

are  obscure,  for  the  country  lay  full  in  the  pathway  of 
the  great  east-to-west  migrations,  and  was  submerged 
by  one  after  another  1  It  is  probable  that  they  are  a 
mixture  of  the  Dacians,  a  people  of  Thracian  stock  who 
inhabited  the  country  when  it  was  first  conquered  by 
Rome;  of  Slavs,  as  shown  by  the  number  of  Slav  roots 
in  their  language ;  and  of  the  soldier-colonists — Iberian, 
Gallic,  Thracian  and  Roman — planted  by  Rome  in 
Da'cia.  Their  language,  however,  especially  in  its 
structure,  is  scarcely  other  than  a  Latin  dialect,  and  the 
people  proudly  consider  themselves  to  be  Latins,  which 
indeed,  to  all  intents,  they  are — akin,  vaguely  to  the 
Italians  and  French.  This  Latin  nation,  surrounded 
though  not  submerged  by  an  ocean  of  Slavic  peoples 
no  less  hardy  and  prolific  than  its  own,  feels  itself  to 
be  terribly  isolated;  and  the  recent  recrudescence  of 
the  pan-Slav  movement  has  only  increased  the  sense  of 
continual  danger  in  which  it  lives.  Where  look  for 
friends?  Russia,  from  whom  it  has  just  regained  its 
old  province  of  Bessarabia,  is  sure  to  be  its  enemy  in 
the  future.  Czecho-Slovakia  is  Russia's  warmest 
friend.  Bulgaria,  from  whom  it  took  the  Doubroudja 
in  19 13,  is  for  Roumania  a  certain  foe.  With  Jugo- 
slavia, still  nominally  its  ally,  it  has  quarrelled  bitterly 
over  the  partition  of  Banat;  and  moreover,  the  Jugo- 
slavs are  quick  with  pan-Slav  sentiment  which,  if  it 
were  ever  to  become  militant,  might  suddenly,  like  a 
wet  sponge,  wipe  Roumania  out.  Poland,  it  is  true,  is 
hostile  to  Russia  just  now,  and  is  hence  Roumania's 
friend.  But  what  is  to  guarantee  that  Poland,  as  well, 
may  not  ultimately  be  drawn  into  the  swelling  current 
of  pan-Slavism?  Hungary,  Roumania's  only  non-Slav 
neighbor,  was  Roumania's  enemy  in  the  late  war.    The 


ROUMANIA  «19 

Magyars  devastated  Roumania,  and  have  in  turn  been 
invaded  and  plundered  by  them.  The  Magyars  swear, 
moreover,  that  they  will  never,  in  spirit,  relinquish  the 
province  of  Transylvania,  ceded  to  Roumania  by  the 
peace  treaties,  and  where  they  are  even  now  keeping 
up  a  fierce  propaganda.  With  the  exception  of  Russia 
and  Hungary,  every  one  of  its  neighbors  is  courting 
Roumania;  but  the  isolated  Latin  nation  has  thus  far 
met  their  overtures  with  a  coy  reserve  not  far  removed 
from  suspicion.  To  Poland,  which  invited  it  to  join 
in  the  war  against  the  Bolshevists,  it  replied  sympa- 
thetically but  firmly,  that  it  would  remain  on  the  de- 
fensive and  would  fight  only  in  case  it  should  again 
be  attacked.  To  Czecho-Slovakia  and  Jugo-Slavia, 
which  have  invited  it  to  join  their  "Petite  Entente," 
against  Hungary,  it  has  answered,  even  while  signing 
the  alliance  for  a  period  of  two  years,  that  it  sym- 
pathises with  their  attitude  and  that  certainly,  if  Hun- 
gary takes  up  arms,  it  may  be  counted  upon  to  help 
keep  down  the  Magyar  danger,  but  that  it  cannot,  for 
the  present,  and  pending  other  developments,  press 
the  alliance  too  far.  Even  in  the  midst  of  its  hatred 
and  fear  of  Hungary,  it  has  allowed  this  fiery  state  to 
understand  that  a  day  may  come  when  against  Slav 
aggression  a  measure  of  common  defense  may  become 
more  vital  than  the  prolongation  of  their  private  quar- 
rel. And  to  Bulgaria's  naive  proffers  of  loving  kind- 
ness, it  has  pointedly  answered:  **Yes,  but  does  this 
sudden  amicability  of  yours  include  our  friends,  the 
Greeks?"  Greece,  indeed,  is  the  one  nearby  nation 
with  which  the  Roumanians  feel  they  can  whole-heart- 
edly ally  themselves.  The  Greeks  too,  by  their  recent 
expansion,  have  probably  incurred  the  eternal  enmity 


220  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

of  Russia.  Both  have  every  reason  to  be  suspicious  of 
the  Slav  movement,  and  both  have  a  strong  interest  in 
keeping  the  Dardanelles,  through  which  three-fourths 
of  Roumania's  export  normally  pass,  out  of  Slav  hands. 
The  rapprochement  of  the  two  countries  has  recently 
been  furthered  by  the  conclusion  of  two  important 
dynastic  ties :  Prince  George,  the  eldest  son  of  Constan- 
tine  of  Greece,  has  married  Ferdinand's  daughter;  and 
the  Roumanian  crown  prince,  Carol,  after  having  con- 
tracted an  unpopular  morganatic  marriage  with  Miss 
Lambrino,  a  Roumanian  girl,  is  now  reported  to  be 
engaged  to  the  Princess  Helen  of  Greece.  But  Rou- 
mania  having  now  realized  to  the  full  its  "national 
aspirations,"  I  do  not  believe  that  it  could  be  drawn 
into  an  aggressive  action  even  at  the  behest  of  Greece. 
Its  whole  policy  has  become  one  of  cautious  defense; 
those  means,  and  those  means  only,  which  meet  this 
one  condition,  will  have  its  favor;  and  until  the  future 
attitude  of  Russia  itself  and  of  various  other  nations 
toward  Russia,  becomes  more  clear,  it  may  be  expected 
to  maintain  a  position  of  exceeding  prudence. 

Roumania's  isolation  is  further  accentuated  by  dis- 
appointment in  and  suspicion  of  the  great  allies — even 
of  France  and  Italy,  although  these  two,  especially  the 
former,  have  at  present  a  real  influence  in  Bucharest. 
In  particular,  the  Roumanians,  who  suffered  invasion 
and  pitiless  devastation,  are  indignant  at  having  been 
lumped  by  the  allies  with  Portugal  and  Japan,  among 
the  nations  who  are  to  receive  only  three  per  cent  of 
the  war  indemnities.  Italy  may  be  their  blood  rela- 
tion; they  nevertheless  had  the  surprise  of  seeing  It  aid 
Hungary  when  they  were  fighting  the  Magyar  com- 


ROUMANIA  221 

munists  in  the  spring  of  19 19.  Britain  may  be  as  anti- 
Slav  as  themselves,  but  it  is  not  without  a  certain  dis- 
trust that  they  look  upon  the  obvious  desire  of  the 
former  to  obtain  control  not  only  of  the  Danube,  but 
of  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles.  France  at 
present  may  pose  as  their  best  friend;  it  may  even,  in 
its  new  role  of  conciliator  in  this  part  of  the  world,  try 
some  day  to  reconcile  the  Russians  to  the  loss  of  Bessa- 
rabia ;  but  it  is  no  less  true  that  a  time  may  come  when 
France  will  have  to  choose  between  the  friendship  of 
Roumania  and  that  of  Russia  and  the  Slavs,  in  which 
event,  for  France's  purpose,  it  is  very  doubtful  if  Rou- 
mania could  tip  the  scales.  In  their  complicated  specu- 
lations, looking  toward  the  guarantee  of  their  own 
safety,  the  Roumanians  are  thus  brought  to  the  realiza- 
tion that  to  counter-balance  the  pan-Slav  danger,  they 
may  ultimately  have  to  seek  the  support  of  Germany 
itself.  In  general,  under  the  stimulus  of  their  new 
desire  for  economic  self-sufficiency  they  are  suspicious 
of  the  designs  of  all  great  capitalist  states.  But  if  they 
must  have  financial  and  technical  help  from  somewhere, 
they  would  perhaps  have  an  interest  in  accepting  the 
offers  of  Germany  which,  with  Austria,  had  pretty  well 
conquered  the  Roumanian  market  before  the  war  and 
which  usually  will  make  better  terms  and  quicker  de- 
liveries than  Britain,  France,  or  the  United  States. 

Moreover,  Ferdinand,  their  king,  is  himself  a  Ho- 
henzollern.  This  did  not  keep  Roumania  out  of  the 
war;  it  is  nevertheless  a  consideration.  One  of  the 
standard  subjects  of  gossip  in  Bucharest  is  whether 
Ferdinand,  though  quiet  and  inconspicuous,  is  in  reality 
a  great  statesman,  or  whether,  as  appears  to  be  the 


222  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

case,  he  Is  completely  overshadowed  by  the  active  and 
charming  personality  of  his  queen,  Marie,  who,  as  is 
commonly  said,  "has  a  hand  in  everything." 

The  question  is  perhaps,  after  all,  less  important 
than  it  appears,  for  the  real  government  of  the  coun- 
try seems  to  be  passing  more  and  more  surely  into  the 
power  of  certain  experienced  political  leaders,  such  as 
Take  Jonescu  and  the  Bratianos.  The  war  has  com- 
pletely overturned  Roumania's  political  life.  The  con- 
servatives, and  Dr.  Marghiloman,  the  Germanophile 
leader,  have  disappeared  from  the  arena.  In  May, 
1920,  a  new  party,  the  "people's  party,"  centering 
around  the  personality  of  General  Averescu,  who  is 
credited  among  the  peasants  with  supernatural  power, 
because  of  his  success  in  stopping  the  Germans,  swept 
the  field,  seating  two  hundred  out  of  a  total  of  some 
three  hundred  and  fifty  deputies.  However,  not  only 
is  General  Averescu  himself  a  man  of  no  governmental 
experience,  but  in  this  entire  party,  composed  chiefly 
of  peasants,  with  whom  the  ability  to  read  and  write 
Is  altogether  exceptional,  there  are  no  real  leaders. 
Places  in  the  ministry  were  therefore  offered  to  the  vet- 
eran statesmen.  Take  Jonescu  and  Jean  Bratiano, 
chiefs,  respectively,  of  the  democratic  and  liberal 
parties.  General  Averescu's  popularity  seems  to  give 
a  certain  stability  to  a  government  which  is  really 
conducted  by  two  men  whose  combined  force  in  the 
chamber  does  not  exceed  twenty  deputies.  The  one 
weakness  of  this  ministerial  combination  Is  that  the 
Transylvanlan  mountaineers,  who  In  education.  In 
force  of  character  and  in  energy  are  perhaps  superior 
to  their  countrymen  of  the  vast  rich  lazy  grain-lands, 
are  not  represented.     The  leaders  of  the  Transylva- 


ROUMANIA  223 

nians,  who  are  perhaps  destined  ultimately  to  exercise 
considerable  authority  in  the  country,  arc  MesMrs. 
Vaida  and  Maniu. 

With  the  integration  of  the  Boukovine  and  Transyl- 
vania, the  nation  has  acquired  wide  forests,  and  has 
added  considerably  to  its  mineral  resources  which,  in 
addition  to  the  government  salt  monopoly  producing 
150,000  tons  a  year,  now  include  large  quantities  of 
black  and  brown  lignite,  some  coal,  a  few  gold,  silver 
and  iron  mines,  and  undeveloped  deposits  of  copper 
and  manganese.  There  are  few  factories  in  Roumania. 
Both  iron  and  coking  coal  are  lacking.  Its  locomotives 
are  fired  by  a  mixture  of  brown  lignite  and  oil.  The 
country's  real  wealth  lies  almost  wholly  in  two  things : 
its  oil,  and  its  agriculture.  Even  before  the  war 
doubled  its  territory,  Roumania  was  the  richest  country 
in  the  Balkans.  Its  foreign  trade  exceeded  that  of 
Greece,  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  together.  In  19 13,  it  had 
a  favorable  trade  balance  of  15,574,000  lei.  Oil 
formed  twenty  per  cent,  and  cereals  sixty-seven  per 
cent  of  its  exports.  At  the  present  time,  despite  the 
fact  that  its  mineral  wealth  has  been  increased,  and 
that  the  reannexation  of  Bessarabia  gives  it  another 
great  tract  of  unexcelled  grain  lands,  it  is  struggling  in 
the  grip  of  a  grave  economic  crisis.  Both  oil  and  cereal 
exports  have  fallen  almost  to  zero,  and  as  imports  con- 
tinue, the  public  debt  is  piling  up  fast.  This  year's 
crops  are  estimated  at  only  thirty  per  cent  of  normal. 
I  have  given  elsewhere  the  reasons  for  the  decline  in 
production ;  they  include  the  vast  requisitions  of  horses 
and  cattle  by  the  enemy  during  the  war,  and  above  all, 
the  uncertainties  attendant  upon  the  execution  of  the 
land  reform.     The  oil  question  is  more  complicated. 


224  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

In  1 9 14,  the  Roumanian  oilfields,  located  chiefly  in 
the  Carpathian  foothills,  around  Prahova  and  Dombo- 
vitza,  were  furnishing  one  per  cent  of  the  world's  total 
oil  supply.  Half  of  this  oil  was  available  for  export. 
Of  the  total  capitalization  of  ten  million  five  hundred 
thousand  dollars,  fifty-eight  per  cent  was  in  German 
hands,  twenty-eight  per  cent  in  British  and  fourteen  per 
cent  in  American.  Between  Take  Jonescu  and  the  Bra- 
tianos,  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion  with  regard  to 
the  desirability  of  foreign  capital  in  Roumania.  The 
former  fears  that  the  country  cannot  develop  without 
It.  The  latter,  who  seem  in  this  respect  to  have  public 
opinion  entirely  with  them  at  the  present  time,  are 
not  only  suspicious  of  all  foreign  Investments,  but  they 
desire,  If  possible,  to  eliminate  foreign  money  from 
Roumania  altogether.  Under  their  influence,  the  Rou- 
manian government  has  simply  expropriated  the  Ger- 
man oil  interests,  and  In  exchange,  for  a  promise  of 
twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  profits,  has  turned  them  over 
to  a  group  of  Roumanian  engineers,  who  have  de- 
clared a  capitalization  of  one  hundred  million  lei,  and 
who  claim  complete  control.  The  next  step  Is  to  elim- 
inate the  British  and  American  Interests;  and  this  is 
not  so  easy,  for  both  are  pretty  well  able  to  look  after 
themselves.  However,  the  Roumanians,  nothing 
daunted,  have  set  out  boldly  upon  a  policy  of  Interfer- 
ence and  obstructionism,  by  which  they  hope,  in  the 
end,  to  wear  out  their  adversaries  ajid  force  them  to 
yield.  One  expedient  follows  another.  The  govern- 
ment has  established  a  consortium  to  control  the  in- 
terior market,  and  is  attempting  to  set  the  export  price. 
A  decree  has  been  issued  forbidding  drilling  on  new 
concessions,  which  means  that  In  any  case  the  British 


ROUMANIA  225 

and  American  Interests  can  scarcely  hold  out  longer 
than  two  years  more.  The  latter  protest  that  having 
developed  this  wealth  solely  by  their  own  capital,  initia- 
tive, machinery  and  engineers,  they  have  a  moral  right 
to  the  profits  for  some  time  to  come,  but  this  argument 
leaves  the  Roumanians  cold.  It  is  therefore  not  so 
much  the  German  destructions  in  the  oil-fields  as  this 
economic  battle  between  allies  which  has  reduced  Rou- 
manian oil-production  at  the  present  time  to  such  a 
point  that  as  late  as  July,  1920,  oil  brought  all  the  way 
from  the  United  States  was  being  marketed  profitably 
in  Black  Sea  ports. 

In  addition  to  doubling  the  country's  population,  the 
annexation  of  the  new  provinces  of  Transylvania, 
Bessarabia,  the  Boukovine  and  the  Banat  has  brought 
within  the  country's  frontier  some  vigorous  and  hostile 
racial  minorities  whose  assimilation  bids  fair  to  remain 
a  difficult  matter.  So  far  as  I  know,  accurate  statistics 
do  not  exist;  but  roughly,  of  a  total  of  fifteen  to  six- 
teen millions,  there  are  perhaps  eleven  million  five  hun- 
dred thousand  Roumanians,  one  million  five  hundred 
thousand  Magyars,  five  hundred  thousand  Germans, 
one  million  Ruthenians  (Ukrainians),  nine  hundred 
thousand  Jews  and  one  hundred  thousand  Gypsies.  All 
the  new  provinces  except  Bessarabia  have  nominally 
been  united  under  one  administration,  but  the  change 
from  the  Hungarian  laws  and  customs  in  the  Banat 
and  Transylvania,  from  the  Austrian  in  the  Bouko- 
vine, and  from  the  Russian  In  Bessarabia  must  of  ne- 
cessity be  gradual.  In  none  of  these  regions  Is  the 
Roumanian  majority  beyond  challenge.  In  Transyl- 
vania it  is  only  slightly  over  fifty  per  cent,  with  the 
Magyars  and  Germans  forming  a  close  second.     In 


226  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

Bessarabia  there  are  supposed  to  be  about  fifty-three 
per  cent  Roumanians,  twenty-eight  per  cent  Ruthen- 
ians  (Ukrainians)  and  the  rest  Jews  and  Germans. 
The  estimates  for  the  Banat  show  thirty-nine  per  cent 
Roumanian,  thirteen  per  cent  Magyar,  twenty-five  per 
cent  German  (Suabian),  eighteen  per  cent  Serbian;  and 
for  the  Boukovine,  thirty-five  per  cent  Roumanian, 
thirty-nine  per  cent  Ruthenian  (Ukrainian),  thirteen 
per  cent  Jews.  All  the  new  provinces  are  under  mili- 
tary occupation,  and  in  all  a  strong  hand  is  being 
used.  Minorities,  on  one  pretext  or  another,  are  being 
expropriated  in  favor  of  Roumanians.  New  and  in- 
competent officials  are  making  a  reputation  for  them- 
selves similar  to  that  earned  by  the  northern  "carpet- 
baggers" in  the  south,  after  the  American  civil  war. 
Arrests,  expulsions,  and  even  disorders  are  not  infre- 
quent. However,  except  possibly  in  Transylvania, 
where  the  combined  Magyar  and  German  opposition 
to  the  new  rule  is  very  stubborn,  and  has  by  no  means 
lost  hope,  I  expect  to  see  the  Roumanians  establish  a 
tolerably  stable  order  within  a  relatively  short  time. 
Agitators  here  need  expect  no  mercy. 

A  word  remains  to  be  said  concerning  the  often- 
raised  Jewish  question.  There  is  Indeed  a  certain 
amount  of  anti-semltism  in  Roumania,  as  in  all  Eastern 
European  countries,  where  the  gentiles  stand  In  a  kind 
of  superstitious  dread  of  Jewish  financial  and  commer- 
cial prowess.  However,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  there 
have  never  been  any  pogroms  here.  The  great  com- 
plaint of  the  Jews, — that  the  rights  of  citizenship 
were  withheld  from  them, — ^have  been  met  by  the  re- 
form law  of  two  years  ago,  giving  the  right  to  vote 
and  to  own  property  to  all  Jews  who  can  prove  they 


ROUMANIA  ««7 

were  born  in  Roumania.  This  is  well  enough  for  the 
more  highly  cultured  Sephardic  Jews  of  the  old  Span- 
ish-speaking stock.  But  the  majority  of  Roumanian 
Jews  are  oi  the  Ashkenazic,  or  Yiddish-speaking  Ger- 
man strain,  who  have  fled  into  Roumania  out  of  Rus- 
sia or  Poland,  and  many  of  whom  have  no  family 
papers.  A  generation  will  doubtless  have  to  elapse 
before  they  can  duly  take  advantage  of  this  somewhat 
equivocal  reform.  The  Roumanians,  on  the  whole,  are 
not  indisposed  to  be  tolerant  as  regards  the  country's 
nine  hundred  thousand  Israelites;  although  some  of 
the  latter,  especially  in  Bessarabia,  are  suspected  of 
Bolshevist  sympathies,  and  are  being  encouraged  to 
emigrate. 


7 

JUGOSLAVIA 

For  far-reaching  significance,  all  other  questions,  in 
this  newly  formed  state,  are  overshadowed  by  that  of 
its  constitution,  which  is  still  in  abeyance  and  promises 
to  remain  so  for  some  time.  If,  in  the  end,  the  state 
should  be  constituted  on  a  federation  basis,  as  the  Slo- 
venes and  Croats  seem  to  desire,  Bulgaria  might  then 
be  welcomed  into  the  federation,  the  age-long  Mace- 
donian controversy  would  enter  a  new  phase,  and  the 
Slavs  would  dominate  the  Balkans. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Serbs,  as  they  desire  to  do, 
succeed  in  establishing  a  uniform  administration  on  the 
Serbian  model,  and  under  Serbian  hegemony,  Bulgaria 
may  be  held  aloof,  Macedonia  will  continue  to  be  di- 
vided in  three,  and  the  struggle  for  predominance  in 
the  Balkans  will  continue.  What,  then,  it  may  be  well 
to  ask,  are  the  essentials  of  this  question  of  constitu- 
tion ? 

The  Jugo-Slav,  or  South-Slav  states,  known  officially 
as  the  Kingdom  of  the  Serbs,  Croats  and  Slovenes,  was 
formed  after  the  armistice  by  combining  the  kingdoms 
of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  with  the  former  South-Slav 
possessions  of  Austria  and  Hungary.  The  result  is  a 
rugged  mountainous  country,  filling  the  entire  north- 
western part  of  the  Balkan  peninsula,  with  a  population 
of  over  fourteen  millions,   divided  among  its   seven 

provinces  as  follows:  Serbia,  4,456,000;  Montenegro, 

228 


JUGOSLAVIA  229 

435,000;  Voivodina,  2,675,000;  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
1,898,000;  Dalmatia,  645,000;  Croatia-Slavonia, 
2,621,000;  Slovenia,  1,610,000.  Over  seventy-five  per 
cent  of  the  inhabitants  are  Jugo-Slavs.  There  are  sev- 
eral hundred  thousand  Roumanians  in  the  Voivodina 
and  northeastern  Serbia,  and  several  hundred  thou- 
sand Albanians  in  Southwestern  Serbia  and  Southern 
Montenegro,  but  neither  of  these  races  is  likely  to  be 
a  source  of  trouble.  There  are  perhaps  half  a  million 
each  of  Germans  and  Magyars  in  the  former  Austro- 
Hungarian  provinces,  but  they,  like  the  few  thousand 
Italians  of  the  Dalmatian  coast,  are  too  few  and  too 
scattered  to  be  a  serious  menace.  The  Bulgars  of 
Macedonia  and  the  eastern  Serbian  frontier,  in  all  per- 
haps 700,ox>o,  while  of  a  surly  and  rebellious  mind, 
may  themselves  claim,  despite  the  Tartar  strain  in 
their  blood,  to  be  South-Slavs  and  only  in  the  event  that 
Bulgaria  is  kept  out  of  the  Jugo-Slav  federation  are 
they  likely  to  foment  rebellion ;  so  that  on  the  whole,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  problem  of  assimilating  racial  mi- 
norities is  here  by  no  means  acute.  The  real  difficulty 
is  between  the  three  branches  of  Jugo-Slavs  themselves. 
The  Serbs,  who  not  only  inhabit  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro, but  are  found  in  small  communities  in  the  Voivo- 
dina, in  Dalmatia,  in  Croatia-Slavonia  and  in  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,  are  the  predominant  race,  forming  about 
forty  per  cent  of  the  population.  They  are  of  a  low 
standard  of  literacy,  eighty  per  cent  illiterate,  but  of 
great  military  virtue.  They  use  the  Cyrillic,  or  Russian 
alphabet,  and  profess  the  Greek  orthodox  faith.  The 
Croats,  fifty-five  per  cent  illiterate,  who  number  some 
twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  population,  acquired,  under 
Austro-Hungarian   rule,   a   somewhat   higher   culture 


«80  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

than  the  Serbs  whom,  however,  they  closely  resemble 
in  other  ways.  They  were,  for  instance,  the  best  sol- 
diers in  the  Austrian  army.  They  differ  from  the  Serbs, 
however,  in  certain  peculiarities  of  language,  and  in 
their  use  of  the  Latin  instead  of  the  Cyrillic  alphabet. 
About  one-fourth  of  them  belong  to  the  Greek  ortho- 
dox church,  the  rest  being  Roman  Catholic.  They  are 
found  principally  in  Croatia-Slavonia,  Dalmatia  and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The  Slovenes,  or  Wendes,  in- 
habiting principally  Slovenia,  the  northernmost  Jugo- 
slav provinces,  and  forming  perhaps  ten  per  cent  of  the 
population,  have  been  for  centuries  in  intimate  contact 
with  the  Austro-Germans,  and  boast  the  highest  culture 
of  any  South-Slav  people  (fifteen  per  cent  illiterate). 
Like  the  Croats,  they  employ  the  Latin  alphabet,  but 
their  language  forms  still  a  third  variation  of  the  Jugo- 
slav tongue.  Their  chief  characteristic  is  the  fervency 
of  their  religious  sentiments.  They  are  devout  Roman 
Catholics. 

The  enemies  of  Jugo-Slavia,  especially  the  Italians, 
have  constantly  averred  that  what  with  racial,  cultural 
and  religious  differences  this  state  will  never  succeed  in 
welding  itself  firmly  together.  It  was  said,  for  example, 
that  neither  the  Montenegrins  nor  the  Croats  and 
Slovenes  would  accept  the  Karageorgevitch  dynasty  of 
Serbia;  that  the  Roman  Catholics,  being  slightly  in 
the  majority,  would  rebel  against  the  propagandist  ten- 
tatives  of  the  Greek  orthodox  clergy;  and  finally,  that 
the  better  educated  Croats  and  Slovenes,  with  their 
neat  Germanized  towns  and  public  works,  would  never 
permit  themselves  to  be  dictated  to  by  the  cruder 
Serbians,  with  their  clumsy  sprawling  capital  and  their 
shabby  villages.    But  to  this  one  may  reply  that  the 


JUGO-SLAVIA  231 

superior  culture  of  the  Croats  and  Slovenes  is  perhaps 
largely  external,  and  that  the  three  peoples  are  really 
very  much  alike ;  that  the  Serbs,  though  holding  patriot- 
ically to  their  church,  are  not  aggressively  religious, 
and  will  not  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  sectarian 
freedom  of  their  Roman  Catholic  brothers ;  and  finally, 
that  the  voyage  of  Alexander,  the  Prince  Regent,  to 
Zagreb  and  Ljubliana  in  June,  1920,  which  foreign 
critics  had  declared  he  would  never  dare  to  attempt  for 
fear  of  assassination,  was  not  only  a  success,  but  a 
triumph,  and  that  no  further  proof  is  needed  of  the 
loyalty  of  the  new  provinces  to  the  Serbian  reigning 
house.  I  am  personally  of  the  opinion  that  this  state, 
bound  together  by  so  many  ties — of  blood,  of  lan- 
guage, of  material  interest,  of  common  aspiration, 
even  of  a  kind  of  geographical  unity, — will  in  time  suc- 
ceed in  attaining  a  true  political  unity.  A  year  ago, 
this  outcome  might  have  been  considered  doubtful.  But 
the  prolongation  of  the  Fiume  episode,  and  consequent- 
ly of  the  danger  of  war  with  Italy,  bore  heavily  upon 
the  Slovenes,  who  are  not  only  the  loudest  in  their 
demand  for  autonomy,  but  who  are  closest  to  the  Ital- 
ian frontier,  and  therefore  the  most  exposed.  In  short, 
it  may  be  said  that  the  Fiume  dispute  has  done  more 
than  any  other  factor  to  cement  the  Serbs,  Croats  and 
Slovenes  together. 

The  Serbs  would  like  to  establish  a  single  admin- 
istration throughout  the  whole  territory,  centering  in 
Belgrade,  and  giving  them  a  kind  of  hegemony  over 
the  other  Jugo-Slavs.  It  was  their  action,  they  con- 
sider, which  freed  their  compatriots  from  Austro-Hun- 
garian  domination.  No  one  contests  the  high  value 
of  their  military  organization.    The  dynasty  is  theirs. 


28«  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

And  the  superior  education  of  the  Croats  and  Slovenes 
is  more  than  compensated,  in  the  Serbs'  opinion,  by 
the  superior  political  and  administrative  experience  of 
the  latter. 

The  Croats  and  Slovenes,  however,  while  they  ac- 
cept the  dynasty,  and  the  unification  of  the  army  under 
the  Serbian  general  staff,  are  by  no  means  enthusiastic 
over  the  Serbian  administration,  which  seems  to  them, 
on  the  whole,  decidedly  inferior  to  that  to  which  they 
had  become  accustomed  under  the  Hapsburgs.  They 
consider  that  Belgrade  compares  unfavorably  with  their 
local  capitals,  and  they  incline  toward  a  federative 
constitution,  which  would  leave  them  a  large  measure 
of  regional  autonomy.  In  Montenegro,  as  well,  though 
there  is  no  real  movement  in  favor  of  the  unseated 
king,  Nicholas,  the  people,  particularly  in  the  south, 
seem  to  favor  autonomy.  It  is  to  conciliate  these  South 
Montenegrins  that  the  Serbs  are  so  eager  to  take  the 
town  of  Scutari  from  Albania.  The  inhabitants  of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina,  one-third  of  whom  are  Moslem 
Slavs,  converted  under  Turkish  rule,  seem  also  to  desire 
to  preserve  a  certain  local  independence. 

At  the  present  time.  King  Peter  having  become 
feeble  with  age,  his  son,  Alexander,  reigns  as  Prince 
Regent,  and  seems  to  have  been  accepted  by  the  entire 
country.  The  continuation  of  the  constitutional 
monarchical  form  of  government  is  practically  assured. 
There  have  as  yet  been  no  elections.  A  provisional  as- 
sembly has  been  brought  together,  consisting  of  the 
Serb  deputies  elected  in  19 12,  and  delegates  appointed 
from  the  local  councils  of  the  new  provinces.  Though 
not  really  representative,  the  assembly  is  exercising 
national  legislative  authority.     The  ministry  includes 


JUGO-SLAVIA  233 

Croat  and  Slovene  leaders  as  well  as  Serbs,  but  until 
regular  elections  are  held,  which  will  reveal  the  actual 
strength  of  the  various  political  parties,  no  ministry 
can  long  defend  itself  against  the  attacks  of  the  ever- 
renewed  opposition.  Though  the  Serbs  are  endeavor- 
ing more  and  more  to  take  the  leadership,  the  provin- 
cial administrations  are  still  largely  autonomous.  A 
commission  is  studying  a  possible  re-districting  of  the 
country  on  economic  rather  than  on  racial  lines,  but 
its  recommendations  will  doubtless  be  opposed  by  the 
provinces.  Another  commission  is  trying  to  draft  a 
new  constitution,  and  so  far  as  I  know,  is  still  wrest- 
ling with  the  problem  of  whether  there  shall  be  one 
or  two  legislative  chambers.  As  far  as  can  be  fore- 
seen at  present,  the  probable  outcome  of  all  this  com- 
plicated play  of  racial  and  political  forces  will  be  a 
compromise  between  the  ideas  of  federation  and  unifi- 
cation. The  army  and  the  diplomatic  and  consular 
service  will  be  strongly  centralized.  There  will  be  only 
one  legislature,  but  the  provinces  will  keep  their  local 
capitals,  and  under  the  guidance  of  a  governor,  will  en- 
joy autonomy  in  most  local  questions.  The  spirit  of 
the  constitution  will  be  free  and  democratic,  as  befits  a 
nation  of  peasant  proprietors.  All  religions,  not  only 
the  Greek  orthodox,  representing  fifty  per  cent  of  the 
population,  and  the  Roman  Catholic,  representing 
thirty-five  per  cent,  but  the  Israelite,  representing 
something  less  than  ten  per  cent,  and  the  Moslem, 
five  per  cent,  will  be  placed  upon  an  equal  basis.  For 
if  there  is  no  Jewish  question  in  Jugo-Slavia,  the  Jews 
here  having  been  assimilated  into  a  spirit  of  patriotism, 
there  is  a  Moslem  question.  What  with  the  Bosnian 
Slav  Moslems  (612,000),  the  Albanian  Moslems  and 


234  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  Turks  of  Macedonia,  Jugo-Slavia  has  become  the 
principal  Moslem  power  of  Europe  (1,600,000),  and 
must  take  account  of  the  fact.  Finally,  education  in 
both  the  Cyrillic  and  the  Latin  alphabets  will  be  made 
obligatory.  Of  course,  it  is  entirely  possible  that  the 
Jugo-Slavs  may  behave  foolishly,  and  make  endless 
trouble  for  themselves  by  internal  quarrels.  Nobody 
knows,  and  I,  myself,  in  taking  the  optimistic  view, 
am  only  guessing.  But  I  think  I  am  guessing  about 
right. 

Jugo-Slavia  is  almost  exclusively  an  agricultural 
country.  At  least  ninety  per  cent  of  its  exports  con- 
sist of  grain,  fruit  and  cattle.  Despite  primitive  meth- 
ods, and  the  disturbances  attendant  upon  a  some- 
what disorderly  land  reform,  it  should  have  exported, 
even  this  year,  some  fifty  thousand  lo-ton  carloads  of 
wheat,  and  a  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  carloads  of 
corn.  Its  industries  at  present  are  insignificant.  It  has, 
however,  forests  whose  area  is  twice  that  of  all  Bel- 
gium, and  some  important  mineral  deposits.  The  Bor 
Copper  mines,  developed  by  French  capital,  are  world- 
famous.  There  seem  to  be  copper  deposits  no  less  im- 
portant, awaiting  exploitation,  in  the  region  of  Novi- 
Bazar;  there  are  partially  opened  iron  deposits  in  Bos- 
nia, said  to  be  the  largest  in  the  world ;  and  there  is  for 
the  moment  a  sufficiency  of  coal. 

The  utilization  of  these  resources,  no  less  than  the 
export  of  its  agricultural  surpluses,  depends  to  a  great 
extent  on  the  improvement  of  transportation.  At  pres- 
ent, owing  partly  to  material  difficulties  natural  in  a 
mountainous  country,  partly  to  the  inefficiency  of  the 
state  administration,  the  railways  are  entirely  Inade- 
quate.   The  entire  southern  half  of  the  country  Is  de- 


JUGOSLAVIA  235 

pendent  on  a  single  line  running  to  the  Greek  port  of 
Salonlki.  The  northern  half  could,  it  is  true,  utilize  the 
Danube  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  is  done  at  pres- 
ent, but  to  reach  salt  water,  it  is  dependent  on  Fiume, 
for  the  time  being  at  least,  and  the  free  use  of  this 
port  should  have  been  given  it,  if  only  temporary. 
There  is  urgent  need,  however,  to  transform  the  Bos- 
nian narrow-gauge  railways  into  standard-gauge  lines, 
and  to  open  a  double-track  road  from  Belgrade  to  the 
Dalmatian  port  of  Spalato.  A  second  trans-mountain 
line  from  Belgrade  to  Cattaro  might  then  profitably 
be  undertaken.  Only  by  the  construction  of  these 
lines  can  Jugo-SIavia  become  really  independent  of 
Greece,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Italy,  on  the  other; 
for  even  If  Fiume  were  given  outright  to  Jugo-Slavia, 
It  Is  so  near  the  Italian  frontier  as  to  be  placed  Im- 
mediately In  danger  In  case  of  trouble. 

It  appears,  then,  that  Jugo-Slavs,  despite  their  tardi- 
ness in  stabilizing  their  internal  regime,  and  despite 
their  somewhat  chaotic  administration,  are  a  people 
possessing  not  only  considerable  economic  strength, 
since  they  have  copper  and  Iron  and  a  surplus  of  food, 
but  of  real  military  strength,  both  by  the  geographical 
configuration  of  their  frontier,  and  by  their  hardy  and 
warlike  character.  Fourteen  millions  to-day,  they  may 
well  number  seventeen  or  eighteen  millions  a  few  years 
hence,  which  would  enable  them  to  put  into  the  field 
an  army  of  at  least  two  million  bayonets.  "It  Is  not 
with  politics,"  they  say,  "and  with  strategical  policies 
that  a  nation  defends  itself,  but  with  the  breasts  of 
Its  soldiers."  Though  they  suffered  In  the  war  per- 
haps as  heavily,  in  proportion,  as  any  other  people, 
and  were  Invaded,  massacred,  exiled,  the  Serbs  are  still 


«86  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

fired  with  military  ardor  I     Obviously,  the  Jugo-Slavs 
are  to  be  seriously  reckoned  with. 

The  mainspring  of  the  nation's  foreign  poliq^,  on 
its  positive  side,  at  least,  is  here,  as  at  Prague  and 
Sofia,  a  renaissance  of  pan-Slav  sentiment.  Czechs  and 
Jugo-Slavs,  for  years  before  the  war,  were  united  in 
their  opposition  in  the  Viennese  parliament,  and  the 
peace  treaties  have  drawn  them  more  closely  together 
than  ever.  Both  are  opposed  to  any  sort  of  federa- 
tion which  would  tend  to  restore,  under  another  name, 
the  Hapsburg  Empire;  both  are  distrustful  of  Austria 
and  afraid  of  Hungary;  both  look  toward  Russia, 
soviet  or  otherwise,  with  a  feeling  of  filial  affection. 
Bulgaria,  though  Serbia's  traditional  and  deeply  hated 
enemy,  is  nevertheless  also  Slav,  and  mediative  influen- 
ces on  the  part  of  the  Czechs,  the  French,  and  the 
thousands  of  Russian  emigres  who  have  taken  refuge 
in  the  Balkans,  are  at  work  to  reconcile  these  two  peo- 
ples. The  Croats  and  Slovenes  are  favorable  to 
Bulgaria's  request  to  join  the  Jugo-Slav  federation; 
only  the  Serbs,  opposed  to  the  idea  of  a  federation  and 
preferring  a  unified  administration  under  their  own 
control,  remain  hostile.  And  even  they,  or  at  least 
the  more  intelligent  among  the  Serbian  leaders,  are 
frank  to  say  that  although  it  is  too  soon  at  present, 
the  union  of  Bulgaria  and  Jugo-Slavia  is  in  the  future 
inevitable.  All  the  Jugo-Slavs,  indeed,  are  dreaming 
of  grandeur.  Their  country,  they  believe,  can  easily 
support  fifty  million  people.  Their  resources  are  rich, 
their  people  prolific  and  combative.  The  absorption  of 
Bulgaria  will  give  them  a  coast-to-coast  control  of  the 
Balkan  peninsula,  and  they  will  have  become,  they 
imagine,  a  world-power  of  the  first  rank. 


JUGOSLAVIA  237 

One  reason  why  they  are  still  holding  Bulgaria  aloof, 
and  thus  postponing  the  realization  of  this  bold  pro- 
gramme, is  that  union  with  Bulgaria  will  doubtless 
alienate  them  from  the  Greeks;  for  a  Jugo-Slav  state, 
including  the  Bulgars,  and  holding  all  the  hinterland  of 
Macedonia  and  Thrace,  could  not  fail  in  the  long  run 
to  threaten  Greek  control  of  the  coast,  and  particularly 
of  the  ports  of  Saloniki  and  Cavalla.  Before  arousing 
the  suspicions  of  the  Greeks,  they  would  like,  there- 
fore, to  be  sure  that  the  Adriatic  question  is  really 
settled,  in  which  they  have  always  hoped  to  have 
Greece  with  them  against  Italy.  In  Albania,  indeed, 
Greeks  and  Jugo-Slavs  have  a  common  interest;  first, 
in  keeping  Italy  out  of  Valona,  which,  mainly  through 
the  efforts  of  the  Albanians  themselves,  they  now  seem 
to  have  accomplished;  and  second,  in  dividing  Albania 
between  them,  a  design  in  which  they  seem  at  present 
destined  to  fail,  for  Britain,  France  and  Italy  all  now 
seem  to  favor  an  independent  Albania.  There  are 
signs,  however,  that  under  the  mediatory  influence  of 
Britain,  the  differences  between  Greece  and  Italy  are 
slowly  being  ironed  out.  The  day  may  well  come  when 
the  Jugo-Slavs  will  find  themselves  alone  on  the  Adri- 
atic, facing  a  hostile  and  vigorous  young  Italy, 
having  behind  it  the  sympathies  both  of  Britain  and 
Greece.  In  that  day,  or  even  when  it  appears  that 
such  a  day  is  approaching,  the  Serbs'  last  opposition 
to  union  with  Bulgaria  will,  I  think,  fall. 

Despite  the  conclusion,  in  November,  1920,  of  the 
Treaty  of  Rapallo,  the  question  of  the  Adriatic  bids 
fair  to  be  of  long  duration.  Fiume  was  only  one 
symptom  of  a  serious  general  situation.  When  two  na- 
tions, both  young,  both  strong,  both  ambitious,  face 


288  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

one  another  across  a  narrow  body  of  water  like  the 
Adriatic,  over  which  both  aspire  to  hegemony,  they 
may  succeed  in  reaching  a  truce,  but  scarcely  a  real 
peace.  A  settlement  which  would  presumably  satisfy 
both  parties  is  an  impossibility.  Britain,  profoundly 
distrustful  of  the  Slavs,  tends  more  and  more,  as  I  have 
indicated,  to  range  itself  behind  Italy,  and  hence  is 
viewed  with  more  and  more  suspicion  in  Jugo-Slavia. 
France,  on  the  other  hand,  is  being  drawn  slowly  but 
surely  more  and  more  closely  to  the  Slavs.  The  Jugo- 
slavs, like  all  the  younger  peoples,  are  afflicted  by 
radical  xenophobia,  and  are  suspicious  of  their  friends; 
nevertheless,  so  far  as  they  admit  of  any  advice,  they 
incline  to  listen  to  the  French.  They  are,  moreover, 
enthusiastic  admirers  of  the  man  whom  the  peasants 
fondly  call  "Uncle  Wilson," — this,  of  course,  because 
of  the  American  president's  famous  pronunciamento  in 
the  Adriatic  question.  It  cannot,  however,  be  said  that 
the  United  States  has  any  particular  interest  in,  or  in- 
fluence over  the  Jugo-Slavs. 

After  having  quarrelled  fiercely  with  Roumania  over 
the  partition  of  the  Banat  of  Temesvar,  which  the 
Serbs  claimed  less  on  racial  grounds  than  on  strategical 
—as  a  sort  of  glacis  to  protect  Belgrade — the  Jugo- 
Slavs  are  now  inclined  to  establish  friendly  relations 
with  this  Latin  neighbor  of  theirs;  but  there  are  too 
many  elements  of  uncertainty  in  this  friendship  for 
one  to  attempt  to  predict  how  long  it  may  last. 

The  question  has  often  been  raised — though  it  is 
perhaps  no  longer  apropos — whether  a  war  is  not 
imminent  between  the  Italians  and  the  Jugo-Slavs.  The 
former,  in  their  present  state  of  social  disorder  would 
scarcely  dare  provoke  it.    As  for  the  latter,  though 


JUGOSLAVIA  239 

they  are  confident  that  they  could  take  not  only  Fiume 
but  even  Venice,  almost  at  one  blow,  especially  with 
the  Italian  army  demoralized  as  at  present,  they  will 
not,  I  think,  precipitate  hostilities.  The  support  given 
them  by  public  opinion  in  western  Europe  and  in  Amer- 
ica, in  the  Fiume  dispute  has  been  a  great  sense  of 
pride  to  them;  they  would  not  like  to  turn  opinion 
against  them  by  starting  a  new  war — not  just  now,  at 
any  rate.  The  struggle  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
Adriatic  is  a  struggle  deferred — 'indefinitely,  one  may 
hope. 


s 

GREECE 

The  almost  miraculous  apotheosis  of  Greece  in  the 
Balkan  war  and  the  recent  peace  settlements  is  due  no 
doubt  in  large  part  to  the  extraordinary  personal  skill 
of  the  lawyer  from  Crete,  Eleutherios  Venizelos,  whom 
his  many  admirers  consider  to  be  the  greatest  states- 
man of  modern  times;  and  certainly,  considering  that 
in  the  negotiations,  Greece  has  obtained,  generally 
speaking,  not  only  all  it  asked  for,  but  more,  there  is 
no  one  who  would  deny  the  high  ability  of  this  gifted 
descendant  of  a  race  traditionally  famous  for  being 
deeply  versed  in  political  psychology.  However,  It 
must  be  admitted  that  circumstances — particularly 
those  circumstances  which  have  made  it  the  trusted 
agent  and  ally  of  Britain  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean, 
have  aided  Greece.  And  finally,  it  must  be  said  that 
Venizelos  himself  could  have  done  nothing,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  extraordinary  adaptability  and  expansive 
force  of  the  Greek  people. 

This  breed  of  sailors  and  traders,  sons  of  a  barren, 
rocky  soil,  have  shown  themselves,  particularly  in  mod- 
ern times,  to  be  one  of  the  most  powerful  races  of 
the  Mediterranean.  They  have  spread  in  every  direc- 
tion around  the  shore*  of  this  great  tideless  sea,  and  a 
large  part  of  its  commerce  and  small  shipping, 
especially  in  its  more  easternly  waters,  is  in  their  hands. 

PatriotiCj  pliable,  shrewd,  they  have  penetrated  even 

240 


GREECE  «41 

into  the  inland  towns  of  Asia  Minor.  They  were  the 
businessmen  and  technicians  of  Turkey;  and  would  in 
time,  by  solely  pacific  means,  have  conquered  it  com- 
pletely. But  the  consciousness  of  their  own  strength 
gave  birth  to  the  Pan-Hellenic  movement,  which  in  turn 
has  made  possible  the  country's  present  wide-flung 
frontiers,  and  it  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  in  securing 
their  political  expansion,  the  Greeks  have  paralyzed  the 
progress  of  their  vast  economic  penetration. 

There  are  supposed,  by  Greek  propagandists,  to  be, 
in  the  entire  world,  some  8,464,000  Greeks  scattered  as 
follows:  4,500,000  in  the  Greece  of  1913;  123,000  in 
Northern  Epifus;  436,000  in  Thrace;  355,000  in  the 
region  of  Tchetaldja  and  Constantinople;  1,700,000 
in  Asia  Minor;  350,000  in  Cyprus  and  the  Dodecane- 
sus;  200,000  in  Egypt;  400,000  in  such  Western  Med- 
iterranean ports  as  Genoa  and  Marseilles,  and  in  the 
United  States;  400,000  in  South  Russia  and  the  Cau- 
casus. The  new  Greece,  as  formed  by  the  diplomacy 
of  Venizelos  and  the  British  foreign  office,  includes 
most  of  these  widespread  groups.  It  is  a  country  drawn 
round  about  a  sea,  a  country  of  mountainous  coasts 
and  jagged  islands ;  the  Aegean  has  become  once  more 
a  Grecian  lake.  Although  its  exact  frontiers,  especially 
in  Asia  Minor,  are  still  in  doubt,  its  total  population  is 
probably  about  7,500,000;  4,632,000  in  the  Greece  of 
1 9 14;  2,500,000  in  Thrace  and  Asia  Minor;  150,000 
in  the  Dodecanesus  archipelago;  250,000  in  Northern 
Epirus.  The  principal  racial  minorities  are  the  Alban- 
ians of  Northern  Epirus;  the  Turks  and  Bulgars  of 
Macedonia  and  Thrace;  the  Jews  of  Saloniki;  the 
Turks  of  Asia  Minor.  Exact  statistics  are  not  available, 
but  there  must  be  several  hundred  thousand  Alban- 


842  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

ians;  half  a  million  Bulgars  and  nearly  a  million  Turks, 
depending  on  how  far  into  Asia  Minor  the  Greeks 
finally  penetrate.  These  minorities  are  scarcely  strong 
enough  to  be  troublesome,  except  in  the  event  of  war, 
in  which  case  their  presence  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
frontiers  might  constitute  a  serious  menace. 

The  reoccupation  by  Greece  of  the  lands  with  which 
its  ancient  history  is  so  intimately  associated  is  in  many 
respects  a  magnificent  representation  of  poetic  justice. 
The  mountaineers  of  Northern  Greece  and  those  of 
Southern  Albania  are  no  doubt  among  the  oldest  races 
of  Europe,  and  may  boast  a  kind  of  kinship.  In 
Thrace,  Greek  influence  preceded  that  of  Rome,  and 
prevailed  again  under  Byzance.  As  for  Smyrna, 
Homer  is  said  to  have  been  born  in  its  valley;  it  sent 
an  annual  prize  to  the  Olympic  games.  Pindar  glori- 
fied, and  Alexander  reconquered  it;  it  is  one  of  the  old- 
est Greek  cities.  Once  more,  at  Smyrna  and  on  the 
Dardanelles,  Greece,  which  fought  Europe's  fight  and 
won  Europe's  victories  at  Marathon  and  Salamis,  is 
posted  as  Europe's  sentinel  against  Asia. 

At  the  same  time,  there  are  many  good  friends  of 
Greece  who  are  uneasy.  The  situation  is  no  longer 
what  it  was  in  the  beginning  of  history.  The  Alban- 
ians have  developed  of  late  a  strong  national  con- 
sciousness. Jugo-Slavs  and  Bulgars,  Greece's  north- 
ern neighbors,  are  young,  warlike  and  ambitious,  Rus- 
sia, now  helpless,  bids  fair  one  day  to  cast  its  lustful 
eyes  once  more  on  Constantinople,  Eastern  Thrace  and 
the  Dardanelles.  As  for  Asia  Minor,  it  is  the  citadel 
of  Turkish  nationalism.  The  Greeks,  though  they 
have  of  late  greatly  improved  their  army,  are  not  really 
a  military  people.     Their  new  frontiers,  giving  them 


GREECE  243 

an  inner  coast  while  leaving  the  hinterlands  to  other 
peoples,  are  very  difficult  to  defend.  A  strong  push  by 
the  Serbs  or  Bulgars,  or  perhaps  eventually  even  by 
the  Turks,  might  throw  them  into  the  Aegean  almost 
before  they  could  mobilize.  Their  possession  of  ports 
— Saloniki,  Cavalla,  Dedeagatch,  Rodosto,  Smyrna,— 
which  are  essential  to  the  trade  of  Jugo-Slavia,  Bul- 
garia and  Turkey,  and  which  without  this  trade  would 
merely  stagnate,  is  almost  sure  to  involve  them  sooner 
or  later  in  serious  trouble  with  these  peoples.  Their 
nearness  to  and  their  designs  upon  Constantinople  itself 
ensures  the  enmity  of  Russia.  And  the  enmity  of  Rus- 
sia and  Turkey  will  pretty  effectively  arrest,  I  think, 
their  peaceful  penetration  of  the  Black  Sea  coast  and 
of  Asia  Minor.  These  are  grave  considerations, 
which  may  well  give  pause. 

Assured  of  the  immediate  and  probably  enduring  en- 
mity of  Albania,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  and  perhaps  of 
the  ultimate  enmity  of  Russia  and  Jugo-Slavia,  what 
friends  has  Greece  to  depend  upon?  France,  inclined 
more  and  more  to  cast  its  lot  with  the  Slavs,  and  cha- 
grined at  Greece's  close  understanding  with  Britain,  is 
doubtful.  With  Italy,  which  considers  Greece  its  com- 
mercial rival  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  relations, 
lately  strained,  are  already  better,  and  under  the  media- 
tive  influence  of  Britain,  are  destined,  in  my  opinion, 
to  improve  continually.  In  the  first  place,  Italy's  with- 
drawal from  Albania,  the  southern  part  of  which 
Greece  itself  covets,  is  a  gratification  to  Greece.  In 
the  se'cond  place,  an  understanding  has  been  reached 
both  regarding  the  delimitation  of  the  respective 
Greek  and  Italian  zones  in  Asia-Minor,  and  regarding 
the  Dodecanesus,  which  Italy  has  ceded  to  Greece,  with 


844.  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  exception  of  the  Island  of  Rhodes,  whose  cession  is 
made  conditional  on  the  cession  of  Cyprus  to  Greece 
by  the  British.  In  effecting  a  rapprochement  with 
Italy,  Greece  is  of  course  gradually  alienating  its  old 
ally,  Jugo-Slavia.  Of  true  friends,  Greece  appears  now 
to  have  only  two — Roumania  and  Britain.  Of  these, 
by  far  the  more  important  is  of  course  Britain,  whose 
close  alliance  has  indeed  become  the  cornerstone  of 
Greek  foreign  policy.  Without  Britain,  Greece's 
chances  of  keeping  the  territory  it  has  gained  would 
appear  slight  indeed.  With  Britain,  the  success  of 
Greece,  for  the  time  being  at  least,  is  not  only  possible 
but  probable. 

The  factors  which  have  led  Britain  to  make  of 
Greece  its  agent  and  ally  in  the  Near  East,  and  which 
have  led  Greece  to  seek  and  cherish  this  partnership, 
are  not  hard  to  discover.  Greece,  consisting  entirely 
of  coasts,  peninsulas  and  islands,  is  the  only  near- 
eastern  country  which,  as  shown  in  the  expulsion  of 
Constantine  by  the  allies  during  the  war,  is  completely 
controllable  from  the  sea,  and  which  could  therefore 
never  turn  against  Britain,  even  if  it  desired  to  do  so. 
The  Greeks'  skill  in  business,  their  profound  knowledge 
of  oriental  psychology,  and  their  widespread  penetra- 
tion will  make  them  admirable  distributing  agents  for 
British  trade  and  British  investments.  In  return  for 
these  expected  services,  Britain  has  supported  Greek 
expansion  and  made  Greece  great.  As  it  can  scarcely 
hope  to  keep  Constantinople  itself,  which  It  now  holds 
under  military  occupation,  Britain,  to  keep  this  city 
from  falling  later  Into  other,  perhaps  Russian  hands, 
is  even  disposed  to  give  this  prize  to  the  eager  Greeks, 
and  would  do  so,  I  suspect,  in  one  way  or  another,  if 


GREECE  246 

it  were  not  for  the  firm  opposition  of  France.  Greece 
would  thus  become  more  closely  than  ever  associated 
with  Britain  in  a  common  defense  against  Slav  expan- 
sion. These  are  bold  policies;  both  Britain  and  Greece 
are  gambling  with  heavy  odds ;  that  is  not  to  say,  how- 
ever, that  they  will  not  win  out  in  the  end. 

Agriculturally,  Greece  is  poor.  Its  soil  is  rocky  and 
dry.  It  has  no  considerable  industries.  It  has  neither 
forests  nor  rich  mineral  deposits.  Its  wealth  is  in  the 
highly  developed  commercial  and  financial  sagacity 
of  its  people,  who,  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  are 
considered  superior  in  this  respect  to  even  the  Armen- 
ians and  the  Jews,  and  in  its  shipping.  The  Greeks 
not  only  operate  a  host  of  small  sailing  vessels;  they 
will  buy  and  operate  profitably  for  years,  on  the  calm 
Mediterranean,  steamers  which  in  other  countries  have 
been  condemned.  In  the  art  of  extracting  the  last 
league  of  serviceability  out  of  an  old  broken-down  hulk, 
they  are  unsurpassed.  This  of  course  does  not  mean 
that  they  have  not  also  a  number  of  staunch  new  steam- 
ers. There  is  not  a  port  of  the  Mediterranean  or  the 
Black  Sea  which  does  not  behold  the  blue  and  white 
banners  of  Greece  going  and  coming  continually  over 
the  waters  of  the  harbor.  To  its  shipping  revenues, 
Greece  adds  the  profits  on  a  tourist  trade  which  seem 
susceptible  of  far  greater  development;  the  profits  of 
its  exports  of  olive-oil,  tobacco  and  fruit;  and  the  large 
sums  which  are  sent  back  home  annually  by  patriotic 
and  prosperous  Greeks  residing  abroad.  It  hopes  ulti- 
mately to  compensate  its  present  food  deficit  by  a 
more  intensive  cultivation  of  wheat  in  Macedonia  and 
Ionia   (Asia  Minor). 

At  the  present  moment,  not  only  the  political  sit- 


246  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

uation  but  the  future  status  of  the  government  itself, 
is  much  confused.  Legally,  Greece  is  a  constitutional 
monarchy,  but  the  king  has  the  right  to  dissolve  the 
parliament,  to  replace  the  members  of  the  government 
at  will,  to  declare  war  and  make  treaties.  He  is  more- 
over the  absolute  chief  of  the  civil  administration  and 
the  army.  Exercising  the  royal  prerogative,  the  pro- 
German  Constantine,  influenced  perhaps  by  his  wife, 
who  is  the  sister  of  William  II  of  Germany,  dissolved 
the  Venizelist  parliament  early  in  the  war,  because 
Venizelos  favored  the  Entente,  and  established  another 
which  would  be  more  servile  to  his  personal  views. 
Greece  had  made  a  treaty  of  defensive  alliance  with 
Serbia  only  a  couple  of  years  before;  but  Constantine 
was  resolved  not  to  keep  it.  Venizelos,  conspiring 
with  the  allies,  led  a  successful  regional  revolution  at 
Saloniki,  under  protection  of  which  it  became  possible 
for  the  allies  to  land  at  this  port  without — technically 
— violating  Greek  neutrality.  After  some  months  of 
friction  with  the  Greek  government,  the  allies,  follow- 
ing an  assault  on  a  squad  of  French  marines,  occupied 
Athens  by  force  of  arms,  and  expelled  both  Constan- 
tine and  the  Crown  Prince  George  from  the  country. 
From  that  time  on,  Eleutherios  Venizelos  was  virtually 
dictator  of  Greece.  He  dissolved  the  Constantinist 
parliament^  reconvened  the  Venizelist  parliament, 
which  had  been  regularly  elected  but  which  Constan- 
tine had  dissolved,  placed  Constantine's  young  second 
son,  Alexander,  on  the  throne  and  brought  Greece  into 
the  war  on  the  side  of  the  allies.  He  decreed  an  im- 
portant land  reform  and  projected  a  constitutional  re- 
form which  would  limit  the  royal  powers  henceforth  to 
those  of  a  mere  figure-head,  and  would  place  the  real 


GREECE  Ml 

authority  with  the  parliament  and  a  responsible  min- 
istry. Finally,  representing  his  country  in  person  at 
the  peace  conference,  he  displayed  such  remarkable 
diplomatic  skill  that  whereas  every  other  allied  country 
was  pressed  into  compromises,  Greece  actually  received 
more  than  it  had  originally  asked  for,  doubling  its 
population. 

As  I  write,  Greece,  and  with  it  the  whole  Near  East- 
ern peace  settlement,  has  fallen  prey  to  a  crisis,  the 
outcome  of  which  is  difficult  to  foresee.  The  sudden 
death  of  the  young  king,  Alexander,  from  blood-poison- 
ing, following  a  monkey-bite,  reopened  the  deep  wound 
of  the  dynastic  question.  A  month  later,  on  Novem- 
ber 15th,  1920,  in  the  first  elections  which  have  been 
held  since  the  war  began,  the  Constantinists  won  an 
unexpected  but  a  crushing  victory.  Venizelos,  ignomin- 
iously  defeated,  took  flight  on  a  British  yacht,  escorted 
by  British  destroyers.  A  Constantinist  government 
was  promptly  formed.  The  Venizelist  Admiral  Cound- 
ouriotis,  who,  on  Alexander's  death,  had  been  elected 
regent,  was  replaced  by  Constantine's  another,  Queen 
Olga,  and  the  return  of  Constantine  himself  to  the 
Greek  throne  became  apparently  inevitable.  Venizelos' 
defeat  was  due  not  to  his  foreign  policy,  which  had 
always  been  popular,  but  to  his  dictatorial  and  some- 
what brutal  internal  policies.  Many  Greeks,  more- 
over, resent  the  way  in  which  the  allies  expelled  Con- 
stantine during  the  war.  At  present,  they  would  like 
to  have  their  old  king  back  again,  and  at  the  same  time 
keep  all  the  territories  which  were  won  for  them  by 
Venizelos'  brilliant  diplomacy.  The  new  government 
is  hastening,  therefore,  both  to  recall  Constantine  and 
to  ratify  the  Treaty  of  Sevres,  so  as  to  confront  the 


248  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

allies  with  accomplished  facts  before  the  latter  can 
make  up  their  minds  how  to  react. 

The  French,  who  on  second  thought,  do  not  approve 
of  giving  the  Greeks  so  much  territory  at  the  expense 
of  the  Turks  and  Bulgars,  and  who  are  opposed  to 
Constantine  on  principle,  would  like  to  make  the  latter's 
return  an  occasion  for  revising  the  Treaty  of  Sevres  in 
a  sense  favorable  to  the  Turkish  nationalists,  thereby 
"punishing"  the  Greeks  for  their  infidelity  to  Venizelos. 
But  the  British  are  inclined  to  proceed  with  prudence. 
The  reasons  which  led  them  to  make  of  Greece  their 
trusted  agent  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  have  not 
changed.  If,  indeed,  Constantine  should  defy  them, 
then  they  might  adopt  the  French  viewpoint,  and 
the  revision  of  the  Sevres  Treaty  would  become  prob- 
able. But  if,  as  is  far  more  likely,  Constantine  should 
give  assurance  of  his  support  to  the  British  in  all 
questions  of  foreign  policy,  just  as  Venizelos  did,  then 
it  is  difficult  to  see  what  interest  Britain  would  have, 
after  enlarging  Greece,  in  diminishing  it  again. 

Such  crises  as  the  present  are  not  uncommon  in  the 
Balkans.  The  only  way  to  see  clearly  through  the 
apparent  contradictions  they  engender  is  to  keep  firmly 
in  mind  the  fundamentals  of  the  character,  constitution 
and  foreign  policy  of  the  countries  concerned. 

Such,  then,  are  the  individual  factors  in  this  anarchic 
region  of  Europe:  Austria,  weak,  will-less,  depressed, 
brooding  over  the  forbidden  idea — ^partly  from  a  real 
cultural  affinity,  partly  from  mere  despite — of  allow- 
ing itself  to  be  absorbed  by  Germany;  Hungary,  fiery 
and  unreconciled,  bent  on  recovering  its  lost  territories 
by  any  means  whatsoever;  Bulgaria,  quivering  passion- 


GREECE  249 

ately  under  its  defeat,  but  quick  to  accept  realities,  pro- 
posing reconciliation  to  Roumania,  federation  to  Jugo- 
slavia, and  concentrating  all  its  animosity  against 
Greece;  Czecho-Slovakia,  with  its  undefensible  fron- 
tiers, fearful  of  Austro-Hungarian  restoration,  pro- 
foundly Slav  in  sentiment,  yet  forced  by  its  economic 
and  geographical  situation  to  seek  peace  through  the 
maintenance  of  neutrality;  Poland,  fervent  and  afraid, 
squeezed  as  in  a  vise  between  the  aggressive  hatred  of 
Germany,  and  the  hatred,  no  less  aggressive,  of  Rus- 
sia; Roumania,  a  Latin  nation  in  a  sea  of  Slavs, 
gathered  in  a  surly  defensive,  ready  for  any  entente 
which  promises  self-preservation,  but  unwilling  as  yet 
to  commit  itself  deeply  in  any  direction;  Jugo-Slavia, 
confident,  valorous,  warlike,  dreaming  of  grandeur; 
Greece,  the  child  of  Athens  and  Byzance,  once  more 
restored  to  precarious  empire,  staking  all  its  hope  on 
the  friendly  help  of  Britain,  and  gambling  on  the  future 
with  vigilant  serenity.  Such  are  the  elements  out  of 
which  the  federations  or  understandings,  lacking  which 
no  genuine  reconstruction  will  be  possible,  must  be 
builded. 


PARTY 

FORCES  OF  COHESION 


THE  NATIONALISM  OF  THE   MASSES 

There  are  four  current  fallacies  regarding  the  amel- 
ioration of  international  relations  which  must  be  at 
least  partially  dissolved  by  analysis  before  the  real 
forces  which  are  working  for  reconstruction  in  "Balkan- 
ized  Europe"  can  be  laid  bare.  These  fallacies  may 
be  stated  thus : 

That  the  masses  of  the  people  in  any  nation,  if  left 
to  themselves,  would  quickly  establish  a  regime  of 
universal  friendship. 

That  foreign  poHcy  is  a  creation,  not  of  the  popular 
will,  but  of  more  or  less  chauvinist  governments. 

That  the  League  of  Nations,  or  any  other  institution 
or  set  of  laws,  can  eradicate  at  one  stroke  the  age- 
long ills  from  which  men  suffer. 

That  the  increasing  economic  solidarity  of  the  world 
will  of  itself  lead  inevitably  to  political  solidarity. 

The  first  of  these  fallacies,  which  implies  that  the 
masses  are  born  internationalists  and  become  national- 
istic only  through  perversion,  is  exceedingly  widespread 
in  America  and  in  the  democracies  of  Western  Europe. 
It  may  be  well  to  define  nationalism.  Nationalism,  in 
internal  affairs,  demands  the  sacrifice  of  individual  in- 
terests to  the  common  interest,  and  in  external  affairs 
places  the  interest  of  the  nation  above  all  other  con- 
siderations.   The  theory  of  the  internationalists  is  that 

just  as,  within  the  nation,  the  individual  makes  sacri- 

253 


254  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

fices  to  the  commonwealth,  so,  in  the  concert  of  na- 
tions, the  individual  nation  must  be  prepared  to  sacri- 
fice itself  to  the  general  good  of  the  world.  So  long 
as  the  nations  were  kept  in  ignorance  of  one  another 
by  lack  of  adequate  communications,  the  realization  of 
this  ideal  was  obviously  impossible.  But  with  the  de- 
velopment of  railroads,  fast  steamers,  the  telegraph 
and  the  telephone,  the  various  peoples  are  at  last 
beginning  t;o  make  one  another's  acquaintance.  Each 
people,  it  is  asserted,  is  finding  out  that  the  other 
peoples  of  the  globe  are  merely  human  beings  like 
itself,  and  if  matters  were  left  to  the  common  sense 
and  friendliness  of  the  masses,  there  would  be  no 
more  wars. 

This  theory,  though  plausible  enough,  is  unfor- 
tunately belied  by  the  facts.  The  development  of  mod- 
ern communications  has  been  attended  not  by  an  in- 
creasing internationalism,  but  by  the  reverse.  The 
sentiment  of  nationalism  is  probably  stronger  to-day 
than  it  has  ever  been.  In  the  old  days,  when  there 
were  no  newspapers  and  travel  was  difficult,  men  might 
popularly  suppose  that  all  peoples  are  alike,  think  in 
the  same  ways,  and  share  the  same  sentiments.  But 
no  sooner  have  they  begun  to  make  intimate  contact 
than  they  have  discovered,  to  their  amazement,  that 
not  only  the  personal  habits,  but  the  moral  codes,  the 
motives  and  feelings  of  the  various  races  are  highly 
characterized,  and  by  no  means  identical.  The  philoso- 
pher, the  psychologist,  the  man  of  science,  the  artist, 
may  reach  the  conclusion  that  these  striking  differences 
are  to  some  extent  superficial,  that  one  moral  code, 
and  one  set  of  values  is  as  good,  in  its  way,  as  another, 
and  that  men  differ  chiefly  with  respect  to  their  degree 


THE  NATIONALISM  OF  THE  MASSES    255 

of  civilization.  But  for  the  great  masses  of  mankind, 
such  philosophical  considerations  are  completely  im- 
material. The  ordinary  Anglo-Saxon,  on  ascertaining 
that  the  Turks  are  polygamous,  that  the  French  do 
not  consider  sex  to  be  unclean,  and  that  at  the  seaside 
resorts  of  Southern  Russia  it  is  customary  for  men  and 
women  to  bathe  stark  naked  together,  is  simply  non- 
plused and  repelled.  The  contact  of  Mexicans  and 
Americans  in  the  southwest;  of  Greeks  and  Bulgars  in 
the  Balkans;  of  Czechs  and  Magyars  in  Central  Eu- 
rope, results  not  in  friendly  understanding,  but  in 
hostility  and  mutual  contempt.  The  beginning  of 
American  hostihty  to  Japan  coincided  with  the  be- 
ginning of  Japanese  emigration  to  California;  and  the 
American  doughboys  who  set  sail  with  a  tremendous 
admiration  in  their  hearts  for  the  French  returned  from 
France  disillusioned,  uncomprehending  and  contemp- 
tuous. 

Hatred  of  persons  who  dress  or  speak  or  behave  or 
think  differently  from  oneself  seems  indeed  to  be  one 
of  the  earliest  human  instincts.  With  children,  it  is 
proverbial;  the  boy  who  differs  from  the  rest  merely 
in  being  a  new-comer  generally  has  to  fight  to  establish 
his  place  in  the  juvenile  community.  The  farmer  ob- 
jects to  the  city  man's  clothes,  and  the  city  man  laughs 
at  the  farmer's  way  of  speaking.  Four  years  of  civil 
war  were  necessary  in  the  United  States  before  the 
north  could  impose  its  conception  of  life  upon  the  south, 
and  forge  the  unity  of  the  nation.  To  overcome  the 
rivalries  and  hatreds  of  class  and  locality,  even  be- 
tween peoples  of  the  same  race,  and  build  up  the  mod- 
ern nations,  was  the  work  of  long  and  painful  centur- 
ies.    Even  to-day  the  cor^tempt  of  the  rich  for  the 


256  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

poor,  and  the  envy  of  the  poor  for  the  rich,  bid  fair 
to  disrupt  society  again.  With  even  national  solidarity 
so  new  and  so  precarious  a  conquest,  the  realization 
of  the  dream  of  international  solidarity  seems  far  away 
indeed. 

The  sources  of  internationalism  are  limited  almost 
entirely  to  a  few  small  composite  countries  like  Switz- 
erland and  Belgium ;  to  a  few  truly  international  cities 
like  Paris  and  Vienna,  which  have  large  mixed  foreign 
populations,  to  one  or  two  countries  which,  like  the 
United  States,  are  surcharged  with  undigested  foreign- 
ers; to  labor  organizations  which  hope  by  uniting  to 
increase  their  revolutionary  strength,  and  to  a  few 
humanitarians  who  either  have  never  traveled,  or 
whose  powers  of  observation  are  dulled  by  their  ideals. 
Outside  of  these  limited  categories,  and  even  inside 
them,  the  individual  who  can  divest  himself  of  his 
prejudices  of  heredity  and  environment,  and  declare 
sincerely  that  he  likes  foreigners,  is  rare.  To  attain 
the  sympathetic  insight  necessary  to  enable  one  to  com- 
prehend the  viewpoint  of  a  strange  people  requires  an 
effort  of  study  and  of  penetrative  imagination  which 
exceeds  the  common  capacity.  And  if  to  this  assertion 
the  objection  be  made  that  labor  organizations  are 
international  in  spirit,  I  would  reply  that  they  are  so 
only  as  a  measure  of  opportunism,  and  that  no  sooner 
would  they  control  the  reins  of  government,  the  seizure 
of  which  is  their  aim,  than  their  false  internationalism 
will  quickly  vanish.  Even  the  Roman  Catholic  Church, 
which  is  the  greatest  international  organization  in  the 
world,  has  had  to  adapt  itself  to  the  nationalistic  senti- 
ments of  its  diverse  communicants. 


THE  NATIONALISM  OP  THE  MASSES    257 

For  the  truth  Is  that  the  real  seed  of  xenophobia  is 
not  in  the  upper  but  in  the  lower  classes  of  the  popula- 
tion. It  is  they  who  are  most  easily  stirred  to  rage 
by  differences  of  appearance  and  action.  "Who's 
that?"  asks  the  British  workman.  "Looks  like  a  for- 
eigner," answers  his  comrade;  which  leads  the  other 
to  suggest:  "Heave  a  half  a  brick  at  him."  And  my 
father  has  told  me  of  seeing  two  sober  American  work- 
men in  a  small,  middle-western  town,  step  up  coolly  to 
a  Chinese  standing  peacefully  in  the  door  of  his  laundry 
and  without  a  word  of  explanation  hit  him  in  the  face, 
"to  see  what  he  would  do." 

These  incidents  are  typical.  The  hope  therefore  that 
the  masses  of  the  people,  if  left  to  themselves,  would 
establish  a  regime  of  universal  friendship  Is  obviously 
vain.  But  if  the  instinct  of  xenophobia  has  its  ugly  side, 
it  has  also  certain  virtues.  The  gradual  upbuilding  of 
the  great  modern  nations,  after  centuries  of  local  and 
factional  feuds,  represents  an  Indubitable  advance. 
Before  attempting  to  make  still  another  step  forward, 
and  establish  a  United  States  of  the  world — a  task 
which  may  perhaps  be  practically  envisaged  a  thou- 
sand years  from  now — It  Is  necessary  to  make  fast  the 
advance  already  achieved.  The  cohesive  strength  of 
a  nation  is  in  its  common  habits  and  traditions,  as  de- 
veloped and  maintained  by  heredity  and  environment. 
The  foreigner,  through  his  Influence  on  both  these  fac- 
tors, Is  to  some  extent  a  dissolvent  force ;  and  the  In- 
stinct either  to  eject,  or  complete  and  Immediately  to 
absorb  the  discrepant  particle,  partakes  of  the  nature 
of  self-preservation.  Nationalism  Is  the  normal  anti- 
dote both  to  Internal  disorders  and  to  foreign  Invasion, 


258  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

either  by  force  of  arms  or  by  peaceful  penetration. 
And  whether  we  like  it  or  not,  it  is  indubitably,  in  my 
opinion,  the  strongest  social  force  of  our  modern  time. 
The  problem,  therefore,  is  not  how  to  waste  one's 
energies  by  trying  to  combat  it,  but  how  to  turn  it  to 
the  most  useful  and  benevolent  ends. 


THE  GENESIS  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY 

A  SECOND  fallacy  is  that  foreign  policy  is  a  crea- 
tion, not  of  the  popular  will,  but  of  more  or  less  chau- 
vinistic statesmen,  who  from  ignorance,  carelessness, 
personal  ambition,  or  even  sheer  deviltry,  persist  in 
maloing  trouble  between  the  nations ;  and  that  if  these 
nefarious  individuals  were  to  be  replaced  by  a  govern- 
ment of  philosophers,  philanthropists  or  labor  leaders, 
peace  on  earth  and  goodwill  toward  men  would  auto- 
matically ensue.  When,  as  often  happens,  the  holders 
of  this  belief  are  able  to  "catch"  the  government  in  the 
act  of  exciting  the  masses  by  premeditated  propaganda 
against  some  neighboring  country^,  their  contention, 
they  think,  is  proved  irrefutably.  During  the  war,  in 
particular,  the  saying  was  popular  in  all  belligerent  and 
most  neutral  countries,  that  if  only  the  soldiers  from 
the  opposing  trenches  could  be  gathered  together 
around  a  council  table,  they  would  quickly  succeed  in 
reestablishing  peace. 

Such  assertions  are  singularly  unimaginative.  They 
betray  a  complete  misunderstanding  as  to  the  genesis 
and  aims  of  foreign  policy,  which,  in  its  essentials  ^t 
least,  far  from  being  the  invention  of  individual  states- 
men, is  dictated  imperiously  by  the  conditions  of  na- 
tional existence,  and  changes  only  as  these  conditions 
change.  Everything  that  lives  is  subject  to  two  laws: 
the  first  is  self-preservation,  and  the  second  is  expan- 

259 


260  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

sion.  The  study  of  history,  both  ancient  and  contem- 
porary, reveals  that  it  is  on  these  two  biological  laws, 
and  these  alone,  that  the  foreign  policy  of  any  given 
state  is  based.  The  first  instinct  of  a  people  gathered 
together  under  a  single  government  is  to  insure  the 
national  defense.  This  is  a  matter  not  merely  of  ar- 
mies and  navies,  but  of  alliances,  of  strategical  fron- 
tiers, and  sometimes  of  the  annexation  of  territories 
intended  as  "buffers."  It  may  even  require,  as  in  the 
case  of  Britain,  the  conquest  of  sources  of  food-stuffs 
and  raw  materials.  The  pre-war  Franco-Russian  alli- 
ance had  no  other  motive  than  self-preservation.  Eng- 
land's refusal  to  accord  full  self-government  to  Ireland 
is  at  bottom  merely  a  fear  that  this  island  may  be  used 
as  an  enemy  base  in  time  of  war.  Poland's  desire  to 
form  a  string  of  buffer  states  on  its  eastern  frontiers 
is  due  to  fear  of  Russia.  The  purchase  of  the  Danish 
West  Indies  by  the  United  States  had  no  other  than  a 
strategic  object.  Some  small  states  which  have  power- 
ful neighbors,  as  for  example,  Switzerland,  never  sur- 
pass this  first  stage  of  foreign  policy.  Switzerland's 
entire  preoccupation  is  one  of  self-preservation.  Most 
states,  however,  soon  begin  to  react  to  the  promptings 
of  an  instinct  no  less  insistent — that  of  expansion. 
They  cannot  help  it;  nothing  that  lives  can  escape  the 
impulse.  A  healthy  human  being  is  an  active  center 
of  expansive  force,  and  so  Is  a  healthy  state.  Govern- 
ments merely  follow,  they  do  not  lead,  this  centrifugal 
movement.  The  British  Empire  was  built,  not  by  for- 
eign ministers,  but  by  individual  merchants  and  sailors. 
The  growth  of  the  United  States  within  the  last  hun- 
dred years  was  not  planned  and  executed  by  the  gov- 
ernment; the  people  themselves  brought  it  about;  and 


-      THE  GENESIS  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY     261 

even  they  were  not  wholly  conscious  of  what  they  were 
doing.     All  true  growth  is  instinctive. 

"The  instinct  of  nations,"  says  Guizot,  "sees  further 
than  the  negotiations  of  diplomats;"  and  it  is  true  that 
the  main  lines  of  foreign  policy  are  dictated  to  what- 
ever government  may  happen  to  be  in  power  by  the 
instinct  of  the  people.  But  only  the  main  lines !  The 
people  know  the  end  which  they  wish  to  be  achieved; 
they  do  not  know  how  to  choose  the  proper  means 
to  achieve  it.  This,  and  this  alone,  is  the  function  of 
governments  with  respect  to  foreign  policy.  The  na- 
tion's first  instinct  is  for  self-defense.  The  statesman's 
mission  is  to  devise  the  most  practicable  means  of  in- 
suring this  self-defense.  He  will  be  judged  by  the 
results.  The  nation's  second  interest  is  to  expand. 
It  is  the  statesman's  duty  to  discover,  if  possible,  means 
by  which  this  expansion  may  be  accomplished  without 
endangering  the  national  existence  by  arousing  power- 
ful foreign  enmities — a  task  increasingly  difficult  in 
this  present  day.  Indeed,  it  may  well  be  asked  whether 
this  vital  force  of  expansion  will  not  soon  have  to  be 
directed  entirely  out  of  the  field  of  territorial  competi- 
tion, and  into  that  of  economic  and  cultural  competi- 
tion; for  at  the  present  time,  in  whatever  direction  a 
state  may  seek  to  expand  its  territory,  It  is  met,  as  a 
rule,  by  an  equally  strong  force  of  expansion  on  the 
part  of  Its  neighbor,  and  unless  It  Is  willing  to  en- 
danger its  national  existence  in  the  hazards  of  war, 
its  progress  is  blocked. 

It  thus  appears  that  statesmen,  far  from  Inventing 
foreign  policy,  are  merely  its  interpreters.  No  states- 
man can  oppose  the  popular  Instinct  In  this  respect, 
and  remain  In  power.    The  case  of  Mr.  Wilson  is  one 


Wl  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

in  point.  He  felt  correctly  that  the  American  people 
desire  henceforth  to  take  a  larger  share  in  the  affairs 
of  the  world  (instinct  of  expansion),  but  he  misjudged 
them  in  thinking  that  they  would  therefore  be  willing 
to  involve  themselves  in  far-off  quarrels  which  do  not 
immediately  concern  them  (instinct  of  self-preserva- 
tion). It  is  proper  to  criticize  a  statesman  for  failure 
to  take  account  of  the  national  instinct;  it  is  proper 
to  criticize  the  means  he  may  adopt  to  gratify  this 
instinct;  but  to  criticize  him  for  not  initiating  policies, 
which  however  beautiful  ideally,  are  inharmonious  with 
the  instinct  of  his  people,  is  both  unjust  and  futile. 

Most  popular  criticisms  of  government  arise  from  a 
failure  to  understand  the  problems  of  government. 
These  problems  do  not  change  with  changing  minis- 
tries ;  they  remain  essentially  the  same,  as  the  philoso- 
pher, philanthropist,  or  labor-leader  would  quickly  find 
if  he  were  elevated  to  the  rank  of  foreign  minister 
and  were  confronted  with  the  responsibility  of  having 
to  solve  them.  To  have  made  private  soldiers  from 
the  French  and  German  armies  into  plenipotentiaries 
would  not  have  settled  the  conditions  on  which  the 
German  army  was  to  evacuate  France  and  Belgium, 
or  the  matter  of  reparations,  or  the  future  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  The  private  soldier,  confronted  with  these 
questions,  could  not  have  reacted  to  them  other  than 
would  the  professional  diplomat — that  is  to  say,  in 
the  sense  of  conflicting  national  interests.  In  the  same 
way,  labor,  having  at  present  no  national  responsibili- 
ties, and  desiring  to  strengthen  its  revolutionary  ac- 
tivity by  associating  itself  with  others  of  the  same  class 
in  different  countries,  believes  that  if  its  leaders  were 
put  in  power  they  would  immediately  cast  out  all  ele- 


THE  GENESIS  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY      263 

merits  of  discord  from  the  concert  of  the  nations.  But 
take  for  example  the  case  of  England,  which  has  the 
largest  per  cent,  of  laboring  people  in  its  population 
of  any  country  in  the  world.  Does  any  one  imagine 
that  British  labor,  on  attaining  to  power,  would  sink 
the  British  navy?  England's  life  depends  on  its  for- 
eign trade.  Unless  it  continues  to  receive  large  sup- 
plies of  rawstuffs  from  its  colonies,  notably  India,  and 
to  sell  large  quantities  of  manufactured  goods,  it  can- 
not feed  its  population.  The  rise  of  a  labor  ministry 
could  not  change  this  fundamental  fact.  The  need 
for  sea-power  and  colonies  would  therefore  persist. 
The  work-people,  indeed,  would  be  the  first  to  suffer 
from  the  loss  of  India  and  Egypt,  endangering  not  only 
the  textile  industry,  but  the  supply  of  wheat.  A  labor 
ministry  in  England  or  any  other  country  would  have 
to  face  the  same  problems  of  foreign  policy,  and  would 
have  to  meet  them  in  much  the  same  way,  as  a  con- 
servative ministry.  Indeed,  from  what  I  have  seen 
of  nationalism  in  international  labor  meetings,  I  sus- 
pect that  a  labor  government  would  soon  become  even 
more  chauvinistic  than  a  bourgeois  government,  for 
its  members,  being  less  cultivated,  are  more  subject  to 
the  suggestions  of  the  nationalistic  instinct.  A  good 
example  of  what  is  to  be  expected  from  labor  govern- 
ments is  given  by  the  recent  coal  strike  in  England. 
The  state  by  selling  coal  abroad  at  three  or  four  times 
the  domestic  price,  was  making  sixty-six  million  pounds 
profit  a  year.  If  the  British  miners  had  been  moved 
by  a  spirit  of  humanitarian  internationalism,  they  would 
doubtless  have  proposed  that  this  coal,  so  badly  needed 
by  France  and  Italy,  should  be  supplied  to  these  coun- 
tries at  a  lower  price.     Instead,  the  miners  merely  de- 


264  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

manded  that  the  exorbitant  export  profit  hitherto  col- 
lected by  the  government  should  be  diverted  in  large 
part  to  increase  their  wages  I 

The  quickest  way  to  silence  critics  of  the  govern- 
ment is  of  course  to  associate  them  in  the  responsibili- 
ties of  government.  It  is  by  this  means  that  radicals 
are  soon  converted  to  conservatism. 

In  concluding  these  remarks,  I  may  add  the  curious 
observation  that  despite  their  relatively  wide  culture 
and  experience,  statesmen  and  diplomats  themselves 
are  not  free  from  the  instincts  of  race  fanaticism  which 
prevail  among  the  masses.  The  employ  of  a  common 
language  was  an  unreasonably  strong  bond  between 
the  British  and  American  delegates  at  the  peace  con- 
ference. Neither  the  British  nor  the  Americans,  with 
their  practical,  rather  taciturn  cast  of  mind,  could  for- 
give the  logical,  voluble  French  and  Italians  for  making 
long  speeches. 

In  short,  the  hope  of  establishing  an  era  of  self- 
sacrificing,  world-wide  peace  and  happiness,  in  the  pres- 
ent stage  of  human  evolution,  either  by  elevating  work- 
men and  philanthropists  to  power,  or  by  maintaining 
the  present  regime,  is  entirely  Utopian.  A  change  of 
government  does  not  change  the  problems  of  foreign 
policy.  The  labor  leader,  on  assuming  the  responsi- 
bility of  power,  is  unable  to  escape  either  from  the 
realities  of  national  existence  or  from  his  own  instinct- 
ive nationalism.  As  for  the  professional  statesman 
and  diplomat,  his  nationalism,  despite  his  wider  ad- 
vantage of  travel,  education  and  experience,  is  apt  to 
be  scarcely  less  strong  than  that  of  the  farmer,  clerk 
or  workman,  who  dislikes  and  distrusts  all  foreigners 
without  even  troubling  to  ask  himself  why. 


THE  LEAGUE  Or  NATIONS 

The  fallacy  that  any  institution  cm*  set  of  laws  can 
eradicate  at  one  stroke  the  age-long  ills  from  which 
men  suffer,  has  always  been  common  to  political  re- 
formers, and  is  indeed  their  chief  stock-in-trade.  The 
fact,  nevertheless,  seems  to  be  that  neither  goodness 
nor  wisdom  can  be  instilled  into  a  people  by  acts  of 
legislation.  Laws  are  applicable,  and  institutions  ef- 
fective, only  in  so  far  as  they  are  a  true  expression  of 
popular  sentiment.  An  institution  transplanted  from 
an  advanced  society  Into  one  more  backward  may 
prove  to  be  not  only  a  misfit,  but  an  actual  source  of 
harm,  as  the  French,  for  example,  have  discovered  in 
their  attempt  to  uplift  their  African  colonies  by  estab- 
lishing there  the  right  of  suffrage  and  the  French  sys- 
tem of  courts.  The  natives,  accustomed  to  extreme 
simplicity  both  of  executive  authority  and  of  meting 
out  justice,  are  said  to  be  merely  bewildered  by  the 
complexity  of  the  white  man's  governmental  machinery. 
A  distinguished  Italian  jurist  of  my  acquaintance  was 
sent  to  London  by  his  government  to  ascertain  why 
the  parliamentary  system  seemed  to  work  so  much 
better  in  London  than  In  Rome.  His  findings,  after 
several  months  of  careful  study,  were  a  disappointment 
to  Italian  statesmen.  "The  reason  Is,"  he  reported, 
"that  the  Italian  character  Is  very  different  from  the 
EngllsL"    In  the  same  way,  a  law  may  be  a  misfit.    A 

265 


266  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

law  which  is  opposed  by  most  of  the  members  of  a 
community  can  be  enforced  only  sporadically.  Wit- 
ness, in  certain  American  cities  before  the  prohibition 
regime,  the  Sunday  closing  laws;  or  in  communities 
which  do  not  consider  gambling  -a  menace  to  public 
morals  or  the  state,  the  laws  against  gambling.  An 
even  more  striking  instance  is  the  case  of  Ireland  to- 
day, where  the  British  laws  and  courts,  legally  estab- 
lished, are  ignored,  and  have  been  all  but  supplanted 
by  the  outlaw  courts  and  edicts  of  Sinn  Fein.  A  law, 
we  are  told  by  eminent  jurists,  is  what  has  come  to  be 
regarded  by  public  opinion  as  right.  In  other  words, 
law  does  not  form  opinion;  It  follows  it,  on  pain  of 
becoming  a  dead  letter. 

The  application  of  these  principles  to  the  League 
of  Nations  Is  obvious.  The  object  of  the  League  is  to 
prevent  wars,  by  giving  a  greater  sanctity  to  Inter- 
national law,  and  by  providing  a  machinery  of  action 
for  the  condemnatory  verdicts  of  the  courts  of  world 
opinion  against  unjustified  aggression.  The  weakness 
of  International  law  heretofore  has  been  that,  having 
no  penalties  attached  to  It,  It  could  be  broken  with 
Impunity.  And  the  verdicts  of  the  court  of  world 
opinion  are  empty  talk  so  long  as  they  remain  un- 
enforced. The  murderer  and  the  thief  are  not  deterred 
from  their  crime  by  mere  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
the  law,  or  by  the  consideration  that  opinion  is  against 
them;  while  to  convict  the  assassin  of  murder  and  let 
him  go  unpunished  Is  simple  folly.  Plainly,  so  long 
as  It  has  no  concrete  force  at  Its  disposal,  the  League 
will  be  unable  either  to  Inflict  penalties  or  execute  ver- 
dicts. This  force  has  been  withheld  from  It  because  no 
nation  at  present  Is  willing  to  surrender  any  fraction 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  267 

of  its  full  sovereignty  to  a  super-state.  Public  opinion 
is  favorable  to  the  maintenance  of  international  law, 
but  not  at  the  expense  of  individual  nationalisms.  Such 
is  the  dilemma  of  the  League  of  Nations;  and  so  long 
as  public  opinion  remains  in  the  present  temper,  there 
is  no  remedy. 

On  considering  the  national  instincts  of  self-preserva- 
tion and  expansion  in  connection  with  the  League,  it 
appears  that,  as  regards  the  former,  the  League  tried 
to  satisfy  it  by  Article  X  of  the  covenant,  guaranteeing 
the  territorial  integrity  of  all  signatories  against  for- 
eign aggression.  But  to  the  popular  mind,  the  danger 
involved  in  having  perhaps  to  fight,  under  this  article, 
in  far-off  battles  in  which  no  personal  interest  is  felt, 
outweighs  the  vague  security  of  the  verbal  guarantee; 
and  the  antipathy  is  thus  aroused  of  the  very  instinct 
which  this  article  was  intended  to  gratify.  As  regards 
the  almost  equally  vigorous  instinct  of  expansion,  no 
measure  of  giving  it  satisfaction  is  provided  by  the 
League  covenant  except  the  somewhat  obscure  manda- 
tory system,  and  the  opportunity  to  take  an  active  part 
in  international  debates.  If  this  instinct  could  be  en- 
tirely sublimated,  lifted  out  of  the  geographical  realm 
into  the  realm  of  economics  and  general  culture,  man- 
kind would  have  occasion  to  give  eternal  thanks;  but 
such  a  happy  eventuality  hardly  seems  possible.  Judg- 
ing from  the  past  there  is  profound  reason  to  believe 
that  some  peoples  will  grow  stronger  and  more  nu- 
merous, while  others  grow  weaker  and  fewer.  To  keep 
the  stronger  from  expanding,  ultimately,  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  weaker,  seems  an  illusory  aim.  The  world 
is  alive;  it  is  very  much  alive.  It  cannot  be  frozen 
suddenly  into  a  given  shape,  and  be  expected  to  remain 


268  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

so  frozen  eternally.  Laws  or  Institutions  which  run 
counter  to  the  nature  of  man  or  state,  instead  of  being 
merely  expressive  of  this  nature,  are  destined  to 
futility. 

For  all  these  reasons  It  is  an  error  to  expect  the 
League  to  effect  any  real  change,  for  the  time  being  at 
least,  in  international  relations.  This  is  not  to  say, 
however,  that  the  League  is  useless  and  should  be  dis- 
solved. On  the  contrary,  It  seems  to  fill  a  very  real 
popular  demand,  namely,  that  the  nations,  without, 
for  the  present,  unduly  committing  themselves,  should 
have  a  common  meeting  place  wherein  to  discuss  their 
affairs  and  to  take  general  account  of  the  condition  of 
the  world.  To  ask  more  than  this,  to  require  the 
League  to  prevent  war,  to  enforce  International  law, 
to  pronounce  and  execute  verdicts,  when  it  has  no  force 
at  Its  command,  is  simply  to  kill  at  the  outset  what 
may  gradually  develop  into  an  Indispensable  organism. 
Let  the  League  be  content  for  the  moment  with  the 
modest  role  which  public  opinion  is  willing  to  assign  to 
it — the  role  of  an  Information  center  and  International 
council  chamber.  In  time,  opinion  may  evolve.  The 
prejudice  against  the  delegation  of  sovereignty,  in  cer- 
tain matters,  to  a  super-state  may  decline.  Meanwhile, 
unless  It  is  to  succumb  altogether,  the  League,  like  any 
other  human  Inititution,  must  aspire  not  to  lead  world 
opinion,  but  only  follow  it — the  more  faithfully,  the 
better. 


THE  ECONOMIC  SOLIDARITY  OF  THE  WORLD 

That  the  increasing  economic  solidarity  of  the  world 
will  of  itself  lead  inevitably  to  political  solidarity  is  not, 
like  the  other  three  fallacies  which  I  have  discussed, 
complete;  but  the  fact  that  it  is  only  partially  false, 
the  fact  that  it  contains  a  large  element  of  truth,  makes 
it  only  the  more  dangerously  seductive. 

It  is  true  that  owing  to  the  development  of  railways 
and  steamships,  which  in  turn  have  permitted  the 
fuller  development  of  agriculture  and  industry,  the 
world  has  become  so  inter-related  that  an  economic  dis- 
turbance in  one  part  is  likely  soon  to  be  felt  in  all. 
Industrial  nations  tend  to  have  more  inhabitants  than 
they  can  feed,  and  to  produce  far  more  manufactured 
goods  than  they  themselves  can  use.  Agricultural  na- 
tions, in  selling  their  surplus  food  to  industrial  nations, 
are  able  to  buy  the  manufactured  articles  which  they 
themselves  are  unable  to  make.  Most  industrial  na- 
tions, furthermore,  are  at  least  partially  dependent  on 
less  advanced  nations  for  mineral  or  vegetable  raw- 
stuffs,  while  agricultural  nations  are  apt  to  depend  on 
other  countries  for  the  bulkier  chemical  fertilizers. 
The  resultant  extension  of  foreign  trade  has  necessi- 
tated the  growth  of  a  highly  sensitive  system  of  inter- 
national credit.  Industrial  England,  cut  off  from  Amer- 
ican, Egyptian  and  Indian  cotton,  would  be  plunged 

into  a  terrible  industrial  crisis;  and  cut  off  from  the 

269 


a70  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

wheat  of  America  and  the  British  colonies,  would 
starve.  Agricultural  Bulgaria,  unable,  because  of  de- 
ficient transport,  to  export  its  surplus  of  grain, 
flounders  helplessly  in  debt.  The  collapse  of  any  one 
great  regular  market  brings  on  an  over-production 
crisis  in  the  countries  purveying  to  that  market,  and 
throws  the  whole  international  credit  machinery  out  of 
gear.  These  facts,  demonstrated  theoretically  by  such 
writers  as  Norman  Angell,  were  proved  with  brutal 
forcefulness  in  the  war,  which  not  only  has  ruined  the 
vanquished,  but  has  ruined,  or  half  ruined,  the  victors 
as  well.  No  economist  who  is  in  his  right  senses  can 
pretend,  henceforth,  that  war  is  economically  profitable 
to  any  belligerent.  It  seems  probable  that  even  the 
conquest  of  colonists  is  apt  to  be  more  expensive  than 
remunerative. 

If,  therefore,  men  were  reasonable  beings,  intent 
only  upon  their  material  interests,  no  more  wars  would 
occur.  The  Magyars  would  forget  their  lost  terri- 
tories, and  the  Irish  would  settle  comfortably  down 
under  British  rule  to  enjoy  their  present  unwonted 
prosperity.  Moreover,  the  workmen  of  all  countries, 
realizing  that  a  good  administrator  is  invaluable,  would 
cease  to  envy  the  successful  manufacturer  his  profits 
and  would  beg  him  only  to  tell  them  how  production 
might  be  still  further  quickened,  so  that  soon,  with  the 
steady  fall  of  prices  under  the  increasing  output  of 
goods,  their  standard  of  living  might  be  raised  to  the 
point  almost  of  affluence.  But  men  are  not  reasonable 
— not  economically,  at  any  rate — else  Germany,  which 
in  1 9 14  was  well  advanced  toward  the  peaceful  eco- 
nomic conquest  of  the  world,  would  never  have  started 
the  war.    Taking  no  account  of  material  interest,  the 


ECONOMIC  SOLIDARITY  OF  THE  WORLD    271 

workman  will  ruin  himself  in  the  effort  to  ruin  his 
employer.  The  lord  mayor  of  Cork  will  starve  him- 
self to  death  for  a  political  ideal.  And  from  time  to 
time  some  nation,  dreaming  vague  dreams  of  grandeur, 
will  foam  into  the  folly  of  an  aggressive  war.  It  is 
vain,  therefore,  to  expect  the  nations  of  "Balkanized 
Europe"  to  put  by  their  quarrels  simply  because  they 
have  an  obviously  economic  interest  to  do  so.  Their 
inclination  is  to  think  more  of  their  quarrels  than  of 
their  interests.  Passion  is  always  blinding.  The  first 
thing  to  do  is  to  cure  them,  if  possible,  of  their  pas- 
sion by  counsels  of  political  expediency.  This  much 
having  been  realized,  their  eyes  will  soon  open  to  the 
advantages  of  economic  compromise. 

I  will  give  an  example  of  what  I  mean.  Enlightened 
opinion  in  England,  Italy  and  America,  partly  from 
selfish  business  and  political  interests,  but  largely  from 
the  philanthropic  argument  of  economic  solidarity, 
seems  at  present  to  favor  such  measures  as  will  ensure 
the  rapid  recovery  of  Germany,  esteeming  that  thereby 
the  general  prosperity  will  be  increased.  There  are 
several  reasons  why  France  should  be  more  interested 
than  any  other  nation  in  the  development  of  com- 
merce with  Germany.  France  has  iron,  and  lacks  coal ; 
Germany  has  coal  and  lacks  iron :  an  exchange  is  clearly 
indicated.  Moreover,  controlling  between  them  the 
world's  potash  supply,  they  have  an  interest  not  to 
compete.  It  is  France,  however,  which  persistently 
stands  in  the  way  of  measures  intended  to  help  Ger- 
many. The  reason  is,  first,  that  France  fears  If  Ger- 
many recovers  its  strength  it  will  again  attack  France, 
or  at  least  will  refuse  to  pay  the  reparations  indem- 
nities without  which  France,  in  turn,  will  be  unable  to 


«7«  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

repay  its  debt  to  Britain  and  America;  and  second, 
that  the  French  industries  having  been  practically  de- 
stroyed in  the  war,  it  fears  that  before  these  industries 
can  be  restored,  the  other  industrial  nations,  includ- 
ing Germany,  will  have  preempted  all  the  best  markets, 
and  that  the  French,  in  the  universal  competition,  will 
be  crowded  out  by  those  who  had  the  earlier  start.  It 
is  no  use  trying  to  quiet  France's  fears  with  talk,  about 
economic  solidarity  of  Europe,  or  of  the  world.  What 
is  needed  is  a  practical  political  proposal.  If  Britain, 
Italy  and  the  United  States  were  to  agree  to  guarantee 
their  immediate  armed  assistance  to  France  in  case  of 
a  renewal  of  German  aggression ;  if,  further,  they  were 
to  guarantee  their  support  to  make  Germany  pay  the 
full  reparations  indemnities,  in  such  a  way  that  Ger- 
many would  remain  under  a  kind  of  allied  control  until 
France's  industries  were  fully  restored,  I  feel  sure  that 
the  French  objections  to  helping  Germany  would  in- 
stantly vanish.  This  is  what  I  understand  by  councils 
of  political  expediency.  The  statesman  who  can  for- 
mulate them  in  such  a  way  as  to  seem  to  conciliate  the 
interests  of  all  concerned  has  a  great  field  open  to  him 
among  the  small  nations  of  "Balkanized  Europe." 

A  time  may  come  when  classes  and  nations  alike, 
caring  and  understanding  where  their  true  material  in- 
terests lie,  will  cease  both  from  revolutions  and  from 
wars.  Certainly,  as  peoples  become  more  civilized,  as 
their  wants  increase,  as  their  life  becomes  more  com- 
plex, they  tend  more  and  more  to  seek  and  to  follow 
the  directions  of  material  interest.  But  civilization, 
in  the  western  sense  of  the  word,  is  still  limited  to  a 
very  few  countries ;  and  over  the  others  forms  but  the 
thinnest  of  veneers.     The  economic  solidarity  of  the 


ECONOMIC  SOLIDARITY  OF  THE  WORLD    273 

world  has  been  achieved  by  a  slow  and  tedious  evolu- 
tion; the  achievement  of  the  political  solidarity  of  the 
world,  though  it  will  perhaps  be  even  slower  and  more 
tedious,  is  none  the  less  worthy  of  all  generous  effort. 
The  only  danger  is  that  this  effort,  unless  it  keeps  close 
to  realities,  and  is  careful  to  preserve  the  great  con- 
structions of  the  past  as  the  foundations  of  the  future, 
will  act  merely  as  a  dissolvent,  leaving  the  world  worse 
off  than  it  is  even  at  present. 


POLITICAL  REALITIES 

The  scientist,  desiring  to  obtain  results  in  the  plant 
or  animal  world,  does  not  begin  by  making  up  his  mind 
how  things  ought  to  be  ideally,  and  then  try  to  force 
them  to  conform  to  his  ideal.  But  knowing  the  end  he 
desires  to  accomplish,  he  studies  the  nature  of  the  plant 
or  animal,  what  environment  suits  it  best,  how  best  it 
may  be  nourished,  what  are  its  peculiarities  and  its  re- 
actions, and  how  far  it  may  be  practical  to  atrophy  by 
his  science  the  more  useless  characteristics  and  develop 
the  useful  ones  without  injuring  the  organism  as  a 
whole.  From  first  to  last  he  is  dominated  by  the 
knowledge  that  to  attempt  to  go  contrary  to  nature  is 
surely  to  fail.  Indeed,  he  can  succeed  only  in  so  far 
as  he  is  able  to  associate  nature  itself  in  his  projects,  so 
that  its  laws  will  work  for,  rather  than  against,  him. 

With  all  its  diabolical  lapses  and  its  heights  of 
sublimity,  mankind  remains  nevertheless  a  part  of  the 
biological  world.  As  surely  as  the  sheep  or  the  bee, 
man  has  his  nature,  infinitely  complex,  yet  subject  to  im- 
mutable material  and  psychological  laws.  No  purpose, 
certainly,  can  be  nobler  than  that  of  bettering  the  con- 
ditions of  human  existence;  but  the  amount  of  brave 
idealistic  effort  which  comes  to  naught  through  having 
neglected  to  take  account  of  human  nature,  and  in  par- 
ticular of  economic   and  psychological  principles,   is 

enormous.     We  may  pass  laws,  we  may  establish  in- 

274 


POLITICAL  REALITIES  275 

stitutlons,  we  may  make  revolutions;  but  the  law  will 
slip  gently  into  oblivion,  the  institution  become  per- 
verted, the  revolution  accomplish  nothing  save  destruc- 
tion, if  its  aims  are  inharmonious  with  the  nature  of 
the  individuals  concerned.  The  waste  involved  in 
abortive  reforms  is  shocking  to  all  modern  standards 
of  efficiency.  There  will  always  be  cranks,  I  suppose, 
and  they  will  never  lack  followers — for  this,  too,  is  a 
part  of  the  curious  nature  of  man.  And  I  realize  that 
perfection,  even  in  science,  is  not  of  this  world.  At 
the  same  time,  It  Is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  hope  that 
the  day  Is  near  when  the  same  intelligent  analysis  and 
study  which  are  devoted  to  the  affair^  of  the  mineral, 
vegetable  and  animal  realms  will  be  extended  to  the 
affairs  of  our  human  communities.  It  is  time  that  the 
term  "political  science"  should  become  something  more 
than  a  name  for  a  chair  In  the  universities. 

I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood  as  maintaining  that 
human  nature  is  unchangeable.  The  perusal  of  ancient 
literatures  shows,  certainly,  that  in  knowledge,  and  In 
his  conquest  of  the  material  world,  man  has  marched 
forward  tremendously  in  the  last  three  thousand  years; 
but  In  the  quality  of  his  emotions  and  sentiments, 
scarcely  at  all.  Hector's  armor  has  become  archaic; 
the  Idea  which  he  probably  had  of  geography  would 
make  a  school-boy  smile;  but  the  scene  of  his  meeting 
with  his  wife  and  baby  on  the  wall  of  Troy,  as  he 
was  going  back  to  the  fight,  Is  as  fresh  as  this  morning's 
dew.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  that  part  of  man's 
nature  which  Is  sentimental,  emotional,  instinctive.  Is 
practically  permanent,  for  all  Its  individual  and  racial 
variations,  and  for  all  Its  mysterious  Intricacies;  while 
that  part  which  has  to  do  with  ideas  is  almost  con- 


276  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

tinually  in  flux.  The  statesman  and  the  reformer  will 
do  well  to  take  the  former  as  it  is,  and  to  concentrate 
their  efforts  on  the  latter.  As  examples,  I  would  say 
that  a  law,  like  the  proposed  abolition  of  the  right  of 
inheritance,  destined  to  prevent  the  children  from  bene- 
fiting by  the  parents'  labor  and  economy,  would  be  sure 
to  fail  in  any  era,  because  it  is  contrary  to  the  parental 
instinct.  Indeed,  the  parents'  chief  pleasure  is  to  work 
for  the  future  of  the  offspring,  and  people  would 
quickly  find  a  way  around  any  law  endeavoring  to  de- 
prive them  of  this  pleasure,  which  they  feel  at  the  same 
time  to  be  a  duty.  A  law,  on  the  other  hand,  for  com- 
pulsory schooling,  unpractical  two  hundred  years  ago, 
can  now  be  enforced,  because  people  have  been  brought 
to  believe  that  education  is  a  good  thing  for  every- 
body, and  this  belief  does  not  run  counter  to  any  deep- 
rooted  instinct. 

Applying  these  principles  to  conditions  in  "Balkan- 
ized  Europe,"  I  would  say  that  the  statesman,  with  an 
eye  to  the  future,  should  encourage  the  dissemination 
of  ideas  harmonious  with  the  final  end  he  wishes  to 
attain;  and  with  an  eye  to  the  present,  analyze  the 
material  and  psychological  realities,  and  try  to  combine 
them  in  such  a  way  that  they  will  serve  instead  of 
opposing  him.  Thus,  to  reduce  the  existing  national 
and  international  anarchy,  there  can  scarcely  be  too 
much  careful  propaganda,  destined,  first,  to  instruct 
the  workpeople  in  the  true  processes  of  production  and 
in  the  role,  respectively,  of  capital,  labor,  and  of  tech- 
nical and  administrative  brains ;  and  second,  to  Instruct 
each  nation  in  the  reasons  for,  and  the  benefits  of,  in- 
ternational economic  solidarity.  But  before  this  propa- 
ganda can  bear  fruit,  some  time  must  necessarily  elapse. 


POLITICAL  REALITIES  277 

Politics  is  essentially  the  science  of  immediate  possi- 
bilities.  There  are  decisions  to  be  taken,  acts  to  be 
performed,  every  day.  These,  too,  must  have  their 
direction.  It  is  small  consolation  to  the  present  genera- 
tion to  reflect  that  those  who  follow  may  be  wiser. 
What  is  wanted  is  a  solution  applicable  here  and  now. 
The  statesman  must  therefore  endeavor,  to  the  best 
of  his  ability,  to  understand  and  utilize  present  realities, 
';o  that  he  may  work  with,  and  not  against,  the  forces 
of  human  nature. 

I  have  already  had  occasion  to  show  that  the  im- 
provement of  international  relations  is  not  to  be  ex- 
pected from  an  international  collaboration  of  the 
masses,  from  an  arbitrary  reform  of  foreign  policies, 
or  from  the  League  of  Nations;  for  the  masses  are 
even  more  nationalistic  than  their  leaders,  foreign  pol- 
icy is  instinctive  and  not  subject  to  arbitrary  transfor- 
mations, and  no  institution  can  rise  higher  than  the  in- 
dividuals concerned  in  it.  Even  the  economic  solidarity 
of  the  world  is  not  sufficient  to  keep  the  peace,  because 
nations  are  not  ruled  entirely  by  interest,  but  are  fre- 
quently carried  away  by  their  emotions.  What,  then, 
are  the  factors  on  which  the  statesman  must  build? 

In  the  first  place,  he  will  not  combat  but  will  respect 
the  sentiment  of  nationalism.  It  is  possible,  in  the 
course  of  time,  to  undermine  this  sentiment,  but  it  is 
dangerous  to  do  so;  for  so  preeminently  is  it  a  safe- 
guard against  internal  anarchy,  that  with  its  collapse, 
society  itself  tends  to  go  to  pieces.  The  formation  of 
powerful  nationalistic  states  represents  politically  an 
advance  over  the  tribal  or  feudal  regimes.  Lacking 
the  sense  of  nationality,  India  is  governed  against  its 
will,  in  so  far  as  it  has  any  will,  by  a  handful  of  Brit- 


«78  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

ish;  and  China  has  fallen  a  prey  to  civil  war  and  to 
foreign  encroachments.  Unless  it  is  founded  solidly 
on  nationalism,  any  international  society  whatsoever 
will  be  but  a  grand  superstructure  on  a  foundation  of 
quicksand. 

In  the  second  place,  the  Idea  of  International  eco- 
nomic solidarity  must  be  pushed  as  far  as  possible,  and 
made,  as  far  as  possible,  to  harmonize  with  political 
aspirations. 

In  the  third  place,  there  Is  the  sentiment  of  race  to 
be  reckoned  with,  both  as  a  factor  of  cohesion,  and  as 
a  factor  of  disaggregation. 

Finally,  there  are  the  national  Instincts,  of  which  I 
have  already  spoken,  of  self-preservation,  and  of  ex- 
pansion. Fear  keeps  some  nations  apart,  but  brings 
others  together.  Even  the  instinct  of  expansion,  preg- 
nant with  conflict  as  it  is,  has  certain  cohesive  aspects. 

As  the  scientist  studies  and  seeks  to  utilize  the  prop- 
erties of  the  plant  or  animal  on  which  he  is  working, 
so  must  the  statesman  seek  to  utilize  these  five  puissant 
factors  In  international  relations — nationalism,  eco- 
nomic interest,  race  sentiment,  the  Instinct  of  self- 
preservation,  and  the  Instinct  of  expansion — seeking 
how  far,  without  Injuring  the  organism  as  a  whole,  it 
may  be  possible  to  atrophy  the  less,  and  develop  the 
more,  useful  traits. 


THE  RESTORATION  OF  EQUILIBRIUM 

The  cure  for  Europe's  ills,  political  as  well  as  eco- 
nomic, is,  I  have  sought  to  show,  entente  or  federation; 
and  I  have  indicated  the  factors  which  the  statesmen 
may  use  in  the  formulation  and  application  of  his  poli- 
cies of  reconstruction.  It  is  now  time  to  inquire  what 
kind  of  federation  may  be  possible  in  the  present  cir- 
cumstances. The  idea  of  one  single  federation  en- 
globing  all  the  European  nations,  the  dream  of  a 
United  States  of  Europe,  though  in  itself  both  noble 
and  appealing,  is  still,  I  fear,  premature.  The  poet  and 
the  visionary  may  continue  to  prepare  its  advent  by 
their  puissant  propaganda;  but  the  statesman,  finding 
it  incompatible  with  the  quickened  sentiment  of  race, 
and  difficult  of  realization  because  of  the  wide  differ- 
ences, mental  and  material,  now  existing  between  the 
European  nations,  will  prefer  to  devote  his  energies 
to  schemes  of  more  immediate  promise.  There  re- 
mains the  possibility  of  partial  federations,  which  is 
indeed  the  solution  toward  which,  more  and  more  ob- 
viously, Europe  is  tending. 

At  the  risk  of  seeming  to  draw  a  far-fetched  analogy, 
I  would  point  out  that,  according  to  one  of  the  latest 
scientific  tenets,  health  and  equilibrium  are  synonymous 
throughout  the  manifested  universe,  and  disequilibrium 
is  concomitant  with  disease.  There  is  a  theory  of  phys- 
ics which  suggests  that  matter  itself,  in  its  ultimate 

279 


280  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

particles,  may  be  merely  an  equilibrium  of  positive  and 
negative  force.  However  this  may  be,  it  does  not  seem 
to  me  fantastic  to  conclude,  no  less  from  the  evidence 
of  history  than  from  the  suggestions  of  physics  and 
biology,  that  in  the  body  politic,  as  in  the  human  body, 
disequilibrium  means  trouble,  and  that  to  eliminate  this 
trouble,  nothing  less  than  a  restoration  of  equilibrium 
will  suffice.  Those  governments,  certainly,  appear  most 
stable  which,  like  that  of  the  United  States,  are  based 
upon  a  nice  balance  of  classes,  parties  and  functions. 
The  hegemony  of  one  class  or  of  one  party  within  the 
state  leads  in  time  to  its  overthrow  by  revolution ;  and 
the  hegemony  or  the  attempted  hegemony  of  one  nation 
over  the  others  leads  inevitably  to  disastrous  wars. 

Much  evil  has  been  spoken  of  the  principle  of  the 
balance  of  power,  because  it  was  that  under  which 
Europe  was  living  in  the  fatal  year,  19 14.  I  would 
remark,  however,  that  it  was  not  the  principle  which 
was  then  at  fault,  but  its  application.  The  war  was 
brought  on,  not  by  the  establishment  of  an  equilibrium 
of  alliances,  but  by  what  appeared  to  be  a  disequilibrium 
in  favor  of  the  Central  Powers.  If  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria had  realized  they  would  have  to  fight  not  only 
France  and  Russia,  but  also  Britain,  and  later  even  the 
United  States,  they  would  not  have  provoked  the  war; 
which  may  thus  in  a  sense  be  said  to  have  been  due 
to  the  equivocal  attitude  of  Britain  in  Europe. 

At  the  present  time,  Europe  is  groping  blindly,  in- 
stinctively, toward  a  reorganization  of  the  balance  of 
power,  which  will  restore  its  shattered  equilibrium. 
This  Instinctive  groping  is  even  now  playing  an  essential 
part  In  the  foreign  policies  of  all  the  European  nations. 
If  the  results  are  so  slow  to  appear,  it  is  for  no  other 


THE  RESTORATION  OF  EQUILIBRIUM  281 

reason  than  that  certain  essential  elements  in  the  fu- 
ture balance — notably  Russia  and  Germany — are  still 
obscure  in  their  political  orientation,  and  that  the  other 
nations  are  thus  obliged  to  proceed  with  extreme  wari- 
ness. Sooner  or  later,  the  future  direction  both  of 
Russia  and  of  Germany  will  begin  to  become  clear. 
In  that  day,  within  the  League  of  Nations  if  the  League 
persists,  or  without  it  if  the  League  succumbs,  the  bal- 
ance of  power  in  Europe  will  be  restored.  Then,  and 
not  until  then,  may  the  work  of  political  reconstruction 
be  said  to  have  been  accomplished,  and  health  to  have 
returned. 

Meanwhile,  within  the  area  of  small  and  relatively 
weak  nations  which  have  been  designated  as  "Balkan- 
ized  Europe"  the  leading  statesmen,  soundly  inspired, 
are  already  endeavoring,  by  a  more  or  less  clever  use 
of  the  factors  of  nationalism,  economic  interest,  race 
sentiment,  self-preservation  and  expansion,  to  build  up 
a  number  of  partial  and  local  balances.  This  is  the 
secret  underlying  all  the  checker-board  intrigues  of 
neighbor  against  neighbor.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the 
"Petite  Entente"  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  Roumania  and 
Jugo-Slavia.  It  is  the  reason  of  Hungary's  sympathy 
with  Italy  and  Poland,  and  of  Bulgaria's  desire  to  fed- 
erate with  Jugo-Slavia.  To  become  alarmed  over  these 
manifestations  is  therefore  a  singular  error,  for  they 
are  nothing  more  or  less  than  a  sign  of  returning  health. 
Of  necessity,  one  combination  opposes  and  threatens 
another.  Such  opposition,  indeed,  is  the  very  reason 
of  its  existence,  without  which  it  would  lack  cohesive 
force.  The  danger  is  not  in  the  fact  of  opposition, 
but  in  the  possibility  that  here  again  the  newly  formed 
equilibrium  may  be  broken  by  the  apparent  superiority 


282  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

of  one  combination  over  another,  thus  tempting  the 
stronger  to  risk  the  hazards  of  war.  This  contingency, 
however,  can  be  effectively  prevented  by  the  great  pow- 
ers, if  they  will  have  a  care  always  to  lean  their  weight 
a  little  on  the  weaker  side  and  so  right  the  toppling 
scales. 

To  form  even  a  dual  entente,  in  the  present  state  of 
mind  of  the  nations  of  Central  Europe,  is  no  small 
undertaking.  It  is  easy  to  look  at  the  map  and  ask 
oneself  why  in  the  name  of  common  sense  this  small 
people  does  not  federate  with  that;  but  in  practice, 
each  people  is  so  suspicious  even  of  its  friends,  so  fear- 
ful of  making  a  costly  mistake,  that  nothing  less  than 
the  whole  skill  of  an  able  statesman  is  sufficient  to 
bring  the  shy  young  couple  to  the  signing  point.  In 
the  first  place,  he  must  be  careful  not  to  wound  the 
tender  susceptibilities  of  the  people's  nationalism.  He 
must  then  appeal  to  their  reason  with  demonstrations 
of  mutual  economic  interest.  If  the  two  countries  are 
similar  in  race  he  will  seek  to  quicken  racial  sentiment; 
If  dissimilar,  to  allay  this  sentiment,  or  to  place  it  in 
common  opposition  to  still  a  third  race.  Taking  ac- 
count of  the  Instinct  of  self-preservation,  he  will  show 
how  the  proposed  alliance  strengthens  the  defensive 
position  of  the  two  countries  against  a  common  danger ; 
and,  finally,  taking  account  of  the  instinct  of  expansion, 
he  will  indicate  some  obvious  programme  of  collabora- 
tion in  economic,  cultural  or  political  penetration 
abroad. 

The  objection  may  be  raised  that  the  alliances 
formed  In  the  attempt  to  establish  a  new  equilibrium 
may  serve  not  to  reconcile  neighbors  to  one  another, 
but  only  to  embitter  them  the  more,  thus  failing  to 


THE  RESTORATION  OF  EQUILIBRIUM    283 

break  down  the  present  disastrous  economic  barriers. 
But  I  would  reply  that  the  mainstay  of  these  barriers 
is  fear.  The  establishment  of  firm  alliances,  in  quelling 
this  fear  and  restoring  self-confidence,  will  permit  of 
trade  agreements  even  between  neighbors  belonging 
to  opposite  combinations.  The  principal  foreign  trade 
of  Germany,  before  the  war,  was  not  with  Austria- 
Hungary,  Germany's  "brilliant  second,"  but  with 
France  and  Britain,  Germany's  great  rivals. 


PART  VI 

PRESENT  POLITICAL  TENDENCIES 


THE  RECOVERY  OF  RUSSIA 

In  the  opinion  of  many  observers — an  opinion  which 
I  myself  share — the  chief  obstacle  to  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  European  equilibrium  at  the  present  time  is 
the  prevailing  doubt  as  to  the  future  political  orienta- 
tion of  Russia.  Even  in  its  present  abject  misery  this 
powerful  block  of  nearly  one  hundred  millions,  settled 
solidly  midway  between  Europe  and  Asia,  simply  can- 
not be  ignored,  either  politically  or  economically.  Ac- 
cording to  Niederle's  estimate,  there  were  in  1900, 
fifty-nine  million  Great  Russians  (Moscovites),  six 
million  White  Russians,  and  twenty-seven  million  Lit- 
tle Russians  (Ukrainians,  Ruthenians)  ;  and  the  num- 
ber has  probably  increased  by  ten  per  cent,  in  the  last 
twenty  years,  for  the  race  is  strong  and  prolific.  But 
to  attempt  to  foresee,  in  the  existing  confusion,  what 
direction  Russia  will  ultimately  take,  is  hazardous;  and 
to  elaborate  a  balance  of  power  leaving  Russia  out  of 
account,  is  impossible,  for  the  entire  Pan-Slav  move- 
ment, involving  Czecho-Slovakia,  Jugo-Slavia  and  Bul- 
garia, is  based,  as  I  shall  show  later,  on  the  idea  of 
"Mother  Russia."  Moreover,  any  equilibrium  built 
up  now,  without  Russia,  is  destined  inevitably  to  fall 
into  violent  disequilibrium  as  soon  as  Russia  once  more 
begins  to  make  its  weight  felt. 

The  unanimity  with  which  statesmen  seem  to  con- 
sider that  Russia  will  again  become  a  great  power  is 

287 


288  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

impressive.  No  less  in  Poland  and  Roumania,  than  in 
France,  Britain  and  America,  this  view  is  prevalent. 
In  the  great  sickness  which  has  afflicted  the  mighty 
empire  since  19 17,  not  only  has  it  been  desperately 
weakened  within  by  the  deadly  venom  of  Bolshevism, 
but  its  "hereditary  enemies" — first  Germany,  then 
Britain,  Japan,  Roumania,  Poland — have  sought  to  dis- 
aggregate it  for  ever.  Poland  and  Finland  have  been 
reconstituted  as  independent  states.  Roumania  has  re- 
annexed  Bessarabia.  Esthonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania 
have  proclaimed  and  upheld  their  autonomy.  The 
Caucasus  has  dissolved  into  a  number  of  small  nation- 
alities. Japan  has  occupied  Vladivostok  and  Northern 
Sakhalin.  China  has  reoccupied  Northern  Mongolia. 
There  has  even  been  an  effort  to  create  an  autonomous 
White  Russia  on  the  Polish  frontier,  and  an  auton- 
omous Ukraine.  Thus,  instead  of  acquiring,  as  it  had 
hoped  when  it  entered  the  war,  Constantinople,  North- 
ern Persia,  a  part  of  Asia  Minor,  and  a  rectification 
of  the  German  frontier,  Russia  has  been  clipped,  shorn, 
diminished  on  every  side,  and  shaken  to  its  very  vitals. 
But  the  probabilities  are  that  this  vast,  brooding  and 
powerful  Slav  people  can  neither  be  permanently  dis- 
aggregated, nor  deprived  for  long  of  its  expansive 
force.  It  is  true  that  the  White  Russians  and  the 
Little  Russians  are  in  some  small  particulars  of  dia- 
lect and  custom  distinct  from  the  Great  Russians; 
nevertheless,  they  are  all  self-consciously  Russian  and 
they  will  hold  together.  They  number,  as  I  have  said, 
one  hundred  millions.  Absent  from  the  Paris  confer- 
ence, is  it  to  be  imagined  that  the  Russia  of  the  future 
will  passively  accept  the  settlements,  injurious  to  Rus- 
sian interests,  dictated  by  this  conference?    Or  that  it 


THE  RECOVERY  OF  RUSSIA  «89 

will  recognize  the  treaties  made  by  the  Bolshevist  gov- 
ernment? To  think  this  would  be  naive.  The  day 
will  Surely  come — and  in  this,  as  I  have  said,  European 
statesmen  seem  to  be  agreed — ^when  Russia  will  de- 
mand an  accounting.  In  that  day,  the  so-called  Baltic 
and  Caucasian  states,  too  small,  too  weak,  to  exist 
alone,  will,  most  observers  expect,  slip  back  under  the 
powerful  influence  of  Moscow.  The  question  of  the 
Eastern  frontiers  of  Finland  and  Poland  will  be  re- 
opened. Roumania,  holding  Bessarabia,  may  well 
tremble.  The  Greeks,  newly  reinstalled  in  the  outer 
precincts  of  Constantinople,  will  turn  anxiously  to 
Britain,  their  protector,  for  advice  and  aid.  The  Brit- 
ish protectorate  over  Persia,  the  Japanese  encroach- 
ments in  the  Far  East  will  be  viewed  with  the  cold  eye 
of  an  Implacable  hostility.  In  short,  the  day  of  Rus- 
sia's return  to  health  and  strength  will  be  a  day  of 
reckoning.  This  day  may  be  far  off;  for  the  sickness 
of  Russia  Is  profound,  and  the  cure  must  needs  be 
long.  But  that  it  will  come,  eventually,  five  years 
hence,  ten  years,  twenty — who  can  doubt?  And  the 
mind  of  the  statesman,  meditating  upon  these  things, 
is  clouded  and  troubled;  for  the  years  of  Russia's  re- 
covery can  only  be  years  of  anxious  suspense  to  war- 
torn  Europe,  and  not  until  the  Russia  of  the  future  has 
clearly  spoken  its  word  can  the  Europe  of  the  future 
begin  to  take  symmetrical  form. 

In  his  book,  "The  New  Europe,"  Dr.  Masaryk,  now 
president  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  who  is  a  noted  pan-Slav, 
expressed  himself  thus  regarding  the  future  constitu- 
tion of  Russia — and  I  do  not  know  that  any  better 
informed  or  more  authoritative  opinion  has  as  yet 
been  emitted: 


290  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

"Russia,  in  conformity  with  the  right  of  self-dis- 
position, will  organize  itself  as  a  federation  of  nations. 
In  addition  to  the  Poles,  there  will  enter  into  this  fed- 
eration the  Esthonians,  the  Letts,  the  Lithuanians;  the 
Ukraine  will  form  an  autonomous  part  of  Russia.  The 
various  small  nations  of  the  Caucasus  and  of  the  other 
parts  of  Russia  and  of  Russia-in-Asia,  will  enjoy  a 
national  autonomy  corresponding  to  their  degree  of 
culture,  their  national  consciousness,  and  their  number. 
The  Prussian  part  of  Lithuania,  with  a  few  Letts,  will 
be  joined  to  Lithuania.  The  Roumanian  part  of  Bess- 
arabia will  be  reunited  to  Roumania.  Finland,  If  it 
concludes  an  agreement  on  this  subject  with  Russia,  will 
be  independent." 

While  there  Is  little  doubt  that  Russia  will  aspire  ul- 
timately to  reconquer,  not  merely  one  or  two,  but  the 
entirety,  of  the  provinces  and  spheres  of  influence  lost 
since  19 14,  it  cannot,  obviously,  pursue  them  all  at 
once.  The  question  of  which  of  them  it  will  consider 
most  vital  is  the  important  question  for  Europe,  for 
upon  rfie  response  made  to  it,  depend  whole  series  of 
possible  political  combinations.  If,  for  example,  Rus- 
sia should  first  turn  its  attention  to  Finland  and  Poland, 
it  would  find  friendly  sympathy  and  perhaps  even  active 
support  in  Sweden  and  Germany,  which  are  hostile  to 
the  Finns  and  Poles,  and  it  would  avert  for  the  time 
being  the  almost  inevitable  moment  of  conflict  with 
Britain.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  should  ignore  the 
Finns  temporarily,  make  friends  with  the  Poles,  and 
turn  its  attention  to  the  Balkans  and  Constantinople, 
its  immediate  enemies  would  be  Roumania,  Greece  and 
Britain,  and  its  natural  allies,  Jugo-Slavia,  Bulgaria  and 
France.    If,  finally,  In  still  a  third  hypothesis,  it  should 


THE  RECOVERY  OF  RUSSIA  291 

direct  its  first  efforts  at  a  re-expansion  rather  toward 
the  east  and  southeast  than  toward  the  west,  as  in- 
deed the  Bolshevists  seem  now  to  be  doing,  it  would 
straightway  encounter  the  British  in  Persia,  Mesopo- 
tamia and  perhaps  Afghanistan,  and  the  Japanese, 
Britain's  allies,  in  Manchuria. 

All  in  all,  the  great  problem  for  the  Russians  is 
whether  they  have  most  to  gain  by  an  alliance  with 
Germany  or  by  an  alliance  with  France.  They  cannot 
have  both ;  they  must  choose.  If  they  ally  themselves 
with  Germany  against  Poland,  Britain  doubtless  will 
be  disinterested,  and  France  hostile,  though  largely 
helpless.  But  having  disposed  of  Poland,  they  would 
once  more  find  themselves  face  to  face  with  the  Ger- 
mans. The  fear  has  been  expressed  that  they  might 
then,  in  compact  with  Germany,  set  forth  upon  the 
conquest  of  Europe;  but  this  is  not  likely,  for  they 
would  find  a  powerful  Franco-British  combination  ar- 
rayed against  them,  and  even  if  they  were  successful 
they  would  be  sure,  sooner  or  later,  to  come  into  con- 
flict with  the  Germans.  Indeed,  the  two  most  numerous 
and  most  vital  races  in  Europe  are  precisely  the  Ger- 
mans and  the  Slavs.  They  cannot  both  prevail.  At 
best,  they  can  merely  serve  to  balance  one  another,  in 
opposing  sets  of  alliances. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  making  their  peace  with  the 
Poles,  and  rejecting  the  proferred  German  alliance, 
the  Russians  should  come  to  an  understanding  with  the 
French,  they  would  confront  the  hostility  of  Germany 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  hostility  of  Britain  on  the 
other.  But  they  would  be  protected  from  Germany 
by  the  Polish  rampart,  and  they  would  have  the  sup- 
port, as  well,  of  the  pan-Slav  states — Czecho-Slovakia, 


292  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

Jugo-Slavia  and  Bulgaria.  They  could  aim  at  Con- 
stantinople to  the  southwest,  and  at  Persia,  Mesopo- 
tamia, Afghanistan  to  the  southeast.  If  Japan  inter- 
fered in  Britain's  favor,  the  United  States,  already  so 
sensitive  in  this  direction,  would  probably  soon  be 
aroused  against  Japan.  Britain,  to  whom  Russia  is 
mihtarily  inaccessible,  would  be  threatened  at  its  weak- 
est point — its  Asiatic  Empire.  And  if  the  Franco-Slav 
combination  against  Germany  should  prove  fruitful,  it 
would  not  be  under  the  disadvantage  of  having  to  quar- 
rel over  the  spoils,  for  France  and  Russia  have  no 
rival  Interests.  On  the  whole,  I  suspect  that  Russia's 
best  course  would  be  to  abstain  from  the  obvious  temp- 
tation of  a  German  alliance,  and  accept  the  challenge 
which  Britain,  in  the  Balkans,  in  Asia  Minor,  in  Persia 
and  in  the  Baltic  states,  has  so  boldly  thrown  down 
to  it. 

I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood,  in  setting  forth 
these  political  hypotheses,  as  coolly  prophesying  the 
calamity  of  war;  though  I  do  consider  a  future  conflict 
between  Russia  and  Poland,  between  Russia  and  Japan,. 
or  even  between  Russia  and  Britain,  to  be  by  no  means 
out  of  the  question.  What  would  seem  to  be  certain 
is  that,  one  way  or  another,  by  fair  means  or  foul,  by 
peaceful  negotiations  if  possible,  but  by  active  hostili- 
ties If  necessary,  Russia  is  going  to  seek  satisfaction  for 
what  it  considers  its  present  wrongs.  To  keep  the 
peace,  it  will  perhaps  be  necessary,  when  the  time 
comes,  to  make  concessions  to  a  revivified  Russia.  The 
latter  can  perhaps  afterwards  be  held  within  proper 
bounds  by  the  balance  of  power  which  can  at  any  time 
be  arrayed  against  It  by  the  concert  of  peaceful  nations. 
Unless,  however,  it  receives  a  minimum  of  satisfaction, 


THE  RECOVERY  OF  RUSSIA  293 

even  the  world's  widespread  desire  for  peace  will 
hardly,  I  fear,  be  sufficient  to  restrain  Russia's  bellig- 
erent resentment.  Such,  too,  is  the  feeling  of  many 
other  observers  in  Europe  at  the  present  time. 

Even  those  Anglo-Saxon  politicians,  who  are  perhaps 
not  greatly  concerned  over  Russia's  political  recovery, 
are  prompt  to  admit  the  general  advantages  which 
would  accrue  from  its  speedy  economic  recovery.  Un- 
fortunately, here  as  elsewhere,  the  latter  cannot  pre- 
cede, it  can  only  follow,  the  former. 

The  world's  great  need  at  present  is  food  and  raw- 
stuffs.  In  1 9 13  Russia  exported  the  equivalent  of 
4,043,000,000  gold  francs,  almost  the  whole  of  which 
was  in  the  form  of  grain,  dairy  products,  animal 
products  and  raw-stuffs.  There  is  just  now  a  worldwide 
crisis  in  building  materials;  Russia  furnished  thirty- 
seven  per  cent,  of  the  world's  total  timber  exports. 
There  is  a  crisis  in  the  linen  industry;  Russia  supplied 
seventy-five  per  cent,  of  Europe's  flax.  Irish  linen 
is  made  from  Russian  flax.  Belfast,  in  19 17,  was  still 
importing  fifty-two  thousand  tons  of  flax;  it  receives 
at  present  scarcely  six  thousand  tons.  Ninety  per  cent. 
of  the  French  linen  mills  are  dependent  on  Russian 
flax.  Finally,  in  the  list  of  Russia's  19 13  exports,  let 
the  hungry  peoples  of  Austria  and  Poland  glance  at 
these  significant  items:  Cereals,  11,000,000  tons; 
eggs,  3,572,000,000;  butter,  78,082  tons!  Obviously, 
the  persistence  of  Russia's  sickness  is  a  serious  handicap 
to  European  reconstruction. 

At  the  same  time,  Russia  as  a  future  market  for  de- 
velopment is  exercising  a  powerful  fascination  on  the 
minds  of  industrial  and  commercial  countries.  It  is 
generally  conceded  that  Russia  will  need  foreign  cap- 


294  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

ital,  manufactured  goods  of  all  kinds,  foreign  technical 
assistance,  and  the  services  of  foreign  middlemen.  Be- 
fore the  war,  Germany  was  in  a  fair  way  to  capture 
this  immense  territory  economically.  It  had  flooded 
Russia  with  German  foremen,  engineers  and  mer- 
chants; it  was  lending  capital  and  was  shipping  in  the 
products  of  its  factories.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Ger- 
many is  now  hoping  to  resume  this  remunerative  collab- 
oration. Russia,  indeed,  offers  it  not  only  a  market, 
but  a  field  of  emigration  for  its  surplus  population. 
Germany's  pre-war  example,  however,  has  not  been 
lost  on  the  other  nations,  and  its  ambition  will  not  be 
without  rivals.  There  seems  scarcely  to  be  a  trading 
country  in  the  western  world  which  is  not  dreaming  of 
the  Russian  market.  Sweden,  Denmark  and  Finland 
are  feverishly  preparing  "free  zones"  in  their  ports, 
and  hope  to  profit  by  the  transit  trade  to  and  from 
Russia.  Germany  already  has  its  commercial  agents 
in  the  land  of  the  Soviets.  Czecho-Slovak  and  Italian 
manufacturers  expect  their  goods  to  flow  toward  Rus- 
sia in  a  steady  stream.  Russia's  pre-war  textile  in- 
dustry was  in  Poland;  and  the  Poles  now  claim  Russia 
not  only  as  a  market  for  their  great  textile  mills,  but 
also  as  a  field  of  activity  for  their  commission  dealers 
and  middlemen,  whose  knowledge  of  the  Russian  lan- 
guage and  customs  is  supposed  to  equip  them  peculiarly 
for  this  role.  France  is  making  vague  commercial  ten- 
tatives  in  the  Caucasus  and  the  Baltic  States,  and  looks 
forward,  no  doubt,  to  increasing  its  already  consider- 
able investments  of  capital  in  native  Russian  indus- 
tries. Britain  is  making  a  tremendous  effort.  It  has 
acquired  vast  interests  in  Danzig,  the  Baltic  ports,  and 
the  Caucasus.    It  has  formed  a  great  corporation  for 


THE  RECOVERY  OF  RUSSIA  295 

Russians  trade.  The  armistice  was  no  sooner  signed 
than  its  cloth  mills  stocked  Constantinople  with  British 
textiles,  expecting  soon  to  move  them  on  to  Odessa. 
But  Russia's  gates  remaining  closed,  British  cloth  may 
still  be  bought  in  Constantinople  cheaper  than  in  Lon- 
don. Finally,  the  United  States,  whose  pre-war  trade 
with  Russia  was  largely  conducted  through  British  and 
German  intermediaries,  is  displaying  a  lively  interest  in 
Russia  as  a  field  both  for  export  and  for  the  investment 
of  capital.  In  short,  from  every  commercial  country 
under  the  spell  of  Russia's  fascinating  promise,  agents 
have  gone  forth,  to  Reval,  to  Danzig,  to  Helslngfors, 
to  Riga,  to  Libau,  to  Sebastopol,  to  Tiflis,  and  even 
to  Petrograd  and  Moscow,  inquiring,  prospecting,  bar- 
gaining, drafting  contracts.  The  condition  of  Russia's 
transports  is  such  that  some  time  must  necessarily 
elapse  before  there  can  be  any  considerable  trade  with 
the  country ;  but  every  one  seems  to  realize  that  those 
who  come  first  will  be  first  served,  and  that  the  Russian 
market  is  a  prize  well  worth  a  few  years'  patience,; 


PAN-SLAVISM 

Pan-Slavism  is  the  idea  that  all  Slavs,  being  of  the 
same  race,  should  unite,  in  one  way  or  another,  to 
resist  foreign  assimilation  and  to  work  for  the  greater 
glory  of  the  Slav  peoples.  There  are  in  Europe  some- 
thing like  one  hundred  and  forty-nine  million  of  Slavs, 
to  wit:  100  million  Russians,  22  million  Poles,  11  mil- 
lion Czecho-Slovaks,  12  million  Jugo-Slavs,  4  million 
Bulgars.  The  movement  is  therefore  of  no  slight  im- 
port. The  weakness  of  all  the  Slav  peoples,  up  to  the 
present — no  less  of  the  Russians  than  of  the  Poles,  no 
less  of  the  Czechs  than  of  the  Serbs  and  Bulgars — 
has  been  their  chronic  addiction  to  internal  dissensions. 
Though  pan-Slavism  is  several  centuries  old,  though 
it  had  had  its  poets  and  its  historians,  it  was  powerless, 
until  something  like  half  a  century  ago,  to  influence  this 
fatal  racial  anarchy;  and  little  by  little,  the  Slavs,  fall- 
ing under  foreign  dominion,  were  being  assimilated. 
In  the  last  half  century,  however,  the  beginnings  of  a 
genuine  race  consciousness  have  begun  to  manifest 
themselves.  Russia  was  instrumental  in  liberating  the 
Balkan  Slavs  from  the  Turkish  yoke,  and  it  at  once 
assumed  the  role  of  their  protector.  The  occupation 
of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  by  Austria  quickened  a  com- 
mon Jugo-Slav  sentiment.  The  Polish  agitation  for  in- 
dependence, though  directed  in  part  against  Russia, 

was  generally  viewed  with  sjmipathy  by  the  Slavs. 

396 


PAN-SLAVISM  297 

Finally,  the  Czechs  of  Bohemia,  finding  themselves 
threatened  with  absorption  by  the  Germans,  began  a 
vigorous  cultural  warfare  in  favor  of  the  Slav  tradition. 
There  was  a  pan-Slav  congress  at  Prague  in  1848,  one 
at  Moscow  in  1867,  and  another  very  important  one  at 
Prague  in  1908.  The  Serbs,  in  1912,  marched  against 
the  Turks  singing  a  famous  pan-Slav  hymn  written  by 
a  Czech.  The  assassination  of  the  Austrian  Archduke 
at  Sarajevo  was  the  act  of  a  pan-Slav  fanatic.  Indeed, 
the  Germans'  growing  fear  of  the  Slavs,  and  their  de- 
sire to  crush  this  dangerous  movement  before  it  could 
be  developed  any  further,  may  be  set  down  as  one  of 
the  principal  motives  of  the  war. 

The  Germans  were  right  to  dread  the  deepening 
intensity  of  Slav  sentiment,  for  it  was  in  truth  directed 
chiefly  against  them.  Pan-Slavism  may  almost  be  said 
to  have  been  stimulated  into  active  being  by  pan-Ger- 
manism. The  opposition  of  the  one  to  the  other  was 
cultural  and  racial,  in  the  deepest  sense  of  these  words. 
The  achievement  of  German  unity,  under  Bismarck,  was 
both  an  object  lesson  and  a  dire  threat  to  the  Slavs. 
It  was  a  lesson,  because  it  suggested  to  them  that  if 
the  Germanic  peoples  could  join  together  in  a  single 
Empire,  the  Slav  peoples  might  be  well  inspired  to  do 
likewise.  It  was  a  threat,  because  it  was  immediately 
followed  by  an  intensive  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Ger- 
mans, both  in  Austria  and  in  Germany,  at  Germanizing 
and  so  assimilating  the  Central-European  Slavs,  a  task 
which  was  all  the  more  promising  owing  to  the  obvious 
influence  and  unchallenged  superiority  of  German  cul- 
ture throughout  Central  and  Eastern  Europe, 

But  the  Slavs  had  no  intention  of  allowing  themselves 
to  be  swallowed  up  in  the  swelling  sea  of  Germanism. 


298  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

They  knew  only  too  well  how  thoroughly  the  thing 
could  be  accomplished.  There  is  in  Germany  to-day  a 
small,  compact  community  of  Slavs,  numbering  perhaps 
a  hundred  and  fifty-seven  thousand,  known  as  the 
Serbs  of  Lausitz — a  region  which  once  formed  part  of 
the  Bohemian  crown,  but  in  1635  was  ceded  to  Saxony. 
These  are  all  that  now  remain  of  the  powerful  Slav 
tribes  who  once  inhabited  the  valleys  of  the  Elbe  and 
the  Oder.  They  were  not  driven  out;  they  were  assim- 
ilated. The  weaker  culture  succumbed  to  the  stronger. 
But  Bautzen,  Kottbus,  Zerbst,  Dresden,  Leipzig,  Chem- 
nitz, Torgau,  Glogau,  Stargard — all  these  are  old  Slav 
names,  Germanized.  And  the  Slavs  who  still  remain 
have  not  forgotten.  The  pan-Slav  poet,  Kollar,  wan- 
dering in  the  neighborhood  of  Jena,  where  he  went  to 
school  in  18 15-19,  wrote:  "Each  place,  each  village, 
each  hill  and  stream  bearing  a  Slav  name  seems  to  me 
a  tomb,  a  monument,  in  a  gigantic  cemetery."  And  if 
the  Germans,  in  the  name  of  pan-Germanism,  could,  in 
1 9 14,  boldly  claim  to  annex  Belgium,  Switzerland,  Hol- 
land and  North  Eastern  France,  the  Slavs,  using  pre- 
cisely the  same  vague  philological  and  historical  argu- 
ments, may  claim  to  inherit  Saxony  and  most  of  Prus- 
sia. The  sword  is  two-edged,  and  cuts  both  ways. 
Who  knows  what  mystic  propaganda  may  arise  in  the 
future  among  the  Slav  peoples  for  the  "liberation"  of 
"our  brothers,  the  Serbs  of  Lausitz,"  and  the  recon- 
quest  of  those  ancient  Slav  lands,  the  valleys  of  the 
Elbe  and  the  Oder? 

The  renaissance  of  Poland,  and  the  establisliment  of 
Czecho-Slovakia  and  Jugo-Slavia  as  independent  states, 
have  given  a  new  impetus  to  pan-Slavism.  A  mystical, 
or  if  you  prefer,  a  pseudo-scientific  doctrine  is  arising 


PAN-SLAVISM  299 

in  Prague,  Belgrade  and  Sofia,  which  asserts  that  each 
race  in  turn  is  destined  for  a  time  to  dominate  the 
world,  and  that  the  day  of  the  Slav  is  at  hand.  That 
the  doctrine  is  historically  false  matters  little  to  its 
adherents,  for  pan-Slavism  is  derived  less  from  reason 
than  from  faith,  and  a  kind  of  blind  racial  instinct.  It 
is  animated  not  by  definite  aims  but  by  a  vague  force  of 
expansion  exceedingly  difficult  to  define.  Taking  no 
account  of  social  or  political  ideas,  indifferent  alike  to 
Czardom  and  Sovietism,  reposing  confidently  upon  the 
profound  and  obscure  sentiment  of  race,  it  looks  to- 
ward Moscow  as  the  mystical  mother  of  Slavdom.  If 
the  existence  is  threatened  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  Jugo- 
slavia or  Bulgaria,  who  else  should  save  them  but 
Russia  ?  Conversely,  is  it  not  the  bounden  duty  of  the 
smaller  Slav  peoples  to  work  with  all  their  strength  to 
further  the  interests  of  the  greatest  Slav  people,  and 
of  the  Slavs  in  general?  A  movement  of  this  unreason- 
ing, semi-religious  character  is  full  of  high-explosives. 
It  is  by  no  means  impossible  that,  moved  by  pan-Slav 
emotion,  Russia  should  be  the  next  misguided  can- 
didate for  the  hegemony  of  Europe.  The  Slav  com- 
bination, even  in  its  present  half-formed  phase,  is 
strong  enough  to  have  become  already  the  most  sig- 
nificant political  tendency  in  Europe — the  central  cur- 
rent around  which  the  policies  of  the  western  powers 
are  beginning  to  eddy  and  foam. 

As  to  Russia's  ultimate  recovery,  and  as  to  the  cer- 
tainty of  a  day  of  reckoning  for  Russia's  foes,  the  pan- 
Slavs  have  not  the  slightest  doubt.  Their  immediate 
preoccupations  are  rather  the  Polish  question,  and  the 
question  of  Bulgaria's  relation  to  the  Jugo-Slavs.  The 
Poles  are  the  only  Slavs  who  are  not  at  present  sensi- 


300  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

tive  to  pan-Slavism.  Following  the  traditional  Slav 
proclivity  for  racial  dissensions,  the  Poles  have  quar- 
reled with  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  and  have  felt  obliged 
to  go  to  war  against  Bolshevism.  It  is  possible  that 
the  Poles  will  continue  in  the  same  headstrong,  short- 
sighted policies.  It  is  equally  possible,  however,  that 
reconciled  to  Russia,  and  making  their  peace  with  the 
Czecho-Slovaks,  they  too  will  be  swept  along  in  the 
pan-Slav  stream,  adding  their  puissant  millions  to  its 
already  formidable  potentialities.  It  is  in  this  sense, 
in  any  case,  that  the  Slavs  are  bending  their  efforts. 

Between  the  Czecho-Slovaks  and  the  Jugo-Slavs 
there  is  already  a  firm  alliance.  Between  these  two  and 
Russia — any  Russia  I — an  understanding  is  assured. 
Except  for  the  Poles,  the  only  other  Slav  group  whose 
future  orientation  is  doubtful  is  the  Bulgars.  The 
latter,  as  I  have  fully  explained,  desire  to  join  the  Jugo- 
slav confederation,  but  are  still  waiting  for  an  invita- 
tion. Prague  is  even  now  employing  its  good  offices  for 
the  reconciliation  of  Belgrade  and  Sofia ;  and  no  doubt 
Russia  will  in  time  exercise  an  even  more  potent  media- 
tory influence.  Here  again  it  is  possible  that  this  union 
will  never  be  effected,  and  that  Bulgaria,  isolated  and 
embittered,  will  turn  against  the  other  Slavs;  but  it  is 
probable  that  the  Serbs  will  not  long  be  able  to  resist 
the  splendid  prospect  of  creating,  by  taking  Bulgaria 
into  Jugo-Slavia,  a  South-Slav  state,  extending  from 
the  Adriatic  to  the  Black  Sea,  and  dominating  the  Bal- 
kans with  its  twenty  million  hardy,  war-like  inhabitants. 
This  solution  is  confidently  foreseen  by  all  true  pan- 
Slavs. 

Finally,  pan-Slavism  has  a  grievance — a  grievance 
new  and  deep.     A  belief,  which  has  quickly  acquired 


PAN-SLAVISM  801 

the  majestic  proportions  of  a  legend,  has  sprung  up, 
and  is  current  no  less  in  Sofia  and  Warsaw  than  in 
Belgrade,  Prague  and  Moscow,  that  the  decisions  of 
the  Paris  Peace  Conference*  were  dominated  by  a 
gigantic  plot,  largely  of  British  instigation,  to  keep  the 
Slavs  away  from  the  sea.  "We  ask  you  only  to  look 
at  the  evidence,"  they  say.  "You  may  smile  if  you 
like.  The  fact  remains  that  the  recognition  of  the 
Baltic  States  and  Finland  practically  cuts  Russia  off 
from  the  Baltic;  that  Poland  was  prevented  from  ac- 
quiring Danzig  outright;  that  Czecho-Slovakia  is 
buried  in  the  middle  of  Europe;  that  Fiume  is  with- 
held from  Jugo-Slavia;  that  Bulgaria  has  been  cut  off 
from  the  ^Egean;  that  Greece  has  been  installed  in  the 
vicinity  of  Constantinople,  which  was  to  have  been 
given  to  Russia;  that  every  effort  has  been  made  to 
exclude  Russia  from  the  Black  Sea  by  the  creation  of 
an  independent  Ukraine,  and  of  a  series  of  Caucasian 
states;  and  lastly,  that  Russia  has  been  cut  off  from 
the  Pacific  by  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Vladivostok. 
Draw  your  own  conclusions."  In  this  legend,  there  is 
perhaps  an  element  of  truth;  there  is  certainly  an  ele- 
ment of  fantasy.  Its  argument  is  nevertheless  im- 
pressive. The  Slavs — all  the  Slavs — resent  what  they 
consider  a  treacherous  wrong  to  their  race.  They  do 
not  forget;  they  are  biding  their  time. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  GERMANY 

Russia  is  not  the  only  country  the  uncertainty  of 
whose  future  is  retarding  the  restoration  of  European 
equilibrium;  there  is  also  Germany.  Almost  every 
aspect  of  the  defeated  empire's  national  existence — 
economic,  political,  even  territorial — is  enveloped,  at 
the  present  moment,  in  impenetrable  doubt.  Will  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  be  fundamentally  revised?  Will 
Germany  recover  its  old  commercial  and  industrial 
strength  ?  Will  the  Bavarian  and  Rhineland  separatist 
movements  develop?  Will  Germany  lose  the  Silesian 
plebiscite  ?  Will  it  finally  succeed  in  annexing  Austria 
and  reestablishing  its  influence  in  Mittel  Europa? 
These  questions  are  of  the  greatest  moment  to  the 
whole  of  Europe.  But  as  I  write,  not  one  of  them  can 
be  answered  with  genuine  assurance. 

One  obstacle  in  the  way  of  Germany's  prompt  re- 
covery is  the  reparations  programme  of  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles.  The  Germans,  it  is  true,  have  lost  their 
army  and  navy,  their  merchant-marine,  their  colonies, 
and  some  of  their  domestic  territory.  But  they  have 
intensified  their  agriculture;  their  factories  and  com- 
mercial organizations  are  intact;  and  they  still  form  a 
block,  of  sixty  million  industrious  and  disciplined  people, 
holding  sway  in  the  middle  of  Northern  Europe,  from 
France  to  Poland,  and  from  Austria  to  the  North  Sea 
and  the  Baltic.  Left  to  themselves,  they  would  prob- 
ably astonish  every  one  with  the  promptitude  of  their 

302 


THE  FUTURE  OF  GERMANY     303 

return  to  prosperity  and  power;  for  their  economic 
rivals  have  also  been  badly  crippled  by  the  war.  But 
they  are  not  left  to  themselves.  They  are  held  ac- 
countable by  the  peace  treaty  for  reparations  indem- 
nities running  into  hundreds  of  billions  of  gold  marks, 
in  default  of  which  the  seizure  of  their  coal  mines,  their 
railways  and  their  customs  houses  is  by  no  means  an 
impossibility.  They  are  obliged  thus  to  live  in  an  at- 
mosphere of  obscure  menace,  nervous  tension,  and 
moral  exasperation  which  renders  all  serious  recon- 
structive efforts  exceedingly  difficult. 

It  must  not  be  imagined  that  the  Germans  are  filled 
with  penitence  for  the  wrongs  they  inflicted  in  the 
course  of  a  war  for  which  their  country  was  largely  re- 
sponsible. On  the  contrary,  it  Is  they  who  conceive 
themselves  to  have  been  wronged  by  the  peace  con- 
ference. Of  the  condition  in  which  their  armies  left 
northern  France,  they  have,  as  a  whole,  no  idea.  The 
reparations  clauses  seem  to  them  simply  an  outrage, 
contrived  by  Germany's  enemies  for  the  permanent  en- 
slavement of  the  German  people.  This  plot  they  are 
determined  to  frustrate.  And  though  they  are  any- 
thing but  reconciled  to  the  Polish  "corridor"  cutting  off 
East  Prussia  from  the  rest  of  the  reich,  to  the  military 
occupation  of  the  Rhineland,  or  to  the  treaty  prohibi- 
tion against  the  union  of  Austria  and  Germany,  these 
things,  they  consider,  can  wait;  the  first,  the  dominat- 
ing, the  all-important  necessity  of  the  present,  is  the 
revision  of  the  reparations  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles. 

The  policy  by  which  the  Germans  hope  to  effect, 
and  indeed,  are  already  succeeding  in  effecting,  this 
revision  is  obvious  enough.     In  the  first  place,  they 


304  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

have  encouraged  the  investment  of  allied — especially 
English  and  American — capital  in  German  enterprises. 
The  more  allied  capitalists  who  thus  acquire  an  in- 
terest in  German  prosperity,  the  greater  will  become 
the  allied  propaganda  in  Germany's  favor.  In  the 
second  place,  while  taking  care  not  to  seem  to  be  in- 
triguing to  foment  discord  between  the  various  allies, 
they  are  of  course  quick  to  profit  by  such  discords,  which 
in  the  end,  they  expect,  will  prove  their  salvation.  In 
the  third  place,  they  are  trying  by  every  means  to  excite 
popular  sympathy  throughout  the  world  for  their 
miserable  predicament,  and  to  deflect  attention  from 
the  ill-deeds  of  German  militarism  and  imperialism  by 
creating  a  corresponding  counter-sentiment  against 
French  militarism  and  Imperialism.  In  order  to  prove 
their  absolute  good  will,  and  thus  to  strengthen  their 
resistance  on  the  main  points  at  issue,  they  have  finally 
begun  to  disarm,  and  to  deliver  coal  Indemnities,  though 
with  many  a  sigh  and  groan,  and  with  an  occasional 
outburst  of  popular  resentment  against  France.  They 
have  of  course  promptly  adopted  the  theory  of  eco- 
nomic solidarity  of  Europe  put  forward  by  certain 
English  liberal  economists,  but  which  had  not  hereto- 
fore been  popular  In  Germany.  Finally,  in  order  to 
prove  its  utter  Incapacity  to  pay  the  proposed  Indemni- 
ties, the  German  government  seems  to  be  making  a  de- 
liberate effort  to  force  the  country  into  bankruptcy. 
The  German  national  debt,  Increasing  still  by  leaps  and 
bounds,  will  soon,  at  the  present  rate,  stand  not  far  be- 
hind the  total  French  reparations  Indemnity. 

This  last  maneuver,  however,  is  a  dangerous  one. 
The  French  are  vigilant.  They  are  quite  aware  that 
already  the  total  of  German  exports  exceeds  that  of  im- 


THE  FUTURE  OF  GERMANY  306 

ports,  and  that  at  the  same  time  that  the  country  is 
crying  woe  it  has  just  paid  twenty-five  million  marks 
for  foreign  liquors,  and  an  even  larger  sum  for  foreign 
tobacco — neither  of  which  can  be  considered  essentials 
of  existence.  As  for  the  pretended  misery  of  German 
industry,  the  German  newspapers,  in  October,  1920, 
report  the  pajrmcnt  of  dividends  of  twenty-two  per  cent 
by  the  Lindenbcrg  metallurgical  plants,  twenty-two  and 
a  half  per  cent  by  the  Runingen  flour  mills,  thirty  per 
cent  by  the  Zypen  metallurgical  plants,  sixty  per  cent  by 
the  Ammendorf  paper  mills,  etc.  With  the  exception 
of  the  United  States,  Britain,  France  and  Belgium, 
Germany  is  already  in  better  condition,  in  every  respect, 
than  any  other  of  the  recent  belligerents.  If,  there- 
fore, the  German  government  declares  bankruptcy,  the 
French  will  certainly  put  in  an  immediate  claim  upon 
the  country's  resources  and  active  assets. 

Scarcely  less  important  to  Germany  than  the  divis- 
ion of  the  reparations  clauses  is  the  Upper  Silesian 
plebiscite,  still  in  abeyance,  and  the  outcome  of  which 
is  very  doubtful.  If  Upper  Silesia  goes  to  Poland, 
Germany  will  have  barely  enough  coal  for  its  indus- 
tries; if  it  remains  German,  there  will  be  an  ample 
surplus.  The  issue  is  therefore  fundamental,  and  the 
Germans  are  sparing  no  pains — ^propaganda,  terrorism, 
intrigue — ^to  ensure  success.  They  have,  for  example, 
transferred,  it  is  said,  some  sixty  per  cent  of  their  in- 
dustries in  this  region  to  the  control  of  British  capital, 
thereby  enlisting  the  active  sympathy  of  the  British  on 
their  side.  The  Poles,  however,  have  been  scarcely  less 
active,  and  by  a  similar  deal  have  made  doubly  sure  the 
support  of  France.  It  is  possible  that,  in  the  end,  this 
matter  will  be  compromised  by  arbitration  of  the  allies, 


806  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

as  was  the  Teschen  dispute,  for  the  possibility  of  hold- 
ing an  honest  plebiscite  seems  to  have  become  more  and 
more  remote. 

As  a  result  of  the  Interior  strain  and  tension  brought 
about  by  the  calamity  of  defeat,  by  foreign  military 
occupation,  and  by  the  menace  Involved  in  the  repara- 
tions clauses,  the  question  of  German  unity,  which  was 
thought  to  have  been  settled  once  for  all  by  Bismarck, 
has  again  arisen.  On  the  one  hand,  it  might  appear 
that  with  the  abolition  of  the  Empire  and  of  the 
provincial  dynasties,  and  with  the  establishment  of  the 
republic,  German  unity  has  in  fact  been  forged  more 
firmly  than  ever;  and  this  indeed,  in  the  course  of  time, 
may  prove  to  be  the  case.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
tendencies  of  separation  have  recently  manifested 
themselves,  particularly  in  the  Rhineland  and  in  Ba- 
varia, which  cannot  be  Ignored.  Both  these  provinces, 
chagrined  at  having  been  led  to  disaster  under  the 
hegemony  of  Prussia,  seem  to  be  In  a  kind  of  revolt 
against  this  hegemony.  The  industrial  and  commer- 
cial Rhineland,  occupied  by  allied  troops,  has  perhaps  a 
certain  economic  interest  to  tend  to  pull  away  slightly 
from  Berlin.  Bavaria,  which  fought  on  the  side  of 
Austria  against  Prussia  in  1866,  and  was  forced  Into 
the  confederation  against  its  will,  is  the  second  largest 
German  state,  and  pretends,  Indeed,  to  be  the  largest 
truly  German  state,  for  the  Prussians,  it  maintains,  are 
merely  Slavs,  Germanized  by  the  Teutonic  Knights. 
Bavaria  Is  Roman  Catholic,  artistic,  agricultural;  Prus- 
sia is  Protestant,  crude,  Industrial.  There  Is  accord- 
ingly a  genuine  temperamental  difference  between  these 
two  peoples.  It  Is  too  soon  to  say  what  may  come  of 
these  tendencies,  which,  for  obvious  reasons,  are  being 


THE  FUTURE  OF  GERMANY  307 

supported  passively,  if  not  actively,  by  France.  Prob- 
ably if  Germany  weathers  successfully  the  crisis  of  the 
next  few  years,  German  nationality  will  emerge  more 
strongly  cemented  than  ever.  If,  however,  conditions 
should  become  worse,  if  Germany  should  lose  the  Siles- 
ian  plebiscite,  if  France  should  occupy  the  Ruhr  Basin 
as  security  for  reparations,  if  Bolshevist  disorders 
should  increase,  if  one  economic,  political  and  industrial 
disturbance  should  follow  another,  it  Is  in  my  opinion  by 
no  means  impossible  that  the  Rhineland  and  Bavaria 
should  secede  to  follow  their  own  individual  destinies. 

The  German  government,  scenting  the  danger,  is  at 
present  trying  to  forestall  the  separatist  movement  by 
making  concessions  to  it,  and  turning  it  to  advantage. 
Thus  it  is  not  unusual  to  hear  Prussian  leaders  talk  at 
present  of  a  new  federative  constitution  in  which  a 
large  local  autonomy  should  be  accorded  to  the  various 
states.  By  way  of  plebiscite  propaganda,  local  auton- 
omy has  already  been  promised  to  Upper  Silesia.  And 
there  are  those  who  suspect  that,  knowing  Bavaria's 
traditional  aspiration  to  absorb  the  Tyrol,  Salzburg 
and  Styria;  knowing,  moreover,  that  the  French, 
though  opposing  the  union  of  Austria  with  Germany, 
would  even  favor  the  union  of  Austria  with  an  inde- 
pendent Bavaria, — there  are  those  who  suspect  that 
Germany  Is  not  unwilling  to  risk  a  temporary  secession 
of  Bavaria,  confident  that  in  time  it  would  come  back 
again  into  the  reich,  and  Austria  with  it,  thus  solving 
satisfactorily  an  exceedingly  difficult  problem  of  an- 
nexation. 

This  question  of  the  union  of  Austria  with  Germany 
is  worthy  of  the  most  careful  study  by  all  serious  ob- 
servers of  European  affairs.    The  Austrians,  exasper- 


808  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

ated  by  famine  and  partition,  seem  rather  to  favor  the 
union.  Germany,  though  observing  for  the  moment  a 
discreet  silence,  strongly  desires  it.  Italy,  hoping  there- 
by to  acquire  a  common  frontier  with  Germany,  favors 
it.  Some  American,  neutral  and  British  opinion,  con- 
cerned over  the  principle  of  self-determination,  favors 
it.  Yet  in  the  peace  treaty,  largely  at  the  instigation  of 
France,  this  union  Is  absolutely  forbidden.  Why? 
The  French  viewpoint  Is  not  without  significance.  In 
the  first  place,  say  the  French,  If  Germany  annexes  six 
million  Austrians,  it  will  have  come  out  of  the  war,  in 
spite  of  its  defeat,  greater  and  stronger  than  ever. 
But  in  the  second  place — and  this  is  at  least  as  Impor- 
tant— the  way  would  thus  be  opened  for  the  prompt  re- 
sumption of  the  famous  dran^  nach  osten,  the  dreaded 
German  expansion  down  through  Central  Europe  into 
the  Balkans  and  toward  Asia  Minor,  which  was  so  dis- 
quieting to  both  France  and  Britain  before  the  war,  and 
which  was  indeed  one  of  the  most  formidable  politico- 
economic  movements  in  the  world.  By  the  union  of 
Austria  and  Germany,  revengeful  Hungary  would  be 
brought  back  Into  touch  with  the  Germanic  block, 
no  less  revengeful;  Czecho-Slovakia  would  be  sur- 
rounded and  Isolated;  and  if  Roumania,  through  Its 
anti-Slav  sentiments,  could  be  joined  to  the  combina- 
tion, Germany  would  once  more  dominate  from  the 
Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea.  Obviously,  this  is  a  matter 
worth  pondering  over.  Much  as  "Balkanized  Europe" 
would  profit  from  the  application,  in  general,  of  the 
principle  of  federation.  It  Is  really  questionable  whether 
the  disequilibrium  which  would  thus  be  created  In  Ger- 
many's favor  would  not  more  than  nullify  the  benefits 
which  would  accrue  by  this  solution  of  the  Austrian 


THE  FUTURE  OF  GERMANY     309 

problem.    In  any  case,  the  French  veto  to  the  union 

will  not  readily  be  lifted. 

Convinced,  perhaps,  that  in  the  end  Austria  will 
inevitably  drift  under  the  influence  of  Berlin,  the  Ger- 
mans, in  this  as  in  other  important  political  issues,  arc 
for  the  present  keeping  punctiliously  quiet.  Their  direct 
political  influence  in  Europe  is  for  the  moment  con- 
spicuous by  its  absence.  They  have,  of  course,  a  warm 
sympathy  for  those  countries — Soviet  Russia,  Austria, 
Hungary,  Bulgaria,  Turkey, — ^which  are  also  unwilling 
victims  of  the  peace  settlements.  Anything  which 
shakes  the  foundations  of  the  Paris  treaties  serves  their 
turn,  and  while  they  are  careful  outwardly  to  observe 
all  the  proprieties,  they  are  only  too  willing,  unofficially, 
to  smuggle  arms  and  lend  technical  military  aid  to  the 
Russian  Bolshevists  and  the  Turkish  Nationalists.  In 
August,  1920,  at  the  height  of  the  Bolshevist  advance 
against  Warsaw,  they  were,  it  is  true,  seriously 
tempted,  and  were  perhaps  on  the  verge  of  casting  in 
their  lot  with  the  Russians.  If  Poland  had  been 
crushed,  they  would  almost  certainly  have  done  so. 
Meanwhile,  the  German  foreign  policy  continues,  pend- 
ing economic  reconstruction  and  the  campaign  for 
treaty  revision,  to  remain  negative,  disconcerting,  and 
obscure.  Pan-Germanism,  however,  is  by  no  means 
dead.  In  the  face  of  a  flourishing  pan-Slavism,  the 
Germans  have  not  the  slightest  intention  of  sitting  help- 
lessly by  in  a  kind  of  Buddhistic  contemplation.  They 
will  never  forgive  Poland  for  its  pretensions  on  Upper 
Silesia,  and  for  its  Danzig  corridor.  Nor  will  they  ever 
forgive  France,  either  for  its  friendliness  to  Poland 
and  the  Slavs,  or  for  its  firm  stand,  disastrous  to  Ger- 
many, against  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 


ASPECTS  OF  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  Russians  and  the  Germans  are  the  two  most 
numerous,  and  are  among  the  most  vital  and  most 
prolific,  races  in  Europe.  The  absence  from  the  con- 
cert of  nations  of  the  one  through  a  revolution  whose 
aims  are  hostile  to  every  established  government,  and 
of  the  other  through  defeat  following  a  great  aggres- 
sion, is  sufficient  explanation  of  the  prolongation  of 
political  anarchy.  It  is  true  that  these  two  peoples  are 
even  now  exercising  a  powerful,  perhaps  even  the  pre- 
dominant, influence  on  European  affairs;  but  this  in- 
fluence is  negative,  having  no  other  basis  than  what  the 
various  states  hope,  or  imagine,  or  fear,  the  future  in 
Russia  and  Germany  may  bring.  Until  the  future 
status  and  political  orientation  of  these  two  peoples 
becomes  clear,  there  can  be,  as  I  have  already  pointed 
out,  no  reestablishment  of  continental  equilibrium. 
Meanwhile,  it  will  be  instructive  to  examine  what  posi- 
tive contributions  the  powers  of  the  entente  are  making 
to  political  reconstruction,  and  what  are  the  general 
tendencies  of  their  foreign  policies,  as  affecting  this 
part  of  the  world. 

As  far  as  "Balkanizcd  Europe"  is  concerned,  it  is 

France,  and  one  might  almost  say  France  alone,  which 

has  anything  like  a  concrete  reconstruction  policy;  for 

Britain's  principal  interests  lie  elsewhere,  and  Italy's 

internal  condition  is  too  troubled  to  permit  it  the  luxury 

310 


ASPECTS  OF  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY    311 

of  a  widely  active  diplomacy.  Even  the  French  policy, 
having  to  deal  in  such  complete  uncertainties  as  the 
future  of  Russia  and  Germany,  is  necessarily  vague; 
nevertheless,  one  can,  I  think,  descry  in  it  the  outlines 
of  certain  definite  aims. 

The  key  to  all  French  action  in  Europe,  now  as 
before  the  war,  is  fear  of  Germany — a  fear  which  is 
beyond  any  doubt  fully  justified.  To  most  French 
students  of  foreign  affairs,  it  is  a  source  of  great  re- 
gret, and  of  great  anxiety,  that  the  French  negotiators 
at  the  peace  conference,  cajoled  by  the  vague  promises 
of  a  permanent  defensive  alliance  against  Germany, 
offered  by  Mr.  Wilson  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George — prom- 
ises which  have  not  been  realized — failed  to  obtain 
either  the  disruption  of  Germany  into  four  or  five  sep- 
arate independent  states,  or  even  the  Rhine  as  a  perma- 
nent military  frontier.  To  have  "Balkanized"  Austria- 
Hungary,  it  is  argued,  without  at  the  same  time 
"Balkanizing"  Germany,  leaves  the  latter  in  a  singu- 
larly favorable  condition.  There  is  not  even  a  sufficient 
guarantee  of  reparations  indemnities,  failing  of  which 
France  will  have  the  greatest  difficulty  in  meeting  its 
financial  obligations  to  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
Of  course,  a  good  many  years  must  probably  elapse  be- 
fore Germany  can  think  of  again  attacking  France, 
for  the  German  army  is  shattered,  and  the  French  army 
is  strong.  But  that  Germany  is  even  now  meditating 
revenge,  no  Frenchman  seriously  doubts.  There  are 
sixty  million  Germans;  there  are  only  forty  million 
French.  Who  knows  if,  next  time,  France  will  have 
the  help  of  Britain,  Russia,  Italy  and  the  United 
States?  And  if  France  does  not,  what  then?  The 
logic  of  these  considerations  is  clear.    In  the  first  place, 


312  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

despite  what  British  liberals  may  postulate  regarding 
the  necessity,  for  the  common  good,  of  restoring  Ger- 
many to  full  prosperity  as  quickly  as  possible,  France 
has  probably  a  genuine  interest  to  delay  this  recovery 
by  every  legitimate  means,  at  least  until  devastated 
France  is  restored,  and  until  Russia  begins  to  recover. 
If,  meanwhile,  as  a  result  of  internal  crises,  the  Rhine- 
land  and  Bavaria  should  secede  from  Prussia,  the 
French  would  doubtless  be  disposed  to  make  these 
states  some  very  important  concessions.  In  the  second 
place,  disappointed  in  the  hope  of  having  a  permanent 
defensive  alliance  with  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
thrown  back,  as  it  were,  on  its  own  resources,  France 
is  resolved  to  contrive  whatever  other  defensive  com- 
binations, or  barriers  against  German  expansion,  cir- 
cumstances or  the  ingenuity  of  statesmen  may  make 
possible.  For  this  reason,  it  Is  deploying  at  present  a 
vigorous  diplomatic  activity  in  every  country  of  "Balk- 
anized  Europe."  Pending  the  reestablishment  of 
equilibrium,  it  is  trying  to  play  the  role  of  general  con- 
ciliator, and  to  pose  as  everybody's  friend,  so  that, 
whatever  the  future  may  bring,  it  will  never  be  left  en- 
tirely alone.  This  policy  has  its  inconveniences :  to  be 
everybody's  friend  is  of  course  to  be  nobody's  friend, 
but  neither  is  it  to  become  anybody's  enemy.  On  the 
whole,  the  policy  Is  one  of  far-sighted  prudence;  and 
Incidentally,  it  is  in  many  respects  a  valuable  recon- 
structive force.  Those  who  criticize  France  for  de- 
laying the  return  of  real  peace  by  its  attitude  toward 
Germany  are  apt  to  forget  that  In  the  succession  states 
of  Austria-Hungary,  and  In  the  Balkans,  France  Is 
doing  far  more  than  any  other  power  to  hasten  the  re- 


ASPECTS  OF  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY    313 

turn  of  real  peace  by  its  intelligent  and  untiring  efforts 
to  reconcile  these  various  peoples  to  one  another. 

Though  proceeding  with  extreme  caution,  and  never 
committing  itself  so  far  that  withdrawal  is  impossible, 
the  action  of  France  may  be  said  to  be  chiefly  interested, 
on  its  positive  side,  in  two  possible  combinations.  One 
of  these  is  a  confederation  of  states  bordering  the  Dan- 
ube, and  the  other  is  a  renewal  of  the  Russian  pact, 
in  the  form,  perhaps,  of  a  French-Pan-Slav  alliance. 
Of  the  two,  the  latter  is  the  more  promising.  As  I 
have  already  shown,  the  only  effective  counterpoise  to 
pan-Germanism  is  pan-Slavism.  Moreover,  the  French 
having  failed  in  their  attempt  to  conclude  an  Anglo- 
American-French  alliance,  the  only  other  really  strong 
power  available  for  their  purposes  is  Russia.  But  a 
Soviet  Russia  means  inevitably  a  Russo-German  al- 
liance, which  is  precisely  what  the  French  dread  above 
all  things.  Their  antagonism  to  the  Soviets  is  therefore 
not  merely  financial,  as  some  Americans  have  imag- 
ined, or  merely  narrowly  conservative;  it  is  based  on 
profound  political  strategy,  and  it  is  implacable.  The 
French  program,  with  regard  to  Russia,  is,  for  the 
present,  to  support  Poland  against  the  Soviets ;  to  util- 
ize Poland  to  keep  Germany  and  the  Soviets  apart; 
to  aid  any  anti-Soviet  leader  who  may  arise,  and  to 
encourage  anti-Soviet  tendencies  in  the  Baltic  and  Cau- 
casian states,  without,  however,  recognizing  the  perma- 
nent independence  from  Russia  of  these  states.  But 
once  the  Soviets  fall,  the  French,  bent  upon  winning 
Russia  away  from  Germany  at  any  cost,  will  inevitably 
modify  their  program  as  follows:  reconciliation  of  Po- 
land and  Russia,  even  to  the  extent  of  urging  Poland 


314)  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

to  make  territorial  sacrifices  to  Russia ;  reconciliation  of 
the  Baltic  and  Caucasian  states  within  Russia;  recon- 
ciliation, if  possible,  of  Roumania  and  Russia;  sym- 
pathy for  Russian  aspirations  toward  Constantinople; 
in  short,  the  fullest  possible  support  of  Russia's  claims, 
so  long  as  Russia  resists  the  temptation  of  an  alliance 
with  Germany.  Meanwhile,  France  is  encouraging  in 
every  possible  way  the  reconciliation  of  Czecho-Slo- 
vakia  and  Poland,  the  Czecho-Slovak-Jugo-Slav  al- 
liance, and  the  union  of  Bulgaria  with  Jugo-Slavia,  util- 
izing thus  the  pan-Slav  sentiment  which  is  already 
making  such  progress  in  these  Slav  countries. 

However,  it  is  entirely  possible  that  even  a  non- 
Soviet  Russia  will  accept  a  German  alliance.  In  this 
event,  France  would  back  Poland  to  the  bitter  end,  and 
would  urge  the  permanent  independence  of  the  Baltic 
and  Caucasian  States,  thus  falling  into  harmony  with 
Britain's  bold  anti-Russian  policy.  Meanwhile,  French 
diplomacy,  as  an  additional  precaution,  is  interesting 
itself  in  a  possible  Danube  Confederation.  Such  a 
confederation  could  of  course  offer  manifold  advant- 
ages to  the  states  concerned;  It  interests  France  for 
quite  another  reason.  The  drang  nach  osten — German 
expansion  toward  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Near 
East — ^has  been  momentarily  arrested.  But  who  is  to 
say  that  it  will  not  presently  be  resumed?  The 
"Balkanization"  of  Central  and  South  Eastern  Europe 
would  even  seem  to  make  the  way  easy  for  the  for- 
ward march  of  the  powerful  German  politico-commer- 
cial interests.  The  only  sure  way  to  dam  back  this  In- 
fluence would  seem  to  be  to  forestall  It  by  establishing 
a  cross  current,  which,  traversing  Europe  from  west  to 
east,  would  effectively  block  the  German  current  south- 


ASPECTS  OF  FRENCH  FOREIGN  POLICY    315 

ward.  The  Danube,  to  be  linked  soon  to  the  Rhine, 
and  so  to  French  Alsace,  by  the  Rhine-Danube  canal 
across  Bavaria,  is  the  central  artery  obviously  desig- 
nated for  this  purpose.  The  completion  of  the  Rhine- 
Danube  canal,  I  may  remark,  in  passing,  will  give 
France  a  direct  water  route  from  Strassburg  to 
Odessa;  and  the  opening  of  this  new  water  route  will 
render  Britain's  control  of  the  Mediterranean,  at 
Gibraltar,  to  some  extent  illusory.  As  ideally  con- 
ceived, a  Danube  confederation  would  begin  with  an 
independent  Bavaria  to  which  Austria  would  be  joined; 
and  would  include  Hungary,  Roumania,  and  possibly 
Bulgaria.  However,  with  Bavaria  still  clinging  firmly 
to  Prussia,  the  only  amenable  elements  whom  the 
French  have  to  work  with  are  the  Austrians,  Hungar- 
ians and  Roumanians — with  possibly  the  Bulgarians. 
The  British,  for  economic  reasons,  are  almost  as  much 
interested  in  the  project  as  the  French  arc  for  political 
reasons.  As  a  possible  means  of  bringing  Austria  and 
Hungary  together,  both  France  and  Britain  have  at 
times  seemed  to  favor  the  proposed  Hapsburg  restora- 
tion in  Hungary;  but  this  proposal  is  attended  by  so 
many  disadvantages  that  the  French,  for  the  present  at 
least,  are  working  rather  at  the  other  end  of  the 
Danube,  to  reconcile  Roumania  and  Hungary,  without 
raising  the  difficult  Hapsburg  question.  Thus  is  ex- 
plained the  "mystery"  of  the  French  negotiations  to 
gain  control  of  the  Hungarian  banks  and  railways. 
This  control,  aside  from  its  economic  advantages, 
would  greatly  facilitate  the  work  of  the  French  as 
Danubian  conciliators. 

But  it  is  doubtful  if  both  the  Danube  combination 
and  the  pan-Slav  combination  can  long  be  simultan- 


316  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

eously  cultivated.  I  am  myself  of  the  opinion  that  as 
time  goes  on,  the  French  will  evolve  more  and  more 
toward  the  Slavs,  even,  if  necessary,  at  the  expense  of 
abandoning  the  Austro-Hungarian-Roumanian  combi- 
nation to  the  Germans.  As  for  Greece,  though  still 
outwardly  professing  sincere  friendship  for  it,  the 
French  have  in  reality  already  unwillingly  abandoned  it 
to  Britain,  as  a  factor  in  Britain's  anti-Russian  combina- 
tions. The  important  thing  to  remember  is  that,  for 
the  moment  at  least,  the  French  in  their  desire  to  cir- 
cumscribe future  German  expansion,  seem  to  be  inter- 
ested almost  equally  in  a  Danube  confederation,  and  in 
pan-Slavism. 


ASPECTS  OF  BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  striking  feature  of  British  foreign  poliqr  is  its 
fundamental  consistency.  The  details  may  vary  with 
lightning-like  rapidity;  the  underlying  principle  remains 
the  same.  Sea-power,  colonial  expansion,  the  main- 
tenance of  continental  equilibrium!  By  these  fixed 
stars  the  British  pilots  have  sailed  their  ship  of  state 
for  centuries.  The  whole  national  existence  is  organ- 
ized according  to  these  principles,  and  if  one  of  them 
were  to  fail,  its  existence  would  be  threatened.  There 
is  no  deeper  instinct,  in  man  or  nation,  than  that  of 
self-preservation ;  and  the  fundamentals  of  British  for- 
eign policy  are  as  true  for  the  radical  workpeople  as  for 
the  staunchest  tory. 

Britain  is  a  densely  concentrated  industrial  commun- 
ity, established  on  an  island  and  dependent  on  its  colon- 
ies in  four  quarters  of  the  globe,  not  only  for  its  raw- 
stuffs  but  for  the  very  food  it  eats.  The  corollary  of 
this  condition  Ts  sea-power.  If,  in  time  of  stress,  the 
great  sea-routes  were  to  be  blockaded  to  British  ship- 
ping, the  British  people,  deprived  of  raw-stuffs,  would 
have  to  close  their  factories,  and  deprived  of  meat  and 
grain  would  starve.  The  ever-increasing  demand  for 
food  and  raw-stuffs,  together  with  the  desire  to  protect 
existing  colonies  by  linking  them  together  or  by  sur- 
rounding them  with  still  others,  leads  inevitably  to 
colonial  expansion.     Finally,  it  must  be  remembered 

317 


318  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

that  the  Island  of  Britain  lies  close  beside  the  mainland 
of  Europe,  on  which  for  centuries  have  dwelt  in  cease- 
less rivalry  some  of  the  world's  most  formidable  mili- 
tary powers.  If  these  powers  were  to  combine,  or  if  one 
of  them  were  to  attain  to  hegemony  over  the  others, 
Britain,  for  all  its  navy,  might  well  tremble.  It  is  care- 
ful, therefore,  not  to  arouse  the  antagonism  of  the 
continental  Europeans  as  a  whole,  by  harboring  con- 
tinental territorial  ambitions,  or  by  seeming  to  inter- 
fere too  persistently  in  their  affairs.  If,  however,  one 
continental  power  seems  on  the  point  of  dominating  all 
the  others,  Britain's  weight  must  be  thrown  unhesi- 
tatingly into  the  balance  against  it.  Thus,  in  1815, 
Britain  helped  to  overthrow  Napoleon;  in  19 18,  it 
helped  overthrow  William  II.  But  its  stern  purpose 
accomplished,  and  continental  equilibrium  restored,  it 
retired  as  quickly  as  possible,  in  18 15,  from  the  com- 
plications of  Its  war-time  alliances,  and  resumed  its  at- 
titude of  disinterested  vigilance,  just  as  it  is  doing 
once  more  to-day.  And  with  France,  crippled  but  fiery, 
standing  forth  at  the  end  of  the  war  as  the  strongest 
military  power  on  the  continent,  the  British  instinct  to 
keep  the  balance  is  even  now  functioning  unfailingly. 
Little  by  little,  Britain  leans  toward  Germany,  not 
from  affection  for  the  Germans  or  hatred  for  the 
French,  but  simply  that  the  scales  may  steady  to  a  rest. 
For  whatever  the  bonds  of  the  recent  battlefield  com- 
radeship between  the  two  peoples,  who  is  to  say  if 
the  prolonged  continental  predominance  of  France 
would  not,  fifty  or  a  hundred  years  hence,  prove  as 
dangerous  to  Britain  as,  for  example,  Spain's  predom- 
inance in  the  XV  Century,  or  Germany's  in  19 14?  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  Germany  should  recover  its  political 


ASPECTS  OF  BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY    319 

and  military  strength  more  quickly  than  is  anticipated; 
if  it  should  again  threaten  France ;  and  particularly,  if 
it  should  ally  itself  with  Russia,  Britain  would  in- 
stantly, and  by  the  same  sure  instinct,  swing  back  to 
France,  of  this  there  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt. 

Britain's  vigilance  in  all  international  affairs  is  ener- 
getic and  untiring.  It  never  neglects  an  opportunity 
to  prepare  the  way  for  what  may  ultimately  prove  to  be 
the  necessity  of  intervention  to  reestablish  equilibrium. 
"The  occupation  of  Cyprus,"  said  Lord  Salisbury,  in  a 
speech  shortly  after  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  "was 
simply  the  development  of  what  has  been  for  a  long 
time  the  traditional  policy  of  the  English  government. 
When  the  interest  of  Europe  was  centered  in  the  con- 
flicts which  were  being  fought  out  in  Spain,  England 
occupied  Gibraltar.  When  the  interest  of  Europe  was 
centered  in  the  conflicts  which  were  being  fought  out 
in  Italy,  England  occupied  Malta.  Now  that  there  is 
a  chance  of  Europe's  interest  being  centered  in  Asia 
Minor  or  Egypt,  England  has  occupied  Cyprus."  Not 
having  the  original  at  hand,  I  have  been  obliged  to  re- 
translate this  illuminating  passage  from  the  French; 
but  the  sense  of  it  is  no  less  clear. 

So  much  for  general  principles.  In  a  more  immediate 
sense,  Britain,  at  the  present  time,  has  two  great  pre- 
occupations. The  first  is  to  restore  its  badly  stricken 
commercial  and  financial  situation  as  quickly  as  possible. 
For  this  purpose  its  chief  need  is  markets  which  can  pay 
it  for  its  goods  with  something  better  than  fine  prom- 
ises. Until  Germany,  Russia  and  perhaps  even  the 
states  of  "Balkanized  Europe"  are  once  more  placed 
upon  a  sound  economic  basis,  there  can  be  no  real  pros- 
perity for  Britain.    Thus  Britain  is  brought  to  favor 


320  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

modification,  in  Germany's  favor,  of  the  reparation 
clauses  of  the  treaty;  resumption  of  economic  relations 
even  with  Soviet  Russia;  and  the  formation,  if  possi- 
ble, of  a  Danube  federation,  which  will  ensure  some 
means  of  stability  to  Central  and  Southeastern  Europe. 
British  financial  and  business  interests  have  been  ex- 
ceedingly active,  negotiating,  organizing,  investing  on 
a  large  scale,  throughout  this  part  of  the  world,  as 
well  as  in  the  new  limitrophe  states  of  Russia ;  and  Brit- 
ain's economic,  no  less  than  Its  political  Interest  is 
everywhere  to  put  the  war  and  the  war  mentality  out  of 
mind  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  get  back  to  work.  The 
British  are  thus,  in  one  respect,  a  potent  factor  in  Eu- 
ropean reconstruction,  but  in  another  respect  they  are  an 
obstacle.  For  In  their  Insistence  on  the  purely  economic 
viewpoint,  they  fail  to  understand,  they  lose  patience 
with,  the  purely  politicai  viewpoint  which,  as  I  think  I 
have  adequately  shown,  must  Inevitably  take  prece- 
dence, In  "Balkanized  Europe,"  over  the  more  coldly 
reasonable  economic  viewpoint.  It  is  perhaps  in  recog- 
nition of  their  initial  error  In  this  respect  that  the  Brit- 
ish are  tending  more  and  more  to  quit  the  continental 
political  field  altogether,  and  let  the  continental  states 
arrange  things  between  them  as  best  they  can.  Com- 
pared to  its  tremendous  efforts  just  after  the  armistice, 
the  present  activity  of  British  diplomacy  in  most  con- 
tinental European  states  is  relatively  modest. 

Britain's  other  great  preoccupation  is  the  future  of 
Russia.  Just  as  the  key  to  French  foreign  policy  is  Ger- 
many, so  the  key  to  one  of  the  most  important  aspects 
of  British  foreign  policy  is  fear  of  Russia.  The  Rus- 
sian empire,  in  the  days  of  its  grandeur,  threatened  not 
indeed  Britain  itself,  as  did  Napoleon  and  William  II, 


ASPECTS  OF  BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY    321 

but  that  part  of  the  British  empire  which  is  at  once 
most  valuable  and  most  vulnerable — India  I  Prior  to 
the  war,  Russia  made  no  secret  of  its  desire  to  possess 
Constantinople,  where  it  would  be  within  easy  striking 
distance  of  Suez.  But  this  was  not  all.  Russia  held 
the  whole  of  the  Caucasus,  Northern  Russia,  and  was 
encroaching  upon  the  middle,  or  neutral  zone  of  Persia ; 
its  influence  was  permeating  Afghanistan,  where  its 
propaganda  was  active  in  fomenting  raids  against  the 
British.  Just  beyond  lies  India  itself.  No  wonder 
the  Anglo-Indians  were  alarmed.  The  state  of  mind 
in  which,  for  several  generations,  these  British  colon- 
ials have  lived  with  respect  to  Russia's  expansion,  is  ad- 
mirably presented  in  Kipling's  powerful  short  story, 
"The  Man  Who  Was," — an  instinctive  antagonism  too 
deep  for  mere  words — profound  as  the  human  heart, 
and  irreconcilable. 

Convinced,  probably  with  good  reason,  that  to  count 
upon  the  lamb-like  friendship  of  a  reconstituted  Rus- 
sia would  be  merely  naive,  Britain  has  profited  by  Rus- 
sia's collapse  in  defeat  and  revolution  to  fling  out  wide^ 
spread  and  intricate  defenses  for  its  Indian  realm.  The 
Slavs  accuse  it  of  deliberately  attempting  to  prolong 
civil  war  in  Russia  by  always  shifting  its  support  to 
strengthen  the  losing  side;  but  this  would  be  contrary 
to  Britain's  economic  interests  and  is  probably  a  mere 
pan-Slav  fancy.  What  is  certain,  however,  is  that  Brit- 
ain, since  the  armistice,  has  strengthened  its  hold  upon 
Egypt,  Mesopotamia  and  Afghanistan,  has  extended 
its  influence  over  the  whole  of  Persia,  has  encouraged 
the  independence  of  the  Baltic  and  Caucasian  states, 
has  encouraged  its  ally,  Japan,  to  occupy  Eastern 
Siberia,  has  assisted  the  expansion  of  its  ally,  Greece, 


822  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

straight  across  the  Balkan  peninsula,  so  as  to  protect 
Constantinople  from  the  Slavs  on  the  north,  and  in 
general,  has  tended  more  and  more  to  detach  itself 
from  the  various  Slav  states — Poland,  Czecho-Slo- 
vakia,  Jugo-Slavia,  Bulgaria — and  to  favor  rather  their 
rivals — Germany,  Hungary,  Austria,  Greece,  Italy. 
This  is,  in  my  opinion,  an  extremely  bold  policy.  It 
may  be  true  that  the  hostility  of  a  reconstituted  Russia 
is  inevitable ;  but  the  present  British  policy,  which  even 
the  British  liberals  do  not  oppose,  seems  actually  to 
be  aiming  to  provoke  it.  If  the  Soviets  would  recog- 
nize by  treaty  the  independence  of  the  Baltic  and 
Caucasian  states,  the  former  shutting  Russia  off 
the  Baltic  and  the  latter  shutting  it  out  of  Asia  Minor, 
no  doubt  Britain  would  have  every  interest  to  recog- 
nize the  Soviet  government,  provided  it  gave  serious 
promise  of  remaining  in  power.  But  suppose  it  should 
fall,  as  it  probably  will?  The  fact  that  Britain  had 
recognized  it  would  make  the  game  only  too  transpar- 
ent. Britain  would  be  in  an  even  worse  position,  with 
regard  to  Slav  hostility,  than  at  present.  And  the 
present  position  is  far  from  reassuring.  The  British 
people,  more  than  any  other,  will  have  occasion  to 
watch  with  the  closest  attention,  the  struggles  of  Russia 
to  recover  itself.  They  may,  indeed,  try  to  conciliate 
Russia,  when  the  latter  becomes  threatening  again,  by 
making  it  concessions;  but  concessions  obtained  under 
threat  inspire  no  gratitude;  and  the  clouds  which  are 
now  obscuring  Russia  are  ominous  with  future  trouble 
for  Britain. 

In  conclusion,  I  may  point  out  that,  quite  apart  from 
the  large  share  of  fine  sentiment  and  generous  idealism 
with   which   the   British   people   are   supporting  the 


ASPECTS  OF  BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY    823 

League  of  Nations,  the  British,  more,  perhaps,  than 
any  other  people,  have  a  political  interest  in  supporting 
the  League.  Interested,  on  the  continent,  solely  in 
peaceful  reconstruction  and  the  preservation  of  the 
balance  of  power,  masters  in  the  rest  of  the  world,  of 
the  most  magnificent  empire  ever  created  on  earth,  they 
have  nothing  to  desire  beyond  the  enjoyment  of  their 
vast  possessions  in  prosperity  and  peace.  The  League 
meets  these  desiderata  admirably.  The  fact,  however, 
that  the  British  are  so  actively  interested  in  it  is  no 
reason  for  other  nations  to  turn  against  it.  On  the 
contrary,  the  essential  purpose  of  the  League  is  that 
each  shall  find  therein  the  means  of  furthering  peace- 
fully his  own  best  interests.  Moreover,  the  British 
Empire,  as  at  present  constituted,  is  so  variegated,  vast 
and  complex,  that  it  is  paralyzed  by  its  very  constitu- 
tion against  any  considerable  aggressive  action  in  the 
world;  it  can  not,  therefore,  be  properly  considered  a 
serious  military  menace  to  the  other  powers,  except 
in  the  case  of  a  purely  defensive  war. 


ASPECTS  OF  ITALIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Modern  Italy  is  old  only  in  culture.  Politically  and 
economically,  it  is  still  very  young.  Indeed,  one  may 
maintain  that  prior  to  the  war,  it  had  not  even  fully 
established  its  national  unity,  for  Sicily  and  Piedmont 
were  almost  complete  strangers  to  one  another,  while 
between  these  extremes,  in  the  various  other  provinces, 
might  be  found  innumerable  differences  of  dialect,  cus- 
tom and  social  organization.  However,  the  war  and 
the  psychological  reactions  engendered  by  the  war,  are 
tending  rapidly  to  weld  the  Italian  people  together,  and 
the  achievement  of  that  semblance  of  social,  political 
and  sentimental  homogeneity  so  essential  to  national 
strength  seems  now  only  a  question  of  a  few  more 
years. 

Conscious  both  of  past  grandeur  and  of  young, 
fresh  energies,  modern  Italy  is  ambitious.  It  feels  that 
during  its  long  struggle  for  independence  and  unity, 
the  other  powers  stole  a  march  on  it,  seized  all  the 
best  colonies  and  slighted  its  wishes.  It  entered  the 
war,  and  fought  the  war  with  a  stern  determination  to 
make  up  for  lost  time,  claiming  at  the  peace  confer- 
ence, the  following  territories:  Trieste  and  Istria,  the 
South  Tyrol  with  Trent,  Fiume,  considerable  portions 
of  the  Dalmatian  coast,  Albania's  chief  port  and  a 
portion  of  its  hinterland,  a  large  share  in  the  partition 
of  Asia  Minor,  and  the  cession  by  France  and  Britain 

324 


ASPECTS  OF  ITALIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY    825 

of  a  part  of  their  North  African  colonies.  All  of  these 
things  except  Fiume  had  indeed  already  been  promised 
it  by  the  allies  as  the  price  of  its  entry  into  the  war. 
It  aspired,  in  short,  to  dominate  the  Adriatic  com- 
pletely, and  to  exercise  an  increasingly  strong  influence 
in  the  middle  and  eastern  Mediterranean.  The  acquis- 
ition of  the  Albanian  port  of  Valona  would,  moreover, 
have  opened  the  way  for  its  political  and  economic  ex- 
pansion into  the  Balkans,  where  it  dreamed  of  playing 
the  role  which  had  been  Austria's  before  the  war.  Ital- 
ian nationalism,  as  a  force  of  expansion,  was  at  a  very 
high  pitch  during  the  days  of  the  peace  conference. 

But  unfortunately  for  Italy,  the  country,  in  its  youth, 
and  its  post-war  exhaustion,  was  not  strong  enough 
materially,  socially  or  diplomatically,  to  realize  those 
large  and  perhaps  not  unjustifiable  ambitions.  Italy  re- 
ceived Trent  and  Trieste  as  by  right.  It  even  received 
the  South  Tyrol  and  a  sphere  of  influence  in  Southern 
Asia  Minor.  But  the  colonial  concessions  accorded  it 
proved  to  be  mere  frontier  rectifications,  and  Fiume 
and  the  Dalmatian  coast  were  refused  it  altogether. 
Taking  advantage  of  the  social  disorders  which  fol- 
lowed, and  of  the  grave  disaffection  in  the  Italian 
army,  the  Albanians,  in  the  summer  of  1920,  descended 
upon  the  Italian  garrison  of  Valona,  and  drove  it  to 
sea,  thus  clearing  the  Italians  out  of  Albania. 

Though  these  facts  are  well  known  to  every  one, 
I  have  ventured  to  recall  them  because  they  go  far 
to  explain  Italy's  present  foreign  policy.  I  do  not  con- 
sider that  this  policy  has  changed,  in  reality,  from  what 
it  was  at  the  time  of  the  peace  conference.  The  Ital- 
ians are  young,  strong,  intelligent,  vital;  they  have  a 
large  surplus  population  and  a  considerable  cultured 


326  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

force.  All  in  all,  It  is  inevitable  that  they  should  aspire 
to  dominate  the  Adriatic  and  to  play  an  increasingly 
important  part  in  the  Balkans  and  the  Mediterranean. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  are  apparently  not  yet  as 
strong  as  they  thought  they  were.  They  made  the  mis- 
take, in  the  vulgar  phrase,  of  "biting  off  more  than 
they  could  chew." 

Economically,  Italy  suffered  during  the  war,  and  is 
still  suffering,  more  than  any  allied  country.  However, 
if  the  government  had  been  successful  in  its  peace 
program,  the  people,  doubtless,  would  have  continued 
to  bear  this  suffering  proudly.  But  the  failure  of  the 
government's  diplomacy,  especially  in  the  Adriatic  ques- 
tion, which  is  a  question  of  national  security  to  Italy, 
exasperated  all  classes.  I  regard  the  recent  disorders 
in  Italy  as  due  in  large  part  to  what  the  people  consider 
the  insult  and  humiliation  of  their  country  at  the  hands 
of  the  allies.  Nationalism  seeming  to  "fail,"  the  way 
was  immediately  opened  to  a  violent  reaction  against 
nationalism,  even  taking  the  form,  In  some  extremist 
groups,  of  Bolshevism.  The  consequent  weakening  of 
the  entire  social  structure  has  made  any  further  thought 
of  expansion  impossible,  for  the  time  being.  But  as 
I  have  said,  I  do  not  consider  by  any  means  that  Italy's 
expansive  aspirations  are  ended;  they  are  merely  in 
abeyance.  With  the  return  of  interior  health,  they  will 
promptly  revive. 

Meanwhile,  made  impotent  for  any  aggressive 
diplomacy  by  the  country's  bad  interior  situation,  the 
new  government  has  fallen  back  on  what  may  be  con- 
sidered a  purely  defensive  policy.  In  a  general  way, 
this  policy  takes  the  form  of  a  somewhat  radical  liberal- 
ism, more  or  less  on  the  British  model.    Since  Italy  is 


ASPECTS  OF  ITALIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY    327 

not  to  be  allowed  to  expand,  neither  shall  other  allied 
states.  Let  the  war,  therefore,  be  forgotten  as  quickly 
as  possible,  let  the  equilibrium  of  Europe  be  restored 
by  the  application  of  the  doctrine  of  economic  solidar- 
ity, and  the  treaties  be  revised  in  favor  of  the  enemy 
states. 

More  specifically,  however,  Italy  is  afraid  of  France, 
its  great  rival  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  of  Jugo- 
slavia, its  rival  in  the  Adriatic,  and  is  acting  quietly  in 
a  variety  of  ways  against  these  supposed  dangers. 

As  far  as  "Balkanized  Europe"  is  concerned,  Italy's 
ideas  are  those  of  a  strict  opportunism.  It  is  opposed  to 
anything  which  may  tend  to  strengthen  the  Jugo-Slavs, 
and  in  favor  of  anything  which  promises  to  weaken 
them.  It  is  opposed  to  a  Hapsburg  restoration  from  a 
fear — in  my  opinion,  mistaken — that  this  would  prove 
but  the  first  step  toward  the  reconstitution  of  an  Aus- 
tria-Hungary which  would  include  Jugo-Slavia.  It  is 
particularly  nervous  moreover  over  the  recrudescence 
of  pan-Slav  sentiment,  which  it  is  trying  to  meet,  yon 
the  one  hand,  by  itself  seeking  the  friendship  of  the 
Bulgarians,  Czecho-Slovaks,  Poles  and  Russians,  so 
that  it  can  attempt  to  effect  other  than  purely  Slav 
combinations;  and  on  the  other,  by  rapprochements 
with  the  anti-Slav  peoples,  as  the  British,  Greeks  and 
Roumanians.  After  violently  opposing  a  proposed 
Danube  confederation  in  the  fear  that  it  might  include 
Jugo-Slavia,  Italy  now  seems  not  ill-disposed  toward  a 
confederation  which  would  include  merely  Austria, 
Hungary  and  Roumania,  and  would  be  opposed  to 
Jugo-Slavia.  However,  the  main  idea  of  Italian  for- 
eign policy  at  present  seems  to  be  to  work  for  the 
restoration  of  Germany,  and  for  the  union  of  Germany 


328  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

and  Austria.  The  advantage  to  Italy  of  this  union  Is 
clear.  In  the  first  place,  reviving  pan-German  senti- 
ment, It  would  raise  once  more  a  formidable  rival 
against  pan-Slav  sentiment;  In  the  second  place,  It 
would  enable  Italy  to  play  France  and  Germany  one 
against  the  other,  and  so  obtain  favors  from  both;  in 
the  third  place,  giving  Italy  a  common  frontier  with 
Germany,  it  would  form  a  solid  barrier  against  French 
economic  and  political  expansion  eastward;  finally,  it 
would  greatly  reinforce  Italy's  position  In  the  Mediter- 
ranean. The  German  drang  nach  osten  could  reach  the 
Mediterranean  at  Trieste.  Not  only  would  the  port 
prosper  by  the  transit  of  German  commerce,  but  Italy, 
as  Germany's  shipping  and  commercial  agent  in  the 
Mediterranean,  would  greatly  profit.  However,  the 
French  are  well  aware  what  such  a  combination  would 
mean  for  them,  and  they  are  strong  enough  to  prevent 
the  union  of  Germany  and  Austria  for  some  time  to 
come. 

Broadly  speaking,  it  seems  probable  that  Italy  is  des- 
tined to  fall  more  and  more  under  the  Influence  of 
Britain.  Its  geographical  situation  In  the  south  of 
Europe  is  not  dissimilar  to  that  of  Britain  in  the 
north.  It  has  Indeed  been  compared  to  a  pendulum 
swinging,  figuratively,  between  the  east  and  the  west. 
Both  Britain  and  Italy  have  an  Interest  in  seeing  an 
equilibrium  reestablished  between  the  age-long  rivals, 
France  and  Germany;  both  Britain  and  Italy  are 
strongly  committed  against  the  Slav  movement.  How- 
ever, being  itself  a  country  poor  in  resources,  rich  only 
in  thrift,  diligence  and  the  plenty  of  its  labor,  Italy 
is  dependent,  to  a  large  extent,  on  Britain  for  both  the 
fuel  and  the  raw  stuffs  required  by  Its  growing  Indus- 


ASPECTS  OF  ITALIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY    329 

tries.  At  no  point  does  Britain  appear  to  block  the 
path  of  future  Italian  expansion;  indeed,  it  may  even 
serve  to  further  this  expansion.  Under  the  circum- 
stances, a  future  Italo-British  combination  stands  ready 
indicated. 


THE  DISSOLUTION  OF  THE  ENTENTE 

The  Entente,  In  everything  except  name,  is  ended. 
France,  Britain  and  Italy  associated  themselves  in  the 
war  for  a  common  purpose — the  defeat  of  the  Central 
Empires.  This  purpose  having  been  fulfilled,  what 
should  hold  them  together?  Their  interests  are  differ- 
ent. The  only  conceivable  bond  persisting  between 
them  is  a  vague  and  somewhat  artificial  sentiment  of 
battlefield  fraternity,  and  a  vague  desire  for  a  pro- 
longed peace ;  but  with  this  question  of  peace  or  war, 
bold  and  determined  men,  in  every  country,  pursuing 
personal  or  national  aims,  have  always  shown  them- 
selves ready  to  gamble. 

At  least,  it  may  be  objected,  there  are  the  peace  trea- 
ties, conceived  in  concert,  and  involving  both  common 
privileges  and  common  duties.  An  illusion  1  Even  in 
the  execution  of  the  treaties,  the  interests  of  the  various 
allies  are  not  the  same.  Britain,  having  obtained  the 
German  colonies  and  the  destruction  of  the  German 
fleet,  cares  nothing  for  reparations;  what  it  wants  is 
the  restoration  of  the  German  market.  France,  not 
yet  in  a  position  to  trade  on  a  large  scale,  cares  nothing 
about  the  German  market,  but  demands  Its  reparations 
indemnities.  Italy,  convinced  that  with  France  and 
Belgium  enjoying  a  sort  of  priority  right,  reparations 
for  itself  are  out  of  the  question,  wants  Germany  to 
recover  rapidly  for  political  no  less  than  for  business 

330 


THE  DISSOLUTION  OF  THE  ENTENTE  331 

reasons.  How  reconcile  these  conflicting  viewpoints? 
The  peace  treaties,  far  from  being  a  center  of  concilia- 
tion, are  merely  an  additional  cause  of  dissension.  The 
allied  nations  chafe  and  strain  under  the  outworn  har- 
ness of  their  alliance.  The  secret  aspiration  of  each  is 
to  be  free  again — entirely  free,  so  that  it  may  seek 
unhampered  the  new  friends,  the  new  combinations,  de- 
manded by  the  new  conditions  in  which  the  war  has 
left  it.  Indeed,  one  might  almost  say  that  the  neces- 
sity, under  the  treaties,  of  associating  for  the  perform- 
ance of  certain  common  duties  is  a  source  less  of  har- 
mony and  understanding  than  of  irritation  and  of  fric- 
tion. 

The  dark  clouds  which  have  been  piling  up  during  the 
last  year  on  the  horizon  of  Franco-British  relations  are 
no  mere  fortuity;  they  are  the  evidence  of  a  long 
gathering  storm.  The  British,  having  already  obtained 
from  the  peace  settlement  everything  for  which  they 
can  hope,  have  nothing  more  to  ask  of  the  French.  The 
latter,  having  still  everything  to  hope  for  in  the  way  of 
reparations,  are  placed  continually  in  the  position  of 
having  to  beg  favors  of  the  British,  and  for  every 
favor  granted,  they  are  obliged  to  make  a  concession; 
as  for  example,  at  San  Remo,  when  the  British,  in  re- 
turn for  withdrawing  their  support  from  the  Emir 
Feycal,  who  was  opposing  the  French  occupation  of 
Syria,  induced  the  French  to  sign  away  all  the  oil  in 
France  and  the  French  colonies  to  the  British  oil  in- 
terests. At  this  game,  Britain  has  nothing  to  lose  and 
everything  to  gain ;  France  must  submit,  under  pain  of 
seeing  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  collecting  its  repara- 
tions indemnities  increased  manifold  by  the  British 
lending  their  diplomatic  support  to  Germany.     The 


882  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

French  and  British,  moreover,  are  rivals  in  the  Near 
East,  and  they  stand  on  opposite  sides  of  the  Rus- 
sian question,  the  British  inclining  to  favor  the  Soviets 
and  to  oppose  the  pan-Slav  movement,  the  French  op- 
posing the  Soviets  and  favoring  pan-Slavism.  On  what 
terms,  then,  should  a  renewal  of  the  Franco-British  al- 
liance be  based?  As  long  as  Germany  remains  un- 
able to  threaten  Britain's  power  again,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  why  the  British  should  share  in  France's  apprehen- 
sions. Nothing  short  of  a  Russo-German  alliance  could 
at  present  restore  the  Entente  Cordiale. 

The  fundamental  disagreements  between  France  and 
Italy  are  no  less  deep  than  those  between  France  and 
Britain.  Although  the  French  are  not  racially  Latins, 
but  Celts  latinized,  both  France  and  Italy  consider 
themselves  the  descendants  of  Rome,  and  a  keen  cul- 
tural rivalry  is  the  result.  The  Italians  may  properly 
claim  that  it  was  they  who,  by  their  expansion  in  the 
Renaissance,  brought  the  modern  spirit  into  France. 
Yet  at  the  present  time,  the  French  commonly  look  with 
a  kind  of  contempt  on  the  Italians,  and  the  latter  are 
furiously  jealous  of  the  French.  Both  nations  aspire 
to  the  hegemony  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  Italians 
look  with  envious  eyes  on  France's  North-African  em- 
pire, while  the  French  are  vigilant  to  place  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  Italian  colonial  expansion.  The  French 
are  trying  to  establish  an  east-and-west  commercial  cur- 
rent across  Europe,  which  the  Italians  are  trying  to 
block;  and  the  Italians  are  working  for  the  union  of 
Austria  and  Germany,  which  the  French  have  thus  far 
successfully  prevented.  The  French  are  friendly  to 
the  Jugo-Slavs,  who  are  Italy's  bitterest  enemies;  and 
Italy  dreads  and  opposes  the  pan-Slav  movement,  which 


THE  DISSOLUTION  OF  THE  ENTENTE   333 

France  is  inclined  to  encourage.  Both  countries  lack 
coal,  both  import,  and  both  export,  much  the  same  kind 
of  things.  Nothing  less  than  the  imminence  of  a  great 
common  danger  would  be  strong  enough  to  bind  to- 
gether two  countries  thus  formed  by  nature  for  rivalry. 
The  fact  that  in  all  recent  allied  conferences  the  Italians 
invariably  joined  with  the  British  against  France,  leav- 
ing France  invariably  in  the  minority,  is  perhaps  the 
chief  reason  why  France,  following  the  conferences  of 
Spa  and  Boulogne,  practically  broke  off  negotiations 
with  its  two  allies. 

It  is  of  no  use,  therefore,  to  speculate  on  what  good 
reconstructive  results  the  allies  might  have  obtained  in 
"Balkanized  Europe"  had  they  remained  united  in 
viewpoint;  for  they  did  not,  and  obviously  could  not, 
remain  so  united.  The  break-up  of  Austria-Hungary 
is  only  one  cause  of  the  prevalent  political  anarchy; 
the  break-up  of  all  existing  alliances  is  a  cause  no 
less  potent.  But  already  the  pendulum  is  beginning  to 
swing  the  other  way.  Having  attained  a  maximum  of 
isolation,  the  nations  are  at  last  groping  toward  new 
combinations — combinations  in  conformity  with  their 
new  political  and  economic  interests — combinations  out 
of  which,  little  by  little,  will  be  builded  the  new  equili- 
brium. 


THE  NEW  BALANCE  OF  POWER 

The  domination  of  the  small  nations  of  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe  by  one  among  themselves  or  by  some 
outside  nation  is,  I  have  said,  neither  desirable  nor 
immediately  possible.  To  reduce  the  present  anarchy, 
which  is  hindering  the  return  of  peace,  the  only  other 
means  available  is  to  reconstruct  a  series  of  federations, 
alliances  or  understandings  which  will  restore  public 
confidence.  Neither  the  League  of  Nations  nor  the 
idea  of  economic  solidarity  will  suffice  for  the  forma- 
tion of  these  new  understandings.  In  nearly  every 
case,  a  political  solution  must  precede  the  economic 
solution,  and  these  political  solutions  must  be  founded 
not  on  vague  idealism,  but  on  such  realities  as  the  in- 
stincts of  self-preservation  and  expansion,  and  the 
sentiments  of  race  and  nationality.  "Natura  non  nisi 
parendo  vincitur,"  said  Bacon;  to  conquer  nature  we 
must  first  obey  it.  Already  the  nations,  great  as  well 
as  small,  are  instinctively  groping  their  way  toward  a 
new  balance  of  power.  So  long  as  the  future  of  Ger- 
many, and  particularly  of  Russia,  remains  obscure,  a 
complete  equilibrium  cannot  be  obtained.  The  diffi- 
culty, under  these  circumstances,  of  attempting  to  fore- 
cast the  political  future,  is  sufficient  to  give  pause  to 
the  boldest  analyst.  There  is  no  magic  whereby  that 
which  is  essentially  veiled  and  uncertain  can  be  conjured 
suddenly  into  a  revealing  light.    Nevertheless,  the  tend- 

334 


THE  NEW  BALANCE  OF  POWER         335 

encies  now  sensible  in  the  foreign  policies  of  the  large 
and  the  smaller  powers  are  such  that  the  beginnings  of 
this  new  equilibrium  are  already  discernible. 

I  have  discussed  in  some  detail  three  important  co- 
hesive movements  which  are  still  in  their  formative 
phases,  and  which  may  develop  or  decline  according 
to  events,  namely,  pan-Slavism  (including  the  union  of 
Bulgaria  and  Jugo-Slavia),  pan-Germanism  (including 
the  union  of  Austria  and  Germany)  ;  and  the  movement 
for  a  Danube  confederation.  It  will  be  opportune  to 
glance  for  a  moment  at  the  so-called  "Petite  Entente," 
which  is  the  first  definite  alliance  to  be  signed  in 
"Balkanized  Europe." 

In  August,  1920,  when  the  Bolshevist  army  was 
at  the  outer  forts  of  Warsaw,  the  French  ministry  of 
foreign  affairs  did  its  best  to  enlist  help  for  Poland  in 
the  neighboring  countries.  Czechoslovakia  and  Rou- 
mania  both  refused  to  move ;  but  Hungary,  hating  com- 
munism from  having  been  ruined  by  it,  and  hoping  per- 
haps to  obtain  an  amelioration  of  the  peace  terms,  prof- 
fered its  services.  In  sudden  dread  lest  the  Magyars, 
backed  for  a  larger  purpose  by  the  French,  might  re- 
gain some  of  their  lost  territory  and  become  once  more 
a  menace  to  their  neighbors,  Mr.  Benes,  Foreign  Min- 
ister of  Czecho-Slovakia,  took  the  initiative,  in  the 
course  of  a  rapid  voyage  to  Belgrade  and  Bucharest, 
of  combining  the  "Petite  Entente,"  the  specified  pur- 
pose of  which  is  to  ensure  the  permanence,  in  Central 
Europe,  of  the  recent  peace  settlements,  but  which  in 
reality  is  based  almost  entirely  on  the  fear  of  Hungary. 
Both  Poland  and  Greece  have  lately  been  Invited  to 
join  this  defensive  federation  of  the  lesser  allies,  the 
term  of  which  has  been  fixed  at  two  years.    Poland,  irk- 


336  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

ing  under  its  grudge  against  Czecho-Slovakia,  and  fail- 
ing, moreover,  to  see  what  interest  it  would  have  in 
supporting  countries  which  withheld  their  aid  for  it 
under  the  most  tragic  circumstances,  has  refused.  As 
for  Greece,  its  answer  will  doubtless  be  contingent  on 
the  agreement  it  reaches  finally  with  its  friend,  Rou- 
mania. 

The  question  arises,  how  far  Roumania  itself  is  com- 
mitted to  the  "Petite  Entente"?  An  alliance  between 
Czecho-Slovakia  and  Jugo-Slavia  was  a  foregone  con- 
clusion. Pan-Slav  sentiment,  economic  and  political 
interests — everything  combined  to  make  it  inevitable. 
But  Roumania's  case  is  different.  For  the  present, 
Roumania  has  no  doubt  an  interest  to  exercise  strict 
vigilance  as  regards  Hungary;  but  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  almost  as  much  afraid  of  pan-Slavism  as  of  the 
Magyars.  I  do  not  believe,  therefore,  that  Roumania 
has  given  more  than  a  formal  adhesion  to  the  "Petite 
Entente,"  which  is  perhaps  by  no  means  the  great 
stroke  of  diplomacy  some  have  proclaimed  it. 

The  truth  is,  it  is  too  soon  to  foretell  what  is  going 
to  happen  in  "Balkanized  Europe."  There  are  too 
many  unknown  quantities.  The  French,  in  their  prud- 
ent policy  of  waiting,  and  of  acting  meanwhile  in  the 
role  of  general  conciliators,  are  well  inspired.  For 
who  knows?  The  Europe  of  five  or  ten  years  hence 
may  begin  to  crystallize  in  political  combinations  quite 
other  than  those  which  seem  at  the  present  day  most 
probable.  The  revival  of  pan-Germanism,  the  growth 
of  pan-Slavism,  may  quite  submerge  such  flimsily  im- 
mediate constructions  as  the  "Petite  Entente."  How- 
ever, by  way  of  illustrating  how  complete  may  be  the 
surprises  of  the  future,  and  I  might  almost  say  for  the 


THE  NEW  BALANCE  OF  POWER         337 

sheer  fantasy  of  the  thing,  I  will  venture  to  sketch  one 
possible  basis  of  European  equilibrium — not  that  it  is 
any  more  probable  than  three  or  four  others,  but  that 
it  is  no  less  probable. 

As  necessary  preliminaries,  I  will  assume,  quite  arbi- 
trarily, that  Russia  recovers  its  power;  that  Poland 
and  Russia  are  reconciled;  that  the  sentiment  of  pan- 
Slavism  develops;  that  the  union  is  effected  of  Bulgaria 
and  Jugo-Slavia ;  that  Germany  also  recovers,  and  that 
pan-Germanism  once  more  becomes  active;  that  the 
French  successfully  prevent  the  union  of  Germany  and 
Austria,  but  that  Austria  nevertheless  falls  completely 
under  German  influence;  and  finally,  that  Roumania, 
alarmed  by  the  pan-Slav  development,  tightens  its 
bonds  with  Greece,  and  seeks  a  reconciliation  with  Hun- 
gary. There  might  then  be,  on  one  side  of  the  Euro- 
pean balance,  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary,  Italy,  Rou- 
mania, Greece;  and  on  the  other,  France,  Russia,  Jugo- 
Slavia,  Czecho-Slovakia  and  Poland.  Both  Britain  and 
the  United  States  would  remain  isolated;  but  the  main 
sympathies  of  Britain  would  be  with  the  Germano-Ital- 
ian  anti-Skv  group,  and  the  main  sympathies  of  the 
United  States  with  France  and  the  Slavs;  for  in  Asia, 
Japan,  the  ally  of  Britain,  would  be  against  the  Slavs. 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  while  tending  normally 
to  counterbalance  one  another,  would  remain  sufficiently 
detached  so  that  in  periods  of  crisis,  when  one  alliance 
or  another  seemed  tempted  toward  aggression,  they 
could  utilize  their  combined  weight  in  the  interests  of 
peace.  Such  a  hypothetical  equilibrium  may  be  quite 
imaginary;  it  is  at  least  suggestive. 

The  eminent  French  authority  on  foreign  politics, 
Monsieur  Jacques  Bainville,  has  recently  sketched  a 


338  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

series  of  what  he  considers  probabilities,  which  are 
based  on  quite  opposite  hypotheses.  Monsieur  Bain- 
ville  takes  small  account  of  pan-Slavism.  The  recon- 
ciliation of  Russia  and  Poland,  being,  in  his  opinion, 
extremely  dubious,  he  regards  a  Russo-German  alliance 
— Soviets  or  no  Soviets — as  inevitable.  The  possibility 
of  the  union  of  Bulgaria  and  Jugo-Slavia  seems  to  him 
so  remote  that  he  does  not  even  mention  it.  Italy,  he 
foresees,  will  reach  a  common  agreement  with  both 
Jugo-Slavia  and  Germany,  just  as  it  had  reached  an 
agreement,  before  the  war,  with  Austria-Hungary  and 
Germany.  Under  the  circumstances,  the  best  that 
France  can  hope  for  is,  he  thinks,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
Polish  alliance;  and  on  the  other,  a  Hungarian-Rou- 
manian-Bulgarian alliance.  Of  course,  as  I  have  said. 
In  the  present  state  of  international  anarchy,  no  com- 
bination Is  impossible;  and  it  is  even  likely  that  be- 
fore any  lasting  stability  is  achieved,  a  number  of  en- 
tentes and  alliances  will  have  been  tried  for  a  few 
months,  or  a  few  years,  only  to  be  abandoned  in  favor 
of  others  more  promising.  At  the  same  time,  while 
I  defer  respectfully  to  Monsieur  Bainville's  profound 
knowledge  of  diplomatic  history,  I  believe  he  entirely 
under-estimates  the  deep-rooted  forces  of  pan-Slavism, 
with  the  ultimate  conflict  which  they  imply  between  the 
Slavs  and  Germans.  The  fact  that  Poland  and  Russia 
have  always  quarrelled  in  the  past  Is  inconclusive  as 
proof  that  they  will  always  quarrel  in  the  future. 

In  a  general  way,  I  am  optimistic  regarding  the  Im- 
mediate future.  I  believe  that  the  nations  are  already 
working  toward  a  new  and  healthy  equilibrium,  within 
some  kind  of  general  league  or  association  of  nations, 
and  that  gradually  they  will  achieve  It.    I  do  not  look 


THE  NEW  BALANCE  OF  POWER         S39 

for  any  considerable  reduction  of  armaments,  but 
neither  do  I  think  there  will  be  any  more  great  wars— 
not  for  many  years. 

To  assume,  however,  that  there  will  never  again  be 
such  a  war  as  the  last  overtaxes  one's  best  optimism. 
I  once  had  occasion  to  look  into  the  biography  of  a 
somewhat  obscure  Elizabethan  dramatist  named 
Robert  Greene.  This  talented,  well-meaning,  unhappy 
and  very  human  fellow  passed  his  entire  life  in  a  brisk 
alternation  of  debauchery  and  crime,  repentance  and 
honest  endeavor.  For  weeks  he  would  roll  drunken 
through  the  streets  in  the  companionship  of  cut-purses 
and  thieves;  then,  sobering,  a  profound  contrition 
would  permeate  his  soul;  he  would  weep  and  pray,  and 
setting  himself  at  his  work-table,  would  produce  de- 
nunciatory exposures  of  the  London  criminal  classes, 
and  write  dramas  and  poetry  of  real  distinction,  until 
once  more  his  devil  conquered  his  angel,  and  he  disap- 
peared into  the  back-rooms  of  taverns.  Reflecting  over 
past  centuries,  no  less  than  over  the  events  of  recent 
years,  the  double  life  of  Robert  Greene  comes  forcibly 
before  me.  Poor  fellow  1  And  poor  miserable  man- 
kind that  we  are !  Never  again,  we  swear,  shall  there 
be  such  a  relapse  as  the  last.  Chastened,  repentant, 
resolute,  we  fervently  denounce  militarism  and  its 
causes,  and  settle  down  to  a  period  of  high  and  peaceful 
endeavor.  But  the  generation  whose  minds  are 
stamped  with  the  horror  passes  away;  the  glamor  out- 
lingers  the  shame ;  and  little  by  little  the  old  itch  creeps 
into  the  blood — the  spirit  of  excitement  and  adventure, 
the  desire  to  dominate,  the  lust  for  revenge,  the  mere 
brute  instinct  to  break  things,  to  destroy — and  soon 
once  more  the  race  is  grovelling  fiertely  in  the  mud  and 


340  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

the  blood  of  the  eternal  tragedy.  Shall  we  ever  escape 
from  this  fatal  cycle  of  war  and  peace?  It  is  in  such 
moments  of  bitter  vision  that  all  the  soul's  rich  strength 
of  confidence  is  necessary  to  uphold  the  faltering  heart. 
We  look  upon  the  waving  grain,  the  sunlight  flashing 
on  the  sea,  the  grace  of  a  flower,  the  flight  of  a  bird, 
the  tender  lips  of  love,  and  paradoxically,  perhaps,  but 
none  the  less  surely,  we  know  that  this  created  universe 
is  beautiful  and  good.  An  inscrutable  future  stares  us, 
with  gaunt  mockery,  in  the  face;  let  us  meet  it  eye  to 
eye,  serene  and  unafraid. 


THE   ROLE  OF  THE    UNITED  STATES 

There  remains  to  add  a  few  words  concerning  the 
important  part  which  the  United  States  should  and 
doubtless  will  play  in  world  affairs  from  this  time  on — 
a  part  in  many  respects  scarcely  less  important  than 
that  of  Britain  itself. 

The  United  States  has  a  special  interest  In  the  two 
American  continents — an  interest  which  has  been  spe- 
cifically formulated  in  the  Monroe  doctrine  and  the 
doctrine  of  pan-Americanism.  It  has  a  special  interest 
in  the  Pacific,  where  its  young  expansive  force  has  come 
into  a  conflict,  more  or  less  avowed,  with  the  young  ex- 
pansive force  of  Japan;  so  far  as  this  interest  has  been 
formulated,  it  may  be  read  from  the  so-called  "open 
door  policy"  in  China,  and  from  the  idea  underlying  the 
new  four-power  China  consortium,  which  is  a  creation 
of  American  diplomacy.  Finally,  the  United  States 
has  a  general  interest,  as  the  late  war  proved,  in  the 
preservation  of  world  peace,  and  consequently,  in  the 
just  and  expeditious  settlement  of  international  quar- 
rels. 

Bearing  these  several  interests  clearly  in  mind,  one 
reaches  the  conclusion  that  it  will  be  best  for  us,  despite 
certain  obvious  objections,  to  ratify  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, and  to  join  the  League  of  Nations,  with  ap- 
propriate   reservations.     I    believe,    moreover,    that 

341 


34«  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

this  is  practically  the  only  wise  course  which  remains 
open  to  us. 

American  criticisms  of  the  Treaty  itself  are  directed, 
first,  against  the  attribution  to  Japan  of  Shantung  and 
of  the  Marshall  Islands;  and  second,  against  the  doubt- 
ful justice  and  wisdom  of  a  number  of  the  European 
settlements.  It  is  true  that  the  Shantung  clause  gives 
Japan  a  menacing  strategic  hold  upon  the  throat  of 
China ;  and  that  the  acquisition  of  the  Marshall  Islands 
gives  our  Asiatic  rival  a  good  naval  base  between 
Hawaii  and  Guam,  on  the  flank  of  the  communications 
which  we  have  painstakingly  elaborated  with  the  Philip- 
pines. A  more  experienced  American  diplomacy  in 
Paris  would  no  doubt  have  been  able  to  prevent  at 
least  the  Marshall  Islands  attribution.  But  as  it  is,  the 
Treaty  has  already  gone  into  effect;  Japan  has  occupied 
both  the  Marshall  Islands  and  Shantung.  We  are  faced 
with  the  accomplished  fact.  Short  of  war,  which  is  out 
of  the  question,  we  have  no  alternative  save  to  continue 
the  direct  negotiations  already  opened  with  Japan, 
the  outcome  of  which  will  probably  be  that  in  return 
for  the  recognition  of  our  right  to  regulate  Japanese 
immigration,  we  recognize  the  Shantung  and  Marshall 
Islands  settlements. 

In  respect  to  those  European  decisions  which  seem 
to  us  of  doubtful  justice  and  wisdom,  we  are  also 
faced  with  the  accomplished  fact.  Even  if  it  were 
wholly  desirable,  which  is  by  no  means  clear,  there  is  no 
inmiediate  possibility  whatever  of  a  fundamental  revis- 
ion of  the  treaties.  Suppose,  therefore,  that  we  were 
definitely  to  refuse  to  ratify.  In  the  first  place,  we 
should  accomplish  nothing,  change  nothing,  ameliorate 
nothing.     In  the  second  place,  in  order  to  be  logical, 


THE  ROLE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES    343 

we  should  have  to  refuse  to  recognize  the  present  con- 
stitution of  the  succession  states,  for  to  recognize  them 
as  now  constituted  would  be,  after  all,  but  another  way 
of  ratifying  the  Treaty.  In  the  third  place,  desiring 
to  promote  peace,  we  should  by  refusing  to  ratify,  give 
a  powerful  encouragement  to  every  force  of  disorder 
and  revenge  in  Europe,  thereby  promoting  the  very 
end  we  seek  to  avoid.  As  for  our  own  moral  scruples 
in  the  matter — our  dislike  to  put  our  name  to  a  docu- 
ment in  which  we  do  not  truly  believe,  which  is  certainly 
a  very  worthy  consideration — ^we  might,  if  necessary, 
assuage  them,  theoretically  at  least,  by  accompanying 
our  ratification  of  the  Treaty  with  a  sort  of  general 
moral  reservation. 

The  American  criticisms  of  the  League  Covenant 
contend  that  for  us  to  adopt  it  without  reservations 
would  be  to  betray  our  traditional  policies;  that  even 
with  reservations,  the  League  tends  to  involve  us  too 
deeply  in  European  affairs ;  and  that,  even  granting  the 
desirability  of  some  kind  of  association  of  nations,  the 
present  League  is  cumbersome  and  unpractical. 

I  am  not  in  favor  of  adopting  the  Covenant  without 
reservations.  We  have  only  to  propose  whatever  reser- 
vations we  like;  they  will  be  accepted  by  the  other 
members  of  the  League,  just  as  Switzerland's  impor- 
tant reservation  safeguarding  its  traditional  policy  of 
permanent  neutrality  was  accepted. 

As  for  the  League  involving  us  too  deeply  in  Euro- 
pean affairs,  we  are  already  involved  so  deeply  that 
we  shall  never  again  become  disinvolved,  whether  we 
join  the  League  or  not.  We  are  involved  morally  be- 
cause of  our  intervention  in  the  war  and  our  conse- 
quent responsibility  in  the  peace.     We  are  involved 


344  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

politically  by  our  Russian  policy,  which  is  in  effect 
favorable  to  the  integral  restoration — except  for  Po- 
land and  Finland — of  this  vast,  half-European,  half- 
Asiatic  country.  We  cannot  disinterest  ourselves  from 
Russia  without  also  disinteresting  ourselves  from 
Japan.  The  fact  that  our  growing  specific  political  in- 
terest in  Europe  enters  by  the  back  door,  and  works 
from  east  to  west  instead  of  from  west  to  east,  does 
not  modify  the  essential  fact;  which  is,  that  we  have  a 
peculiar  interest  in  Russia's  recovery.  Financially  and 
commercially,  we  are  also  inextricably  involved  in  Eu- 
rope— League  or  no  League;  financially,  because  of  our 
official  loans  of  ten  billion  dollars,  and  our  private 
loans  of  three  or  four  billion  more ;  commercially,  be- 
cause with  the  growing  necessity  of  export  trade  to  the 
health  of  our  industries,  Europe  is  now,  and  will  re- 
main, our  greatest  market.  Even  from  the  viewpoint 
of  national  defense,  we  cannot  disinterest  ourselves 
from  world  affairs.  The  navies  of  the  immediate  future 
will  be  oil-burning  navies.  The  United  States,  at  the 
present  enormous  rate  of  consumption,  has  oil,  accord- 
ing to  a  report  of  the  geological  survey,  for  only  eigh- 
teen more  years.  Nearly  all  the  rest  of  the 
world's  oil  sources  have  been  cornered,  and  are  held  ex- 
clusively for  Britain,  which  thus  has  a  supply,  theoreti- 
cally, for  one  hundred  and  fifty  years.  Unless  the 
American  navy  is  to  become  dependent  on  Britain  for 
Its  fuel,  we  must  manage,  somehow,  to  secure  a  more 
equable  distribution  of  the  world's  oil  fields.  To  con- 
sider ourselves,  under  these  circumstances,  to  be  dis- 
interested in  world  affairs,  would  be  suicidal;  and  to 
join  the  League  would  not,  therefore,  involve  us  any 
more  deeply,  I  repeat,  than  we  are  already  involved. 


THE  ROLE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  346 

The  objection  remains  that  the  present  League  is 
cumbersome  and  unpractical.  This  objection,  in  my 
opinion,  is  sound.  The  alternatives  are  to  dissolve  this 
League  and  start  a  new  one,  or  to  try  gradually  to 
modify  the  existing  League  in  a  more  practical  sense. 
The  first  alternative  will  doubtless  have  to  be  dismissed 
at  once;  for  the  present  League  is  already  functioning; 
over  forty  nations  have  joined  it;  and  to  imagine  that 
merely  to  gratify  the  United  States,  they  will  abandon 
it  and  accept  a  new  one  of  our  dictation,  would  be  an 
act  of  megalomania.  In  the  way  of  the  second  alter- 
native, there  are  no  serious  obstacles.  If  I  have  under- 
stood correctly  the  thought  of  the  Republican  party 
leaders,  they  desire  that  less  emphasis  should  be  placed 
on  the  executive  side  of  the  League,  and  more  on  the 
judiciary  and  legal  side.  They  want  a  high  international 
court  to  be  established,  the  principle  of  arbitration  to 
be  adopted,  and  the  codification  to  be  attempted  of 
fundamental  international  law.  These  aims  do  not 
seem  to  me  incompatible  with  the  present  League.  I 
believe  they  can  be  realized. 

Before  leaving  this  subject  I  would  point  out  one 
thing  more,  which  seems  to  have  escaped  most  Ameri- 
can commentators.  We  have,  as  I  have  said,  special 
interests  in  the  two  Americas  and  in  the  Pacific.  Japan 
has  joined  the  League;  China  has  joined;  Canada,  Aus- 
tralia and  New  Zealand  have  joined;  most  of  the  Latin 
American  Republics  have  joined;  even  Cuba  and  Pan- 
ama have  joined.  For  us  to  remain  isolated,  under 
these  circumstances,  would  be  contrary  to  the  most 
elemental  good  sense;  for  how  can  we  adequately  ob- 
serve the  activities  of  all  these  states  which  have  so 
many  direct  interests  in  common  with  or  opposed  to 


346  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

our  own ;  how  can  we  fully  exercise  the  influence  which 
is  naturally  ours,  without  participating  in  the  common 
councils  ? 

In  short,  we  have  no  insurmountable  reasons  for  not 
joining  the  League,  and  we  have  some  very  realistic 
and  practical  reasons  which  urge  us  to  adopt  the  famous 
covenant,  with  reservations,  and  without  delay! 

So  much  for  our  immediate  course.  The  League, 
however,  will  not  effect  any  miraculous  change  in  inter- 
national relations.  Within  the  League,  the  same  ebul- 
lient political  life  will  continue  which  has  marked  every 
phase  of  human  history.  And  for  us,  the  first  great 
problem  of  practical  politics  will  be  that  of  our  rela- 
tions with  Britain.  The  situation  is  as  follows:  Brit- 
ain and  the  United  States  are  to-day  the  two  strong- 
est powers  in  the  world.  The  influence  of  Britain  dom- 
inates Eastern  and  Southern  Africa,  and  the  Southern 
half  of  Asia;  the  influence  of  the  United  States  dom- 
inates the  two  Americas,  and  most  of  the  North  Pacific. 
The  supreme  financial  power  long  exercised  by  London 
has  passed  over  to  New  York.  The  supremacy  of  the 
British  navy  is  threatened  by  the  rapidly  increasing 
strength  of  the  American  navy,  while  the  American 
merchant  marine  has  suddenly  become  almost  equal  to 
that  of  Britain.  The  two  countries  are  rivals  both  in 
the  buying  and  selling  of  raw-stuffs,  and  in  the  selling  of 
manufactured  goods.  Many  Europeans  consider  that 
the  principal  conflict  of  the  next  generation  will  be  the 
struggle  for  supremacy,  peaceful  perhaps,  but  deter- 
mined, between  Britain  and  the  United  States — ^both 
proud,  both  practical,  both  energetic,  both  ambitious, 
and  both  very  strong. 

It  is  with  a  clear  vision  of  the  circumstances — of 


THE  ROLE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES    34.7 

their  dangers  as  well  as  of  their  possible  advantages — 
that  the  British  have  as  much  as  proposed  to  us  an 
alliance  of  Anglo-Saxon  peoples,  the  effect  of  which 
would  be  to  dominate  the  world.  Our  only  answer,  so 
far,  has  been  to  increase  our  ship-building  program, 
and  to  redouble  our  agitation  in  favor  of  Ireland.  It 
will  be  well  for  us,  however,  to  think  over  the  matter 
with  great  care. 

There  are  two  serious  objections  to  the  proposed  al- 
liance. The  first  is  that  we  cannot  approve  of  some  of 
the  aims  and  recent  acts  of  the  British  Empire,  and  that 
the  alliance  would  therefore  be  morally  vitiated  at  the 
outset.  The  second  is,  that  generally  speaking,  there 
is  no  combination  so  strong  that  it  will  not  in  time,  by 
the  play  of  the  instinct  for  equilibrium,  find  itself  con- 
fronted by  another  combination  equally  strong.  An 
Anglo-American  alliance  would  risk  arousing  against 
it  the  whole  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  what,  then, 
would  the  advantage  to  us  be  more  than  temporary? 

But  on  the  other  hand,  a  rivalry  with  England,  which 
might  lead  to  open  hostilities  would  be  a  frightful  dis- 
aster, and  is  to  be  avoided  at  any  cost.  I  am  therefore 
of  the  opinion  that  some  policy  must  be  found  which 
will  hold  a  middle  course  between  these  two.  What- 
ever form  the  new  balance  of  power  may  take  in  the 
world,  Britain  and  America  will  probably  tend  to  range 
themselves  on  opposite  sides,  the  one  counterbalancing 
the  other.  It  is  to  be  hoped,  however,  that  neither  one 
nor  the  other  will  commit  itself  too  deeply  to  either 
set  of  alliances.  In  time  of  peace  the  best  interests  of 
the  world  will  perhaps  be  served  by  the  preservation  of 
a  due  balance  between  Britain  and  the  United  States; 
but  in  time  of  crisis,  when  emotion  runs  high,  and  the 


348  BALKANIZED  EUROPE 

light  of  the  match  glows  red  on  the  powder,  both  these 
great  cool-headed,  far-sighted,  sensible  peoples  must 
be  free  to  sacrifice  their  own  immediate  sympathies  to 
the  general  interest;  both  must  throw  their  whole 
weight,  suddenly  and  violently,  on  the  side  of  the  peace. 

Meanwhile,  the  danger  for  Britain  is  Russia,  and 
the  danger  for  the  United  States  is  Japan.  Britain  is 
already  involved  far  too  deeply  in  hostilities  with  Rus- 
sia; its  problem  is  how  to  extricate  itself  with  both 
safety  and  honor  from  the  threat  of  Russia's  vengeance. 
The  United  States  is  tending  more  and  more  rapidly  to 
become  involved  in  hostilities  with  Japan;  our  problem 
is  how  to  arrest  this  dangerous  evolution  without  either 
loss  of  honor  or  sacrifice  of  interests.  The  Anglo-Rus- 
sian enmity  will  tend  to  range  Britain  on  the  anti-Rus- 
sian side  of  the  future  equilibrium.  The  Japanese- 
American  enmity  will  tend  to  range  the  United  States 
in  the  pro-Russian  combination;  for  Russia,  too,  is  the 
rival  of  Japan. 

Such  vast  over-shadowing  possibilities  obscure  the 
farthest  horizon.  We  cannot,  as  I  have  shown,  escape 
from  the  clutch  of  the  myriad  tentacles  of  world  affairs. 
We  should  ratify  the  Treaty  and  join  the  League  of 
Nations  with  reservations.  While  using  our  power,  in 
most  contingencies,  to  equilibrate  that  of  Britain,  we 
should  remain  free.  In  time  of  crisis,  to  act  boldly  with 
Britain,  and  Britain  should  remain  free  to  act  boldly 
with  us,  for  the  preservation  of  peace.  As  for  the 
rest,  the  time  has  come  for  the  United  States  to  begin 
to  educate  itself  along  the  lines  of  Its  new  and  momen- 
tous responsibilities.  We  should  have  not  only  a  gen- 
eral European  policy,  but  we  should  know  what  we 
think  In  the  case  of  each  separate  European  country, 


THE  ROLE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  349 

great  or  small.  An  alliance  between  two  Central- 
European  states  may  have  its  repercussion  in  farthest 
Asia ;  and  what  happens  in  farthest  Asia  is  by  no  means 
indifferent  to  us.  A  wilful  ignorance  of  international 
politics  is  the  worst  possible  preparation  for  the  in- 
evitable emergencies  of  the  future. 


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